

ISLAMIC EDUCATION IN THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL ISLAM

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Alhamdulillah, thanks Allah, for His blessings that I have sufficient time and opportunity to prepare and publish this book. It took me so long to finalize drafting this book due to my busy job as Vice Rector for Academic and Institutional Development at Raden Fatah State Institute of Islamic Studies (RAFSIIS) and Chairman of *Dewan Pendidikan Sumatera Selatan* (South Sumatera Education Council).

As the title says, this book discusses some issues or topics related to the politics of education within the dynamics of political Islam at micro and macro level. It is a compilation of some articles that I have presented in international seminars and published in some international journals and books. This compilation is made due to requests from my colleagues and postgraduate students who need better access to my works. All articles in this book are written in English and kept so, in order to maintain their contexts and authenticity.

This book is supplementary to my previous books that are written and published in Bahasa Indonesia, namely *Politik Kebijakan Pendidikan di Indonesia: Peran Tokoh-tokoh Islam dalam Proses Penyusunan Undang-undang Nomor 2 Tahun 1989 tentang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional* (INIS, 2004) and *Politik Pendidikan: Dinamika Hubungan antara Kepentingan Kekuasaan dan Praktek Peyelenggaraan Pendidikan* (Rajagrafindo Press, 2005). Like the two books, this book is part of my lecture on The Politics of Eduaton in Magister and Doctorate Programs at RAFSIIS and other higher education institutions in Indonesia.

Articles in this book particularly concern with the connection between education system and the development of political Islam in Muslim country. Some of the articles explain

and discuss the educational roots, processes, dynamics , and implications of the development of political Islam on the dynamics of the politics of education with particular reference to some experiences in some Muslim countries. Such an explanation and discussion is expected to provide a better understanding and broader perspective on the connection between the politics of education and the development of political Islam. In particular, this book is expected to provide references for students and scholars who are interested in issues related to the politics of education.

The preparation and publication of this book was made possible by the supports of my colleagues and friends whose names are too many to be mentioned here. However, I would like to acknowledge my wife, Eni Zahara, and our three children, Imtiyazi Nabila, Izzaty Zephaniah, and Muhammad Fazal Rizvi, for their enduring support and understanding, so that I can spare some times to pursue and develop my academic career, particularly to prepare this book. I would also take this opportunity to thank my Magister and Doctorate students for their encouraging friendship and inspiring attitude that makes me so enthusiastic to develop my lecture on the politics of education and write this book.

Finally, I hope this book is beneficial for all its readers.

Writer,

Muhammad Sirozi

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ISLAMIC WORLDVIEW ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION¹

Introduction

ACCORDING to Acikgenc (1996, p. i), worldview is “the ground for the possibility of our mind to operate.” It is “the framework within which our mind operates” (p. i). In educational context, it is the scheme within which the mind operates and acquires knowledge (p. i). A worldview arises in the mind either naturally or scientifically (Acikgenc 1996, p. i). “A worldview,” Acikgenc explains, is “an architectonic

¹ This article is pravised version of paper presented in International Seminar and Second Posgraduate Annual Conference on *The Application of Islamic Worldview in Islamic Society, Education, Law, and Philosophy* organized by Postgraduate Program of Sultan Thaha Saifuddin State Institute of Islamic Studies, Jambi, on

network of ideas, conceptions, beliefs and aspirations in which all that make it up are organized in a coherent manner, but not necessarily in a systematically interconnected network (which is called ‘system’ in the philosophical sense” (p. 14).

Education has always been a core important issue in Muslim society. This issue has become a “hot” one under post-September 11 climate. Since many of the terrorist suspects are Muslims and educated in Islamic institutions, September 11 tragedy has prompted renewed interest in Islamic education in both the Islamic world and the Western world. A flurry of critical attention has been paid on the subject of Islam and education and education in Muslim countries by the popular media and academic journals, as well as an impetus for self-reflective educational research and policy recommendations. Many serious discussions have been conducted on the philosophy and characteristics of Islamic education, involving scholars of various disciplines, including education, sociology, anthropology, and religious studies. In particular, Islamic education has become a major attraction for many politicians. The values and practices of Islamic education have become a hot topic of political debates in parliaments and a part of diplomatic talks among world leaders. Islamic education has been associated with human resource development, social security, political development, religious harmony, and economic achievement in Muslim countries.

Many questions have been asked on the role of Islam in education, the principles of education in Islamic teachings, and the theoretical constructs that categorizes Islamic education into religious/secular, traditional/modern, and public/private. These existing theoretical frameworks seem to have been inadequate in characterizing educational values and practices in the Muslim world. Researchers, practitioners, and the media are reviewing their approaches to education and looking for the new ones in light of current local, national, and international affairs.

In this paper, Islamic education implies four types of educational activity: education of Muslims in their Islamic faith; education for Muslims which includes the religious and secular disciplines; education about Islam for those who are not Muslim; and education in an Islamic spirit and tradition.

Today, Muslims are the most humiliated community in the world. They are unable to recover themselves from moral and spiritual decadence. After decades of their independent day, many Muslims remain being trapped within the same educational program as given by their colonial masters. Being ruled by monarchy, colonial governments, and oppressive regimes for centuries have brought about moral and spiritual degeneration of Muslims throughout the world. Among the main reasons for this humiliation is the failure of Islamic education or education for Muslims. Therefore, to get rid of this degeneration, it is high time for the Muslim Ummah to revisit, restructure, and redesign its educational priorities, so that they can fulfill the

educational needs of Muslims for responding the challenges of the contemporary world based on Islamic worldview.

Muslims all around the world, including Indonesia badly need educational programs that can make the future generations more familiar with Islamic worldview, more committed to Islamic values, and more competitive in the present world.

The rebuilding of the structure of Muslims' educational program must be able to fulfill their intellectual, emotional, and spiritual needs. According to Abul A'la Mawdudi, today's Muslims need to develop an education system that can produce "Muslim philosopher, Muslim scientist, Muslim economist, Muslim jurist, Muslim statesman, in brief, Muslim experts in all fields of knowledge who would reconstruct the social order in accordance with the tenets of Islam." Ibn Mas'ud (Allah be pleased with him) reported that the Messenger of Allah (S) said: The position of only two persons is enviable; the person whom Allah bestowed wealth empowering him to spend it in the way of righteousness, and the person whom Allah gave wisdom with which he adjudges and which he teaches to others. According to *Tirmidhi and Ibn Majah*, Ibn Abbas (Allah be pleased with him) narrated that the Messenger of Allah (S) said: A single scholar of religion is more formidable against shaytaan than a thousand devout persons.

The Principles of Islamic Education

This paper identifies some fundamental principles of Islamic education that need to be seriously consider in the development of all levels of Islamic education. Each of the principle is discussed in the following part of this paper.

1. *Seeking Knowledge as a Compulsory Sacred Duty*

Education has fundamentally been important in Islamic teachings. Islam considers seeking knowledge as a sacred duty and is obligatory on every Muslim, male and female. The first word revealed of the Qur'an was "Iqra" (read!) Seek knowledge! Educate yourselves! Be educated. It is stated in surah Al-Zumar, ayah 9: "Are those equal, those who know and those who do not know?" It is also stated in surah Al-Baqarah, ayah 269: "Allah grants wisdom to whom He pleases and to whom wisdom is granted indeed he receives an overflowing benefit."

It is essential to understand that the greatest gift of Allah depends primarily on knowledge. No one can truly receive Allah's gift of Islam without knowledge. If Muslims' knowledge of Islam is little, then they will constantly run the risk of losing that magnificent gift, which we have received unless we remain vigilant in our fight against ignorance.

A person without knowledge is like someone walking along a track in complete darkness. Most likely his steps will wander aside and he easily can be deceived by Shetaan. Our greatest danger lies in our ignorance of Islamic teachings and in our unawareness of what the Qur'an teaches and

what guidance has been given by the Prophet. But if we are blessed with the light of knowledge we will be able to see plainly the clear path of Islam at every step of our lives. We shall also be able to identify and avoid the dangerous paths of *Kufr*, *Shirk* and immorality, which may cross it. Whenever a false guide meets us on the way, a few words with him will quickly establish that he is not a guide who should be followed.

Knowledge is identified in Islam as worship. The acquiring of knowledge is worship, reading the Qur'an and pondering upon it is worship, travelling to gain knowledge is worship. The practice of knowledge is connected with ethics and morality by promoting virtue and combating vice, enjoining right and forbidding wrong (*amr bil-l ma'ruuf wa nah-y 'ani-l munkar*).

2. *Primarily Referring to Qur'an and Sunnah*

The term Islam connotes the faith as an ideal based on two core sources: Qur'an and Sunnah (the words and deeds of Muhammad transmitted through the Hadith literature). Islamic education pertains directly to Islamic faith and doctrines, such as Islamic values, principles and beliefs, Islamic worship, and Islamic law. The philosophy, objective, and program of Islamic education must be designed according to the Islamic worldview, whether they be about the nature of the learner, the nature of the knowledge or the subject specialization, or contemporary life itself. In this regard, the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet should be the primary references in understanding the

nature of the learner and knowledge, and results of empirical research - especially on the psychology of learning and the learner, which have been published and documented - should act as a complement. Accordingly, the philosophy of education must be based on the Islamic worldview and play a crucial role as the educational guide for the state, school leaders, teachers, parents, and students. It is from the philosophical stand that goals and objectives of education must be spelled out.

The Qur'an and Islamic law recognizes various spheres of human action, including *aqida* (articles of belief), *ibadat* (forms of worship) and *'ilm* (embracing knowledge of the first two as well as worldly knowledge). A *hadith* expressly states that Muhammad advised his followers to think independently about matters of ordinary life and human skill, and not to do such things in unquestioned imitation of his example. He asked his followers' advice and relied on their experience and skill. The Qur'an is a rich source of inspiration to many fields of knowledge, both for its exhortations to acquire and share knowledge, and for its remarkably intriguing descriptions of natural phenomena. Believers are asked in the Qur'an to glorify the Creator by applying reason to the information absorbed by the senses, and making knowledge out of it (Douglass & Shaikh 2007).

Every one of us, young or old, man or woman, should at least acquire sufficient knowledge to enable ourselves to understand the essence of the teachings of the Qur'an and the purpose for which it has been sent down. We should also be

able to understand clearly the mission, which our beloved Prophet (S) came into this world to fulfill. We should also recognize the corrupt order and system, which he came to destroy. We should acquaint ourselves, too, with the way of life which Allah has ordained for us. No great amount of time is required to acquire this simple knowledge. If we truly value Iman, it cannot be too difficult to find one hour every day to devote for our Iman.

3. *Being Universal and Inclusive*

Islam is a universal religion and its teachings are universally relevant and applicable. The concepts of *'abd*, *khalifah*, and *rahmatan lil 'alamin* have to be translated into operational terms in educational practices. Educational authorities, policy makers, educators, supervisors, and curriculum designers must be aware of these fundamental concepts of Islamic inclusive teachings and adopt, translate, as well as practice them in the conceptual and operational levels of education. In this way, Islamic education institutions are expected to be applicable and acceptable to Muslims and non-Muslims. It can accommodate all of mankind and serve all societies.

Many contemporary Islamic education institutions adopt utilitarian and pragmatic approach in their programs. They neglect holistic human resource development and idealize national economic development. Many universities have merely become a factory that produces products for national development. Hashim (2007, p. 5) observation in Malaysia suggests that “the goal of fostering national

development and of producing a good citizen has overridden that of human development and producing a good man.” In curriculum development, she further observes, the selection of subject matter is driven by utilitarian and pragmatic aims, not by Islamic educational goals. Like in Malaysia, educational authorities in Muslim countries tend to overemphasize the applied sciences over the social sciences and humanities as well as individual development over social development. The percentage of educational facilities for natural and applied sciences are much better than facilities for social science and humanities in most universities in Muslim countries. In institutional development, Hashim (2007) further observes, the adoption of pragmatic and utilitarian approach among Islamic education institutions is marked by the establishment of specialized universities. In Malaysia, she gives an example, we can find more of specialized universities, such as the University of Petroleum, the University of Telecommunications, the University of Energy, and the University of Industry. In Indonesia, for example, we can find Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia (UPI). This institutional specialization, according to Hashim (2007, p. 5), “is a reflection of the confusion and misunderstanding over the concept of a university, which, as the name implies, is concerned with the universals, the whole (*jami'ah*), and less with the particulars (*kulliyy*).”

Islamic education is “education in the Islamic spirit,” said Douglass and Shaikh (2007). It cannot be reduced to the teaching of secular and religious knowledge, the shortcomings

of Western education, and Islamic history. Douglass and Shaikh (2007) stress that “Islamic education is certainly part of a historical tradition, but it is not the polar opposite of modernity, democracy or Western values.”

Another shortcoming of contemporary Islamic education is adopting gender blind curriculum. Since Western secular and liberal values are adopted, gender related aspects have not gained attention in many Islamic education institutions. In her study of curriculums, Hashim (2007, p. 6) finds out that “the curriculum shows no appreciation of the different needs of the learners by gender and roles.” “Both sexes have been treated ‘equally,’ said Hashim (2007). She suggests that female modesty and roles need to be emphasized in the curriculum of Islamic education institutions (Hashim 2007), p. 6). Otherwise, she said, social illnesses and disintegration with damage Muslim families (Hashim 2007, p. 6). I agree with Hashim that, if no measures are taken, Toffler's prophecy on the new nonnuclear or nonextended family of the Third Wave (the Information Technology Age) will also hold true for that of Muslim nations (Toffler 1980, p. 211).

4. Integrating Religious and Secular Learning

The historical dynamics of the development of Islamic education in early Muslim civilization provided for a concept of unity or integration between "religious" and "secular" learning. The design and practice of Islamic education during the early time reflect Islam as the inspiration of universal and ideal human knowledge, not as its constraint. Although

there is no clear delineation between worldly and spiritual knowledge, knowledge based on reason, observation and experiment was not taboo among Muslim scholars. For them, revelation was the paramount truth and they believe that the Qur'an exhorts believers to use reason to verify both the information provided by the senses, and knowledge based on revelation (Douglass & Shaikh 2007).

Today, we can observe that many Islamic education institutions adopt compartmentalized curriculum. Following secular Western education, they tend to adopt curriculums that are compartmentalized into the various divisions of natural sciences, social sciences, applied sciences, humanities, and religious sciences. Each of these knowledge divisions maintains a watertight separation from one another, with no core fundamental knowledge that binds and unite them together. They are depriving all sciences of the foundational basis in faith. As a result, Islamic education institutions produce unguided intellect. “Without the guided intellect,” said Hashim (2007, p. 5), “there is every opportunity for man to become arrogant and ungrateful to his Creator, leading to transgression of natural laws and finally to environmental and personal destruction.” This attitude, she further said, “contradicts man's mandate as *khalifah* on earth” (Hashim (2007, p. 5).

At the same time, the compartmentalization of curriculum leads to the deprivation of religious studies of knowledge in the humanities and in the natural and social sciences. In this way, religious values cannot play role as a

meaningful guide in contemporary life. It can make graduates of religious schools and universities becoming narrow in thought and consider the door of ijihad closing, because of the restricted scope and meaning of fiqh. “Concentration on religious studies alone,” said Hashim (2007, p. 5), “will not ensure man of other knowledges and skills necessary to confront the challenges of living, even the challenge of preserving faith, life, and property.” “Religious studies alone,” she adds, “lead to an imbalance and an unintegrated educational system” (Hashim 2007, p. 5).

5. *Unifying Belief and Practice*

Islamic education stresses the importance of unity between belief (*iman*) and practice (*amal*). The concept of knowledge in the Islamic tradition, and the term for those who develop and transmit it, are combined in the Arabic root ' *a-l-m*, which forms the word for knowledge — '*ilm*, and the participle designating a person of learning — '*alim* (pl. '*ulama*'). The Islamic tradition of scholarship does not include ordination, but confers the status of scholar upon those whose judgment or knowledge is considered worthy. The '*ulama*' have formed a highly influential social group throughout the history of Muslim civilization, in their roles as educators, jurists and scholars. '*Ulama*' were accorded respect and authority that often checked the overweening power of the State, and served as judges and trustees of charitable foundations. The spread of knowledge through this local and transregional class of people was an important factor in the unification of Islamic beliefs and practice and in

sustaining a literate tradition within Muslim societies (Bulliet, 1994).

Every Muslim is required, not only to seek knowledge, but also to practice it. For Muslims, correct knowledge should come before correct action. This is to say that knowledge without action is useless because a learned person without action will be the worst of creatures on the Day of Resurrection. This is also to say that action should not be based on blind imitation for this is not the quality of a thinking, sensible human being. More importantly, must pursue knowledge and practice it with modesty and humility and leads to beauty and dignity, freedom and justice.

6. *Aiming to Produce Muaddab*

In Muslim culture and Arabic language, *adab* means “a custom or norm of conduct passed down through the generations.” With the context of Islamic civilization, the word took on the sense of "high quality of soul, good upbringing, urbanity and courtesy." In particular, urbanity and courtesy referring to manners used in elite company, and behavior befitting a civilized person. In the Abbasid time, *adab* was a valuable educational outcome. Gabrieli (1999) observes that "the word was the equivalent of the Latin urbanitas, the civility, courtesy, refinement of the cities." *Adab* refers to the discipline of body, mind, and spirit. It endows the possessor with the knowledge of the proper places of things or objects (*hikmah*) in the scheme of Creation and subsequently to act in a just manner (*'adl*). In educational context, *adab* acquired an intellectual meaning.

It was “the sum of knowledge that makes a person courteous and ‘urbane’ in secular culture.” Becoming *mu’addab* was the primary goal of education. To become *mu’addab*, one had to study the sciences of rhetoric, grammar, lexicography, metrics, and be well versed in poetry, and literature (Douglass & Shaikh 2007). Because it progressively instills adab on man, education is therefore better understood as *ta’dib*, not *tarbiyah* (al Attas 1990).

7. *Balancing Individual and Social Competencies*

It has been acknowledged by educators throughout the world that education serves a dual purpose, one for the individuals and one for society. Through proper education, an individual's potentials - physical, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and emotional are drawn out, cultivated, and developed. In this sense, Socrates referred to a teacher as a midwife because his or her role is to draw out something already innate in a child. Of course, what is drawn out and how soon depends very much on the skills and ability of the teacher. Education also serves another important role, which is to transmit and transform the cultural values, and legacy of a particular society. Education is said to be playing a conservative role when it merely transmits the prevailing cultural values and beliefs from one generation to the next. It is also capable of playing a more radical role when it attempts to reform society. In general, education plays both a conservative and a radical role in the progress of civilization.

8. *Serving Physical and Spiritual Needs*

The learner, being human, is made up of a dual nature of spirit and body. The spiritual faculty is known as the *ruh* (soul), *'aql* (mind or intellect), *qalb* (emotion), or *nafs* (self) according to the function that is ascribed to it. *'Aql* (the faculty of reason), unique to human beings, elevates them above the rest of creation (Qur'an, 95: 4). The soul could be elevated to the noblest of positions but it could also be debased to the lowest of the low (Qur'an, 89:25; 95:5). The body consists of several faculties corresponding to the physical senses. The nature of the learner with regards to learning has been the subject of study in psychology. It is common knowledge that the learner is inquisitive and flexible and can be molded especially at a tender age. The learner has physical needs for food, activity, and sex; social needs for affection, belonging, and status within a social group; and spiritual needs relating to something larger and beyond one's self, that is, the need to reach for God.

In Islamic worldview, man is prepared by Allah to acquire knowledge with a soul and physical senses. For al-Attas (1990), *'ilm* (knowledge) is the arrival of the *ma'na* (meaning) of an object in the soul or the arrival of the soul at the meaning of an object of knowledge. "The soul," he explains, "is not merely passive but active too" (al-Attas 1990). *Wahy* (revelation) and intuition are received by the soul. The five physical senses are the windows of the mind, particularly for obtaining empirical and the rational knowledge. In this regard, Islamic education aims "at the

balanced growth of the total personality of Man through the training of Man's spirit, intellect, rational self, feelings and bodily senses” (al Attas 1979, pp. 158-9). The training imparted to a Muslim must be such that faith is infused into the whole of his personality and creates in him an emotional attachment to Islam and enables him to follow the Qur'an and the Sunnah and be governed by the Islamic system of values willingly and joyfully so that he may proceed to the realization of his status as *khalifat Allah* to whom Allah has promised the authority of the universe (al Attas 1979, pp. 158-9).

Al Attas (1978) observes that many subjects offered in Muslim educational institutions from the elementary to the tertiary levels, particularly in the acquired sciences are inspired by Western secular worldview. They contain knowledge that is devoid of religious values or is filled with values that are incompatible with Islamic beliefs and values. In the long term, al Attas (1978) predicts, Muslim children are living with alien values, such as the dualism of body and spirit, of truth, humanism, secularism, and tragedy. Such a curriculum does not provide Muslim children with accurate and adequate learning experiences. It may provide them with intellectual and physical development but not with emotional, moral, and spiritual development. Leading educators, such as Piaget, believes that good moral habits and character must be inculcated at an early age. Good moral habits and good character are developed in the first five years of life. Obviously, partial learning experiences are not consistent with spiritual and moral development. Such

experiences will not make young generation of Muslims faithful and are practicing Islamic values in their lives.

9. *A Lifelong Process*

Education is a lifelong process. A famous tradition of the Prophet Muhammad exhorts believers to "seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave." Just recently, modern medicine has shown that a child can also receive external stimuli even when he/she is still an embryo. Thus, the potential of learning begins as early as a few months after conception. Education is of three types: informal, formal, and nonformal. The home is the most important institution of informal education. In it, learning takes place in an unstructured and indirect manner. It is the first "school," and the mother is the first "teacher." School is the most important institution of learning for formal education. In it, learning experiences are structured and organized systematically to achieve specific learning outcomes. In formal education, the school curriculum and the school teachers are very important facilitators of learning. In addition, learning occurs nonformally, which means that education is provided through institutions or organizations other than the formal school, for example, adult literacy classes.

10. *Balancing Revealed and Acquired Knowledge*

In tawhidic worldview, knowledge is integral or holistic. There are two categories of knowledge, the *'ilm alnaqliyah* or *fard 'ayn* (revealed) and the *'ilm alnaqliyah* or *fard kifayah* (acquired). *Fard 'ayn* knowledge is finite,

certain, and obligatory for every individual Muslim to acquire. It includes the knowledge about the pillars of the religion, the articles of faith, and the *Shari'ah*. On the other hand, *fard kifayah* knowledge is obligatory upon the community. Each community should ensure that there are some people who are knowledgeable in the acquired or intellectual knowledges essential for the survival of the society, such as medicine, mathematics, natural and applied sciences, and social sciences. Islam ensures that every individual is anchored to his faith while exploring new horizons. The analogy of flying a kite can be used to describe the relationship between faith and reason, where faith is the string and reason is the kite itself. There is always tension between faith and reason just as there is between the kite and the string; if for some reason the string is broken, the kite will fly off in any direction. Similarly, if reason is not grounded in faith, then it will wander in all directions without knowing its limit (Hashim 2007).

So, there must be no gap between religious and secular knowledge. Both *fard 'ayn* and *fard kifayah* knowledge have the purpose of strengthening faith, the former through careful study of the words of Allah in the Holy Qur'an and the latter through a meticulous, systematic study of the world of man and nature. Knowledge is integral to action, spirituality, and ethics (Daud 1991, Chapter 4).

In the curriculum, for example, the hierarchy of knowledge (between *fard 'ayn* and *fard kifayah*) should be preserved. The revealed knowledge as core should

permeate all subject matters or all faculties in the Muslim university. Therefore, a few courses from the revealed sciences have to be made into graduation requirements for all students, regardless of their specialization. The approach to teaching these sciences in the university definitely ought to be different from that of the schools, especially since university students are now more mature and capable of thinking and reflecting. Similarly, a few courses from the acquired sciences such as the natural sciences, the social sciences, and humanities must be required of our students, especially those specializing in the revealed sciences. A more integrated curriculum, but still possessing a core, should be adopted by schools and universities so that the problem of educational dualism is gradually eliminated. An integrated curriculum enables students to specialize in any of the revealed or acquired sciences from within the same school system. An effort ought to be made to introduce the Arabic language much earlier in the formal curriculum, especially since this is the universal language of Muslims and the language in which their knowledge is embedded.

Just as man is of a dual nature - having a body and a spirit - so also the curriculum should possess a center or a core consisting of revealed knowledge (*'ilm alnaqliyah*), which fulfills the spiritual needs of the individual, and acquired knowledge (*'ilm alnaqliyah*), which fulfills the physical and intellectual needs necessary for societal development radiating from it. Both knowledges, *fard 'ayn* and *fard kifayah*, are essential for happiness in this world and the next. The balance between them must be

preserved. Being the core of the curriculum, *fard 'ayn* (revealed knowledge) will be required of all students. To fulfill the requirement of *fard kifayah* (acquired knowledge), however, students will choose to specialize in at least one field of study.

11. *Designed to Produce God-fearing man (muttaqien)*

Al Attas defines "education" as the progressive instilling of "the recognition and acknowledgment of the proper place of things in the order of creation, such that it leads to the recognition and acknowledgment of the proper place of God in the order of being and existence" of mankind. Therefore the primary goal of education is to lead man to recognize and acknowledge his Creator. This acknowledgment is manifested in obedience and adherence to His commandments. In other words, the primary goal of Islamic education is to produce the good being, who, by developing all his/her potentials accordingly, ensures him or her to be the servant (*'abd*) and the vicegerent (*khalifah*) of Allah who has undertaken the *amanah* (trust) of maintaining prosperity on earth. To this effect education is designed to produce the God-fearing (*taqwa*) servant of Allah who is aware of his individual vertical relations with Allah (*hablun min Allah*) and his social horizontal relations with his fellow man (*hablun min al-nas*). Thus, in effect the primary goals of education include spiritual, moral, social, intellectual, and physical development with specific goals. There is no conflict between societal and individual aims because there is unity of purpose. Just as knowledge is a reflection of man,

ideally the curricular framework of an Islamic educational institution, particularly at the tertiary level, should reflect knowledge.

The main purpose of acquiring knowledge is to bring us closer to God. It is not simply for the gratification of the mind or the senses. It is not knowledge for the sake of knowledge or science for the value of sake. Knowledge accordingly must be linked with values and goals. One of the purposes of acquiring knowledge is to gain the good of this world, not to destroy it through wastage, arrogance and in the reckless pursuit of higher standards of material comfort.

Islam is our greatest gift. We have to be thankful for this gift. We have to render to Allah His due. Allah has given us so much by making us a part of the Ummah of the Prophet Muhammad (S) so we must totally commit ourselves as followers of the Prophet (S). We must become true Muslims. We are Muslims not because we were born as Muslims, but because we follow Islam, we are submitters to the Will of Allah. We are Muslim if we consciously and deliberately accept what has been taught by the Prophet Muhammad (S) and act accordingly. Otherwise we are not true Muslims. Whether we and our children are true Muslims or the trivial ones depends on how much we understand Islamic teachings and practice them in our daily life. We need to develop and maintain our iman continuously and consistently by dedicating our selves to acquire the knowledge of Islam and the Islamic way of life.

Conclusion

The paper concludes that key motivations and characteristics of Islamic education is holistic and purposeful. Islamic education builds a love of learning along with the academic skills to continue a child's education for life. Islamic education supports the formation of Muslim character by helping students achieve spiritual goals through the pursuit of knowledge and service to the community and society. It strives to cultivate behavior that reflects Islamic morals and values as prescribed by the Qur'an and Sunnah. Islamic education fosters an open spirit of inquiry in which faith and reason leads toward higher knowledge, sound individual life choices and responsible citizenship. The ability of an educated, civilized person to benefit humanity, as well as their capacity to communicate with others, is a goal of learning that creates understanding and shares these values in a civic conversation. Its goal is to engage in collaborative efforts to solve common problems and to create a civilized society that shares knowledge for the benefit of all.

Future agendas and strategies for the development of Islamic education need to adopt more inclusive approach and be more connected to the history of Muslims. The use of secularization policies in dealing with issues related to Islamic education will always be unhelpful for Muslim education. More autonomy needs to be provided to Islamic education institutions, so that Muslim educators have sufficient freedom to counter secularization, assimilative,

and alienating policies. For this purposes, there must be more and more studies on the values and practices of Islamic education, to provide critical assessments and analysis on the conceptual and empirical strengths, weaknesses, challenges, opportunities for all levels of Islamic education programs®

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2

CHALLENGING SECULARIZATION

The Educational Roles of Nurculuk Movement²

Introduction

THE HISTORY of modern Turkey can not be separated from the tension between Islamic movement and secularization. “A defining mark of modern Turkish life,” Yavuz (2003b, p. 297) writes, “is the great tension between society and state.” “Since the beginning of modern Turkish republic,” he further writes, “this tension has been articulated in terms of the conflict between Islamic social movements and state ideology.” According to Yavuz (2003b, p. 307), the

² This article is pravisd version of paper presented in International Seminar and Workshop of Reformulation of a New Paradigm of Islamic Education in East Indonesia the Model of Said Nursi, organized by State Islamic College of Ternate, Nort Maluku-Indonesia.

movement has been triggered by secularization, increased literacy, an expanded market economy, and the proliferation of information technology.

After the defeat and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, a national hero, Mustafa Kemal Attaturk, imposed secular ideology by which he tried to abolish almost all Islamic institutions, including the Sultanate and the Caliphate as well as banning Islamic traditional dress, such as the veil for women and propagating western dress, with one explanation, that religion should not be a matter for public, but a matter of private, for each individual citizen. Under the banner of secularization, Oehring (2011) notes, Ataturk prohibited polygami, replaced Arabic script with Latin alphabet, replaced the Muslim calendar of Hijriyah with the Gregorian calendar, closed traditional Islamic education and introduced a modern western education system. The practices of all religious education were strictly limited and closely controlled by the education authority of Attaturk's secular regime. (see Otmar Oehring, Ed. 2011).

Anti religious teachings, symbols and institutions in public sphere was deeply rooted in the teachings of an ultra secular nationalistic view, that religion is a private or individual matter that is not supposed to be shown or performed in public. With the support of American and European leaders, close relationship with the military leaders, and the implementation of authoritarian leadership style, Kemal Attaturk was able to implement the secularization policy and maintained his power and

influence. Oehring (2011) observes that, despite three military coups since 1960 and strong criticisms and protests from many religious groups, the secularization policy or the separation of religion and the state remains the main feature of contemporary Turkey.

Gradually, however, the secularization policy begin to loose its ground at the grassroot level of Turkish society. According to Oehring (2011), the reason for the weakening of secularization in Turkey is the revival of Islamic movement. Hakan Yavuz (2003) notes that, “since Ataturk's death in 1938, ... Turkey has been gradually moving away from his militant secularism and experiencing "a quiet Muslim reformation." This move was apparant in the social and political aspects of daily life in Turkey. In November of 2002, the Justice and Development Party that has strong Islamic roots swept to victory in the Turkish parliamentary elections. The victory has raised questions regarding the reality of contemporary politics in Turkey. Does it mean the coallapse of nearly a century of secularization that was promoted by Kemal Ataturk in early-twentieth-century reforms? Does it indicate rising political awareness among Muslims in the country? If the answer to this later question is “yes”, what has been the driving force of the political awareness?

With my limited knowledge about Turkey and Turkish people, it took time for me to understand the political reality. Since my major is the politics of education, I always believe in what Abernety (1956) said that “education and politics are inextricably linked” and Michel Foucault’s idea regarding the

reciprocal relation between “Knowledge and Power.” I began to look at the possible link or connection between the rise of political awareness among Muslims Muslim political awareness and the mode of Islamic religious education in the country. Such a link become clearer to me after a series of my meetings with the Nurcus, the followers of Nurculuk movement.

I began to meet them in 2002 when I attended an international symposium on the thoughts of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi at Sunan Kalijaga State Institute of Islamic Studies, now Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University of Yogyakarta. Being in the symposium allowed me to meet some Muslim brothers of scholars from Turkey who are the students or the followers of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi and learned some presentations on the thoughts of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi. In November 2002, as the Director of Postgraduate Program of Raden Fatah State Institute of Islamic Studies, I was able to organize an international seminar on Said Nursi’s ideas. Another joint seminar was organised one year later, in 2003.

My had the chance to know more about Turkey and Nurculuk movement in my two visits to Turkey. My first visit was in 2004 when I attended International Symposium on Bediuzzaman Said Nursi in Istanbul and presented a paper on Said Nursi’s ideas. The symposium allowed me to met many international scholars and students who presented papers on Said Nursi’s ideas. After the symposium I managed to have one-day city tour in Istanbul. My second visit was in 2005 with brother Ibrahim Abu Rabi, when I was

a Fulbright visiting scholar in the USA. Brother Faris Kaya invited us to Turkey and visited Darsanas and senior students of Said Nursi in five big cities, including Istanbul, Bursa, Konya, Kayseri, and Ankara.

The more I know the Nurcus and their activities, the more I believe that their movement is based on strong belief and commitment. The sincerity and continuity of the movement and the role that they play in Muslim society in Turkey need to be learned. This paper aims to discuss some important lessons from Nurculuk movement that need to be learned by other Islamic movements. In particular, this paper discusses the dynamics and mode of religious education in one of the divisions of Nurculuk movement, the Darsana, in the light of its role in changing and developing social and political commitment among Muslims in Turkey. Therefore, discussion will specifically focuses on the relation between the mode of education in Darsanas and the development of Muslims' political identity in Turkey. It involves a comparative analysis between Darsana experiences in Turkey and Madrasah experiences in Indonesia within the contexts of the teachings of the inspirator of Nurculuk movement, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi.

The Roles of Nurculuk Movement

Nurculuk movement has been one of the most important Islamic movements that emerged from the secular-religious tension in Turkey. It is “a modern faith movement based on the writings of Said Nursi (1876-1960).

(see Mardin 1989). In the words of Turner (2008), it is “a faith-based movement” that first emerged in public in 1950 and is inspired by the teachings of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1873 - 1960) and is managed by his leading followers.

Nurculuk movement has provided a community base for Turkish Muslims to identify and develop their Islamic identity and consciousness. “Through religiously rooted and socially shaped networks, the Nurcus have sought to establish a sense of community within a secular state” (Yavuz 1995, p. 324). One of the networks is called Darsana, the Indonesian version of a Turkish word, *Dershane*, a word that refers to “a special apartment floor or one-floor building and a congregation of people who meet there to read and discuss the writings of Nursi” (Yavuz 2003b, p. 307). In Nurculuk movement, Yavuz (2003b, p. 307) explains, Darsanas are “central to Nur identity and facilitate the formation of multifaceted close networks of relationships among followers [of Said Nursi], who are able to form a bond of trust and civility among themselves.”

Although no open conflict emerge among the followers of Nurculuk, the movement is not monolithic. It has moderate and radical divisions. Among the radical divisions are the small Med Zehra Group, also known as Hizb-i Kuran (Party of the Koran) and the Aczmendiler, who are principally organised in the province of Elazig and stand out on account of their anti-state and anti-western rhetoric. Among the moderate divisions, the most influential group seems to be the “Disciples of Fethullah Gulen” (Fethullah

Gulen Talebeleri). The ideology of the moderate groups of Nurculuk movement is a blend of neo-nationalism, neo-Ottomanism and the ideas of the Nurcus. In Turkey, these moderate groups have an extensive network of foundations, private schools and institutes of further education, as well as student hostels.

Said Nursi's Influences

Said Nursi (1878 – March 23, 1960) was a Turkish, a Muslim scholar who is commonly known as *Bediuzzaman*, which means "the wonder of the age". His major writings are presented in the *Risale-i Nur*, a collection of Qur'anic commentary exceeding six thousand pages. Nursi was born in Nurs, a village in the Ottoman Bitlis Province in eastern Anatolia. (Vahide, Şükran 2005, p. 3) According to Said Nursî himself, he was a descendant of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad. (Sahiner, Necmettin 2004, p. 238). For Cacilia Schmitt (2011, p. 1), Said Nursi is the one who shape Islam in Turkey and draw the moderate Islam picture of Turkey and set the future of Islam there based on faith, prayer, and ethics. Cacilia adds that “Nursi’s intention is simply to motivate people to think for themselves and understand the value of life in its diversification and its dynamism.”

It is explained in a flyer of a lecture on *What Makes Said Nursi's Risale-i Nur Modern?* at Middle east Institute, Georgia State University, by Dale F. Eickelman from Dartmouth College, that Said Nursi played important role in shaping “justice and morality in contemporary societies,

including the Muslim majority world.” The Flyer further explains that “Nursi’s concepts play a major role in understanding how religious thought and practice contribute to thinking about modernity.” In Oxford Dictionary of Islam, Said Nursi is described as the most influential figure in twentieth century Muslim scholarship.

More importantly, Said Nursi was the founder of what is arguably Turkey's most important popular religious grouping, the Nurculuk Movement, “which sought - and seeks - to foster Islamic sensibilities through a system of education based on Nursi's ideas” (see Turner and Horkuc 2011). In the light of this movement, Said Nursi is not simply a religious instructor, but also a “renewer” or the “mujaddid” who, as predicted in Islamic tradition, would appear at the beginning of each century to revive Islam and reinterpret the tenets of the Qur'an according to the needs of the day (see Turner and Horkuc 2011). In so many ways, Turner (2008) observes, Nursi’s life and what he stood for echo the increasingly dangerous polarisation in Turkey between Islamic traditionalism and the secularism established by Ataturk.

Nursi’s influence develops from his writings. The main objectives of the writings are: “first, to raise the consciousness of Muslims; second, to refute the dominant intellectual discourses of materialism and positivism; and third, to recover collective memory by revising the shared grammar of society, Islam.” (see Yavuz 2000). In the writings of Nursi, Yavuz (2003b, p. 312) concludes, one can

see “an ethical ideal that is informed by Islam and that provides a ground for transformation of individual and society.” Yavuz further concludes that “The writings of Nursi and practices in *dershanes* indicate that Islam is a code of meaning that establishes continuity and justifies social change.” Using religion as an imaginative force, said Yavuz (p. 312), “one sees the way in which Nursi’s followers readjust their conduct and norms to shape the present.” It is the imaginative function of Islam and its teachings of justice that makes Islam, as in the Nurculuk movement, “a religion of resistance and a resource to be used against oppression.” (Yavuz 2003b, p. 312).

The *Risale-i Nur* was written as a critical response to secularization. It is the expression of Nursi’s constant challenges to secularization policy of Kemal Ataturk. Nursi started to challenge Ataturk’s secularization policy in early 1920s and five years after challenging the policy, in 1925, he began to take the risk of his opposition when he was exiled by Ataturk’s government to Barla in the Isparta province for eight years. Being in exile, Said Nursi began to write *Risale-i Nur* (Treatise on Divine Light). Due to his constant opposition to secularization policy, Said Nursi was repeatedly put in trials in 1944, 1948, 1952, 1956 and 1958. Nevertheless, the repeated trials did not stop the spread of his writings and the rise of the Nurculuk movement. In 1950, while he was still dealing the trials of Ataturk’s government, Nursi’s writings were first printed and circulated in Turkey by his students or followers who are united in Nurculuk movement.

Constant trials to Said Nursi and the publication of his writings attracted more followers, spreading more supports for him, and accelerated the development of Nurculuk movement. In the 1980s, after 30 years of its development, Nurculuk movement was becoming more and more popular and attracted more than one million members. It has grown with significant strength and being followed by an increasingly educated and urbane population. Today, Nurculuk movement is followed by an estimated seven million Muslims worldwide, standing out from other contemporary Muslim religious and ideological groupings (see Oxford Dictionary of Islam).

Nursi's followers are actively introducing and publishing his writings and thoughts in a publishing house named *Yeni Asya* (see Oxford Dictionary of Islam). The publishing house is based in Istanbul and also used as the headquarters of Nurculuk movement. It publishes the daily papers, *Yeni Nesil* and *Yeni Asya*, the magazine *Kopru* (The Bridge), the women's magazine *Bizim Aile* (Our Family), the children's magazine *Can Kardes*, (Brother Life) and numerous books. Since 1993, the Nurcus, the followers of Nurculuk movement, have been carrying on their activities under the umbrella of the Yeni Asya Foundation (Yeni Asya Vakıfı). The foundation has many branches and representations in Turkey with one main purpose: "to disseminate Said Nursi's ideas" (Turner and Harkuc 2011).

In order to ensure the effectiveness of its publication programs, the Yeni Asya Foundation is supported by an

archive, library and research institute (Risale-i Nur Enstitüsü), an academic degree programme in social sciences. The foundation also finances programmes for school and university students and specialist academic researchers, the company's journalistic and publishing activities, special children's and youth programmes, and, finally, the establishment of cultural centres. For targeting Turkish youths, the Yeni Asya Foundation maintains two youth cultural centres in Ankara and Izmir, a women's cultural centre in Istanbul, and convalescent homes in Barla, one of the places where Said Nursi lived in internal exile. Although becoming the headquarters of Nurculuk movement and most of its activities aim to overthrow the existing secular system and setting up an Islamic theocratic state, the Yeni Asya publishing house continues to avoid any hint of open political confrontation with the state (see Turner and Horkuc 2011).

The followers of Nurculuk movement are primarily interested in Said Nursi's teachings on the importance of renewing individual and collective faith and rejecting any kind of religiously legitimized violence or militancy for the sake of politico-ideological ends. (see Oxford Dictionary of Islam). In particular, Nurculuk followers are interested in Nursi's ideas regarding the solution to the decline of Islamic civilization by unifying science and religion. The objective of Said Nursi's work, *The Risale-i Nur*, is "to promulgate an Islam that brought all Muslims under a common faith but added the advantages of Western technology" (see Oxford Dictionary of Islam). For Turner and Horkuc (2011), *The*

Risale-i Nur is “a logical and scientifically based concept for dealing with the problems and challenges that increasingly face Muslims in the modern world.”

Scientific paradigm, especially related to relation between religion and science is among the most important aspects of the thoughts that Nursi promote in his works. For him, religion and science are not mutually exclusive. They can be connected and reciprocal, thus, should not be let to develop alone. Religion and science need to be unified, so that they can support and enrich one to another. “If [religion and science] are separated,” Nursi explains, “it [the separation] gives rise to ignorance and fanaticism in religion and fallacies and scepticism in the science.” (Said Nursi 1996, p. 2). With such a mode of thinking, said Yavuz (2003b, p. 307), “Nursi popularized science by reframing it within Islamic idioms, and his practice enabled the [Nurculuk] movement to make a shift from the tekke (Sufi lodge) to text and from oral Islam to print Islam.”

Nevertheless, Said Nursi warns, religion can not replace science and vice versa. Each caterogy has unique benefits in explaining, understanding, and predicting human issues. Nursi further warns that the final goal of all sciences is to enlighten individuals and strengthen their faith. In his own words: "The science of religion is the light of the conscience. Civilisation's (natural) sciences are the light of the intellect." (Said Nursi 1996, p. 2). For Nursi, the union of religion and science will reveal the truth and “inspires incentive (motivation) and initiative” (Said Nursi 1996, p. 2).

He seems to suggest that, "religion without science is a superstition. Science without religion has gone astray." As Schmitt interprets Nursi, "religion without science and science without religion are equally disastrous." Indeed, Nursi explains, "withouth religion, science can alienate people from religion, ethics and moral values in the civilization. They [people] can be trapped into materialistic and exploitative economic practices." "Withouth science," Nursi further explains, "religion can be trapped into blind practices." Nursi concludes that "positive way of life can only be developed by synthesising religion and the natural sciences. The two of them should be placed in an equal and balance position in a complementary manner." (see discussion in Cacilia Schmitt 2011, p. 42).

For Nursi, the unity of science and religion was the fondation of the golden age of Islam from eight to twelve century. In his view, unifying religion and science will revive Muslims' historical experiences. He believes that giving high values on the importance of science, knolwedge, and learning enabled Muslims to achieve high level of Islamic civilization. He also believes that simplifying the concept of science and the degradation of the value of scientific endeavour was the reason for Muslims' failure in world civilization. According to Nursi, simply limiting sciences to theology and jurisprudence and undervalue humanities and natural science is a big mistake for Muslims (see Cacilia Schmitt 2011, p. 42). If Muslims fail to reconcile religion with natural science, Nursi argues, they will not be able to catch up with the modern age and achieve technological progress.

Since human development and technological progress is essential for the progress of civilization, he further argues, failure to do so will deter the progress of Islamic civilization. In this regard, Nursi adds, human development and technological progress reflects Islamic attributes and qualities. So, both being alienated from religion as well as from science, research, and technology is not helpful for the future of Islamic faith and civilization. (see Cacilia Schmitt 2011, p. 42).

As discussed by Schmitt (2011, p. 42), Nursi's fundamental argument is that the knowledge of science is not contradicted by the Qur'an. For him, the main task of Muslim scholars is to equip scientific endeavours with the logical proofs of God's existence and creations, so that scientists remain in faith. Nursi believes that with the support of science Islamic faith will produce the satisfaction of heart and mind. In turn, it will develop a deliberate and conscious belief (*tahkiki iman*) and destroy blind belief (*taklidi iman*). With *tahkiki iman*, Nursi suggests, a man will be able to move from external belief that only appear on outward appearance into internalise his belief that appear on inward and outward appearance.

In the light of his writings and his influences among the Nurcus, Turner (2008) describes Said Nursi as "the most influential, ... Turkish Muslim thinker of the twentieth century." He was a Kurd by birth and a lecturer at the Islamic College in Istanbul. More importantly, Said Nursi was the

most vocal and critical challenger of Kemal Ataturk and his secularization policy.

Challenging Secularization

The introduction of Nursi's teachings, especially his teachings on the unity of religion and science has inspired young Muslims in Turkey, especially those who are involved in Nurculuk movement, with the important of religious commitment and the aquisition of modern sciences. This inspiration has provided them with the balance between piety and intellectuality or between *ilm* and *iman*. This balance allows them to develop their scientific skills in line with religious knowledge and commitment. More importantly, they give no room for secularization in their personal and professional lives. Whatever profession they choose and whatever career they develop there will always be a unity of religion and science. With this type of thinking and personality, Nursi's followers will always be the main enemy of secularization. The more they play roles in public sectors, the lesser room for secularization to emerge. It is in this way that Nurculuk movement actualize the mission of their teacher, Said Nursi, namely to challenge secularization. Nursi's teachings have equip them with modern Islamic character that oppose secularization. When they acquire state bureaucracy, we can be sure that they will oppose secular public policies. They will assure the weakening of secular policies in state bureacracy of contemporary Turkey. This is to say that Nurculuk movement has conctinuously

been playing important roles for Turkish people, especially among Muslim youths, in challenging secularization.

In the last two decades, the movement and other Islamic movements in Turkey have been able to notch up impressive electoral successes. The movements, said Oehring (2011), have shared “an endeavour to bring religion out of the private sphere and the mosques and back into public life, and thus into state institutions.” In particular, they have been able to bring religious education and instruction into formal education programs. Islamic religious education and instruction has been offered by the state as a compulsory subject. It must be emphasized that in the light of secularization policy that has been applied in Turkey, the involvement of state in offering religious education and instruction in formal schools is a big breakthrough in the politics of education in the country. Certainly, this policy requires political will among policy makers and such a political will will not exist without sufficient religious understanding and commitment. This breakthrough shows that more and more dedicated Muslim policy makers and scholars control the educational authority of Turkey.

Despite its continuous rejection to the existing secular political system, the Nurculuk movement has been able to develop common political awareness and perspective among Muslims in Turkey, particularly among Muslim youths. Their informal religious gathering in Darsanas, has raised political awareness, knowledge, and responsibility to advocate and support Islamic religious interests, not only

improve their piety and intellectuality. Since the main activities of the Darsanas is to understand the teachings of Said Nursi and the teachings cover almost all aspects of human interests, they do not only provide their followers with the knowledge of Islamic worship (*ibadah*) and Islamic morality (*akhlak al karimah*), but also provide them with the knowledge of social and political system and the roles that Muslims need to play individually (*fard ain*) and collectively (*fard kifayah*) in private and public affairs.

Therefore, in the light of its effectiveness in shaping the religious thinking of its followers, the Nurculuk movement has become a significant religious force that play important role in slowing down the spread of secular policies in public sphere. Although no formal political affiliation has been developed to certain political party, the followers of Nurculuk has channelled their political interests and aspirations through certain political circles. The political circles have been changing from one general election to another. In the 1950s the political channel used by the followers of Nurculuk was the Democratic Party (DP) of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, in the 1960s the channel was the Justice Party (AP) of Suleyman Demirel, who was Prime minister at the time and later became President, in the 1970s it was the National Salvation Party (MSP) of the then Vice-Premier, later Premier, Necmettin Erbakan, and finally, from the 1980s onwards, the True Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP). More importantly, Nurculuk movement has been able to affect the political

preferences of Muslims in Turkey. With their support and affiliation, Islamic political party can win general election.

The Roles of Darsanas

My discussion on the roles of Darsanas in Nurculuk movement will began with a simple question: Why Islamic oriented political parties are successful in a secular country like Turkey and why such political parties are not very successful in a country that is claimed to be a religious one like Indonesia? Many answers, responses, and explanations can be made for this question. But for me and based on by limited observation and undersanding of education and political system in Turkey, the answer is simple and direct: Because in Turkey there is Darsanas that provide effective religious education among Muslim youths and in Indonesia the Madrasahs have not been very effective in developing religious character and commitment.

In Turkey, the Darsanas has been an effective and efficient mode of religious education that inculcate religious teachings and nurture religious understanding as well as religious commitment in Muslim society. Darsanas have been the core educational means that is applied by leaders of the Nurculuk movement to provide Muslim youths with religious understanding and commitmen based on the teachings of Said Nursi. In Darsanas, Muslims are guided to identify the enemy of Islam and find the solution. In his writings, Nursi explains that the enemies of Islam is ignorance, poverty, and fragmentation. To counter these

enemies, according to Nursi, Muslims need to develop education, do hard work, and make consensus. (see Yavuz 2003b, p. 301). My visits to Turkey allowed me to witness the commitment and enthusiasm of thousands of young Muslims most of whom are university students, to follow Darsanas. From my brief dialogues to some of them, I can understand that many of them are achieving students of various modern disciplines at best universities in Turkey.

By Many Muslim leaders most of whom are students of Said Nursi, Muslim youths are provided with dormitories and apartments where they can meet, communicate, share all daily needs and the teachings of Said Nursi, and discuss educational, social, political, and economic issues. This is Yavuz's (2003b, p. 307) observation of Darsana daily situation: "After work, or on Friday evenings, people assemble in dershanes to discuss the writings of Nursi. Although almost all conversations start with the writings of Nursi, they take different directions and most likely end with political or business exchanges." Certainly, the conversations are based on the Nursi's writings, the *Risale*.

The participants of Darsanas can be permanent residences or simply regular visitors. For those who stay in Darsanas, the activities are more rigid. In early morning, before going to campuses, they do Subuh prayer in jama'ah. After prayer, they do Dzikir and then listening to the reading of *Risale-I Nur*, usually led by a senior member of the jamaah. After the reading, members of the jamaah share household jobs and prepare the breakfast. In the afternoon, after

attending lectures, they go back to their apartments, then prepare dinner together, do Magrib and Isya prayers in Jama'ah, and ofcourse listening to the reading of Risale-I Nur, before they go back to their university assignments or take a rest.

Over all, Darsanas inculcate Islamic teachings through a unique lifestyle. As Yavuz (2003b, p. 298) summarises it, “the lifestyle of *Dershanes* is ascetic: spartan living condition, simple food, a rigid study program, and obedience to the teachings of Islam.” In Darsana, Islam is not introduced as a formal or seremonial religion, but as “personal Islam with the goal of constructing microlevel morality by raising religious consciousness” (see Yavuz 2003b, p. 301). In other words, Islamic teachings are not formally shown in public space, but are integrated in personal daily lifestyles. Therefore, many Muslim youths in Turkey improve their scientific knowledge in universities and develop their religious awareness in Darsanas. Based on the writings of Said Nursi, Darsana train them to build Muslim personality, “which is pious and modern; tolerant but firm about the core virtues of Islam.” (Yavuz 2003b, p. 3001). With national and international networks, Darsanas “help to institutionalize a pattern of conduct in society” at large (Yavuz 2003b, p. 307).

After graduation, students of Darsanas will become professional managers, policy makers, teachers, and other job positions. Being trained in darsanas provide them with unique character as discribed by Yavuz: pious and modern,

tolerant but firm in religious matters. This is to say that the participants of Darsanas are well equipped with modern sciences and well informed with religious knowledge. In this way, they have a comparative advantages to compete in job market and various areas of private and public activities. If they are to make political or economic decisions, their decisions will be guided by their understanding of religious teachings.

Although being conducted in informal mode, Darsanas have played important role in shaping the mind set of Turkish Muslims. This important role of Darsanas is discussed by Yavuz (2003b) in his article: “Nur Study Circles (*Dershanes*) and the Formation of New Religious Consciousness in Turkey.” According to him “the *dershane* institution helps its members to be both modern and Muslim at the same time.” (2003b, p. 297). “The task of *Dershanes*,” said Yavuz (2003b, p. 298), “is to inculcate Islamic values and norms in society through conversational reading (*sobbet*) and prayers.”

Today, Darsanas have become a worldwide phenomenon. Darsanas exist in Europe, the USA, the Middle East as well as in many countries in Asia, with thousands of Turkish and non Turkish followers from different backgrounds, such as university students, businessmen, politicians, and military officers. According to Yavuz (2003b, p. 309), Darsanas become attractive to many people because they “fulfill multiple functions,” as *kervan saray* where Turks may enjoy coffee and socialize with each other.

Besides, Darsanas disseminate information, find jobs, facilitate new friendships, and allow access to diverse social networks. Yavuz (2003b, p. 309) stresses that, in Darsanas, “personal trust and communal control are brought together.” He further stresses that, “being organized horizontally, not hierarchically, darsanas stress solidarity, participation, and integrity.” “In awal”, he adds, “they [Darsanas] help to build sustainable communities.” “These networks [of Darsanas], he further adds, “facilitate coordination and amplify information about the trustworthiness of other Nurcus.”

Some Lessons Learned

As a Muslim and a practitioner of Islamic education in Indonesia, I am very happy to find out this fact about the success of Nurculuk movement in developing and practising an effective mode of religious education through Darsanas. The fact about Darsanas inspires me with some ideas to evaluate the paradigm and practices of Islamic religious education in Indonesia and other Muslim countries where an effective mode of religious education system is badly needed to counter the negative impacts of secularization and respond to the challenges of globalization. As explained early in this paper, I consider the effectiveness of Darsanas in social and political contexts with a comparative analysis of Turkish and Indonesian experiences.

Since the first day of its independence on the 17th of August 1945, the founder of this nation state declared that

Republic of Indonesia is a religious country with the national ideology of Pancasila and more than 90 percent of its population are Muslims. Today, Indonesia has the largest system of Islamic education with hundreds of Madrasahs, Pesantrens, and Islamic Higher Education Institutions, spreading all around the country. Nevertheless, the social and political life of people in the country has not been representing Islamic fundamental values, such as justice, honesty, and responsibility. Indeed, no Islamic political party is successful in the history of general elections in the country. So far, most of general elections at district, provincial, and national levels have been dominated by nationalist political parties. In Turkey, however, Muslims are successful to advocate Islamic political parties although there is a very limited Islamic religious education programs are conducted formally and informally. Since political participation and commitment are shaped by educational and religious experiences, a comparative analysis of the experiences of Islamic political parties in Indonesia and in Turkey can be related to the mode of religious education applied in the two Muslim countries.

While in Indonesia Islamic religious education is provided formally in Madrasahs and schools, in Turkey, Islamic religious education is limited to and dominated by informal religious education in Darsanas. In the light of comparison between Darsanas experiences in Turkey and Madrasah and school experiences in Indonesia, there are ten lessons need to be learned.

First lesson, religious education seems to be more effective when it is provided in informal than in formal setting. In Indonesia, as generally developed and implemented by Ministry of Religious Affairs and major Muslim organizations and foundations, Islamic religious education tends to be formalistic. It is a compulsory subject for all levels, types, and lines of education. As a result, the process of religious education is limitedly and partially run in formal setting and no systematic and well designed religious education outside school hours. Like in other subjects, the effectiveness of religious teachings is predominantly measured by the score that a student get or a teacher gives in semester exam. Frequently, the score tends to be based on cognitive measurement per se, without conducting or considering affective and behavioural measurements. Since religious education score has not been the determinant factor for the “pass and fail” of student grade and being excluded from national exam (ujian nasional), the way religious teachers mark the scores of their students has not been very serious. This is to say that most of scores for religious subjects in most schools in Indonesia are simply formalistic, to fulfill minimum requirement for Teaching and Learning Achievement Standard (Standar Ketuntasan Belajar).

Second lesson, religious education seems to be very effective with a balance of theoretical and practical experiences; the balance between piety and intellectuality; and the balance between *ilm* and *iman*.

Third lesson, religious education seems to be more effective when it is provided an integrated mode than a monolithic mode. In Indonesia, Islamic religious education tends to be monolithic. It is limitedly provided in one single or separated subject named Pendidikan Agama (Religious Education). The debate has been on the importance of the inclusion of religious subject in the curriculum, not so much on the effectiveness of the subject. Being in a separate subject, religious education program becomes a separate “entity”, being disintegrated and disconnected with other subjects and school environment as well as school culture. In consequence, religious education is teacher centered and subject based, aiming to transfer religious knowledge under the responsibility of one or two religious teachers. Thus, teachers of other subjects pay limited attention and take minimum responsibility for the success of religious education.

Fourth lesson, religious education needs to be related and connected to science education. Students of religion need to enter into natural sciences analytically and deeply in order to find the roots of natural phenomenon, develop their intellectual capacity to develop logical considerations, to connect and integrate spiritual and natural sciences. In the same way, students of science need to be well equipped with the knowledge of religion in order to develop the ethics of their scientific endeavour. “If [religion and science] are separated,” Nursi explains, “it [the separation] gives rise to ignorance and fanaticism in religion and fallacies and scepticism in the science.” (Said Nursi 1996, p. 2). If Muslims

fail to reconcile religion with natural science, Nursi argues, they will not be able to catch up with the modern age and achieve technological progress. With the unity of religion and science, Muslims generation will be “pious but modern.”

Fifth lesson, religious education need to focus on the formation of character (*akhlak al karimah*), not on the knowledge itself. It needs to inculcate Islamic teachings through a unique lifestyle. It is expected to produce Muslims who are “tolerant but firm” in all religious affairs.

Sixth lesson, religious education will be more effective if it is provided with a strong bases of Islamic brotherhood (*ukhuwah Islamiyah*). In Nurculuk movement, religious education is provided in a very unique way. It is provided in a very informal way, with the spirit of Islamic brotherhood (*ukhuwah Islamiyah*). The spirit of brotherhood in Darsana is inspired by Said Nursi’s teachings and the communal character of its participants who represent the youths, middle age people, and the elderly. Darsanas develop Personal and collective Islam, not formal and seremonial Islam.

Seventh lesson, religious education will be very effective if it is delivered with full of sincerity, commitment, and responsibility with the spirit of Islamic dakwah. As practiced in Nurculuk movement, especially in Darsanas, all participants of religious education need to be aware of the connection between the incultation of Islamic teachings to the future of Muslim society.

Eight lesson, religious education will be effective if it is delivered in the form of real life experiences. Students need to be involved in real life experiences, not only in textbook and theoretical discussion.

Ninth lesson, religious education need to be based on an authoritative resource. Ta'lim in Darsana particularly focuses on introducing, reading, understanding, and implementing Islamic teachings based on the works of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, especially a series of thematic Qur'anic interpretation entitled *Risalei Nur*. In Indonesia, resources used in Islamic religious education have no clear criterias and standards.

Tenth lesson, religious education needs to contextual to social, economic, and political environment. In Darsanas, there is strong emphasis on Nursi's ideas regarding the enemy of Islam (ignorance, poverty, and fragmentation) and the solution that needs to be developed (education, hard work, and consensus).

This comparative analysis of some lessons from Darsana experiences in Turkey and Madrasah experience in Indonesia suggests that Islamic education system at all levels, lines, and types of education in Indonesia needs to be revisited, to ensure the effectiveness of its religious teachings. The methods, strategies, and approaches of religious teachings in Islamic education in Indonesia needs to be evaluated.®

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3

THE DYNAMICS OF STUDENTS’ CIRCULATION IN THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

A Case Study of Indonesia

Chapter 1 Introduction Objective

THIS STUDY aims to discuss the dynamics of international students’ circulation in Indonesia in the light of the development, implementation, and implications of internationalization policies in the country’s higher education system within a global context. It particularly discusses the rationales and strategies of internationalization policies in the country and explores the

implications of the policies on the patterns and trends of the inflow and outflow of international students in the country. Discussion places the policies as well as the trends and patterns in the historical, social, cultural, economic, and political contexts of the development of higher education system in Indonesia with particular attention on international students' choices of destinations and study programs as well as the factors that encourage them to study overseas (*the push factors*) and the factors that discourage them (*the pull factors*).

This study is expected to provide a better understanding of Indonesian standing and experiences in the dynamics of international students' circulation. It is expected to contribute to a better comparative understanding of the methodology, concepts, rationales, approaches and definitions of internationalization policies and international students' circulation in global context. Since Indonesia is among developing countries, this study is expected to illustrate the position and role of developing countries in the dynamics of international students' circulation in particular and in international higher education system in general. Since Indonesia is the most populous Muslim country in the world, this study is expected to provide an understanding of the position and role of Muslim countries in contemporary dynamics of international students' circulation and international higher education system.

Such understandings are urgently needed in order to create and design a framework for more helpful, flexible, and sustainable policies and actions at institutional, national and international levels. Furthermore, such understanding are expected to inspire the development of an acceptable, accountable, and reliable global perspective with respect to international higher education system in general and international students' circulation in particular.

Context

Globalization has been described in many different ways by many scholars. Harvey (1989), for example, describes it as “an intense period of time-space compression that has had a disorientating and disruptive impact on political-economic practices, the balance of class power, as well as upon cultural and social life.” This understanding highlights the importance of globalization in changing the speed, dynamics, and patterns of practices in various aspects of activities. For Pierre Bourdieu (2003), globalization “designates certain power relations, practices and technologies, playing a ‘hegemonic role in organizing and decoding the meaning of the world’” (quoted in Rizvi 2005, p. 12). For Rizvi (2005, p. 10), globalization has culturally “propelled enormous increase in the movement of people and ideas, leading to the hybridization of cultural practices.” Referring to Friedman (1999), Rizvi et al. (2005, p. 10) suggest that globalization makes people’s activities farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper. In their words:

In less than two decades, the idea of globalization has become ubiquitous, widely used around the world in both policy and popular discourses. It is used to describe the various ways in which the world is becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent, referring to a set of social processes that imply “inexorable integration of markets, nation states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before-in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach round the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before.

According to Currie and Newsom (1998), globalization is unstoppable and forceful. It is “a material set of practices drawn from the world of business,” combined with a new liberal “market ideology” operationalized through a managerialism, the impact of which is evident in systems around the world” (quoted in Rizvi 2004, p. 25). The managerialism, they argue, has altered the nature of academic work and has led to the transformation of university systems into commercial entities, robbed of their traditional role as sites of cultural debate and catalysts of social change” (in Rizvi 2004, p. 26). Key drivers of changes in globalization, according to Knight (2004, p. 7), include “the development of advanced communication and technological services, increased international labour mobility, more emphasis on the market economy and the trade liberalization, focus on the knowledge society,

increased levels of private investment and decreased public support for education, and life long learning.”

Although mainly affecting economic and cultural activities, Rizvi et al (2005, p. 10) observe that globalization is also affecting educational activities. “The setting of educational priorities,” they said, “can no longer ignore global power systems.” Despite their different understandings and definitions of globalization, they further observe, educational scholars agree that “education is deeply implicated in the processes of contemporary globalization” (Rizvi et al 2005, p. 1). They write:

Globalization is a highly contested concept employed to embrace a whole range of academic and popular discourses. It is a concept that is used to describe almost any and every aspect of contemporary life, from the complex contours of contemporary capitalism, to the decline in the power of the nation-state system and the rise of transnational organizations and corporations, to the emergence of a global culture challenging local traditions, to the information and communications revolution enabling rapid circulation of ideas, money and people (Rizvi et al 2005, p. 1).

“Educational system,” Rizvi et al (2005) suggest, “have been asked to produce a workforce adequately prepared to meet the challenges of globalization and the global economy” (p. 3). With globalization, they further suggest, “there is now greater mobility of capital, information and

ideologies, and people” (p. 3) at both national and international levels. Certainly, the mobility occurs, not only in economic sectors but also in the educational ones.

At national level, globalization has been a major driver of increased mobility of people from regional and rural areas to metropolitan centers where they are greater possibilities of employment. In educational sectors, such a mobility is driven by greater possibilities of education programs. At international level, globalization has been a major driver of increased mobility of people from one country to another for economic or educational purposes. Globalization affects educational practices and policies in many countries. “Educational policies,” according to Rizvi et al (p. 4), “have been deeply affected by these [mobility] developments, as national governments have sought to re-align their educational priorities to what they perceive to be the imperatives of globalization.” Similarly, Burbules and Torres (2000, p. 4) observe that the processes of globalization affect educational endeavor. Such processes, they further observe, “are threatening the autonomy of national educational system and the sovereignty of the nation-state as the ultimate rule in democratic societies.” “Globalization,” they argue, “in changing the fundamental conditions of an educational system, threatening to weaken education’s links to the imperatives of a community, while making stronger its relationship to the requirements of the global economy” (p. 4). “Under the condition of globalization,” Burbules and Torres (2000, p. 4) further argue, “not only the purposes of education but also the

modes of its governance are converging around the underlying notions of global interconnectivity and interdependence.”

Globalization has intersected with higher education institutions. Globalization has changed the way higher education institutions see themselves and develop their programs. It “has destabilized patterns of university cultures everywhere, requiring the development of new structures, incentives and policies within a framework of fiscal constraints and pressures on nation-states to hold universities accountable” (Slaughter and Leslie 1999; discussed in Rizvi 2004, p. 25). “The death of distance,” *The Economist* (2005) reports, “is transforming academia just as radically as it is transforming business” (p. 3). According to Apple (2000, p. 58), interconnectivity and interdependence between globalization and higher education makes it impossible for us to understand various aspects of higher education development without placing them in global context. Globalization pushes students, academic staffs, and managers of higher education institutions to move from one site of the world to the other sites to pursue their academic related interests. With the availability of supports from transport, communication and information technologies, the international mobility of people in the academic works has never been greater. They are moving from one campus to another, from one country to another, from one seminar/conference to another, and from one center to another, for a wide variety of academic related purposes. New transport, communication, and information

technologies enable academic people to move at high speed across various kinds of previously impervious boundaries. The mobility increases the circulation of students, academic ideas, images and ideologies across spaces providing cultural and academic bases for international higher education system.

Such a circulation brings new challenges and opportunities to higher education managements. Internationalization has been one of the most important responses from many higher education institutions in many countries to the challenges and opportunities. Higher education institutions are reforming their structures and rewriting their priorities toward internationalization. According to Knight (2004, p. 8), globalization and internationalization are two very different but related processes. Globalization is “the flow of technology, economy, knowledge, people, values, [and] ideas ... across borders” and internationalization is “the process of integrating an international, intercultural or global dimensions and concepts into the purpose, functions or delivery of post-secondary education” (Knight 2003, p. 2).

Globalization affects each country in a different way due to a nation’s individual history, traditions, culture and priorities” (Knight & de Wit 1997, p. 6). Globalization is “part of the environment in which the international dimension of higher education is becoming more important and significantly changing” (Knight 2004, p. 8). Therefore, globalization, higher education, and internationalization are

three inseparable elements that play equally important roles in this changing world, and affecting one another. In Knight's (2004, p. 5) words: "Internationalization is changing the world of higher education, and globalization is changing the world of internationalization." Internationalization can be a stimulant for and a response to globalization. Knight further says: "The world of higher education is changing and the world in which higher education plays a significant role is changing" (p. 5). In her view, "the international dimension of higher education is becoming increasingly important, complex, and confusing" (p. 5). She identifies four interpretations of internationalization in educational sphere. First, internationalization is understood as "a series of international activities such as academic mobility for students and teachers; international linkages, partnerships, and projects; and new international academic programs and research activities" (p. 6). Second, internationalization is understood as "the delivery of education to other countries through new types of arrangements such as branch campuses or franchises using a variety of face-to-face and distance techniques" (p. 6). The third understanding is according to Knight, that internationalization is "the inclusion of an international, intercultural, and/or global dimension into the curriculum and teaching learning process" (p. 6). The fourth understanding is that internationalization is "international development projects and, alternatively, the increasing emphasis on trade in higher education" (p. 6).

Whatever interpretation is adopted for internationalization, “the world of higher education is changing, and the world in which higher education plays a significant role is changing” (Knight 2004, p. 7). The processes and consequences of internationalization, according to Knight (2004, p. 6), can be seen at both the institutional and the national/sector levels. At the national level, she said, we can see policies, funding, programs, and regulatory frameworks related to internationalization. At the institutional level, she further said, we can see how the real process of internationalization is taking place (Knight 2004, pp. 6-7). She concludes that “the international dimension of postsecondary education is therefore becoming increasingly important and, at the same time, more and more complex” (Knight 2004, p. 7).

Student circulation has been one of the most important dimensions of the process of the internationalization of higher education in global context. Students are moving from one country to another, crossing national, geographic, cultural, and ideological borders to find suitable or ideal places for studies. A report published by IDP Australia in 2003 suggests that the global demand for international higher education increased from 1.8 million students in 2000 to over 7.2 million in 2025 (discussed in Rizvi 2004, p. 36). *The Economist* (2005) also reports that “the number of people from OECD countries studying abroad has doubled over the past 20 years, to 1.9 m; universities are opening campuses all around the world; and a growing number of countries are trying to turn higher

education into an export industry” (p. 3). *The Economist* (2005) further reports, “there are more than 80m students worldwide, and 3.5m people are employed to teach them or look after them” (p. 4). The report suggests two main driving forces behind the solid growth of the number of international students all around the world; “the magnetic power of the world’s top universities and the under-supply of university places in the developing world” (p. 16). “The world’s brightest students,” the report adds, “... want to study at the world’s best universities” (p. 16). For Jane Knight (2002), this increasing global trend of international students is a “trade creep” that is generally driven by trade and market economy enmeshed with other issues and trends in higher education. The trends, she suggests, include the growing number of domestic and international private for-profit providers, the availability of domestic and cross-border delivery supported by information and communication technologies, increasing costs and tuition fees for public and private institutions, and the need for public institutions to find extra sources of funding.

The circulation of international students does not only bring international dimensions to higher education systems, but also creates new challenges and opportunities for all elements of university life, including academic communities, students, teaching staffs, administrative staffs, and program managers. More importantly, international students’ circulation pushes the adoption of international standards in higher education’s practices. According to Rizvi (2004, p. 31), this is possible because students are human agents who

have the capacity to accept, resist or reject ideas and ideologies.

Some countries are primarily, although not exclusively, on the sending side of student circulation and having the opportunities to improve the quality of their human resources, transfer latest sciences and technologies, and learn new educational and cultural values from their host countries. These countries can make use of foreign universities to develop human resource with international qualifications. *The Economist* (2005) illustrates the situation of the sending countries: “The governments of many developing countries encourage bright students to go abroad, often using scholarships as inducements, as part of a general policy of ‘capacity building’ so they can plug themselves into the latest thinking in the West.”

Other countries are primarily, although not exclusively, on the receiving side of the dynamics of international students’ circulation. They have the opportunities to gain educational, cultural, economic, and political benefits from international students whom they host. Since the students come with their own financial, cultural, and educational backgrounds and resources, their presence would give their hosts the opportunity to gain financial, cultural, and educational benefits from them. In 2000, Rizvi (2004, p. 36) notes, the United States was able to generate more than \$10 billion in revenue from international students. In 2005, *The Economist* reports, international students contributed \$13 billion a year to America’s GDP and supplied brainpower for

its research machine and energy for its entrepreneurial (p. 18). According to World Bank, global spending on higher education is \$300 billion a year, or 1% of global economic output (*The Economist* 2005, p. 4).

The many dimensions and multiple effects of internationalization policies and the dynamics of international students' circulation make it become an important issue in the development of international higher education systems. Trends and patterns that emerge in the policies the circulation of international students have become interesting areas of studies on international higher education. These areas of studies have attracted the attention of educational policy makers, scholars, observers, and practitioners. The trends and patterns of internationalization and international students' circulation have become important factors that need to be taken into account in designing and planning policies and programs for the internationalization of higher education system at both institutional and national levels.

Brief History of Indonesian Higher Education System

Altbach & Selvaratnam (1989) is right to observe that in most Asian, African, and Latin American countries, universities are following or eclectic combination of, European and North American universities, tracing their roots to European medieval universities. This is the case with the development of higher education in Indonesia. Main agendas for the future development of higher

education system in the country are continuously influenced by the major metropolitan universities in the United States of America and Europe. Over all, the development of higher education in Indonesia has gone through six main historical stages: the pre-colonial era (before 1831), the Dutch colonial period (1831-1942), the Japanese occupation (1942-1945), the Old Order Era (1945-1966), the New Order Era (1966-1998), and the Reform Era (1998-present time). Each historical stage has its own characteristics, contexts and environment.

1. *The Pre-colonial Period (before 1831)*

The origin of higher education system in Indonesia, especially the religious one, can be traced from the pre-colonial period (before 1831). During this period, higher education in the country was characterized by Islamic, non-formal, and less structured boarding education named *pesantren*. It is a form of education institution that does not apply levels or structures as in the modern education system. The whole process of education in *pesantren* system is centered on a central figure called *kyai* or *ulama*. In most cases, *kyai* is the founder, the owner, the principal teacher, and the manager of *pesantren*. The levels of education in *pesantren* were distinguished by teaching process and methodology as well as the curriculum. The main contents of curriculums were traditional Islamic lessons, such as the recitation (*qiraat*) and memorization (*tahfiz*) of the Qur'an, the writing, reading, and speaking of Arabic, the introduction of Islamic rules and regulations (*syariah*),

Islamic law (*fiqh*), the practicing of Islamic worship (*ibadah*), and the teaching of Islamic theology (*tauhid*).³

The contribution of *pesantren* system to higher education system in Indonesia is very significant. It originates the development of Islamic higher education institutions⁴ that are managed by Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) along with general higher education institutions managed by Ministry of National Education (MNE). Based on their discussion of the historical stages of the development of higher education system in Indonesia, Buchori and Malik (2004) conclude that “Islam and Islamic education have shaped Indonesia’s higher education system” (p. 251). “Indeed,” they explain, “Islamic education predated secular higher education, even though it was only in unstructured formats” (p. 252). Buchori and Malik further explain: “there is substantial evidence to suggest that Islam, especially cultural Islam,⁵ has had a pronounced influencing on the higher education system while, conversely, academic thinking has also influenced the development of Islam in Indonesia” (p. 251).

2. *The Dutch Colonial Period (1831-1942)*

During the Dutch colonial period (1831-1942), secular higher education model began to challenge the traditional

³ See discussion in Buchori and Malik (2004, p. 252).

⁴ In 2003/2004 academic year, there are 485.077 students enrolled in Islamic higher education institutions throughout Indonesia (Depdiknas 2006, February 5).

⁵ The word Cultural Islam is made popular by Muslim intellectuals, such as Nurcholis Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Amin Rais, to describe a cultural way, not a structural way, to develop Muslim community.

Islamic one. The real challenge started in 1902 when the Dutch colonial government established a medical school for indigenous doctors that is called School Tot Opleiding Van Indische Artsen (STOVIA) and later became Geneeskundige Hooge School (GHS) in Batavia, now become Jakarta. Eighteen years later, in 1920, Dutch colonial government established another higher education institution for the indigenous youths. It was the engineering school Technische Hooge School (THS) in Bandung. Four years after the establishment of THS (in 1924), another two higher education institutions were also established by Dutch colonial government. They were the agricultural school Landbouwkundige Hooge School (LHS) in Bogor and the law school Rechts Hooge School (RHS) in Jakarta. These secular higher education models mainly focused on professional training and less on research-oriented academic studies. They responded to the growing needs of cheap professional workers to support the economic and political interests of the colonial government.⁶

3. *The Era of Japanese Occupation (1942-1945)*

When the Japanese took over power in 1942, Dutch created higher education system was destroyed by the implementation of four policies. The first policy was to isolate students from modern knowledge introduced by Dutch professors. The professors were fired and their books were banned by Japanese authority. The second policy was to limit the freedom of thought and communication by

⁶ See further discussion in Buchori and Malik (2004, p. 253).

controlling the activities of teachers and intellectuals. The third policy made by Japanese authority was to degrade the dignity of teachers and intellectuals by lowering the level of their welfare. The fourth policy was to reduce time allocation for intellectual exercises significantly and substitute it with basic military training. Students were forced to spend more time for joining military training and left very limited time for reading and discussing their lessons. Besides, the Japanese eliminated the stratified school system at the lower levels and replaced Dutch with Malay Indonesian as the language of instruction. In a sense, said Buchori and Malik (2004, p. 254), the Japanese made education system become more democratic and egalitarian, but overall, the Japanese made condition of education system deteriorating qualitatively and quantitatively (p. 254). Many higher education institutions that were initiated and established by the Dutch ceased to operate and barely surviving.

4. *The Old Order Era (1945-1966)*

Indonesia gained her independence from the Dutch on August 17, 1945. After the country declared its independence, the newly established government of the Republic of Indonesia that is called as Old Order government led by President Soekarno quickly paid serious attention on higher education system. Agendas and priorities for the development of higher education system in the country were quickly set up. In the light of the agendas and priorities, the development of higher education system

in Old Order era can be divided into two phases: reconstruction phase (1945-1950) and nationalization phase (1950-1965).

The reconstruction phase was characterized by a strong commitment to reconstruct higher education system that was destroyed by the Japanese's policies. According to Buchori and Malik (2004, p. 254), this phase of higher education development was marked by two main circumstances. First, there was clear vision and strong belief among national leaders regarding the importance of appropriate higher education system to assure better future and unity for the new republic. Second, the nationalist and the Islamic groups who played prominent roles in the national struggles for independence began to fight for the representation of their educational interests in national education system (Buchori and Malik 2004, p. 254).

Under these circumstances, the new government was urged to develop educational policies that can quickly recover education system and accommodate the competing nationalist-Islamic educational interests. The new government immediately established Balai Perguruan Tinggi Repoeblik Indonesia (Center for Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia) and appointed Sarwono Prawirohardjo as the Chairman of the center with one major task: "to take steps to ameliorate the damage inflicted on medical training during the Japanese occupation" (Muchori and Malik 2004, p. 255). The center started the task by offering three main courses, including medicine, law, and

literature. In December 1945, the Dutch came back to reoccupy Jakarta and the center was forced to move to Yogyakarta. In early 1946, the name of the center was changed into Balai Perguruan Tinggi Gajahmada (Gajahmada Center for Higher Education). In 1947, as part of attempts to reoccupy Indonesia, the Dutch established Universiteit van Indonesie in Jakarta with four faculties, including medicine, law, literature, and philosophy. Two years later, on December 19, 1949, with the support from the Sultan of Yogyakarta, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, President Sukarno inaugurated the center as Universiteit Negeri Gajahmada (Gajahmada State University). Following the establishment of Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta and Universitas Gajahmada in Yogyakarta, other universities with special interests of study programs were also established in other big cities, such as veterinary medicine and agriculture in Bogor, the sciences and engineering in Bandung, medicine) in Surabaya, and economics in Makasar. These study programs and universities were mainly supported by professors and lecturers of Dutch nationals and applied Dutch as the language of instruction.

Besides, the reconstruction program was able to invite private sector in developing higher education program. Two major private universities emerged during this period of reconstruction: Islamic University that is now better known as Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII) in Yogyakarta and National University, better known as Universitas Nasional in Jakarta.

So, despite the difficult circumstances, the government of the new Republic of Indonesia was able to use its first five year administration to recover higher education system, introduce some new study programs, establish new universities, and encourage private sector to participate in the establishment of higher education institutions.

From 1950 to 1965, while the reconstruction efforts continued, the government began to develop the relevance of higher education system to national interests by introducing nationalization programs in higher education system. At this phase, the development of higher education in Indonesia was marked by five major trends. First, the development of higher education system began to touch substantial issues, such as the objectives, missions, and the structure of organization. Higher education authority began to review the relevance of the system to the social and political interests of the new republic, define its objectives, formulate its missions, and develop its organization. All efforts were made to make sure that higher education system was in conformity with the future agendas of the new republic.

Second, the introduction of conceptual changes on the medium of instruction. Along with the reformulation and redefinition of the objectives and missions, the medium of instruction was also reviewed, revised, and changed with the medium that was considered more relevant to national

values. In this regard, the use of national language, Bahasa Indonesia, was emphasized.

Third, transition from the European free study model to a more structured Anglo-American model. With strong Dutch influence, higher education institutions in Indonesia followed pre-World War II Continental-European model. Since mid 1950s, along with the coming of foreign aids for developing some state universities, such as IPB, ITB, UI, and UGM, institutional model for higher education in the country began to follow the American one. Many young lecturers from these universities were sent to USA for doing master and doctorate programs. While they were away for studying, American professors were substituting them. When the young lecturers returned home, they introduced ideas for program innovation. One glaring example of the ideas was the introduction of credit system or Sistem Kredit Semester that continues until the present time at most of higher education institutions in Indonesia.

Fourth, the reconstruction phase was the beginning of a serious concern on the quality of the system and its relevance to the needs of national development. In 1961, the government released a law on higher education which is still in effect today. The law states the function of higher education better known as the Tri Dharma Perguruan Tinggi (three pillars of services of higher education), including education, research, and community services. This law expects that higher education institutions play equal roles in intellectual and community development.

Fifth, the transformation of the branches of Universitas van Indonesia into separate universities. These include Air Langga University in Surabaya (1954), Hassanuddin University in Makassar (1956), Bandung Institute of Technology (1959), and Bogor Agricultural University (1963). Besides, three institutes of teacher training were also established. The expansion program continued and in a very short time, one university was established for one province.

With this rapid expansion, higher education enrollment experienced an almost twenty-fold increase over ten years. It reached more than 108,000 by 1961. Nevertheless, Buchori and Malik (2004, p. 256) note, the quality of higher education system in the 1950s declined. They further note that the decline was caused by three main reasons. First, the expansion was too quick and without sufficient infrastructure, equipment, and quality academic staff. Second, lower standards of selectivity and unproductive learning due to economic hardship and political turbulence. Third, rapid nationalization ignored quality aspects. Besides involving the taking over of ownership and management, nationalization also involved the replacement of Dutch by Bahasa Indonesia as the language of instruction. This policy caused the mass exodus of Dutch professors and lecturers who were previously among the core elements of academic staffs (Buchori and Malik 2004, pp. 256-57).

The New Order Era: Systematic Changes

When the new order government led by President Soeharto took over power in 1966, higher education system in Indonesia began to experience dramatic and systematic changes. Buchori and Malik (2004, p. 260) describe the changes:

Even though it was clearly dominated by the military, the new [order] government relegated economic management to civilians, mostly academicians, and thus created an image of a technocratic government. The shifting of the national agenda away from politics to economics had a spillover effect in the education sector. Rapid expansion of capacity at all levels of education began to take place.

However, systematic changes in national education system in general and higher education system in particular did not start before 1975. Despite the growing number of innovative projects introduced by Directorate General of Higher Education (DGHE) in Jakarta, changes and reforms in higher education system before 1975 tended to be partial in character. One pilot project tended to focus only on one aspect of the system without necessarily being integrated to other aspects of the system. In 1975, the new order government was able to initiate some systematic changes in higher education system and the trend continued until the present day. Since then, two important documents were released to systematize and accelerate the development of

higher education in Indonesia. The documents include: 1975 Basic Policy and 1978 Strategic Plan.

1975 Basic Policy

In 1975, Minister of Education and Culture, now Minister of National Education, released a decision called *Kebijakan Dasar Pengembangan Pendidikan Tinggi* (KDPPT) or Basic Policy for Higher Education Development. The policy introduced ideas for bringing a modern, relevant and future oriented higher education system in Indonesia. As the decision stresses: “higher education must become a dynamic driving force for modernization, that can connect today and the future, and finding a direction for modernization for developing future society” (Dikti 2005, Chapter 1, p. 3). More importantly, the decision introduced five directions for a comprehensive development of higher education system in public and private sectors: The directions include:

1. Being an integral part of regional and national development programs.
2. Being the bridge among science, technology, and the needs of society.
3. Conducting education based on analytical thoughts and is directed to problem solving with futuristic perspective.
4. Participating in the development of the quality of life and culture, science and its application, international

understanding and cooperation toward world peace and prosperity.

5. Allowing the development of all human potentials, educational experiences, diversification and democratization of education and learning process, mobilizing social resources for education, and developing research activities (Dikti 2005, Chapter 1, p. 3).

With these ideas and directions, 1975 Basic Policy provides a better conceptual foundation for the development of higher education in Indonesia during the New Order era.

1978 Strategic Plan

In three years time, the 1975 Basic Policy was followed by a strategic plan for the development of higher education. This first strategic plan was entitled *Kerangka Pengembangan Pendidikan Tinggi Jangka Panjang* (KPPTJP) or Long Term Framework for Higher Education Development (1975-1985). The main objective of the strategic plan was “to develop the best higher education system that can respond future challenges” (Dikti 2005, Chapter 1, p. 4). It identifies two major problems of higher education system in Indonesia: “disintegrated patterns of development” and “lack of effectiveness.” To respond to these problems, the plan suggests two main strategies. The first strategy was to increase accommodating capacity and

implement a better desired education system (Dikti 2005, Chapter 1, p. 4).

The strategic plan seems to work effectively. By the end of 1985, Directorate General of Higher Education (DGHE) (Dikti 2005, Chapter 1, p. 4) found that the national education system was running and efficiency improved from 5% to 15%, and accommodating capacity increased up to 35% of high school graduates. One of the most prioritized programs in the strategic plan was to develop all levels of education by allowing top national universities to run master and doctoral programs. From 1976 to 1986, as a result, 335 out of 400 doctors were produced by national universities. Certainly, the new doctors strengthened academic staffs in many higher education institutions (Dikti 2005, Chapter 1, p. 4).

With these results, it can be said that the release of 1975 Basic Policy and 1978 Strategic Plan was a very important stage in the development of higher education system in Indonesia. The two documents initiated more planned and systematic approach to the development of the system.

1985-1995 Five Year Planning

From 1985 to 1995, the New Order government continued to do systematic changes in the development of higher education system in Indonesia. During this period, the development focused on the improvement of

institutional capacity, infrastructure, management, productivity, and quality. These programs were integrated to the target of the fourth Five Year planning of new order government with more priority on the development of relevant science and technology as well as research. The main objective of the programs was to “develop higher education as the centre for science and technology, and centre for researches relevant to contemporary and future needs” (Dikti 2005, Chapter 1, p. 5). During this five year period, the development of higher education programs focused on relevance and quality and planned based on three main factors: demography, the distribution of educational opportunity, and global trends on the needs for higher education graduates for social development (Dikti 1995, p. 1). The most important question for the development of higher education in this era, according to Dikti 2005, p. 1) was “how to direct the collective efforts of higher education to fulfill the needs for society development?”

The Reform Era (1998-present time): Decentralization

Before the economic crisis in 1998, Indonesia was among the “Asian Miracles,” along with Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, that were able to make economic achievement and improve the quality of public services in various sectors, including education. Indonesia was able to cut absolute poverty by about two-thirds, dropped population growth rates, dramatically improved health and

education, and nearly quadrupled overall per capita income. Economic prosperity in the country was directly proportional to participation rates in education. Participation rates for all levels of education increased significantly and education programs were significantly expanded.

The quality of public services, including the educational ones, suddenly decreased when the country faced economic crisis in 1998. The crisis hit Indonesia very hard. The currency, Rupiah, lost 72 per cent of its value against US Dollar; about 6 and 12 million people in the country lost their jobs, raising the unemployment up to 15-20%; inflation surged from 6.6 per cent in 1997 to 20.0 per cent in 1998; real wages fell a calamitous 44%; the incidence of poverty rose from 11% to 18%; and educational participation significantly depressed with 3 million children dropped out of school and school enrolment ratio declined from 78% to 54% (Purwadi 2001, p. 62).

In response to the economic crisis, Indonesian government has taken some major economic, political, constitutional, regulatory, social, and educational initiatives. The national constitution, Undang-undang Dasar 1945 (UUD 45), has been revised, political institutions have been restructured to pave the way for democratization. Although facing some difficulties, democratization has allowed broader public participation in the discussion, implementation, and control of educational programs. To ensure democratization, the paradigm for national

development has been shifted from centralization to decentralization. The shifting paradigm from centralization and decentralization has significantly changed the procedures and processes for educational policies. Regional governments have been given more authority for managing lower education and management for higher education retained for national government under Directorate General of Higher Education (DGHE) at the Department of National Education. These initiatives have affected public policies in various sectors, including the educational ones. For the first time the UUD 45 states that 20% of yearly national and regional budgets must be allocated for educational programs. Although has not yet been implemented consistently by national and regional governments, this regulation should be enough to ensure better financial supports for future education in Indonesia.

Insight 2010

In April 2003, five year after the collapse of new order government and the beginning of reform era, DGHE released Basic Framework for higher education Development (KPPTJP IV, 2003-2010) called Insight 2010. The framework describes three major strategic issues regarding future development of higher education in Indonesia: nation's competitiveness, autonomy, and organizational health. Clearly, these three issues are closely related to reformation agendas.

In relation to nation's competitiveness, Insight 2010 document suggests that for a better future of higher education in Indonesia, special attention needs to be paid on five sub-issues, including national integration, globalization, research and education, mission differentiation, and access to knowledge.

With regard to national integration, Insight 2010 explains that higher education institutions must play academic and social-political roles simultaneously. The document further explains: "higher education institutions have been and always take vital role in nation building" (p. 7). "Although formally the role of institutions is reflected in the Tridharma,⁷" said the document, "institutions also play roles as a source of conscience and inspiration to the unity of the nation" (p. 7). The document adds:

when major shifts occur in a society, new leaders emerge in a variety of institutions. Opportunities and entrepreneurship, as well as a solid academic and scientific reputation, often characterize university reformers that emerge when such shifts occur. From our history we learned that the institutional leaders can and do make a difference. Leadership development is critical for the continuous improvement of existing leaders and for cultivating the next generation of academic leaders. Institutions around the world have a proven history as a fertile

⁷ Tridharma meaning three services or principles [of higher education], including education and instruction, research, and social services

ground for such leadership to grow and blossom (KPPTJP 2003, p. 7).

This quotation implies higher expectation and strong confidence in contemporary Indonesia that higher education institutions are the best places for leadership training and dissemination of national values and interests.

With regard to globalization, Insight 2010 document suggests the importance of improving national and international competitiveness for Indonesia. “In higher education,” the document explains, “the globalization combined with the advancement of information and communication technology, have brought a variety of new schemes in carrying out education process” (KPPTJP 2003, p. 7). “Although character building is the core concern of basic and secondary education,” the document further explains, “intensification of national and international competitiveness will be visible in an education process emphasizing students’ character enhancement (in regards with national unity values and their soft skills...” (p. 7).

Insight 2010 document also suggests that new approaches of education are required in order to respond to challenges and opportunities brought by globalization. “In facing globalization and speed of information’s flow,” the document says, “the teaching methodology should be shifted to learning, instead of teaching, methodology, in order to produce graduates with immense self-learning capacity” (p. 8).

With regard to research and education, Insight 2010 document states that the development of tertiary education has been considered to be very instrumental in contributing to economic and social development as well as in increasing competitiveness of a nation” (p. 8). Therefore, the document concludes: “it is ... very important for a higher education institution to keep hand in hand with the science and technological development, and to stay relevance with social and economic needs within its local setting as well as in the global arena, through among others” (KPPTJP 2003, p. 8). Insight 2010 document suggest seven areas of needs that must be fulfilled by higher education institutions:

- a) contributing to the creation of knowledge, b) reducing dependence on foreign experts, c) developing capacity to sustainable exploration of natural resources, d) developing the needed technology for local and national industry, e) developing import substitution and improving added value of export products, f) improving health and social well being, and g) developing qualified researchers (KPPTJP 2003, p. 8).

In order to fulfill these needs of the nation, the document stresses the importance of strong and relevant research activities by higher education institutions. “In higher education,” the document says, “graduate education is the core activity in developing research capacity that it is essential to continuously strengthen and link it with any research activity” (KPPTJP 2003, p. 8).

In relation to mission differentiation, Insight 2010 document also stresses the importance of research for every higher education institutions and balance it with education programs and community services. The document says: “with its expensive resources,”... institution is expected to excel in undertaking research, providing education, and extending services to the community” (KPPTJP 2003, p. 9). “In order to effectively capitalize its capacity,” Insight 2010 document concludes, “it is important for an [higher education] institution to set its niche and focus” (p. 9). The document further says: “In the light of its chosen niche, a higher education institution may set and state its main thrust on excellence in teaching, where as other may in research excellence” (p. 9). There seems to be a strong belief that specific focus and strength would allow every higher education institution to achieve its own excellence.

With regard to access to knowledge, Insight 2010 document explains:

Due to rapid technological and market changes, any nation will also have to face with a future volatile labor market. The life cycle of required skills will be shorter and easily changed. The need of improving and shifting worker’s skills will be tremendously increasing in the future. Higher education should be prepared to cope with such challenges by providing more flexible modes in accessing knowledge to employed students, i.e. distance learning, short

courses, modular curriculum, and other means allowing workers to access knowledge without losing their employment (KPPTJP 2003, p. 9).

This quotation implies an expectation that higher education institutions are able to respond to the challenges of the future labor market and see themselves as the center for preparing skillful labor. “Community and industry,” the document stresses, “should become a closer partner of institutions in educating the students, by providing substantial financial contribution and access to learning facilities such as industrial laboratories, etc.” (KPPTJP 2003, p. 9).

In relation to the second strategic issue, autonomy, the Insight 2010 document stresses two sub-issues: shifting roles of Directorate General of Higher Education (DGHE) and social responsibility. With regard to the first sub-issue, the document suggests DGHE to improve the public accountability of higher education programs in Indonesia and pay attention on the quality of the programs. The document says:

One of the important roles of DGHE is to inform periodically to the community at large about the universities’ performances and facilitate the information flow among parties in regard with such evaluation. The evaluation based on output is the foundation for improving accountability, efficiency, and relevance in process. This will first encourage institutions to perform accountable planning of

programs and human resource development. In the long run, this will diminish institutions that place mostly its role in fund generating rather than quality production of graduates (KPPTJP 2003, p. 10).

With regard to social responsibility, Insight 2010 document states that:

In light of the spirit in increasing community participation in supporting higher education, institution shall set its own tuition and fees. In doing so, however, the institution should take into account the disparity in students' economic background. Some scheme of cross subsidy should be developed within the institution. Likewise, government funding policy should also include new and innovative schemes, e.g. student loan and voucher, and improve the quality of support rather than focusing merely on the quantity of recipients (KPPTJP 2003, p. 10).

This quotation shows that higher education institutions need to respond to the growing interests in higher education programs with a socially sensitive financial policy; avoid being commercial and stay focus on quality improvement.

In relation to the third major strategic issue, organizational health, the document suggests five sub issues to be considered: institutional capacity building, university governance, financing, human resources, and quality assurance.

With regard to institutional capacity building, Insight 2010 document highlights the importance of paradigm change from centralization to decentralization and urges higher education institutions to develop their institutional capacity in line with the new paradigm and with particular quality standard. The document says:

Responding to the paradigm change in the context of autonomy and decentralization, institutions should consistently improve their institutional capacity and assure quality toward a particular standard. However, due to the disparity among institutions, in terms of development stage, wealth, and opportunity, different implementation practices are needed. Good practices should be inventoried, published, and disseminated to the different groups of institution (KPPTJP 2003, p. 10).

In order to develop the institutional capacity and quality standard of higher education institutions, Insight 2010 document stresses that “DGHE should provide leadership and guidance, through various capacity building programs and financial as well as academic incentives for those who adopt and implement such practices” (KPPTJP 2003, p. 10).

The importance of quality standard in Insight 2010 document is in line with the spirit of the National Education System of the Republic of Indonesia. Chapter IX of Act Number 20, 2003 regarding National Education System states that “national education standards consist of the

standard of the content, process, graduate outcomes, educational personnel, facilities and equipment, management, funding, and educational assessment, which should be improved systematically and regularly” (Article 35). The Act also states that “national educational standards are used as a guideline for the development of curriculum, development of educational personnel, provisions of facilities and equipment, management, and funding.” In order to assure the adoption of the national standards at all levels of education, the Department of National Education System establishes a quality assurance body. “The development, monitoring, and reporting on the achievement of the national education standards,” Act number 20, 2003 says, “are organized by a quality assurance body.”

With regard to university governance, Insight 2010 document stresses an important connection between the system of governance and the values and goals of higher education institutions. The document explains: “A good system of governance is contingent upon the goal of a higher education institution and local values shaping it. It is therefore the discretion of the individual institution to set forth its own governance system.” The document also stresses that good governance should promote academic freedom that recognizes the rights of academics to define their own areas to research, to teach, and to publish.” Within a decentralized system and with the principle of academic freedom, Insight 2010 document suggests: “the system of governance allows faculties and administrators to

have meaningful voice in determining institutional policies” (KPPTJP 2003, p. 10-11). This concept of autonomy and academic freedom is inline with Article 24 of Act Number 20, 2003 for National Education System. The Article says: “in the implementation of education and development of science, a higher education institution is entitled to intellectual pursuits freely and to academic freedom, and scientific autonomy.” The explanation of this Article says: “higher education institutions are entitled to autonomy to manage their institutions as a centre of higher education, scientific research, and services to the community.” One aspect of the autonomy is to raise fund for programs. The Act further explains: “Higher education institutions are entitled to raise funds from the community, and their management is based on the principles of public accountability.” Autonomy of higher education institutions is to set “the requirements for awarding academic, professional, or technical and vocational degrees” and to revoke degree awarded due to plagiarism (Article 25, Act Number 20, 2003).

With regard to financing, Insight 2010 document explains that higher education in Indonesia is “under funded” compared with other developing countries in Asia. Table 2 shows that in 2000, only 2.2% of GDP for education and only 25% of educational fund for higher education. Table 1 shows, China, Thailand, and Malaysia started which much higher public funding allocation and significantly increase their enrolment during the last 20 years. Table 3 shows that most educational public budget in Indonesia is for basic education. The document blames lack of funding as the

cause of low quality in higher education programs in the country. “Starting with relatively low public expenditure per student, without meaningful budget increase,” the document says, “even small expansion in Indonesia cost the higher education system dearly in term of quality. In Asia, no Indonesian university is among top 20 universities (Heyneman 2006, p. 2).

Table 1

Public Expenditure in Higher Education and Enrolment for Selected Asian Countries

Countries	Public Expenditure per Student/GDP per Capita (%)		Gross Enrolment ratio (GER)	
	1980	1997	1985	2002
China	246.2	65.3	2.9	13.2 (2001)
India	83.3	92.5	6.0	6.5 (1995)
Indonesia	25 (1985)	12.3	8.5	12.8
Thailand	59.7	25.4	18.1	31.92
Malaysia	140.6	53.6	5.8	28.26
Philippines	13.7	14.8	n/a	29.45 (1999)
Vietnam	n/a	86.1	2.3	9.66 (2000)

(DGHE: Higher Education Sector Study 2003).

Table 2

Public Expenditure of Higher Education in Selected Countries (Task Force 2000)

Countries	Higher education/Total education (%)	Education/GDP (%)	GDP per capita US\$ 1995
Korea	10.0	3.7	9,250
China	15.4	2.3	2,047
Philippines	25.0	2.2	1,760
Thailand	19.4	4.8	4,869

Malaysia	16.8	4.9	6,916
Singapore	34.8	3.0	15,774
Australia	29.8	N/A	15,952
Indonesia (1999)	25.0	2.2	2,478

(Jalal & Musthafa 2001, p. 193).

Insight 2010 document further suggests that increasing budget is crucial for future development of HE system in Indonesia;

Even without any expansion, higher allocation of public resources for higher education is needed, In order to significantly contribute to the national competitiveness, therefore, it is important to consistently advocating for higher allocation of public resources, and at the same time continuously mandate is to be met, the proportion of public resources per student allocated for higher education should be increased at least 4 times, to the level of 50% of GDP per capita (KPPTJP 2003, p. 11).

Table 3

Public Financing in The Education Sector in 1999/2000

Types of Education	DIP 99/00 (Rp billion)	Enrollment (million)	Subsidy/student (Rp million)
Higher education	2103	2.4	0.8
Basic education	5980	5.6	0.1
Public universities	2103	0.8	2.6

(Jalal & Musthafa 2001, p. 195).

With regard to human resources, Insight 2010 document explains, “most higher education institutions [in Indonesia], particularly in the public sector, are at the same time over and under-staffed. It is over staffed in term of quantity, and it is under-staffed in term of quality” (KPPTJP 2003, p. 12). “In addition,” the document further explains, “moonlighting practices is rampant and in some cases there are mismatch” (p. 12). Insight 2010 document is concerned with the adoption of civil service model for human resource development in higher education system. “The civil service system,” the document criticizes, “is inappropriate for higher education environment, i.e. recruitment and discharge, performance evaluation, incentive, and promotion” (p. 12). “In this regard,” the document suggests, “possibility of having a new human resource management system, suitable for academic environment, need to be explored” (p. 13).

With regard to quality assurance, Insight 2010 document suggests that higher education system in Indonesia should pay more attention on quality and make it become part of the inner spirit of the system. “In a healthy organization,” the document says, “continuous quality improvement should become its primary concern.” The document further says: “Quality assurance measure should be internally driven, institutionalized within each organization’s standard procedure, and could also involve external parties” (KPPTJP 2003, p. 13). “However,” the document warns, “since quality is also a concern of all stakeholders, quality improvement measures also aims to

produce quality outputs and outcomes as part of public accountability” (p. 13). Insight 2010 document also warns that the quality must be the concern of all stakeholders and is shown in the outputs and outcomes of higher education institutions as part of public accountability (p. 13). “As demand continues to grow and change,” The document suggests, “higher education is becoming a more intensively competitive, learner-defined enterprise.” “Students,” the document further suggests, “want programs that provide what they need, such as non-degree programs, training and education programs.” Insight 2010 document concludes that higher education institutions should carefully work to satisfy demands and assure quality” (Jalal & Musthafa 2001, p. 166).

Insight 2018

Before the mission of Insight 2010 is accomplished and its objective is achieved, another document is also released. In 2005, five years before Insight 2010 document was ended, Directorate General of Higher Education (DGHE) released a document called *Wawasan (Insight) 2018* that outlines the system, vision, and mission of higher education system in Indonesia. The document states that National higher education System is committed to support the national ideology, Pancasila, and national constitution, Undang-undang Dasar 1945 (UUD 45). The document also states that in 2018 higher education in Indonesia will “becomes the most important element in enlightening life of the nation; developing scientific society; maintaining, developing, and

socializing culture that is based on knowledge, technology, and art; and developing quality Indonesian people (Dikti 2005, Chapter 4, p. 2). In relation to this vision, the document states three main missions of higher education system:

1. To produce pious, civilized, scientific, and professional members of society.
2. To produce new science and technology; researchers, thinkers; and to develop the capacity to collect, transfer, spread, interpret, and apply science and technology for the prosperity of the society.
3. To spread the results of applied researches and technology for the benefits of productive activities in improving the quality of social life (Dikti 2005, Chapter4, p. 3).

These mission statements suggest national higher education system to form noble characteristics of the nation, initiate the development of science and technology, and contribute to a better quality of the life of the nation.

Similar to Insight 2010 document, Insight 2018 document outlines some strategic issues in the development of higher education system in Indonesia. Unlike Insight 2010 document that outlines the strategic issues in a thematic way, Insight 2018 document outlines the issue based on SWOT analysis. It outlines the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of higher education in Indonesia. The document shows 10 major internal strengths of higher education system in the country (Table 4).

Table 4
Internal Strengths of Higher Education System in Indonesia
According to Insight 2018

Number	Strengths
01	There is a strong commitment to national ideology, Pancasila, national constitution, UUD 45, and national development.
02	There is an established National Education System.
03	Many teaching staffs become national experts.
04	There are research cooperation between HE institutions and foreign partners.
05	More attention to the provision of research fund.
06	There have been 10.000 master students and 1.000 doctorate students.
07	One fifth of more than 90.000 teaching staffs in various faculties have postgraduate qualifications.
08	Many teaching staffs have been able to continue their study overseas.
09	In some universities, there have been sufficient hardware and software for conducting researches.
10	Networking of libraries and information among HE institutions are developing.

(Dikti 2005, Chapter 4, p. 3).

Despite the strengths, Insight 2018 document admits that higher education system in Indonesia is surrounded by many weaknesses. It identifies 20 internal weaknesses of the system in Indonesia (Table 5).

Table 5
Internal Weaknesses of Higher Education System in Indonesia
according to Insight 2018

Number	Internal Weaknesses
01	The system capacity has not been able to provide

	good HE programs.
02	Good quality HE institutions are not located in all parts of the country.
03	The institutional role of the system has not been effective.
04	The system has not been functioning effectively.
05	Lack of connection between HE programs and industrial sector.
06	Normative bodies are not functioning.
07	Graduates do not fulfill the qualification of labour market.
08	Lack of circulation for the students in gaining learning experiences.
09	Lack of dialogue regarding HE standard between HE management and users of their graduates and professional association.
10	There has not been accreditation system that assesses the quality of graduates.
11	Lack of investment and operational supports for development.
12	Lack of access in gaining scientific information.
13	Structural pressures on academic community.
14	There are no continuous efforts to uphold academic ethics.
15	Lack of anticipation and futuristic insight in management.
16	There is no financial autonomy.
17	There is no integrated budgeting and financial management system.
18	There is no regulation for financial, educational, and research accountability.
19	Lack of control in the teaching activities of academic staffs.
20	It takes too long for students to finish their studies.

(Dikti 2005, Chapter 4, p. 4).

Although with so many weaknesses, Insight 2018 document sees many opportunities available from external environment for developing a better future of higher education system in Indonesia. Among the external opportunities, according to the document, includes five issues (Table 6).

Table 6

Opportunities that Come from External Environment

Number	External Opportunities
01	Science and technology will play more important role in the development of society.
02	Great interests among high schools graduate to do further study.
03	Better and better availability of information technology that broaden access for information and knowledge.
04	Improving prosperity of the society.
05	Increasing needs for consultation services.

(Dikti 2005, Chapter 4, p. 4).

Along with the opportunities, Insight 2018 document also sees that external environment provide some threats for higher education system in Indonesia. The threats include five issues (Table 7).

Table 7

Threats that Comes from External Environment

Number	External Threats
01	A very past growth of science and technology that requires continuous innovations.
02	Growing free trade policy increase competition for graduates in labour market.

03	Increasing qualifications for working in modern sectors.
04	High research skills are required to get access to the networks of scientific information.
05	Migration of highly skilled labour to other ASEAN countries.

(Dikti 2005, Chapter 4, p. 4).

Based on an analysis of internal and external threats and opportunities, Insight 2018 document identifies three main problems of the future development of higher education in Indonesia. The first problem is lack of effectiveness in the system. With regard to this problem, the document suggests the main agendas for future development of higher education in the country to prioritize autonomy, accountability, accreditation, and evaluation. The second problem is lack of relevance and quality of the three areas of academic programs, including education programs, researches, and social services. Insight 2018 document further suggests that the development of higher education system in Indonesia must always refer to “sustainable quality improvement” and invite participation from all parties (Dikti 2005, p. 1). The third problem identified by Insight 2018 document is limited access for higher education among population aged 19-24 and the absence of good universities in most parts of the country. This fact, the document suggests, makes it difficult for good talents from many regions to get access to good universities. This means that it is difficult for regions to have good human resources to support their development programs (Dikti 2005, Chapter 4, p. 4).

Characteristics of Higher Education System

Discussion of the characteristics of higher education system in Indonesia to be discussed below covering four major aspects of the system, including legal base; principles; streams, levels, and types; and institutional structure.

Legal Base

There are five levels of legal base that involve in the development, implementation, evaluation, and control of higher education system in Indonesia.

The first and the highest legal base is the 1945 Constitution. The Preamble of this constitution mandates: “Government of the Republic of Indonesia protects all her citizens and territorial integrity and promote public welfare, enhance the intellectual life of the whole nation, and take part in world peace keeping, based on independence, enduring peacefulness, and social justice.” The constitution also mandates that the government organizes and runs one national education system, based on legal framework, strengthen the people's faith and piety to God the Almighty and their moral character as a means for enhancing the intellectual capacity of the nation. It is further mandated in the constitution that a national education system should ensure equal opportunity, improvement of quality and relevance and efficiency in management to meet various challenges in the wake of changes of local, national and

global lives; therefore it requires a well-planned, well-directed, and sustainable education reform.

The second legal base for the development of higher education system in Indonesia is Act of The Republic of Indonesia Number 20, Year 2003 on National Education System. Chapter I of this Act states:

education means conscious and well-planned effort in creating a learning environment and learning process so that learners will be able to develop their full potential for acquiring spiritual and religious strengths, develop self-control, personality, intelligence, morals and noble character and skills that one needs for him/herself, for the community, for the nation, and for the State.

The Number 20 Act also states that “National education means education based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and is rooted in the religious values, national cultures of Indonesia, and one that is responsive to the needs of the ever-changing era.” The Act further states: “National education system means the overall components of education, which are interrelated in an integrated way in the pursuit of national education objectives.”

The third legal base for higher education system in Indonesia is Peraturan Pemerintah (PP) or Government Regulation Number 60 1999 on Higher Education. This regulation outlines operational aspects of higher education system, including the objectives, the implementation, the curriculum, the evaluation, the academic freedom and scientific autonomy, titles, the structure, academic staffs,

students and alumni, infrastructures and facilities, funding, requirement and procedure for establishment, controlling and accreditation, and cooperation among higher education institutions.

The fourth level of legal base for higher education system in Indonesia is ministerial regulations and the fifth level is decisions of Director General of Higher Education (DGHE). These fourth and fifth levels of legal base provide detailed technical aspects of implementation as stated in national education act and relevant government regulations. And the sixth level is decisions of Rectors of every higher education institutions. Besides providing detailed explanation of ministerial decisions, this level of legal base also outlines policies specific and unique to every higher education institutions.

The Principles

Chapter III of Act Number 20, 2003 states that the provision of all levels of education is based on six major principles. First, “education is conducted democratically, equally and non-discriminatorily based on human rights, religious values, cultural values, and national pluralism.” Second, “education is conducted as a systemic unit with an open system and multi-meanings.” Third, “education is conducted as a life-long process of inculcating cultural values and for the empowerment of learners.” Fourth, “education is conducted based on the principles of modeling, motivation and creativity in the process of

learning.” Fifth, “education is conducted by developing culture for reading and writing and, arithmetic, for all members of the community.” Sixth, “education is conducted by empowering all components of the community through their participation in the implementation and quality control of the education services.”

Streams, Levels, and Types of Institutions

Chapter VI of Act Number 20, 2003 states that Indonesian National Education Systems consists of three complementary streams: formal education, non-formal education, and informal education; three levels of education: basic education, secondary education, and higher education; and five types of education: general education, vocational education, academic education, professional education, vocational and technical education, religious education, and special education. It is stressed in this Act that “the streams, levels, and types of education can take the form of an educational unit organized by the Government, local governments, and/or community.”

Article 19 of Chapter VI explains that “higher education is a level of education after secondary education consisting of diploma, bachelor (*sarjana*), masters and specialized postgraduate programs, and doctorate programs imparted by a higher education institution.” The same article also explains that “higher education shall be provided in a flexible system.”

There are five types of higher education institutions stipulated by Act Number 20, 2003. Article 20 of the Act explains: “higher education institutions can take the form of academy, polytechnic, college for specialization (Sekolah Tinggi), institute, or university.” “Higher education institutions,” the same article further explains, “shall provide education, research, and community services.”

In terms of the programs, Article 20 also explains: there are three choices of programs that can be run by higher education institutions in Indonesia: academic, professional, and/or vocational and technical programs. It is explained in Article 21 of Act Number 20 that “higher education institutions, which meet the requirements prescribed, and possess the competence to provide a particular academic program can confer academic, professional, or technical and vocational degrees in accordance with the education program that are provided.” It is further explained in the same article that “an individual, organization, or education provider that is not a higher education institution is prohibited from conferring academic, professional, or vocational and technical degrees.” “Academic, professional, or vocational and technical degrees,” the same article also explains, “can be made use of by only graduates of higher education institutions, which can confer such degrees rightfully.”

Institutional Structure

There are four main layers of authority involved in the organization of higher education in Indonesia: (1) central authority or Directorate General of Higher Education (DGHE) of Department of National Education,⁸ (2) higher education institutions, (3) basic academic unit, and (4) academic community (Dikti 2005, Chapter 3, p. 2). Although hierarchical in character, these institutions are expected to closely cooperate and jointly designing development programs for higher education in Indonesia. Since higher education in general is centralistic, the role and authority of DGHE is very dominant in the whole development of higher education in the country. It remains the most powerful administrative element of higher education programs and institutions in Indonesia.

There are three key institutions under DGHE that play major role in designing, implementing, evaluating, and accrediting higher education programs. The first institution is Badan Akreditasi Nasional Perguruan Tinggi (BAN-PT) or National Board for Higher Education Accreditation. This institution was established under Government Regulation number 30, 1990 and its job covers all types of higher education institutions. The second powerful institution with regard to policies on higher education in Jakarta is an Advisory Board that gives advices to Director of higher

⁸ Since the operation of religious higher education is authorized to Department of Religious Affairs, this department sets up Directorate for Religious Higher Education for providing administrative and academic guidelines for religious higher education institutions.

education with regard to planning and research agendas. Third, Kerangka Pengembangan Pendidikan Tinggi Jangka Panjang (KPPTJP) or Long Term Plan for Higher Education Development, a ten year planning document that outlines priorities for higher education development (Dikti 2005, Chapter 3, p. 7). These key institutions are mainly responsible for developing national standards and quality assurance.

Despite the centralistic system, higher education managements are given a broad autonomy. Unlike policies and programs for elementary and secondary education that are designed by central and local government, policies regarding higher education institutions are designed by their own management. Article 50 (6) of Law Number 20, 2003 says: “Higher education institutions design policies and have the autonomy in managing their own programs.” The extent to which this autonomy has been implemented in contemporary development of higher education in Indonesia is subject to discussion. It depends on the willingness of central authorities to delegate their authority to university managers and on the readiness or capacity of the managers in taking over the authorities.

Student Development

The number of student at higher education institutions in Indonesia steadily increases from time to time, with rapid growth among private providers. This section discusses the growth of student population in four stages of situation:

1945-1950 situation, 1950-1975 situation, 1975-1995 situation, 1995-2005 situation, and projection for 2020.

1945-1950 Situation

As discussed earlier in this report, the focus of higher education development in the first five years of independent era (1945-1950) was on the reconstruction of higher education institutions that were destroyed by the Japanese. The success of the reconstruction programs helped to increase higher education enrolment nationwide more than three-fold, from 1,600 students to 5,200 students (Buchori and Malik 2004, p. 256).

1950-1965 Situation

The main focus of higher education development in the 1960s was nationalization and the reformulation of the sensitive parts of higher education system, such as the objective and curriculum of higher education programs. Not so much attention was paid on the expansion of the programs. As a result, higher education enrollment grew sluggishly. Between 1961 and 1968 the number of students nationwide increased by only around 50 per cent from 108,000 to 156,000 students (Malik 1994). The situation began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s following the establishment of new order government which provided a more favorable climate for education.

1975-1995 Situation

In 1975, the number of students registered at state universities was 400 thousands. In 1985, the number increased to 500 thousands. In this period, the number of students at state universities remained 500 thousands, but the number of students at private universities increased 9% every year. Initially, the number of students at private universities was about the same. But in 1985, the number exceeded the number of students at state universities, 600 thousands. A very significant increase of the number of students at private universities occurred in the period of 1985-1995. In 1986, the government began to develop polytechnic programs in every province and the number of student population increased to 95.000. In 1993, student population at private universities was 1,0 million and the trend continued until 1994-1995.

1995-2005 Situation

In 1995, total number of population aged from 19 to 24 year old in Indonesia was 22,78 millions and total number of university students in the country was 2,20 millions. They were distributed among state, private, religious, and in-service higher education institutions (See Table 1). The participation rate of higher education in 1995 was 10%. In the same year, the government projected that the number would raise up to 3,10 millions in year 2000 and 4,05 millions in year 2005 (Dikti 2005, p. 1). Indeed, Buchori and Malik (p.

260) note in 2004, that the enrollment exceeded 3.4 million students.

According to DGHE (Dikti 2005, Chapter 3, p. 1), this projection of student growth was based on three major considerations. First, demographic consideration, in order to spread up access for higher education throughout the country. Second, challenges and opportunities brought by the global trend. Third, that higher education graduates are badly needed in order to support development programs in various sectors.

Projection for 2020

The growth of student number is projected to continue at both public and private higher education institutions. Table 8 shows that in 2020, the percentage of higher education participation is projected to be 25% of total population aged 19-24 year.

Table 8
Projection of the Growth of Student Number from 1995 to 2020

	1995	2000	2005	2020
Percentage of Participation	10%	12,8%	15%	25%
Population Aged 19-24 in Million	22,78	25,65	26,98	24,79
Total Student Number in Million	2,20	3,10	4,05	6,20
Students of State	0,50	0,55	0,69	1,20

University in Million				
Students of Private University in Million	1,37	2,20	3,00	4,64
Students of Religious/Service HE in Million	0,35	0,35	0,36	0,40

(Dikti 2005, Chapter 2, p. 11).

Teaching Staff Development

There was a rapid increase of 100% of the number of teaching staffs for higher education institutions in Indonesia from 1983 to 1997. In 1983, the number of teaching staffs at state universities was 20,5 thousands (Dikti 2005, Chapter 1, p. 5). In 1997, the number becomes 47,928. However, the academic qualifications of the teaching staffs were very low. Table 9 and 10 shows that in 1995, most teaching staffs at state universities and polytechnics were graduates of BA Honors. Only 30% of them were graduates of Master and Doctorate programs. Until 1989, the minimum requirement of teaching staffs for higher education institutions was Honors (S-1). Since 1989, the government has been committed to improve the qualification and change the minimum requirement into Master (S-2).

Table 9

Distribution of Teaching Staffs at State Universities According to Levels of Education by 1995

University Categories	Diplo ma	S-1 (Honors)	S-2 (Master)	S-3 (Doctorate)	Total
University	170	27.092	9.663	2.817	39.742
Polytechnic	623	2.307	115	1	3.046
Total	793 (1,8%)	29.399 (68,7%)	9.778 (22,8%)	2.818 (6,7%)	42.778 (100%)

(Dikti 2005, Chapter 2, p. 8).

Table 10

Distribution of Staff in State Universities in 1997

Highest Degree Earned	Total	%
Diploma	471	0.98%
S-1	27597	57.58%
Specialist	1747	3.65%
S-2	13990	29.19%
S-3	4123	8.60%
Total	47928	100%

(Jalal & Musthafa 2001, p. 170).

In 1994, as shown in Table 11, there was a very big gap between lecturers of public universities and the private ones. What is more, as shown in Table 12, most teaching staffs were from math and natural sciences. Table 12 also shows that the smallest number of teaching staffs with master and doctorate education were in the faculty of law.

Table 11
*Comparative Ratio between Lecturers and Students at State
 and Private
 Universities in 1994*

Faculty/Department	State Universities	Private Universities
Technology	1:10	1:26
Natural science	1:6	1:21
Social and educational science	1:11	1:35

(Dikti 2005, Chapter 2, p. 8).

Table 12
*Distribution of Teaching Staffs with Master and Doctorate
 Qualifications at Four Faculties*

Faculties	Number of Teaching Staffs	Teaching Staffs with Master & Doctorate Education	Percentage
Social and Political Science	1.699	451	27%
Law	2.126	413	19%
Economics	2.832	896	32%
Natural Sciences	2.223	942	42%
Technology	2.954	1.037	35%

(Dikti 2005, Chapter 2, p. 9).

In ten years (from 1990 to 2000), the government was able to speed up the growth of teaching staffs with postgraduate qualification. For example, in 1993 the number of teaching staffs with postgraduate qualification throughout the country was only 2,0 thousands. In 1994, the number become 8,0 thousands. In year 2002, the number of

postgraduate students in the country was 15,2 thousands and the number of teaching staffs with postgraduate qualification was 3,9 thousands (Dikti 2005, Chapter 2, p. 12). So, along with undergraduate programs, postgraduate programs also grow steadily in Indonesia.

Public and Private Provisions

Both public and private sectors are equally enthusiastic, active, responsive, and participating in the development of higher education programs in Indonesia. Nevertheless, there is inequality in term of their institutions, students, and teaching staffs.

In term of institutions, there is a very big gap between public provision and the private ones. Table 13 shows that only 76 out of 1635 higher education institutions in the country are public and the rest (1558) are private. Institutional gap between public and private higher education institutions is also observable in term of regions. Table 14 shows that the number of private higher education institution exceeds the number of public higher education institutions in all regions. In line with the institutional gap, there is also a gap of student number between public and private higher education institutions. Table 7 also shows that the number of students at private higher education institutions are nearly three times bigger than the number of students at public higher education institutions.

Table 13
Distribution of Institutions and Students

Types of Institutions	Number of Institutions	Number of Students
Public Institutions	76	950,000
Private Institutions	1558	1.600.000
Total	1634	2.550.000

(Jalal & Musthafa 2001, p. 170).

Table 14 shows that in 1995 the number of students at private universities was 1.365.000, nearly three times bigger than the number of students at public universities, 500.000.

Tabel 14
Distribution of University Students According to University Categories by 1995

University Categories	Numbers
Public Universities	500.000
Private Universities	1.365.000
Religious HE	216.000
In-service HE	114.000
Total	2.200.000
Comparative scale between State and Private Universities	1:2,5
Participation Rate	10.0%

(Dikti 2005, Chapter 2, p. 7).

Since there is a gap between the number of teaching staffs and students at state and private higher education institutions, there is also a gap of the ratio between teaching staffs and students at public and private higher education institutions. Table 15 shows that ratio between lecturers and students of all departments at public higher education institutions are much better than the ratio at

private higher education institutions. This shows that private higher education in Indonesia are badly suffering from lack of teaching staffs. These institutions seem to be unable to balance their needs for more and more students and their ability to provide suitable lecturers for them.

Tabel 15

Comparative Ratio between Lecturers and Students at Public and Private Universities by 1994

Faculty/Department	State Universities	Private Universities
Technology	1:10	1:26
Natural science	1:6	1:21
Social and educational science	1:11	1:35

(Dikti 2005, Chapter 2, p. 8).

Table 16

Distribution of Student Population in Public and Private Higher Education Institutions⁹ in Thousands according to Regions in 1995

Categories	Western Region	Java	Eastern Region	Total
State Universities	99,2	211,3	125,5	436,0
Private Universities	213,4	957,7	215,2	1.386,0
Total	312,6	1.169,0	340,7	1.882,3

(Dikti 2005, Chapter 2, p. 8).

⁹ Excluding students of religious and service HE institutions.

Table 17
Student Enrolment in 1997

Categories	Enrolment
Public Sector	942,973
Private Sector	1,681,175
Religious Institutions	189,540
Vocational Institutions	51,498
Total	2,865,186

(Jalal & Musthafa 2001, p. 169).

Internationalization Policies

The DGHE has played central role in the development of higher education in Indonesia. Regulatory, political, and paradigmatic changes as well as emerging challenges and opportunities brought by globalization have inspired DGHE with some new initiatives to improve higher education system in the country. One of the most important policies is to pave the way for internationalization. Internationalization policies have marked new patterns and trends in the historical stages of the development of higher education system in Indonesia. As in many other countries in the world, globalization has pushed higher education authorities in Indonesia to develop internationalization policies. Being internationalized or adopting international standard and quality in all aspects of higher education institutions has been seen as an urgent and significant step to be taken in order to respond to challenges and opportunities brought by globalization.

Many policies have been developed to pave the way for internationalization. With strong social and political

pressures to preserve national values and interests, internationalization policies have been taken cautiously and carefully. Higher education authorities in the country are very open and enthusiastic about internationalization, but at the same time, they are very concerned with the relevance of the policies with national values and interests. Many internationalization policies have been developed at both institutional and national levels with particular attention on the relevance of the policies to national values and interests.

In the eyes of two senior staffs in Department of Education, Jalal and Musthafa (2001, p. 264), “the multifaceted impact of globalization trend on higher education is quite complex due to its interrelation with much broader cultural changes.” For them, higher education institutions need to be sensitive and responsive to the changing trends and various impacts of globalization in order to contribute to the development of society (p. 264). They believe that “complex and interrelated forces are driving changes in the national higher education systems: demographic trends, shifts in the labor market, technological development and ongoing political reforms” (p. 165). In respond to this changing trend and the globalizing need, they suggest three principles that need to be emphasized in the development of higher education system: relevance, quality, and internationalization (p. 214). With these three principles, they believe, higher education institutions can fulfill the crucial needs of Indonesian society in coping with the challenges and impacts of globalization.

“An important characteristic of this global world,” Jalal and Musthafa (2001, p. 164) said, “is the rise of multilateralism and nationalism.” “This trend,” they suggest, “has created new needs for many nations to reformulate their national identities” (p. 164). They believe that higher education institutions can help the nation in four following ways. First, they can educate Indonesian citizens to be “global citizens.” Second, they can promote a creative and mutually enriching encounter between cultures by navigating people to discover genuine multiculturalism, and enlightening them with moral and ethical issues. “One of the most important values the universities must foster in addition to academic excellence,” Jalal and Musthafa add, “is that of human solidarity which is the antithesis of narrow nationalism, racism, and religious exclusivism of the past” (p. 265). Third, higher education institutions can prepare future leaders who have the commitment to international solidarity, human security, and global peace. Jalal and Musthafa believe that preparing future leaders and citizens for a highly interdependent world requires a higher education system that promotes cultural diversity and fosters intercultural understanding, respect, and tolerance among peoples. They also believe that “such internationalization of higher education contributes to building more than economically competitive and politically powerful regional blocks: it represents a commitment to international solidarity, human security and helps to build a climate of global peace” (p. 215). Fourth, higher education institutions can help their respective countries in economic

growth. “Through researches and innovative programs related to teaching and research,” Jalal and Musthafa believe, higher education institutions can “create new dimensions of higher education through their interconnectedness with industries and business” (p. 215). This perspective is shared by many actors involved in the development of higher education system in Indonesia. Higher education authorities in the country have been very responsive to the challenges and opportunities that are brought by globalization. They see internationalization as a form of response required.

Generally, internationalization is interpreted in the form of establishing various levels of “international” education programs at local and national levels. Article 50 (3) of Law Number 20, 2003 on National Education System suggests that “central and local governments need to develop at least one unit of all levels of education to be international education programs.” Local and national governments are obliged by National Education Law to develop “international” education programs. Despite the difficulties to do so, many local and national education authorities are enthusiastic with the new challenge. They are willing to have what “international” schools or universities in their districts or provinces. At institutional level, heads of schools and rectors of universities are starting to take initiatives in order to get “international” status for their institutions and programs. Despite the simplistic interpretation, the word “internationalization” has become a new inspiration for contemporary development

of national education system in general and higher education system in particular in Indonesia.

According to Knight (2004, p. 13), internationalization of education affects policies at national and educational levels. At national level, she said, internationalization affects policies related to foreign relations, development assistance, trade, immigration, employment, science and technology, culture and heritage, education, social development, industry and commerce. At educational level, she further said, internationalization affects policies on the purpose, licensing, accreditation, funding, curriculum, teaching, research, and regulation of postsecondary education. In a narrow sense, said Knight (2004, p. 16), the policies include “those statements and directives that refer to priorities and plans related to the international dimension of the institution’s mission, purpose, values, and functions,” such as international mission statement or policies on study abroad, student recruitment, international linkages and partnerships, cross-border delivery, and international sabbaticals. In a broader sense, Knight (2004, p. 16) further said, institutional policies include statements, directives, or planning documents that address implications for or from internationalization. These education-related policies, said Knight (p. 13), directly affect all kinds of providers, including public and private, for-profit, or nonprofit providers. “Many of the policies related to the international dimensions of education,” said Knight (2004, p. 16), “will affect both the public education institutions as well as the commercially oriented private providers.”

This study finds that in Indonesia, internationalization has considerably affected policies at national and educational levels in a narrow sense. The policies have not been able to touch implications for and from internationalization, but rather have touched the technical aspects of internationalization. This study identifies that higher education authorities in Indonesia have produced eight policies related to internationalization, including policies on: (1) the conditions and procedure for foreign students, (2) international cooperation, (3) the presence of foreign institutions, (4) types, forms, and levels of international cooperation, (5) scholarship, (6) language of instruction, (7) visa for foreign students, and (8) curriculum. Below, each policy is discussed in the light of its backgrounds, contents, and objectives.

The Conditions and Procedure for Foreign Students

With its strong commitment to internationalization, higher education authority in Indonesia continues to ease conditions and procedures for foreign students who want to study in the country. Current conditions and procedures began on September 7, 1998, when Minister of Education and Culture, Juwono Sudarsono, released a ministerial decision outlining them. It is stated that the decision is made as a response to globalization and internationalization trends. The decision says: “globalization makes cooperation among higher education institutions increased and a regulation is needed to ease cooperation in higher

education sector.” It states five conditions for foreign students to study in Indonesia:

- a. fulfilling academic requirement for attending higher education in Indonesia;
- b. being accepted as a student by higher education institution;
- c. having financial resources for supporting higher education;
- d. providing certificate of physical and mental health from a medical doctor;
- e. obeying existing laws and regulations on higher education (Mendikbud 1998a).

After fulfilling these conditions, prospective foreign students can follow up their plan through five steps of procedure:

- a. apply directly to higher education institution;
- b. with a letter of acceptance from a higher education institution, a foreign student can apply for visa at Indonesian embassy or consulate in his/her own country.
- c. When the visa is granted, Attaché for educational affairs at the embassy or consulate reports or recommends the student to The General Secretary and Directorate General of Higher Education at Department of National Education.

d. After arriving in Indonesia, a foreign student needs to arrange for special staying permit for foreigners (Depdikbud 1998a).

In order to renew his/her visa, a foreign student needs to have a letter of recommendation from president or head of higher education institution where he/she studies (Depdikbud 1998a).

International Cooperation

Rizvi (2004, p. 35) suggests that internationalization of higher education involves both competition for the recruitment of students and faculty and for profits and prestige and cooperation. “Outside the compatible products, services and structure,” said Rizvi (2004, p. 25), “competition becomes a meaningless concept.” He further said that internationalization requires cooperation at the regional and global levels (Rizvi 2004, p. 35). Higher education authorities in Indonesia view international cooperation and exchange programs as integral part of internationalization. They believe that such cooperation and exchange programs can bring benefits to the future development of higher education system in the country. Jalal and Musthafa (2001, p. 214) write: “Few universities in the world, including those in Indonesia, can afford to ignore the educational, social, and cultural benefits from international university cooperation and exchange.” Similarly, Government Regulation number 57, 1998 (Article 122) suggests that “globalization increases cooperation

among nations and triggers changes in the policies of Indonesian government, including policies on education.” “The government,” the regulation further suggests, “is challenged to improve the quality of human resources for the needs of national development and to face competitions among nations in free market era” (See general explanation of PP 57 1998). It stresses that all higher education institutions are entitled to do policy changes, and develop new regulations to allow cooperation with their international counterparts (Article 122).

Despite its strong commercial motive, Jalal and Musthafa (2001) believe that international cooperation will enable higher education institutions to strengthen their knowledge capacity and broaden various aspects of their roles. In their words: “Although world-leading universities also aim at becoming a powerful knowledge industry, it should be restated that the underpinning idea of internationalization of universities is to develop a shared understanding of cultures, politics, and markets” (p. 214). For them, international collaborations could become effective mechanisms in developing a quality standard, increasing pressure for higher education authorities to have a quality standard for education, and strengthening motives for local higher education institutions to boost their academic standing to enter the global market.

Policy on the Presence of Foreign Institutions

One of the most significant changes on internationalization policies in Indonesian higher education system is regarding the permission for foreign institutions to participate in higher education programs in the country. The presence of foreign higher education institutions in Indonesia was prohibited under Article 120 of Government Regulation Number 30 1990. Eight years later, with the release of Government Regulation number 57 1998, the revised version of the 1990 regulation, foreign investors are allowed to involve in higher education sector. The general explanation of 1998 regulation further explains:

Like other levels of education programs, higher education programs really need funding, particularly for improving their quality. Therefore, higher education institutions need to be given the opportunity and need to have the capacity to develop their financial resources by various forms of investment. The aim is for higher education institutions to have sufficient financial resources for developing their programs (PP Number 57 1998).

Clearly, changing policy toward foreign investment is pushed by financial interests and a hope for quality improvement.

Despite the desperate need for international cooperation and investment in higher education programs, foreign investors are welcome with considerable cautions. Their presence is confronted with strict regulations for

assuring quality. Article 65 of the 1998 regulation states four requirements for foreign institutions to be present in Indonesia. First, they must fulfill high quality standard accredited and evaluated by Department of Education. Second, new higher education institutions must fulfill all conditions required by higher education regulation in Indonesia. Article 17 of the 1998 regulation stresses that all foreign institutions can cooperate with Indonesian HE institutions that have the same programs. The same article also stresses that foreign institutions must be accredited by their home accreditation board, and evaluated by Department of Education and Culture. Third, permission for foreign investments in education programs is given if the investment goes through a joint cooperation with local institutions and employ local staffs (Article 65 (3) of the 1998 Regulation). The same article also states that “Education programs that adopt system from other countries must obey regulations applied in that country.” The article explains that the elements of foreign education system include curriculum, evaluation system, and levels of education. Another requirement, that foreign institutions can follow regulations in their own countries of origin with official permission from higher education authority. Article 64 of 1998 Regulation states: “a unit of education that is run by representative of foreign country in the United Republic of Indonesia, for foreign students, can follow regulations applied in its country of origin with permission from the government of Republic of Indonesia” (Diknas 2003, p. 41). The fourth requirement for foreign institutions to develop

cooperation with Indonesian institution is being accredited. Article 65 (1) of number 20 law says: “Accredited or admitted foreign educational institutions can run education programs in the United Republic of Indonesia according to existing law and regulations” (Depdiknas 2003, p. 41), including law and regulations on immigration, tax, foreign investment, and labour.

Types, Forms, and Levels of International Cooperation

According to Knight (2004, p. 14), internationalization allows various aspects of research and scholarly collaboration, including area and theme centers, joint research projects, international conferences and seminars, published articles and papers, international research agreements, and research exchange programs. In Indonesian context, Jalal and Musthafa (2001, p. 265) identify some possible collaboration schemes in education, including joint-degree programs, credit earning activities, exchanges of students and teachers, and researches. They emphasize that research collaborations are important and highly potential academic venture that will have a long-term impact on both sides (p. 265). For them, one of the main objectives of international collaborations is “to assure quality” (p. 265).

In order to provide technical guidelines for international cooperation among higher education institutions, on September 7, 1998, Minister of Education and Culture, Juwono Sudarsono, released a Ministerial

Decision number 223/U/1998 on *Cooperation among Higher Education Institutions under Department of Education and Culture*. Article 1 of the decision states four types of cooperation that can be made by higher education institutions in Indonesia:

- a. with other higher education institutions in the country;
- b. with other institutions in the country;
- c. with foreign higher education institutions;
- d. with other foreign institutions; (Depdikbud 1998b).

The Ministerial Decision states that the cooperation can cover four main aspects:

- a. higher education management;
- b. education programs;
- c. research programs;
- d. social service programs (Depdikbud 1998b).

With these four areas, Article 4 of the decision says, the cooperation can take ten possible forms:

- a. management contract;
- b. twinning programs;
- c. research;
- d. social services;
- e. exchanges of teaching staffs or students for academic activities;

- f. sharing resources for academic activities;
- g. credit transfer;
- h. joint publication;
- i. hosting scientific events together;
- j. other relevant forms of necessary cooperation (Depdikbud 1998b).

Some forms of cooperation programs, such as foreign language study, internationalized curricula, areas or thematic studies, work/study abroad, international students, teaching/learning process, joint/double degree programs, cross-cultural training, faculty/staff mobility programs, and visiting lecturers and scholars are not explicitly mentioned in the regulation. However, the last point of the above list indicates that other forms of program cooperation can be adopted where and when possible.

Article 5 of the 1998 Ministerial Decision stresses that “cooperation among higher education can only be made at institutional level with full responsibility of the Director, Chair, or Rector in charge” (Depdikbud 1998b). In the case of national cooperation, the managers/leaders will only need to report their cooperation programs to the Minister (Article 6, Kepmendikbud 1998b). In the case of international cooperation, managers/leaders of Indonesian higher education institutions need an approval from the Minister of Education or other ministers in charge. Every higher education institution that wants to develop cooperation with other institutions will need to write a

proposal and send it to the Director General of Higher Education (DGHE) and the proposal will be considered only if it:

- a. does not oppose national interests and existing regulations;
- b. does not disturb policies on national development and security, and is beneficial to the society;
- c. does have similar and accredited program for foreign HE institutions;¹⁰
- d. being among prioritized programs, such as technology, economy, and management (Article 7, Kepmendikbud 1998b).

Clearly, all types and levels of international academic cooperation must be adapted to priority program, must not disturb national security, and may not oppose or be in conflict with national interests as well as national higher

¹⁰ On April 16, 2003, Director General of Higher Education released an open announcement that warns Indonesian society not to participate in illegals degree programs introduced under international names, including: Harvard International University, World Association of Universities and Colleges, American World University, Northern California Global University, Edtracon International Institute, Institute of Business & Management "Global", American Management University, American Global University, American International Institute of Management and Technology, Jakarta Institute of Management Studies (JIMS), Distance Learning Institute (DLI), AIMS School of Business Law, Washington International University, American Institute of Management Studies, International Distance Learning Program (IDL), San Pedro College of Business Administration, Kennedy Western University, University of Berkeley, Berkeley International University, American Genesco University, Chicago International University, and the others (Dirjen Dikti 2003a).

education policies. In other words, academic activities run under national and international cooperation need to follow all regulations applied for higher education institutions in Indonesia. The regulations include:

1. providing minimal requirements for teaching staffs and facilities required for a study program;
2. the program must be an academic one, including undergraduate program (S1), master (S2), doctorate (S3), and professional program, including training, diploma, and specialist.
3. fulfilling credit load required for every level of education;
4. taking national curriculum as a guideline;
5. providing titles and certificate relevant to titles and certificate relevant to HE system in Indonesia (Article 8, Kepmendikbud 1998b).

International cooperation can be developed in the form of management contract with existing higher education institutions in Indonesia or establish a new higher education institution by sharing with their counterparts in Indonesia through the establishment of private organizations, such as foundation, social group, and/or endowment (Article 9, Kepmendikbud 1998b). The establishment of such institutions must fulfill all conditions required by higher education law in Indonesia (Article 9, Kepmendikbud 1998b). Graduates of higher education institutions run under such a cooperation will be entitled to

have both Indonesian title/certificate and title/certificate from foreign institution in charge (Article 9, Kepmendikbud 1998b). For this purpose, special arrangement for credit transfer and mutual credit recognition needs to be made by both sides (Article 10, Kepmendikbud 1998b).

Another area of international cooperation is in the form of twinning programs. In this regard, Article 11 of Kepmendikbud 1998b states that all policies involved must follow three principles. First, “foreign institutions that involved in twinning program with Indonesian institutions are required to provide educational assistance, so that the graduates are qualified for both Indonesian and foreign institutions.” Second, “for their graduates to gain Indonesian recognition, students studying in foreign institutions must comply 30% of study load,” and third, students of twinning programs gain titles from both Indonesian and foreign institutions.

For research cooperation between Indonesian higher education institutions and their foreign counterparts to take place, research proposals must be approved by all relevant departments and the objectives of the research must be relevant to existing regulations (Article 12, Kepmendikbud 1998b).

So, although being highly expected and welcome, international academic cooperation in Indonesia are highly selected and regulated. They need to fulfill stated requirements, gain approval from relevant bodies, and follow existing regulations. Although highly selected and

regulated, many higher education institutions in Indonesia have been able to develop international cooperation. Such cooperations are growing at institutional and national levels, especially among four top universities, including UGM (Universitas Gadjahmada), UI (Universitas Indonesia), ITB (Institut Teknologi Bandung), and IPB (Institut Pertanian Bogor). These universities are among 17 members of ASEAN University Network (AUN), representing 10 ASEAN countries. They have been able to develop international cooperation with their counterparts in Asia, Europe, and the USA.

Scholarship

Unlike its neighbors, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam, where talented students are sent to study overseas with national budget, Indonesia has not been able to do so. Indonesian government provides very limited scholarship for studying overseas from national budget. Such scholarships are mostly dependent on foreign providers, such as AusAid, The British Council, JICA, Fulbright, Ford Foundation, Asia Foundation, and Toyota Foundation. Table 18 shows that the biggest scholarship provider for Indonesian students overseas in 1998/1999 is Australia, followed by Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Austria, USA, England, and Canada.

Table 18*Major Scholarship Provided for Indonesian Students Overseas*

Number	Scholarship Providers	Number of Scholarship/Student/Year
1	Australia	110
2	Germany	37
3	Japan	48
4	New Zealand	20
5	Austria	10
6	United States of America	10
7	England	5
8	Canada	10
9	Others	10

(Dikti 2006, p. 2).

Since scholarship provision for studying overseas is mostly dependent on foreign sponsors, the amount of scholarship available from year to year are not based on need assessment, but on scholarship policy made by the sponsors. Since such a policy is connected to the social, political, and diplomatic interests of the sponsors, the number of scholarship available from year to year is based on the social, political, and diplomatic assessment of the sponsors.

The 1998 economic crisis caused financial difficulties among 10-15% of university students in Indonesia (Dikti 2006, p. 1) and inspired new scholarship policy. Directorate General of Higher Education (DGHE) introduced scholarship program for domestic and international students of undergraduate and postgraduate programs. For domestic students, DGHE provides five different categories of financial aids, including scholarship for academic

achievement, working scholarship, student credit, society-based scholarship, and scholarship for graduate studies. For the teachings staffs of public and private universities who study overseas, DGHE provided US\$ 20,000 – 25,000/person/year to cover their living cost and tuition fees. An announcement released by DGHE says that the scholarship is taken, not from national budget, but from international loan and foreign aid. In 1998/1999 academic year, DGHE provided scholarship for 670 teaching staffs who study in more than 20 different countries with scholarship from respective countries.

Language of Instruction

Language of instruction seems to be an important and sensitive issue in the contemporary development of internationalization policies in Indonesia. It involves discussions of national identity, culture, pride, and interests. On May 2, 1998, President Soeharto signed Government Regulation (GR) Number 57 1998 on the Revision of GR number 30 1990 regarding Higher Education. Article 7 (1) of the 1998 regulation states that “higher education is run with Bahasa Indonesia as the language of instruction.” Local language and foreign language, the same Article says, can also be used if needed for certain aspects of knowledge, training, and/or skills. In line with this 1998 regulation, Act number 20, 2003 on National Education System (see Chapter VII) allows three possible languages for the medium of instruction: Bahasa Indonesia, local language, and foreign

languages. Article 33 of the Act makes it very clear that “Bahasa Indonesia as the language of the nation shall be the medium of instruction in the national education.” In the early stages of education, however, the use of local language as a medium of instruction is acceptable, especially for delivering particular knowledge and/or skills. The same Article says: “A foreign language can be used as a medium of instruction [at elementary and secondary schools] to support the competency of the learners.” For higher education, the same Article mentions that foreign languages, such as English, is allowed to be used as a language of instruction for the maximum of 50% of all study loads. The use of English for more than 50% of study load will require written permission from Minister of Education (Article 13, Kepmendikbud 1998b). For higher education programs that use foreign language as a language of instruction, Bahasa Indonesia must be provided for at least 4 (four) credits (Article 14, Kepmendikbud 1998b).

The use of foreign language as a language of instruction seems to be an important aspect of the concept of internationalization in Indonesian higher education system. Despite strong emphasis on the importance of using the national language, Bahasa Indonesia, as the language of instruction, the use of foreign language at higher education level is possible. Strong emphasis on the use of Bahasa Indonesia as the language of instruction for higher education programs may be a good way to maintain the importance of the national language in academic activities. However, the use of national language as the language of

instruction for higher education programs has created language difficulties for internationalization. Indonesian students who want to study overseas, especially in English speaking countries such as Australia, Canada, USA, and United Kingdom as well as in countries where English is used as the language of instruction need to work very hard to fulfill language requirement in the forms of TOFL or IELTS scores. They can not even study well in some ASEAN countries where higher education institutions use English as the language of instruction. In Brunei Darussalam, for example, Indonesian Ambassador, Yusbar Djamil, admits that English has been a major constraint for Indonesian students who study at Universiti Brunei Darussalam (UBD) where the language of instruction is English (see *Republika*, October 8, 2004). Similar difficulty is also faced by Indonesian students in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippine. Lack of English proficiency among Indonesian academics has also been a major constraint for Indonesian higher education institutions to develop international academic cooperation.

Above all, the limited use of English as the language of instruction at Indonesian universities has created difficulties for the outflows and inflows of international students in the country. Lack of English proficiency seems to have been one of the main obstacles for Indonesian students to study overseas. In the same way, lack of proficiency in Bahasa Indonesia makes it difficult for foreign students to do academic programs in Indonesia. Indonesian universities need to develop special language policies to allow foreign

students to join their programs. Institut Pertanian Bogor (ITB), for example, required foreign students to study Bahasa Indonesian for four semesters before they can commence their courses (see *Republika*, October 8, 2004). Certainly, limited use of English and lack of English proficiency reduce the opportunity and capacity for Indonesian academics to develop and implement internationalization policies at global level.

Visa for Foreign Students

As part of its commitment to internationalization, Indonesian government develops a special visa policy for international students who want to study in the country. Referring to a letter from Director General of Immigration number F.IZ.10-1214, General Secretary of Department of Education, Bambang Soehendro, released official announcement number 3765/D/T/1998 that introduces what he describes as a “simple” visa procedure for foreign students. The announcement states 6 steps to be taken by foreign students to get Visa study in Indonesia:

1. Get a letter of acceptance from an Indonesian higher education institution.
2. With a letter of acceptance in hand, get Social-Cultural Visiting Visa direct from the nearest Indonesian embassy or consulate.
3. With a letter of acceptance and the Visa, come to Indonesia and begin your study.

4. While studying, organize required letters of recommendation and send them to International Cooperation Bureau of the Directorate General of HE in Jakarta.
5. After four months, convert your Visa from short visiting Visa to limited staying Visa.
6. Organize the limited staying Visa at Immigration Office without necessarily needing letters of agreement from the regional office of justice or Directorate General of Immigration (Dikti 1998).

It can be understood from the six steps that there are two stages of Visa that need to be arranged by foreign students before commencing their study in Indonesia: Social Cultural Short Visiting Visa and Limited Staying Visa. Directorate General of Higher Education or DGHE (Dikti 1998) claims that this Visa procedure is made very simple, so that foreign students can start their study in Indonesia on time and are able to organize their Limited Staying Visa easily.

In 2001, three years after the announcement, Director of DGHE, Satriyo Soemantri Brodjonegoro, released a letter stating some aspects of the rationales for foreign students in Indonesia and sent it to all university Rectors. “In order to anticipate the growing number of foreign students in Indonesia,” the letter says, “there must be some rules and guidelines” (Dikti 2001). The first part of the letter provides five rationales for foreign students in Indonesia:

1. State Higher Education has the mission to provide broader access to higher education for Indonesian citizens.
2. State Higher Education Institutions are subsidized by government with development fund taken from the society.
3. The presence of foreign students at State Higher Education Institutions must not reduce access for Indonesian citizens to higher education and foreign students are not supposed to benefit from government subsidies.
4. For its reputation, state higher education institutions must not accept foreign students who are not qualified in their own countries.
5. The presence of foreign students on the campuses of state higher education institutions must be carefully and proportionally managed, so that no exclusivism, frictions, and conflicts on campuses (Dikti 2001).

The rationales suggest that domestic students must be the first priority in higher education accesses, foreign students must be selected, and special management approach needs to be developed for international students. Satriyo's letter also states some rules for foreign students in Indonesia:

1. Maximum proportion of foreign students in every study programs at PTN is 10%.

2. There is no special treatment and dispensation for foreign students. They must fulfil academic criteria as required to domestic students.
3. Tuition fee for foreign students must be calculated in such a way, so that it covers all their own costs. The amount can be between 10 to 15 million Rupiah per academic year.
4. Acceptance for foreign students must consider item 4 and 5 of the rationales (Dikti 2001).

Despite the “simple” procedure for Visa, international students in Indonesia are facing issues of priority, proportion, quality, fee, and culture.

In particular, letter of the Director of DGHE states that no “Student Visa” is available for international students.¹¹ This means that international students must rely on Limited Staying Visa throughout their study in Indonesia. Unlike Student Visa that can be organized once in the commencement of studies, Limited Staying Visa requires yearly renewal. Therefore, despite the “simple” Visa procedure in the beginning of their study, international students in Indonesia need to be cautious about their Visa throughout their studies. With these rationales and rules, it can be said that the presence of foreign students in Indonesia is highly expected with many cautions.

¹¹ What makes it more difficult for foreign students, that some universities require “Student Visa” as one of the conditions that must be fulfilled by international students. This can be seen in registration form for international students provided by IPB that is available on <http://www.ipb.ac.id/ipb-bhmn/registrasi/mhsasing.php>

Curriculum

Curriculum is a central issue in the contemporary development of National Education in Indonesia, particularly with regard to internationalization policies. Curriculum has been seen as an important aspect of the characteristics of national education that must be relevant to and integrated with the principles of national education system and national interests. Article 36 of Act Number 20 2003 on National Education System states that “curriculum development is based on national education standards for the pursuit of national education goals.” The same Article also states that “the curriculum at all educational levels and types of education is developed according to the principles of diversifications, adjusted to the units of education, local and learners’ potential.” Among the basic principles that must be represented in the curriculum are:

- a. the enhancement of faith and piety;
- b. the enhancement of noble character;
- c. the enhancement of learners' potential, intellect, and interests;
- d. the diversity of the region's potential and environment;
- e. demand for regional and national development;
- f. requirement of labor market;
- g. development in science, technology, and arts;
- h. religion;

- i. the dynamic of global development; and
- j. the national unity and nation's values (Article 36, Act number 20, 2003).

There is a significant difference between policies on curriculum for elementary and secondary education and policies on curriculum for higher education. The first difference is regarding procedure for curriculum development. Curriculum framework and structure for basic and secondary education is determined by the government and shall be developed in accordance with its relevance by each educational cluster or unit and school/Madrasah committee. Curriculum development is coordinated and supervised by the Ministry of National Education or the Ministry of Religious Affairs at the district/city levels for basic education, and at the provincial level for secondary education. For higher education, curriculum development is autonomous. It is left to each institution and must take into consideration national standards of education for each program of study. Each higher education institution determines the basic frameworks and structure of its curriculum.

Rizvi et al. (2005, p. 37) observes that “there has been more rhetoric about the need to rethink issues of curriculum in light of changes represented by globalization than actual changes in practice.” This observation seems to be relevant to the case of curriculum for higher education in Indonesia. Although there have been significant changes in pedagogical approaches, higher education curriculum in

Indonesia remains remarkably unaltered. There have been very limited initiatives in curriculum development. The most important curriculum initiatives in respond to globalization seem to be the teaching of Information Communication Technology (ICT), computer, and foreign languages, such as English, Arabic, Japanese, and Franc as compulsory or optional subjects. World Bank Data Group suggests that in 1995 Indonesia use only 2.1% of its GDP on ICT and in 2001 only 2.2% of the GDP was on ICT. World Bank Group Data also suggests that in 1995, there were only 22,100 computers in Indonesian education. In 2001 the number increases to 58,500 and in 2002 the number becomes 58,593.

The second difference is regarding the number of compulsory subjects included in the curriculum. Article 37 of Act Number 20, 2003 states that curriculum for basic and secondary education must include 12 compulsory subjects, including:

- a. Religious education
- b. Civic education
- c. Language
- d. Mathematics
- e. Science
- f. Social sciences
- g. Art and culture
- h. Physical education and sports
- i. Vocational skills and

j. Local content.

For higher education institutions, there are only three compulsory subjects: religious education, civic education, and language. Only religious and civic educations are compulsory for all levels of education. Article 12 (1) of Law Number 20, 2003 on National Education System states that students [at all levels of education] are entitled to “gain religious education suitable to their own religions and taught by teachers of the same religions.” However, this Article does not seem to be applicable for foreign students. Article 65 (2) of Law Number 20, 2003 states: “Foreign educational institutions at elementary and secondary levels are required to provide religious and civic education for students of Indonesian citizens.” Since university leaders are given the autonomy to develop their own curriculums, the reality about religious education can be different. Some universities require international students to take religious subjects. At Agriculture Institute in Bogor (IPB), for example, compulsory subjects for international students include Bahasa Indonesia, English (for non English speaker), Religious Education (for relevant religious group), Introduction to agriculture, and Sport and Art.

Approaches to Internationalization

According to Knight (2004, p. 18), an approach to internationalization “reflects or characterizes the values,

priorities, and actions that are exhibited during the work toward implementing internationalization.” It indicates “the manner in which internationalization is being conceptualized and implemented” (Knight 2004, p. 18). Approaches, said Knight (2004, p. 18), are not fixed, changeable, combinable, transitional, and can be seen at two levels: national or sectoral and institutional or provider levels. At national level, said Knight (2004, p. 18), approaches to internationalization can be seen in terms of programs, rationales, ad hoc, policy, and strategic. In term of program, internationalization “is seen in terms of providing funded programs that facilitate institutions and individuals to have opportunities to engage in international activities such as mobility, research, and linkages” (p. 19). In term of rationale, internationalization of higher education “is presented in terms of why it is important that national higher education sector become more international” (p. 19). “Rationales,” said Knight (p. 19), “vary enormously and can handle human resource development, strategic alliances, commercial trade, nation building, and social/cultural development.” In term of ad hoc, internationalization of higher education “is treated as an ad hoc or reactive response to the many opportunities that are being presented for international delivery, mobility, and cooperation in postsecondary education” (Knight 2004, p. 19). In term of policy, internationalization of higher education “is described in terms of policies that address or emphasize the importance of the international or intercultural dimension in postsecondary education” (p. 19).

“Policies,” said Knight, “can be from a variety of sectors, for example, education, foreign affairs, science and technology, culture, or trade” (p. 19). In term of strategic, internationalization of higher education “is considered to be a key element of national strategy to achieve a country’s goals and priorities both domestically and internationally” (p. 19). These approaches, she further said, “are not mutually exclusive categories, nor are they presented in any particular or progressive order. They are merely descriptions of dominant features of the general ways that a country or the education sector has decided to proceed with internationalization” (Knight 2004, p. 18).

At institutional level, approaches to internationalization of higher education can be seen in terms of activity, outcomes, rationales, process, at home, and abroad (cross-border). In term of activity, internationalization “is described in terms of activities such as study abroad, curriculum and academic programs, institutional linkages and networks, development projects, and branch campuses” (Knight 2004, p. 20). In term of outcome, “internationalization is presented in the form of desired outcomes such as student competencies, increased profile, more international agreements, and partners or projects” (p. 20). In term of rationale, “internationalization is described with respect to the primary motivations or rationales driving it. This can include academic standards, income generation, cultural diversity, and student and staff development” (p. 20). In term of process, “internationalization is considered to be a process where an

international dimension is integrated into teaching, learning, and service functions of the institution” (p. 20). At home, “internationalization is interpreted to be the creation of a culture or climate on campus that promotes and supports international/intercultural understanding and focuses on campus-based activities” (p. 20). Abroad, “internationalization is seen as the cross-border delivery of education to other countries through a variety of delivery modes (face to face, distance, e-learning) and through different administrative arrangements (franchises, twinning, branch campuses, etc)” (p. 20).

In Indonesia, approaches to internationalization reflect a mixture of national, academic, and economic values, priorities, and actions. Internationalization policies are conceptualized and implemented within the framework of these values, priorities, and actions. The approaches have been changing, combining, and shifting at national and institutional levels, producing certain programs, rationales, policies, and strategies. The approaches are showing the dominant features of the general ways that higher education authorities in Indonesia decide to respond to global challenges and opportunities and pave the way for internationalization. Academically, internationalization has been designed to pave the way for Indonesian academicians and higher education institutions to involve in international activities and cooperation, allow foreign academicians and institutions to participate in the development of national higher education system, raise academic standards, and enable the transfer of relevant knowledge and skills from

world class higher education institutions and scholars. Nationally, internationalization has been designed to broaden opportunities for Indonesian students and academic staffs to gain foreign experiences and achieve higher academic standards, so that the country can have human resource with international qualification in various areas of expertise. Such a human resource is believed to be a fundamental requirement for the future of nation building and social/cultural development in the country. Economically, internationalization of higher education system in Indonesia has been designed to open more opportunities for academicians and their institutions to bring their activities to international level by which they can develop more revenues for fulfilling their financial needs and support their academic programs. In particular, internationalization policies has been made to produce more quality professionals who can support the country's economy.

Rationales to Internationalization

“Traditionally,” said Knight and de Wit (1999), the rationales driving internationalization have been presented in four groups: social/cultural (national cultural identity, intercultural understanding, citizenship development, social and community development), political (foreign policy, national security, technical assistance, peace and mutual understanding, national identity, and regional identity), economic (economic growth and competitiveness, labor

market, and financial incentives, academic (international dimension to research and teaching, extension of academic horizon, institutional building, profile and status, enhancement of quality, and international academic standards) (quoted in Knight 2004, p. 21). According to Knight, some new rationales for internationalization are emerging at national and institutional levels. At national level, the new emerging rationales include “human resource development, strategic alliances, commercial trade, national building, and social/cultural development” (Knight 2004, p. 23). At institutional level, the new emerging rationales include “international branding and profile, income generation, student and staff development, strategic alliances, and knowledge production” (Knight 2004, p. 23).

In term of strategic alliances, “the international mobility of students and academics as well as collaborative research and education initiatives are being seen as productive ways to develop closer geopolitical ties and economic relationship” (Knight 2004, p. 23). In term of commercial trade, “more emphasis has been placed on economic and income-generating opportunities attached to cross-border delivery of education” with the development of new franchise agreements, foreign or satellite campuses, online delivery, and increased recruitment of fee-paying students (Knight 2004, p. 24). In term of national building, educational programs and institutions are imported for nation-building purposes. An educated, trained, and knowledgeable citizenry and a workforce able to do research and generate new knowledge are seen as key

components of a country's nation-building agenda (Knight 2004, p. 24). In term of social and cultural development, internationalization of higher education is seen as a means to promote national cultural identity (Knight 2004, p. 25).

In Indonesia, internationalization has culturally been driven by a need to intensify citizenship, social, and community development. It is expected to open the opportunity for students and academic staffs to engage with social and cultural activities at international level. Politically, internationalization has been driven by a need to engage with international institutions and gain their conceptual as well as technical assistances useful for nation building. Economically, internationalization in Indonesia has been triggered by a desperate need to allow Indonesian youths to adopt relevant knowledge and skills with international level of quality to compete in global labor market. It is also motivated by a need to gain financial supports from international donators, stimulate privatization, and invite national and international investments in educational sectors. Academically, internationalization in Indonesia has been inspired by a willingness to develop the international dimension of research and teaching, extend academic horizon, build new academic institutions, enhance academic quality, and internationalize academic standards. What Knight considers as new rationales, such as a need for human resource development, national building, social/cultural development, and student and staff development has also

reasonably been involved in the development of internationalization in Indonesian higher education system.

The Dynamics of International Students' Circulation

This section aims to discuss the dynamics of international students' circulation in Indonesian context based on statistical data provided by Open Policy document, Directorate General of Higher Education (DGHE) of National Education Department, Republic of Indonesia, and other sources. Data on the outflows mainly based on the number of graduates who have reported their graduation to DGHE and legalize their certificates. The data does not, therefore, include forthcoming and ongoing students as well as graduates who have not reported their graduation or legalize their certificates. Discussion will focus on the outflow and inflow trends of international students' circulation.

Outflow Trends

Discussion on the outflow trend is focused on the main destinations of Indonesian student studying overseas with particular attention on the countries, institutions, and study programs that they choose. The discussion is expected to provide an overview of most favorable countries, institutions, and programs for Indonesian students all around the world. The overview is expected to provide a better understanding of Indonesian's position in the

dynamics of international students' circulation all around the world.

Table 19 shows top fifteenth destinations of Indonesian students all around the world. The table shows that the most popular destination for Indonesian students in the world is the USA. Data published by Open Door Policy project (Table 20) shows that, from 2002/03 to 2003/04 Indonesia is the tenth biggest sender of international students, representing 1.6% of total international students in the USA. In last five years, the number of Indonesian students in the USA is decreasing. Total number of Indonesian students in 2002/03 academic year in the USA was 10,432. In the following academic year, 2003/04, the number decreased 14.9% and become 8,880 students.

Table 19

Top Fifteenth Destination for Indonesian Students in the World

Number	Countries of Destination	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	United States of America	9671
02	Australia	6686
03	United Kingdom	3048
04	Germany	2244
05	Netherlands	1890
06	France	1747
07	Malaysia	1110
08	Canada	906
09	India	802
10	New Zealand	410
11	Egypt	116
12	Singapore	114
13	Austria	113
14	Pakistan	93

15	China	61
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(Dikti 2006).

Table 20
*Tenth Biggest Sender of International Students in USA
from 2002/03 to 2003/04*

Rank	Place of Origin	2002/03	2003/04	2003/04 % Change	% of Int'l Student Total
	World Total	586,323	572,509	-2.4	
1	India	74,603	79,736	6.9	13.9
2	China	64,757	61,765	-4.6	10.8
3	Korea, Republic of	51,519	52,484	1.9	9.2
4	Japan	45,960	40,835	-11.2	7.1
5	Canada	26,513	27,017	1.9	4.7
6	Taiwan	28,017	26,178	-6.6	4.6
7	Mexico	12,801	13,329	4.1	2.3
8	Turkey	11,601	11,398	-1.7	2.0
9	Thailand	9,982	8,937	-10.5	1.6
10	Indonesia	10,432	8,880	-14.9	1.6

(Chin 2004, p. 8).

Among its Southeast Asian neighbors, Indonesia is the second largest sender of international students in the USA. The largest sender is Thailand, followed by Malaysia as the third largest sender, Singapore as the fourth largest sender, and Philippine as the fifth largest sender. (see Table 21).

Table 21
*Southeast Asian Origin of International Students in USA from
2002/03 to 2003/04 Academic Year and Its Percentage of Change*

Place of Origin	2002/03	2003/04	% Change
Brunei	17	13	-23.5
Cambodia	329	330	0.3
East Timor	4	8	100.0
Indonesia	10,432	8,880	-14.9
Laos	108	65	-39.8
Malaysia	6,595	6,483	-1.7
Myanmar	870	691	-20.6
Philippines	3,576	3,467	-3.0
Singapore	4,189	3,955	-5.6
Thailand	9,982	8,937	-10.5
Vietnam	2,722	3,165	16.3
Southeast Asia Unspecified	41	0	-100.0
Southeast Asia	38,865	35,994	-7.4

(Chin 2004, p. 27).

Table 22 shows that more than 70 per cent of Indonesian students in the USA do undergraduate studies. Only 24.7% of them do graduate studies. The rest (5.0%) do other programs, such as short courses in language and other non-degree programs.

Table 22
Southeast Asian Students in USA at Undergraduate and Graduate Levels

Country of Origin	Under-Graduate	% Under-Graduate	Graduate	% Graduate	Other	% Other	Total
Brunei	7	53.8	5	38.5	1	7.7	13
Cambodia	240	72.7	62	18.8	28	8.5	330
East Timor	6	75.0	2	25.0	0	0.0	8
Indonesia	6,249	70.4	2,190	24.7	441	5.0	8,880
Laos	48	73.8	10	15.4	7	10.8	65

Malaysia	4,543	70.1	1,731	26.7	209	3.2	6,483
Myanmar	501	72.5	167	24.2	23	3.3	691
Philippines	1,911	55.1	1,368	39.5	188	5.4	3,467
Singapore	2,170	54.9	1,590	40.2	195	4.9	3,955
Thailand	2,464	27.6	5,708	63.9	765	8.6	8,937
Vietnam	2,226	70.3	815	25.8	124	3.9	3,165
Southeast Asia	20,365	56.6	13,648	37.9	1,981	5.5	35,994

(Chin 2004, p. 31).

In 2003/04 academic year, Indonesia was on the 13th rank of top 20 international students in the USA by institutional types. See Table 23.

Table 23

Top 20 International Students for Doctoral/Research Extensive and Intensive 2003/04 in USA

Rank	Place of Origin	% of Enrollment
1	India	17.5
2	China	14.5
3	Korea, Republic of	9.7
4	Japan	4.6
5	Taiwan	4.6
6	Canada	4.3
7	Turkey	2.2
8	Mexico	2.1
9	Germany	1.6
10	Thailand	1.5
11	United Kingdom	1.5
12	France	1.4
13	Indonesia	1.4
14	Malaysia	1.3
15	Brazil	1.2
16	Hong Kong	1.1
17	Pakistan	1.1

18	Colombia	1.1
19	Russia	1.0
20	Singapore	0.9
Total		354,839

(Chin 2004, p. 41).

Table 24 shows that Indonesia send only 1.9% of Master students in the USA. The percentage is a lot smaller than the percentage of Master students from other developing countries that have much smaller population, such as Mexico (2.4%), Taiwan (6.0%), and Kenya (2.4%).

Table 24

Top 20 International Students for Master's I and II, 2003/04 in USA

Rank	Place of Origin	% of Enrollment
1	India	12.3
2	Japan	10.1
3	Taiwan	6.0
4	Korea, Republic of	5.9
5	China	5.6
6	Canada	4.7
7	Kenya	2.4
8	Mexico	2.4
9	Thailand	2.0
10	Turkey	2.0
11	Indonesia	1.9
12	Nigeria	1.7
13	Pakistan	1.7
14	Germany	1.6
15	Nepal	1.6
16	United Kingdom	1.4
17	Brazil	1.3
18	Colombia	1.1
19	Russia	1.1
20	Hongkong	1.1

Total		93,687
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(Chin 2004, p. 41).

Although 6.249 (70.4%) of Indonesian students in the USA do undergraduate studies, their number far below the number of undergraduate students from other developing countries. Indonesia does not belong to the top 20 senders of international undergraduate students in the USA. See Table 25.

Table 25

Top 20 International Students for Baccalaureate I and II, Baccalaureate/Associate's, 2003/04 in USA

Rank	Place of Origin	% of Enrollment
1	Japan	10.2
2	Canada	10.1
3	Korea, Republic of	6.4
4	India	5.0
5	China	2.6
6	Bulgaria	2.4
7	United Kingdom	2.3
8	Kenya	2.2
9	Nepal	2.2
10	Jamaica	2.2
11	Taiwan	2.1
12	Ghana	2.1
13	Trinidad & Tobago	2.0
14	Brazil	1.7
15	Pakistan	1.7
16	Germany	1.6
17	Nigeria	1.6
18	Mexico	1.5
19	Bahamas	1.5

20	Turkey	1.1
Total		25,376

(Chin 2004, p. 41)

In 2003/04 academic year, Indonesia is on rank 11 of top 20 senders, representing 2.2% of total students of Associate Programs in the USA (75,830). The rank is below other smaller developing countries like Kenya (2.7%), Columbia (3.0%), and Mexico (4.0%). Although with much smaller number of population than Indonesia, Japan represents 15.3% of total Associate's students in the USA in 2003/04 academic year (Table 26).

Table 26

Top 20 International Students for Associate's, 2003/04 in USA

Rank	Place of Origin	% of Enrollment
1	Japan	15.3
2	Korea, Republic of	9.1
3	Mexico	4.0
4	Taiwan	3.2
5	China	3.1
6	Colombia	3.0
7	India	2.9
8	Kenya	2.7
9	Hongkong	2.5
10	Canada	2.4
11	Indonesia	2.2
12	Brazil	2.1
13	Venezuela	2.1
14	Pakistan	1.8
15	Jamaica	1.8
16	Peru	1.6

17	Vietnam	1.4
18	Turkey	1.3
19	Nigeria	1.3
20	Poland	1.3
Total		75,830

(Chin 2004, p. 41).

For other institutions, such as English courses and other non-degree programs, Indonesia is on rank 8 of top 20 senders of international students in the USA. It contributes 2.0% of enrolment. In this regard, the percentage of Indonesian students is also far below the percentage of students from other countries with much smaller population such as Japan (6.8%) and Taiwan (5.6). See Table 27.

Table 27

Top 20 International Students for Other Institutions, 2003/04 in USA

Rank	Place of Origin	% of Enrollment
1	Korea, Republic of	17.6
2	Canada	13.0
3	India	7.3
4	Japan	6.8
5	Taiwan	5.6
6	China	5.2
7	Thailand	2.2
8	Indonesia	2.0
9	Kenya	1.7
10	Mexico	1.6
11	United Kingdom	1.5
12	Germany	1.5
13	Brazil	1.4
14	Turkey	1.3

15	Colombia	1.3
16	Israel	1.0
17	Venezuela	1.0
18	Philippines	0.9
19	Malaysia	0.9
20	Hong Kong	0.9
Total		22,777

(Chin 2004, p. 41).

Table 28 shows that Indonesia is one of the biggest senders of students for Intensive English Program (IEP) in the USA, representing 153 out of total 1,442 students from Southeast Asia.

Table 28

Origin of IEP Students in USA for Southeast Asia Region, 2003

Place of Origin	2003 Students	2003 Student-Weeks
Brunei	0	0
Cambodia	23	362
Indonesia	153	1,905
Laos	6	80
Malaysia	31	422
Myanmar	17	310
Philippines	22	547
Singapore	2	45
Thailand	943	12,899
Vietnam	245	2,857
Total	1,442	19,427

(Chin 2004, p. 72).

The most popular university of destination for Indonesian students in the USA is University of Wisconsin-Madison, followed by University of Southern California, and Sam Houston State University (Table 29). None of the top

ten universities of destination for Indonesian students in the USA belongs to top ten categories.¹² This implies that Indonesian students in the USA are not among the best achievers in US higher education institutions.

Table 29

Top Ten Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in United States of America

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	University of Wisconsin-Madison	326
02	University of Southern California	255
03	Sam Houston State University	246
04	University of Kentucky	221
05	University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign	213
06	Michigan State University	186
07	The Ohio State University	170
08	University of Pittsburg	159
09	IOWA State University	137
10	Texas A&M University	128

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

Beside the USA, Canada is also a popular destination for Indonesian students in North America with McGill University, the University of Manitoba, and the University of New Brunswich as the top three most popular choices. See Table 30.

¹² See Table 64.

Table 30

Top Ten Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in Canada

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	McGill University	110
02	The University of Manitoba	91
03	The University of New Brunswick	59
04	The University of British Columbia	57
05	Simon Fraser University	51
06	Carleton University	41
07	The University of Waterloo	40
08	Memorial University of New Foundland	33
09	The University of Saskatchewan	32
10	Concordia University	31

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

The second most popular destination for Indonesian students all around the world is Australia. Table 31 shows that The University of New South Wales, The University of Queensland, and Curtin University of Technology are the top three most favorable destinations for Indonesian students in Australia.

Table 31

*Top Ten Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in
Australia*

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	The University of New South Wales	1020
02	The University of Queensland	497
03	Curtin University of Technology	469
04	Monash University	445
05	University of Wollongong	338
06	The University of Melbourne	333
07	Australian National University	309
08	The University of Sydney	304
09	The Flinders University of South Australia	243
10	The University of New England	218

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

Australia's neighbor, New Zealand, is also a popular destination for Indonesian students with The University of Auckland, Victoria University of Wellington, and Massey University among three most popular choices of university (Table 32).

Table 32

*Top Five Universities of Indonesian Students' Destination in
New Zealand*

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	The University of Auckland	85
02	Victoria University of Wellington	79
03	Massey University	76
04	University of Canterbury	47
05	University of Waikato	42

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

In Europe, the most popular destination for Indonesian students is United Kingdom, followed by Germany, Netherlands, France, Italy, and Austria.

In United Kingdom, Table 33 shows, University of London, University of Birmingham, and University of Leeds are among three most popular choices of university for Indonesian students in the United Kingdom.

Table 33

*Top Ten Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in
United Kingdom*

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	University of London	306
02	University of Birmingham	280
03	University of Leeds	236
04	University of Newcastle- Upon-Tyne	156

05	University of Wales	150
06	University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology	147
07	University of Strathclyde	127
08	University of Reading	111
09	University of Sheffield	75
10	University of Salford	70

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

In Germany, Table 34 shows, the most popular choice of destination for Indonesian students is George August Universitat Zu Gottingen, followed by Berlin Technische Universitat as the second most popular university, and Rheinisch West Falische Technische Hochschule as the third most popular one.

Table 34

Top Ten Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in Germany

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	George August Universitat Zu Gottingen	222
02	Berlin Technische Universitat	158
03	Rheinisch West Falische Technische Hochschule	111
04	Hamburg Universitat	108
05	Berlin Freie Universitat	96
06	Justus Liebig Universitat Giessen	84
07	Stuttgart Universitas	67

08	Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitat	63
09	Fachhochschule Koln Universitat Applied Science	61
10	Darmstadt Technische Hochschule	60

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

In The Netherlands, The Delf the Netherland , International Institute for Aerospace Survey and Earth, and Delf University of Technology are among top three most popular destination for Indonesian students. See Table 35.

Table 35

Top Ten Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in Netherlands

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	The Delf the Netherland	490
02	International Institute for Aerospace Survey and Earth	254
03	Delf University of Technology	231
04	International Institute for Hydraulic	211
05	Erasmus University Rotterdam	93
06	International Institute Infrastructural Hydraulic	71
07	Leiden University	46
08	Berlage Institute	40
09	Hogesschool van	39

	Utrecht	
10	Haagse Hogeschool	29

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

In France, Table 36 shows, the most popular destination for Indonesian students is Ecole Nationale Des Travaux Public Del’Etat, followed by Universities Monthpelier II and Institut National Politechnique De Loraine.

Table 36

Top Ten Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in France

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	Ecole Nationale Des Travaux Public Del’Etat	234
02	Universite Monthpelier II	94
03	Institut National Politechnique De Loraine	81
04	Universite Henry Poincare Nancy I	70
05	Ecole Nationale Superiore Agronomyque	67
06	Universite Montpelier I	64
07	Universite Paul Sabatier Toulouse III	61
08	Institut National Politechnique De Toulouse	59

09	Universite Patis X	43
10	Universite D'Aix Marseille III	40
	Universite De Technologie De Compiegne	40

In Italy, Table 37 shows, the most popular destination for Indonesian students is Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana with 85 graduates.

Table 37

Top Five Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in Italy

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana	85
02	Pontificia Universitas Urbaniana	36
03	Pontificia Studiorum Universitas Pontificia Universitas Lateranensis	29 29
04	Pontificium Institutum Biblikum	19
05	Pontificium Athenaeum Anselmianum	14

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

In Austria, most Indonesian students go to University Wien, Institute of Tourism and Hotel Management, and Leopold Franzens Universitat Innsbruck (Table 38).

Table 38

Top Five Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in Austria

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	University Wien	38
02	Institute of Tourism and Hotel Management	23
03	Leopold Franzens Universitat Innsbruck	16
04	Die Technische Universitat Graz	13
05	Technische Universitat Wien	11

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

In Southeast Asia, Table 39 shows, the most popular destination for Indonesia students is Philippine, followed by Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Brunei Darussalam.

Table 39

Top Five Destination for Indonesian Students Studying in Southeast Asia

Number	Countries of Destination	Number of Graduate by May 2006
01	Philippine	1709
02	Malaysia	1110
03	Thailand	754
04	Singapore	114
05	Brunei Darussalam	8

(Dirjen Dikti 2006)

In Philippine, Table 40 shows, three most popular destinations for Indonesian students are University of the Philippines at Los Banos, University of the Philippine at Quezon City, and University of Santo Thomas.

Table 40

Top Five Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in Philippine

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	University of the Philippine at Los Banyos	490
02	University of the Philippine at Quezon City	167
03	University of Santo Thomas	126
04	De La Salle University	90
05	Philippine Christian University	82

In Malaysia, Table 41 shows, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Universiti Sains Malaysia, and Universiti Putra Malaysia, and International Islamic University of Malaysia are among most popular choices for Indonesian students.

Table 41

Top Ten Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in Malaysia

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia	340
02	Universiti Sains Malaysia	175

03	Universiti Putra Malaysia	160
04	International Islamic University of Malaysia	127
05	Universiti Malaya	80
06	Universiti Pertanian Malaysia	35
07	Universiti Teknologi MARA	31
08	Universiti Utara Malaysia	28
09	Coventry University	2
	Institut Teknologi Tun Abdul Razak	2
	Inti College	2
	Pusat Teknologi dan Pengurusan Lanjutan	2
	University of Northumbria at Newcastle	
10	Asian Institute of Management	1
	Asian Institute of Technology	1
	Kolej Universiti Sains dan Teknologi Malaysia	1
	Lincoln University	1
	Collaboration KDU College	1
	Mahidol University	1
	Monash University Malaysia	1
	The University of the East	
	University of East London	

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

In Thailand, Table 42 shows, among the most popular destinations for Indonesian students are Asian Institute of Technology, Mahidol University, Kasetsart University, Prince of Songkhla University, and Chulalongkorn University.

Table 42

Top Five Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in Thailand

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	Asian Institute of Technology	424
02	Mahidol University	201
03	Kasetsart University	57
04	Prince of Songkhla University	16
05	Chulalongkorn University	14

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

In Singapore, Table 43 shows, most popular choices of university for Indonesian students are National University of Singapore, Nanyang Technological University, and Ngee Ann Polytechnic.

Table 43

Top Nine Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in Singapore

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	National University of Singapore	80
02	Nanyang Technological University	16
03	Ngee Ann Polytechnic	3
04	Southeast Asia Union College	3
05	Trinity College	3
06	Chartered Institute of Marketing	2
07	University of Oxford	2

	Informatics Computer School	
08	Shatec	1
09	The South East Graduate School of Theology	1

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

In Brunei, only Sultan Saiful Rijal Technical College (1 graduate) and University Brunei Drussalam (7 graduates) are destinations for Indonesian students. Most of them in Brunei, especially those who are at University Brunei Darussalam (UBD) study geoscience (Dirjen Dikti 2006).

In South Asia, the most popular destinations for Indonesian students are India and Pakistan. In India, Table 44 shows, the most favorable university is University of Roorke, followed by Anna University, Indian Institute of Technology, Aligarh Muslim University, and University of Bombay.

Table 44

Top Five Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in India

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	University of Roorke	525
02	Anna University	66
03	Indian Institute of Technology	47
04	Aligarh Muslim University	43
05	University of Bombay	22

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

In Pakistan, Table 45 shows, the most popular destination for Indonesian students is International Islamic University Islamabad, followed by Punjab University, Quad-I-Azam University, University of Peshawar, and University of Karachi.

Table 45

Top Five Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in Pakistan

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	International Islamic University Islamabad	56
02	Punjab University	12
03	Quad-I-Azam University	11
04	University of Peshawar	4
05	University of Karachi	3

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

Table 46 shows that the most popular destination for Indonesian students in East Asia is Japan, followed by Taiwan, China, South Korea, and Hongkong.

Table 46

Top Five Destinations for Indonesian Students in East Asia

Number	Countries	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	Japan	3813
02	Taiwan	76
03	China	61
04	South Korea	40
05	Hongkong	5

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

In China, Table 47 shows, University of Peking is the most popular university and in Japan, Table 48 shows, the most popular university is Kyoto University.

Table 47

Top Five Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in China

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	University of Peking	17
02	Beijing Language and Culture University	9
03	Peking Institute	4
04	Peking Medical Institute	4
05	Hua Qiao University	3
	The Chine University of Hongkong	3
	Tsing Hua University	3

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

Table 48

Top Five Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in Japan

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	Kyoto University	204
02	Hiroshima University	202
03	University of Tokyo	188
04	Kyushu University	159
05	Nagoya University	140

(Dirjen Dikti 2006).

Among Muslim countries, Table 49 shows, the most popular destination for Indonesian students are Malaysia, Egypt, and Pakistan.

Table 49
Top Ten Destinations for Indonesian Students Studying in the Muslim World

Number	Countries of Destination	Number of Graduate by May 2006
01	Malaysia	1110
02	Egypt	116
03	Pakistan	93
04	Saudi Arabia	40
05	Brunei Darussalam	8
06	Syria	3
07	Sudan	3
08	Qatar	1

In Malaysia, the most popular destination for Indonesian students is Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (see Table 41). In Egypt, the most popular destination for Indonesian students is al Azhar University. See Table 09. In Pakistan, the most favorable university for Indonesian students is International Islamic University Islam Abad (see Table 45).

Table 50
Top Five Universities of Destination for Indonesian Students in Egypt

Number	Universities	Number of Graduates by May 2006
01	Al Azhar University	65

02	Cairo University	22
03	Zagazig University	13
04	Alexandria University	9
05	Ain Shams University	3

Inflow Trends

With lack of international achievement, it seems to be very difficult for higher education institutions in Indonesia to attract international students from other countries, particularly from the developed ones, such as USA and Europe. There is no data available on international students who do degree programs in Indonesia. This study only finds data on students who do abroad programs. Indonesia does not seem to be a favorite destination for US study abroad students in Southeast Asia. In 2001/02 academic year, there were only 52 US study abroad students in Indonesia. In the following year, 2002/03 the number decreased to 26 with 50% change. For international students, Indonesia seems to be far least favorable than its closest neighbors like Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. See Table 51.

Table 51
Host and Destinations of U.S. Study Abroad Students in Southeast Asia, 2001/02 & 2002/03

Countries of Destination	2001/02	2002/03	% Change
Cambodia	10	12	20.0
East Timor	1	0	-100.0
Indonesia	52	26	-50.0
Laos	1	2	100.0

Malaysia	25	47	88.0
Myanmar	0	1	-
Philippines	102	124	21.6
Singapore	231	176	-23.8
Thailand	836	794	-5.0
Vietnam	218	286	31.2
Total	1,476	1,468	-0.5

(Chin 2004, p. 59).

Among its Southeast Asian neighbors, Indonesia is reasonably a popular destination for students, especially for medical and literature studies. No data is available for the whole picture of foreign students in Indonesia. This study can only locate partial data from different universities. Firdaus Ali from Universitas Padjajaran (UNPAD) in Bandung claims that medical faculties at Indonesian universities, including Universitas Indonesia, Universitas Gajahmada, Universitas Airlangga, and UNPAD are among the best in Asia and attract students from Malaysia. He notes that in 2005 there are 40 students from Malaysia studying in the Medical Faculty of UNPAD (*Gema Mahasiswa*, August 2005).

The Push Factors

Based on previous discussion on some aspects of internationalization, this study considers four main factors that push Indonesian students to study overseas. They are quality awareness, regional opportunities, growing middle class, and social-religious motives.

Quality Awareness

Discussion on the strategic programs of the development of Indonesian higher education system in this report suggests that there is a growing concern on the quality of the system. After more than fifty years of massifications, higher education authorities in the country have started to promote the concept of quality assurance in their agendas. There seems to have been a strong agreement that it is high time for the country to improve the quality of its higher education system. In this regard, having more and more overseas graduates among teaching staffs is believed to be one of the best ways to speed up the quality assurance process. Many scholarships projects have been developed to enable higher education institutions to send their teaching staffs to do Master and Doctorate programs overseas. The projects are developed under the National Planning Board, the BAPPENAS, as well as loan from World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and international scholarship providers, such as AusAid, The British Council, and Fulbright. These scholarship providers have been asked to prioritize teaching staffs for studying overseas.

Regional Opportunities

The speed of the development of higher education systems in the neighboring countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippine, have provided more opportunities and created new destinations for many Indonesian students to study overseas with much cheaper

stipend and living costs compared to the costs for similar programs in the USA, United Kingdom, and Australia. As Table 39 shows, more and more students from Indonesia do Master and Doctorate programs in their Southeast Asian neighbors.

Growing Middle Class

Some economic surveys show that the number of middle class family in Indonesia continuously increase up to 10% (20.000.000) of the total population (200.000.000). These families certainly have higher expectation for their children's education and have sufficient financial capacity to achieve it. They certainly can send their children to study in quality higher education institutions overseas. Unlike government officers and teaching staffs of state universities who mainly rely on scholarship, children of these families can rely on their parents' financial supports. Predictably, this type of students are among the majority of Indonesian students overseas.

Social-Religious Motives

Modernization has made social and religious life in Indonesia more open and moderate. In term of education, this modern trend has created more opportunities for Indonesian youths, particularly the Muslim ones, to study overseas. Muslim youths in the country have no religious difficulty to continue their study in Western countries. They

have the opportunity to study, not only in the Middle East, but also in the West. More and more Muslim youths continue their studies in Western countries to study various modern disciplines.

The Pull Factors

Voanews.com suggests on December 7, 2004 that for the first time in 32 years the number of foreign students in the USA is decreasing. For 2002-2003 academic year, Voanews quotes US Department of Trade, the number of Asian students in the US experiences 8% decrease from 2001-2002 academic year. The news identifies four major reasons for the decrease. The first reason is difficult visa procedure. Voanews quotes one student said in the Senat that he had to wait two years for getting entry student visa to the USA and decided to cancel his study. One university President said to US Senators that if visa policy is not eased, no more foreign students will come to the US. The second reason for the decrease of foreign students in the US, Voanews reports, the continuous raising of tuition fees at US universities. While many countries in Asia and Africa are struggling with economic crisis, US universities are raising their tuition fees. Certainly, this is unhelpful for foreign students from developing countries like Indonesia to study in the US. The third reason, said Voanews, many students from Asia and the Middle East are discouraged to study in the US due to the role of US government in Iraq. The fourth reason, according to Voanews, some Asian countries, such

as China, Japan, and South Korea, have been able to develop universities with international standards and are attractive to many international students.

The decreasing number of international students is economically and politically risky for the US. Voanews explains that every year international students contribute 13 billion Dollars to US economy. Being sensitive to the political risks, State Secretary, Colin Powell, released a message to US consulates all around the world for them to carefully ease visa procedure. “American biggest asset,” said Powell, “is friendship with future world leaders who study in America” (Voanews, December 7, 2004).

In Indonesian context, this study identifies three main factors that tend to discourage Indonesian students to study overseas. The factors include September 11, 2001 tragedy, economic crisis, and growing number of private providers.

September 11, 2001 Tragedy

The bombing of World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 has created tensions and suspicions in the relationships between the Muslim world and the West, particularly the USA and United Kingdom. President of the USA, George Bush, and his allies, have reacted aggressively to the incident and developed some policies that are considered to be part of efforts to make the country safer and more secured from terrorist attacks. Among the policies are

preemptive actions, investigations, detentions, and deportations to terrorist suspects, and the adoption of strict immigration policies, including visa restrictions and strong border control. Since many of the terrorist suspects are Muslims and are from Muslim countries, the main targets of the policies seem to be Muslims and Muslim countries. Since Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, the policies are strictly implemented to Indonesians. Media coverage of the hostile attitude of some people in the USA, United Kingdom, and Australia to Muslims, difficulties faced by many Muslims in organizing their visas, the terrorist image of Muslims set up by Western media have together discouraged many Indonesian students, particularly the Muslim ones, to study in Western countries.

Economy Crisis

Unlike other Asian countries that have been able to get out of the 1998 economic crisis, Indonesia is struggling to recover from it. Businesses in the country remain unstable, the currency rate is still low and fluctuated, jobs are significantly reduced, and prices are very high. This economic situation, especially low currency rate, makes tuition fees and living costs in Western countries become more and more expensive for Indonesian students. Some of them decided to move their studies to other countries with lower tuition fees and living costs, some of them decided to cancel or delay their overseas study plan, and some others decided to continue their studies at home.

Growing Number of Private Providers

It has been discussed early in this report that one of the most significant developments of higher education system in Indonesia is a rapid increase of the number of private providers. This trend seems to continue, despite the economic crisis. More and more private higher education institutions are available in many big cities all around the country and are broadening higher education access for Indonesian youths. In the last five years, private providers for higher education in Indonesia are not only among local institutions, but also among international ones, especially from Australia. Many top universities in Australia have created their branch campuses in some big cities in Indonesia, such as Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, and Medan. Although much more expensive than state universities and local private providers, the international branch campuses are very attractive to Indonesian students from middle and upper class families.

Critical Issues

This study identifies some critical issues related to the development and implementation of internationalization policies in Indonesia and the country's standing in the dynamics of international students' circulation in a global context.

The first strategic issue with regard to international students' circulation in Indonesia is lack of quantity. Despite

having big population (around 200.000.000), the number of Indonesian students overseas is far below the number of students from other countries with much smaller population. South Korea, for example, is sending more than 190 thousands of university students in many countries in the world. Fifty six thousands of them are in the USA, 24 thousands in China, 18.500 in United Kingdom, 18 thousands in Australia, 17 thousands in Japan, and 13 thousands in Canada. The reasons for the lack of Indonesian students overseas can be various. One reason can be lack of scholarship. If this is the reason, higher education authorities in the country are challenged to develop a better scheme or strategy for scholarship provision. Many Indonesian students overseas rely on foreign scholarship providers. Indonesian government needs to find and develop better and stronger scholarship schemes to allow more Indonesian students studying overseas. The new scholarship schemes can be developed through annual budget planning and educational cooperation with prospective countries. Indonesian government needs to encourage more and more bright students in the country to study abroad by providing them with scholarships and see the encouragement as part of general policy for developing human resources with international qualifications.

Another way to give more chances for students to have international higher education is by making international higher education institutions available in Indonesia. The government needs to develop a policy that can make the country attractive for higher education

institutions, so that foreign universities are willing to develop their branches in the country. This is what has been successfully done by Singapore. Today, higher education authorities in Singapore have been able to work closely with 15 international partners, including the best higher education institutions in the world, such as Stanford, Cornell, and Duke Medical School. Dubai has also been successful to develop a “knowledge village” with 13 foreign universities and similarly, Qatar already has an “Educational City,” largely for Middle Easterners who can not afford to go to the USA or Europe for Western education. China and Malaysia have been able to become “educational middlemen: importers as well as exporters of talent” (*The Economist* 2005, p. 18). Between 1998 and 2002, the number of international students in China doubled, from 43,000 to 86,000. Malaysia has been very aggressive, not only in sending students abroad in an effort at “capacity building,” but also recruiting students from China, Indonesia, and Pakistan and other neighboring countries (see discussion in *The Economist* 2005, p. 18). Certainly, Indonesian government can follow the footsteps of these countries, so that Indonesia does not only become a consumer but also a producer in the dynamics of international students’ circulation. The opportunity is now widely open, because according to *The Economist* (2005), “a growing number of the world’s top universities are getting more enthusiastic about offshoring” (p. 21).

The second strategic issue with regard to the dynamics of international students’ circulation in Indonesia is lack of

quality. It is the quality of education programs and degrees that Indonesian students do overseas. None of the universities that become the main destinations for Indonesian students all around the world belongs to world's top university (see Table 64). This can imply that Indonesian students overseas are not competing at world level. This also implies that when they become professionals or academicians, it would also be very difficult for them to compete at world level. The kind of universities that can be accessed by Indonesian students overseas depends on the kind of academic qualification that they have. The better their academic qualifications the better higher education institutions that they can access overseas. In this regard, higher education authorities in Indonesia are challenged to improve the academics quality of higher education at home.

The third strategic issue is lack of relevance. Indonesian students overseas, especially those who are supported by government scholarship schemes, seem to choose and do studies as they wish, without considering the relevance of their studies to the real need of human resource building. As a result, there is no link and match between overseas graduates and human resource capacity building in the country. This is to say that many overseas graduates are not properly managed.

Table 64
The World's Top Universities

Rank	Universities	Countries
1	Harvard University	America
2	Stanford University	America

3	University of Cambridge	Britain
4	University of California (Berkeley)	America
5	Massachusetts Institute of Technology	America
6	California Institute of Technology	America
7	Princeton University	America
8	University of Oxford	Britain
9	Columbia University	America
10	University of Chicago	America
11	Yale University	America
12	Cornell University	America
13	University of California (San Diego)	America
14	Tokyo University	Japan
15	University of Pennsylvania	America
16	University of California (Los Angeles)	America
17	University of California (San Francisco)	America
18	University of Wisconsin (Madison)	America
19	University of Michigan (Ann Arbor)	America
20	University of Washington (Seattle)	America

(*The Economist* 2005, September 10, p. 4).

The fourth strategic issue is inequality between the outflow and inflow of international students. Statistical data discussed in this report confirms that in the dynamics of international students' circulation in global contexts, Indonesia has primarily been in the sending side, not in the receiving side. There is a huge gap between the outflow and inflow trends of international students in the country. With such a gap, Indonesia cannot play significant role in international higher education system. Indonesia will only be the buyer, not the producer of international higher education programs.

In order to develop the balance between the outflow and inflow of international students, higher education

authorities in Indonesia need to develop world class higher education institutions in major cities in the countries. Only world class quality and accreditation are accepted and attractive to international students and academicians. Such a quality can be achieved by developing world class universities. Some Asian countries, including China, Japan, and South Korea have been able to attract more and more international students, not only from developing countries, but also from developed countries by establishing world class universities at home. Voanews explains that there are 3.500 American students in Japan, 2.500 in China, 750 in South Korea, and 300 in Vietnam. This number, according to Voanews, is increasing from year to year (Voanews, December 7, 2004). With stronger commitment, higher education authorities in Indonesia can follow the footsteps of their Asian counterparts.

The fifth critical issue is Visa procedure. Visa policy plays an important part in the dynamics of international students' circulation. As discussed earlier in this report, Visa procedure has been one of the main reasons for the decline of international students in the USA (see *The Economist* 2005, September 10, p. 18). Visa related issues can also be one of the reasons for the lack of international students in Indonesia. Indeed, Indonesian government does not provide international students with Student Visa, a Visa that only needs to be organized once at the beginning stage of their study. Instead, international students are provided with Limited Staying Visa, a Visa that needs to be renewed annually. Certainly, this annual renewal of Visa is very

disturbing for international students. Indonesian government urgently need to develop easier visa procedure that allows international students to pursue their study conveniently.

The sixth critical issue is the teaching of foreign languages, especially English. This international language has been one of the most important driving forces for the internationalization of higher education. It has been a blood vessel of the dynamics of international students' circulation in a global context. English proficiency determines access to scholarship and study programs. The wide spread use of English as a language of instruction makes it become a basic element for the success of gaining scholarship and certificate from international institutions. Therefore, English proficiency determines the role and position of a country in the dynamics of international students' circulation.

Lack of English proficiency has been one of the main reasons for the limited number of Indonesian students overseas. In the same way, the limited use of English as a language of instruction in higher education institutions has been one important reason why very limited international students come to Indonesia. Indonesian students need to spend more time and energy as well as financial resources for studying English before they can commence their study overseas. Foreign students also need to spend sufficient time, energy, and fund to study Bahasa Indonesia before they can commence their study in Indonesia. In fact, Indonesian students are among the biggest population of

the participants of Intensive English Programs in the USA and many international higher education institutions need to develop language preparation programs before they can recruit students from Indonesia.

Higher education authorities in Indonesia are challenged to develop more effective and broader schemes for the teaching of international languages, especially English. More importantly, a strategic plan need to be developed to demolish a colonial syndrome and a narrow understanding of nationalism that see learning and using English and other foreign language as being anti nationalist. A fanatic religious attitude that sees English as the language of the *kuffar* (infidels) also needs to be stopped. In the age of internationalization and globalization, such an understanding and policy is unhelpful for the future development of higher education system.

Since the early stage of independent era in 1950s, narrow nationalism has dominated higher education policies in Indonesia. One of the policies, as discussed earlier in this report, is the prohibition of using foreign languages as a language of instruction for all levels of education. As a result, no foreign language lesson is well provided at all levels of education. Although being occupied by the Dutch for nearly three and half centuries, very few Indonesian youths today can speak Dutch well without taking special course outside their formal education programs. English, for example, is only provided once a week for one or two hours sessions at all levels of education. In consequence, very

small number of Indonesian youths can speak English well except few of them in big cities who are lucky enough to be able to find and pay English courses in their neighborhood. For students from middle class families, the only problem is time and commitment. For students from lower class families, the problems are time, commitment, and money.

The following long quote from *The Economist* (2005) may be helpful for higher education authorities in Indonesia to change their language policy and understand their future challenges:

The great universities of the 19th century were shaped by nationalism; the great universities of today are being shaped by globalization. The world's higher education system is increasingly dominated by a superleague of world-class universities competing with each other for talent and prestige ... The top universities are citizens of an international academic marketplace with one global academic currency, one global labour force and, increasingly, one global language, English. They are also increasingly citizens of a global economy, sending their best graduates to work for multinational companies (*The Economist* 2005, p 20).

Certainly, nationalism is no longer a sufficient foundation for developing higher education system in this global era. An ability to respond to the challenges and opportunities brought by globalization is a key for all higher education institutions or systems to play significant role in

the dynamics of international higher education system in general and the dynamics of international students' circulation in particular.

Conclusion

The patterns of higher education development and internationalization policies discussed earlier in this report indicate that Indonesian higher education system has intersected with global challenges and opportunities and reasonably been implicated in the processes of contemporary globalization. Globalization has changed the ways higher education authorities in the country see themselves and develop their programs. It has changed the patterns of higher education development in Indonesia and pushed the creation of some new structures and policies within the framework of higher academic standards of quality and expectation on the role of higher education institutions and their graduates in social/economic development. Although with a degree of conceptual confusion, rhetorically hyperbolic, empirically inconsistent, and normatively shallow, the concept of globalization has appeared to name some fundamental changes in higher education system in Indonesia affect the practices, policies, and endeavors in the system.

Higher education authorities in Indonesia are making their best efforts to align their agendas or priorities to what they perceive and believe to be the imperatives of globalization. Globalization has transformed the discursive

terrain within which higher education policies and programs are developed and enacted. The terrain is increasingly informed by a range of demands for higher academic standards and dominated by ideas for internationalization. The authorities respond positively to internationalization. Some policies have been developed to allow internationalization at institutional and national levels. The policies imply that internationalization is understood in terms of international linkages, partnerships, projects, academic programs, researches, and academic mobility for students. They have not really been implied academic mobility for teaching staffs, the delivery of education to other countries, trade in higher education, and the inclusion of an international and intercultural dimension into the curriculum and teaching learning process.

The advancement of information and communication technology, the competitiveness of international labor mobility, the dynamics of economic liberalization, the rise of quality awareness, and the enthusiasm of privatization has strengthened internationalization policies and changed the world of higher education in Indonesia. Public expectation on higher education is getting higher and higher and the role that higher education institutions play in the development of human resource capacity is becoming more and more important. Such changes make internationalization becomes more and more complex and important in the dynamics of the development Indonesian higher education system. Internationalization trend has pushed higher education authorities in the country to

reconsider their priorities, review their plans, shift their paradigms, and change the way they see their policies and programs as well as the fundamental condition of higher education system. Internationalization strengthens relationship between higher education system and global academic requirements as well as the imperatives of the country.

It can be understood from internationalization policies discussed in this report that higher education authorities in Indonesia have pursued major agendas for higher education reform. The agendas presuppose some versions of the interpretations of challenges and opportunities brought by globalization. They show enthusiasm to align higher education reform to the requirements of globalization. The agendas also show that internationalization policies in Indonesia are developed under international pressures for liberalization and deregulation of education and the global trends towards modification, privatization, and commercialization of education.

With regards to the pressures, higher education authorities in Indonesia tend to see internationalization as a source of both opportunities and threats to national education values and interests. Their policies have attempted to encourage international collaboration and exchanges while reinforcing a sense of national identity and emphasizing national values, preferences, and interests. There is a high level of enthusiasm and ideological/cultural resistance among higher education authorities in Indonesia

toward internationalization. There seems to be a view among the authorities that internationalization programs are urgently needed, but are threatening the characteristics of national education system and conflicting with domestic needs. They seem to agree that one of their crucial jobs is to preserve national identity against the backdrop of globalization and thus, their policies should ensure that internationalization will not lead to westernization and contradict the cultural, economic, and ideological interests of the country. The authorities seem to expect that the purpose of higher education and the modes of its governance are converging around the underlying notions of global academic standards and requirements without leaving the principles of national ideology and interests. The expectation suggests that in a global context, internationalization policies and programs need to be sensitive to national values and interests. Failure to respond to such a sensitivity could create difficulties for internationalization.

Discussion of Indonesian experiences in the dynamics of international students' circulation in this report shows that there is a huge gap between the outflow and inflow of international students in the country. Indonesia is predominantly in the sending side and plays a very limited role in the dynamics of international students' circulation in a global context. Certainly, such a gap is culturally, economically, politically, and academically unhelpful for the future development of higher education system and human resource capacity the country. More active and aggressive

policies are needed at institutional and national levels to reduce the outflow-inflow gap. Higher education authorities in Indonesia need to strengthen their commitment and improve their policies to push more Indonesian students studying overseas and pull foreign students to study in Indonesia. This study suggests that among main push factors that need to be strengthened are scholarship provision or financial support, the teaching of foreign languages, especially English, and the reliability of Visa arrangement. Among main pull factors that need to be improved, this study suggests, are the use of international languages in education system, the availability of Student Visa, and the improvement of academic quality, standards, culture, and procedure in line with international requirements. At the same time, higher education authorities in developed countries that are predominantly in the receiving side of international students' circulation need to provide sincere assistances to a developing country like Indonesia to improve the quality of their higher education system. Such an assistance needs to be adjusted and adapted to national values and needs, so that the system can develop with its own characteristics.

Of course, internationalization is expected to strengthen the link and relevance of higher education standards to global requirements and converge the modes of higher education governance with global interconnectivity and interdependence. However, the linkage and relevance should not change the fundamental conditions of higher education system or weaken the link

between the system and the imperatives of community in one particular country. Internationalization must be able to integrate international and intercultural values into the purposes and functions of national higher education system in a country. A combination of enthusiasm, sensitivity, sincerity, and flexibility among higher education authorities in both developed and developing countries will ensure that the real process of internationalization is taking place and create a balance of roles between the two sides in the dynamics of international students' circulation. Above all, such a combination will allow the development of more helpful, flexible, and sustainable policies and actions at institutional, national, and international levels.®

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4

COUNTERIES ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN POST-SOEHARTO INDONESIA: Toward East-West Joint Educational Cooperation and the Roles of Islamic Universities¹³

Introduction

THE RISE OF REFORM and democratization movement after the fall of the authoritarian Soeharto regime on May 21, 1998, paved the way for the resurgence of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. The reform movement allows Islamic radicals in

¹³ This article is pravisied version of paper presented in International Conference on “The Idea(l) of an Indonesian Islamic University: Contemporary Perspectives”. Yogyakarta, Dec. 9-11, 2004 hosted by Interdisciplinary Islamic Studies Graduate Studies Program State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta & Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta.

the country to organize their activities, develop their networks, and consolidate their power. Initially, the collapse of the regime raised some hopes about the future of democracy in Indonesia. Many believed that it would pave the way for reform movement in the country to accelerate democratization. Despite some failures and slow progress, the reformers have been able to make some significant changes, such as reducing the authority of the executive power, especially the President by revising the national constitution (*Undang-undang Dasar 1945*), reducing the role of the armed forces in politics,¹⁴ reforming the structure of

¹⁴ Soeharto government adopted the concept of *dwi-fungsi* ABRI or the “twin functions” of the armed forces, which justifies military participation in civilian political life. The *dwi-fungsi* concept has been pivotal in enabling the military to play a prominent political role in both bureaucracy and parliament. For security reasons, the Department of Defence and Security routinely intervenes in the internal affairs of political parties and social organizations. Many active and retired military officers were appointed to high positions in the central and provincial bureaucracies, including in departments that have no direct connections with military affairs. Twenty percent of the members of both *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR (People’s Representative Council) and the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly), which elect the President, were military officers. By late 1970s, after five years of New Order government, military appointees accounted for 50 per cent of the Cabinet, 66 per cent of regional governorships, 56 per cent of district officer positions, and 78 per cent of director-generalships in the bureaucracy. See See Liddle, W. 1997. Coercion, co-optation, and the management of ethnic relations in Indonesia. In M.E. Brown & Ganguly, S. (eds), *Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific*. The Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, p. 292 and Halligan, J. & Turner, M. 1995. *Profiles of Government Administration in Asia*. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, p. 30. For critical accounts of of Soeharto government, see Micheal R.J. Vatikiotis 1993. *Indonesian Politics under Soeharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change*. London and New York: Routledge and Adam Schwarz 1996. *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesian in the 1990s*. Third printing. Boulder: WestviewPress.

political parties,¹⁵ changing electoral system,¹⁶ broadening the freedom of the press, and shifting the paradigm of government and development from centralization to regionalization.¹⁷ This new development shows that post-Soeharto Indonesia has been open to reform and a fertile ground for democratization.

At the same time, however, post-Soeharto Indonesia has also been a fertile ground for radicalism. Radicalism has characterized the activities of many interest groups in the country, including the Islamic ones. The resurgence of Islamic radicalism has been one of the important characteristics of post-Soeharto Indonesia. Radical Islamic

¹⁵ Under Soeharto government, political party was strictly limited in term of both number and freedom. Only three political parties were competing in general elections, including Soeharto's power machine, Golongan Karya (Golkar). After the collapse of Soeharto regime, every one is free to establish his own political party. More than ten political parties competed in 1999 general election and have their representative in People's Representative Assembly or *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (DPR).

¹⁶ One of major criticisms on the New Order regime of Soeharto is being "executive heavy," that the executive, particularly the President, control so much power undermining the role of the executive power. On November 9, 2001 *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR) or People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia confirmed amendment of various chapters of the national constitution, UUD 45. One of the most important parts that was amended is Chapter 6A (1) regarding presidential election. The amended version of this chapter states that President and Vice President are directly elected by the people, not by MPR members as stated in the old version. Full version of the amended UUD 45 is available on http://www.sawitwatch.or.id/monitoring/keb_uud453.html

¹⁷ Regionalization policy has been introduced through Law No. 22, 1999 on Regional Government and Law No. 25, 1999 on the equity of central and regional budget, effective by January 1, 2001. These two laws shift the paradigm of government and development system from centralization to decentralization and change regional development from homogenous to heterogeneous pattern.

groups who were strictly controlled and suppressed by Soeharto regime have found sufficient freedom to organize themselves, consolidate their power, and actively play roles in the dynamics of social, religious, and political affairs in post-Soeharto Indonesia. They have become what Weber termed the “disenchantment”¹⁸ of post-Soeharto Indonesia. If a willingness to implement *Shari’ah* is an indication of Islamic radicalism, the rising trend of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia seems to be very strong. In 2002, Center for Islamic & Social Studies or *Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat* (PPIM) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta State Islamic University conducted a survey on the development of Islamic radicalism in the country. The survey has indicated that supporters of Islamic *Shari’ah* law have reached 71 percent, rising by 10 percent from the previous year (2001). The survey has also indicated that the supporters of Islamism in Indonesia after September 11, 2001 have grown in number by over 18.8 million in a year with total number of 133.9.¹⁹ Based on this survey result, PPIM Director, Jamhari, remarks: “The face of peace, tolerant, moderate and modern Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia the most important Muslim country in the region, becomes the nest of Islamic terrorism.”²⁰

¹⁸ Quoted in Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter 1982. *Roots of Radicalism: Jews, Christinas, and the New Left*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 380.

¹⁹ For more information and further discussion of the survey results, see *Tempo* (English Edition), December 24-30, 2002, Special Report Religion, pp. 32-42.

²⁰ See Jamhari 2002. “Indonesian Fundamentalism?” In *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 183.

Many names have emerged as leading figures is the rise of Islamic radicalism in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Among them are Habib Rizieq Shihab²¹ of Front of Defenders of Islam or *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI)²², Abu Bakar Ba'asyir²³ of Islamic Congregation or *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI)²⁴ and The Council of Jihad Fighters or *Majelis Mujahidin*,²⁵ Agus Dwi

²¹ Habib (Sayyid) Rizieq Shihab studied in Saudi Arabia and is a firm proponent of the application of the *shari'a* in public life. He appears to have excellent relations with members of the military and political elite. In October 2002, he was arrested (for reasons apparently unrelated to the Bali bombing) and FPI was ordered to disband itself. See Martin van Bruinessen 2002. "The violent fringes of Indonesia's radical Islam," in http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/violent_fringe.htm Also in *ISIM Newsletter 11 (December)*

²² FPI has definitely been the least ideologically motivated of the militant groups in Post-Soeharto Indonesia and a dominant group in numerous anti America and pro-Islamic policies in the streets of Jakarta. Its members can be easily identified because they are dressed in white flowing robes and white turbans in http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/violent_fringe.htm Also in *ISIM Newsletter 11 (December)*

²³ Abu Bakar Ba'asyir has been mentioned in national and international media as the spiritual leader of *al-Qaidah* network, although he cannot be directly linked to any of the said terrorist incidents. He has not been afraid of openly proclaiming his admiration for Osama bin Laden, but he denies any direct contact with him in http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/violent_fringe.htm Also in *ISIM Newsletter 11 (December)*.

²⁴ *Jamaah Islamiyah* has been mentioned by some terrorism experts as the Southeast Asian branch of al-Qa'ida and a likely perpetrator of the Bali bomb massacre. It is not entirely clear to what extent this organization is actually a real organization with a well-defined membership and structure of authority. Ba'asyir has repeatedly denied the existence of an organization named *Jama'ah Islamiyah* — but this term has during the past twenty years repeatedly been used by police authorities as the name for a loose network of radicals in which Ba'asyir played a central role, besides another preacher of Arab descent, Abdullah Sungkar in http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/violent_fringe.htm Also in *ISIM Newsletter 11 (December)*.

²⁵ *Majelis Mujahidin* was established in August 2002, also by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who turn to be its *amir* or commander. This organization has a paramilitary wing,

Karna of *Laskar Jundullah*,²⁶ other names from *Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII)*,²⁷ and Ja'far Umar Thalib of *Jihad Fighters* or *Laskar Jihad*. These names have attracted public attention, gained their places in the dynamics of reform movement in Post-Soeharto Indonesia, and made headlines in national and international media. They have emerged as one significant force in the dynamics of social, religious, and political changes in post-Soeharto

the *Laskar Mujahidin*, which has trained followers in guerrilla techniques who have been sent to fight a *jihad* in the Maluku. At least dozens, possibly a few hundred, of its members have combat experience in Afghanistan in the 1980s; a larger number is likely to have fought in the southern Philippines in http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/violent_fring_e.htm Also in *ISIM Newsletter 11 (December)*.

²⁶ *Laskar Jundullah* is a regional militia based in South Sulawesi, claiming a historical connection with the *Darul Islam* movement of that province. It appears to be primarily active in the Poso district of Central Sulawesi, which has seen vicious fighting between Christians and Muslims (and where the Muslims are in the weaker position). Ideologically, the movement is close to the *Majelis Mujahidin*, of which its commander, Agus Dwikarna, is a committee member. It is devoted to the full application of the *shari`a* in all of Indonesia or at least — with an appeal to recent regional autonomy legislation — in its own region of activity, South and Central Sulawesi. *Laskar Jundullah* is believed to have very professional guerrilla training and to run a training camp in the Poso area. Dwikarna's arrest in the Philippines, in March 2002, does not appear to have paralysed the movement's activities in http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/violent_fring_e.htm Also in *ISIM Newsletter 11 (December)*

²⁷ *Darul Islam (DI)* or alternatively *NII/TII (Islamic State of Indonesia) / (Islamic Army of Indonesia)* is a strictly hierarchical organization. They organize paramilitary training for their members and are not known to have been involved in major violent incidents recently. Their major difference with Ba'asyir's group, apart from personal rivalries, is that the *Darul Islam* is focused exclusively on Indonesia. The *Jama'ah Islamiyah* allegedly rejects this as narrow nationalism (*'asabiyah*) and strives for a larger Islamic state encompassing all Muslim regions of Southeast Asia in http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/violent_fring_e.htm Also in *ISIM Newsletter 11 (December)*.

Indonesia that has been able to influence – not to say to disturb – the flow of democratization and other agendas of reform movement.

Characterizing the Radicals

In this article, radical is understood in a political sense, describing those “who advocate fundamental or extreme measures to challenge an established order”.²⁸ It is taken as being synonymous with fanatic, a term that refers to “the irrationality of religious or political feeling”.²⁹ Islamic radicalism is understood as the ideology of Islamic intellectual, social, and political movements at local, national, and international levels. Especially those who accept “the need for absolute *ijtihad*,³⁰ that it must be done in an authentically Islamic way and not as a covert means of copying the West”.³¹ They “tend to accept more of the past *ijtihad* of the scholars and to emphasize somewhat less the failings of the community in pre-modern times and

²⁸ Philip Herbst 2003. *Talking Terrorism a Dictionary of the Loaded Language of Political Violence*. Westport, Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press, p. 144.

²⁹ *Ibid.*,

³⁰ Along with the *Qur'an*, *Sunnah*, and *Ijma'* (consensus), *Ijtihad* (independent reasoning) is a sources of law in Sunni tradition. It is used when the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* do not provide sufficient legal explanation. Sunni scholars suggest that *ijtihad* is fallible since more than one interpretation of a legal issue is possible. To do *ijtihad* or to be a *Mujtahid*, one must have thorough knowledge of theology, revealed texts, legal theory (*usul fiqh*), a sophisticated capacity for legal reasoning, and thorough knowledge of Arabic. See John L. Esposito 2003, p. 134

³¹ William E. Shepard 1987. Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 314.

somewhat more the distortions caused by Western colonialism”.³² They strongly emphasize “the distinctiveness of Islam” and distinguish Islam from “democracy,” “communism,” or “dictatorship”. They tend to reject modified terms, such as “Islamic socialism”³³ and see “Islam as a whole is a distinct and integrated system [way of life], so that even if individual elements do not seem distinctive, their place in the Islamic system makes them different”.³⁴

The radicals emphasize the importance of adopting and implementing the *Shari’ah* at individual, community, and state level³⁵ and believe that *Shari’ah* “is not only an ideal to be known and revered, but a law to be put into effect and obeyed”.³⁶ They tend to adopt a “revolutionary” approach to Islamic law. They legitimize violence, terrorism, and repression for the sake of implementing *Shari’ah*.³⁷ For them, Islam is not a spiritual path as understood in Western culture and in the mystical tradition of the Sufis. It is a complete “way of life” based on Islamic faith and law (*aqidah wa Shari’ah*). Islam is not simply a moral guide, it is more like an ideology, a complete package of rules and guidance for all aspects of life. The teachings invite Muslims to view Islam as a total, comprehensive, and all-

³² *Ibid.*,

³³ *Ibid.*,

³⁴ *Ibid.*,

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 314-315.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

³⁷ John L. Esposito 2003, p. 259.

encompassing way of life. They reflect a desire to unite Muslims in a worldwide Islamic community (*ummah*) and pressure policy makers to implement Islamic law as derived from the teaching of Prophet Muhammad and his companions.

The radicals tend to accuse liberal Muslim scholars of introducing an “evil version of *tawhid*” (*tawhid versi iblis*) based on pride in human rationality, promoting a misleading understanding of Islamic teachings and leading Muslims from the straight path to the wrong one. They believe that liberal Islamic scholars are allies of an international Zionist and Christian conspiracy to separate Muslims from Islam. The radicals accuse secular and liberal scholars of rejection the Qur’an and making Muslims *a priori* to the Qur’an.³⁸ The radicals further accuse liberal scholars of rejecting the Qur’anic verses that require Muslims to perform *jihad* and of accepting the Western view that such verses are terrorist in character.³⁹ They believe that liberal Islamic scholars persuade Muslims to follow a new belief that has no textual basis (*nash*).⁴⁰ They accuse the scholars of arrogance and accepting some of the laws set forth by Allah and rejecting others based on their own ideas. For them, liberal Islamic scholars are dare to correct Allah’s regulations and reject the words of His Prophet, but accept the words of infidels (*kafir*). Such scholars, the radicals argue, being no different

³⁸ *Ibid.*,

³⁹ *Ibid.*,

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*,

Paroah (Fir'aun).⁴¹

The radicals accuse all those who criticize them of attacking Islam and are part of efforts of the infidel to dim the light of Islam by using terrorism as a camouflage. What the U.S. and its allies mean by terror, they criticize, is everybody who defends *Shari'ah*. The radicals describe those who accuse them as “Allah’s enemies” (*musuh-musuh Allah*) and claims that accusations connecting them to *Jamaah Islamiyah* and *Al-Qaeda* are part of a scenario to corner Muslims.⁴² The radicals believe there is an international Zionist and Christian conspiracy with the U.S. government to destroy Muslim countries and eliminate Islam from earth. They urge their followers to ban all American products and to pressure Indonesian government to break off diplomatic relations with the U.S. government.⁴³

The radicals reject modernity for its emphasis on rational and liberal thinking. Modern values that are in line with Islamic teachings, such as progress, justice, and egalitarianism are ignored. They criticize, ridicule, and reject modern values and adopt an uncompromised, uncritical, and

⁴¹ One of the radicals, Ba'asyir, for example, illustrates this point with the *Qur'an*, Chapter 27 (*An Naml*) verse 14. Translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali: “And they rejected those Signs in iniquity and arrogance, though their souls were convinced thereof: so see what was the end of those who acted corruptly!”

⁴² Idy Subandi Ibrahim and Asep Syamsul M. Romli 2003. *Kontroversi Ba'asyir: Jihad Melawan Opini “Fitnah” Global*. Bandung: Penerbit Nuansa, pp. 45-47.

⁴³ See “Taushiah Ustadz Abu untuk Muslim Indonesia”, in *Majalah Islam Sabili*, No. 12 Th. X 2 Januari 2003/29 Syawal 1423, p. 37.

unreflective approach to the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah*. Their teachings maintain that Muslims will be able to revive the quality of their life only by going back to models provided by Prophet Muhammad and his companions in sixth and seventh centuries. The teachings focus only on the negative effects of modernization, such as egotism, materialism, social inequities, and moral degradation, but fail to appreciate the achievements of modern civilization. In particular, the radicals teach that embracing modernity and Westernization has caused moral degradation in Muslim society. They deny the significance of systematic, creative, and intellectual effort for solving Muslims' problems.

Ideologically, radical Islamic organizations in Indonesia seem to share *Salafi-Wahhabi* ideology, an ideology that was developed by a *mujaddid* and moral critic, Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhab (1703-1779) from Saudi Arabia.⁴⁴ This

⁴⁴ Muhammad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhab was born into a Najdi (in Ottoman central Arabia) family of renowned Hanbali scholars. Part of his scholarly training involved traveling (in his late teens) and seeking knowledge in various Islamic centers in Arabia, Persia and Iraq. He studied Islamic fiqh, theology, and philosophy and also Sufism. But during his travels, he became exposed to many “deviationist” practices centered on the cult of saints, which in turn made him turn his back against Sufi superstition accretions and practices. He returned home at the age of forty and started to his summon (*da’wah*) for tawhid in 1740, following the death of his father. Resistance to his *da’wah* by his kinsmen led him to emigrate to Dar’iyah, where he forged an alliance with the local tribal chieftain, Muhammad ibn Sa’ud, who accepted his religious views. It was from there the Wahabiyyah [Unitarian] movement expanded from Najd to Hijaz to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. This alliance led to the establishment of the first Saudi Dynasty, one that extended its control over most of the Arabian Peninsula and beyond. After the takeover of Riyadh, ibn ‘Abdul Wahhab retired from campaigning and devoted the last two decades of his life to worship and meditation. The first Wahhabi/Saudi dynasty was crushed in 1818 at the hands of

ideology, according to many orientalists, tends “to impose reform through intolerant and fanatical methods that instilled in the minds of Muslims the conviction that change was only feasible through violent means.”⁴⁵

They emphasize the fundamental role of *tawhid* and are based on literal interpretation of scripture, reactionary attitude toward the West and modernism, and unrealistic assessment of the actual situation in contemporary world order. They tend to place Islam and modernity in a binary opposition, as if the two of them are totally hostile to one another. The radicals exaggerate their differences, but miss the substantial points that they share. Their teachings may be able to raise a feeling of “religiosity” or “muslimness” and a feeling of “Islamicity,”⁴⁶ but may not be able to provide Muslims with the quality and type of knowledge, skills, and mode of thinking that they need to solve their daily life problems and come to term with the challenges of modern civilization. The teachings may be able to grow Muslims’ critical attitude toward modernization and Westernization, but may not be helpful for Muslims to understand their own problems and design agendas as well

Egyptian and Ottoman forces. See A. Vasil’ev 1998. *The History of Saudi Arabia*. London: Saqi Books. See also discussion in Samira Haj 2002, p. 338.

⁴⁵ See discussion in Samira Haj 2002. “Reordering Islamic Orthodoxy: Muhammad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhab,” in *The Muslim World*, Volume 92, Numbers 3 & 4. Fall, pp. 333-370. For further discussion of the development of Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia, see Alexel Vassilief 2000. *The History of Saudi Arabia*. London: Saqi Books

⁴⁶ Hussin Mutalib 1990. Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN States: Political Implications. In *Asian Survey*, Vol. 30, No. 9, September, p. 883.

as strategies for developing their better future. The radicals' teachings promote faithful living, but fail to promote thoughtful, creative, and competitive one. They promote backward looking, not forward looking.

So, the way the radical Islamic groups see various social, economic, and political problems in the country and the approaches that they apply in expressing and implementing their ideas tend to be very different from the ways and approaches that are required in democratization. Instead of promoting the implementation and supremacy of state laws, the radicals are promoting the implementation of *Shari'ah* law.⁴⁷ Instead of promoting democratization, they are promoting Islamic state and *khilafah* system of government. While the moderate, such as Nurcholis Madjid, argues that the idea of an Islamic state is at odds with the teachings of the Qur'an, the radicals consider it as the only

⁴⁷ *Forum Komunikasi AhlulSunnah Wal Jama'ah* (FKAWJ), the umbrella organization of *Laskar Jihad*, for example, rejects democracy as "incompatible with Islam" and refuses to support any political party, including the more Islamist parties. The founder of these organization, Ja'far Umar Thalib, argues that "in democracy, people who don't understand anything, and they are the majority, elect their leaders without any educated considerations at all. They only elect those that give them money or say what they want to hear." "By these means," he further argues, "religious minorities and nominal Muslims have been able to 'thwart the application of Islamic law' in Indonesia" "In a genuine Islamic society," he believes, "it is God's law rather than the will of the people that is supreme." FKAWJ calls for democracy to be replaced by a council of experts (*ahlu halli wal aqdi*) dominated by Islamic scholars who are learned in Islamic law. The council would have the power to appoint the head of state and control government policy. See Greg Fealy January-March 2001. "Inside the Laskar Jihad. An interview with the leader of a new, radical and militant sect," p. 21. Available on <http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit65/fealy.htm>

choice for a Muslim country. While the moderates consider democratization as the “answer” to Indonesian problems, the radicals preach that democracy is incompatible with Islam. Instead of providing solutions for social, economic, religious, and political problems, the radicals are simply criticizing available solutions. They often proclaim their moral superiority, oppose dominant moderate and pluralistic culture, and create an anti-establishment sub-culture dedicated to the rejection of lousy government, military officers, and moderate Muslim leaders. They always want to do noble deeds, but ignore the useful ones. Their activities are regulated more by moral feeling than by reasoning. They tend to love too much and hate too much. They tend to think that they know every thing, but in fact, they overdo everything. In this way, the radicals are very unhelpful, if not disturbing, to the problematic post-Soeharto Indonesia. Such approaches would not be relevant to an attempt to recover Indonesian economy, inculcate democratic values in Indonesian politics, and increase the role of Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in the world in building world peace and harmony.

The Threats

Many Islamic radicals have been arrested, some of their organizations have been disbanded, and their followers may have not gained any material benefits from their activities, but the activities have brought them some non-material benefits in the form of socially derived

intangible rewards or what Wilson calls *solidarity* benefits,⁴⁸ such as establishing camaraderie among radical Muslim leaders and building their status as important groups or organizations in the history of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia. Although their activities may have been symbolic in character and not been able to fully achieve their objectives, such as replacing state laws with the *Shari'ah* and changing the Republic of Indonesia into an Islamic state, the radicals have gained what Salisbury (1969, p. 16) calls *expressive* benefits, that they had the chance to express their interests.

Irrespective of what they achieved and what they did not achieve, the threat of the radicals in the development of Islam in Indonesia is apparent: spreading Islamic radicalism and holistic image of Islam in Indonesia. Hasyim Muzadi, Chairman of the National Board of *Nahdatul Ulama* (NU), illustrates the impact of radicalism on contemporary Islam in Indonesia: “Islam now has a bad image, and hatred has been poured on Muslims who know nothing about radicalism and terrorism.”⁴⁹ With their limited time, resources, and freedom, the radicals have been able to mobilize public sentiment behind their narrow and rigid understanding of Islam. They have spread an understanding of Islam that “has been defined in terms not only of what it is but more

⁴⁸ See Wilson, G.K. 1990. *Interest Groups*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, p. 34.

⁴⁹ See *The Jakarta Post*, Indonesia, October 23, 2002. An interview with Hasyim Muzani by Soeryo Winoto on Terrorism and Islam in Indonesia: Indonesia: ‘Religion Will Not Prosper Through Violence’, in http://www.worldpress.org/article_model.cfm?article_id=891

importantly what it is not”⁵⁰ according to their own views and to serve their own distinctive sets of ideological purposes. Perhaps most disturbing for the future of Indonesia is the prevailing climate of opinion among Muslim youths that the political system is not working, the government is not doing its jobs, and the use of political violence is justified. This threatens cultural diversity and religious harmony that has been celebrated by globalization and pluralist democracy.

With the resurgence of radicalism, democratization in post-Soeharto Indonesia seems to have depended heavily upon an inherently unstable psychic development, which may have produced its own erosion. Many traditional values now under attack and have become quite dysfunctional. The victories won by the radicals, such as in Maluku, sweeping the streets of big cities in Indonesia, and bombing some public and religious centers, may have been symbolic, but the radicals and their followers experienced the thrill of openly baiting the government, the police, and the armed forces, humiliating the President, and ridiculing the moderates. They took it easy to provoke shock and outrage and ignored lasting and fundamental social change as expected in democratization. The influence that the radicals have exercised in post-Soeharto Indonesian is far beyond their numbers.

⁵⁰ See Fazal Rizvi 2003. “Democracy and Education after September 11,” in *Globalization, Societies and Education*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2003, p. 28.

Although agree with the potential threat of Islamic radical groups, many moderate scholars in Indonesia are reluctant to discuss them. They believe that such groups are insignificant and discussing their activities will simply raise their popularity. Azyumardi Azra, rector of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University of Jakarta, said: “We have to admit that these groups exist, but don’t exaggerate the influence of these radical groups. That is just what they want.”⁵¹ This view is shared by Jamhari who said: “Only small number of Indonesian Muslim community belongs to radical groups. It is correct that one only needs a couple of people to explode a bomb, but to put so much emphasis on the radicalism will potentially look down the majority, and this attitude is counter productive to fight against radicalism.”⁵² This view also seems to be in the mind of many government officials in Indonesia. Wahid Supriyadi, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, believes that the radical Islamic groups are minority with little public support, but are aware of their potential danger. He said: “We are a bit worried, to be honest.”⁵³

Indeed, the radicals’ teachings and activities confront Muslim real life situation in contemporary Indonesia where modernization has dominated many aspects of public life and discourses. Such teachings may not be popular among

⁵¹ Quoted in Seth Mydans 2001. “Americans are Target of Radicals in Indonesia,” in *The New York Times*, October 4, p. 1..

⁵² See Jamhari 2002. *Ibid*, p. 189.

⁵³ Quoted in *ibid*.

Indonesian Muslims who are getting along with modern life style. However, their emphasis and claim on the authenticity of Islam, their ability to call for commitment, their emphasis on the inner characteristics of Islam for bringing dignity and respect to Muslims, and the radicals' sincerity and dedication in promoting them can make his teachings attractive, particularly to the beginner modernists who are still doubtful about modern values and those who are disappointed with modernity, such as many young people and recent urban immigrants who are threatened by the alienation of life in cities. For oppressed groups, the radicals' teachings may be attractive as a vehicle for protesting against unjust authorities. Opportunistic and pragmatic Muslim politicians who look for a short cut to gain supporters may also be interested in the teachings. With regard to their anti-West characteristics, the radicals' teachings can be used by anti-West or anti-American groups to spread their influence.

Educational Measures to be Taken

If no significant measures are taken, we can be sure that in the near future, Indonesia will no longer be a “moderate” Muslims country, but become a “radical” one. If moderation remains the choice of majority Muslims in the country, they need to take some measures in order to stop the resurgence of Islamic radicalism and neutralize the impacts that it has given on Muslim society.

Democratizing Education System

The measures for countering Islamic radicalism must be “morally appropriate and practically feasible” and provide better chance for securing peace.⁵⁴ Such measures cannot be found in the austere and intrusive regimes of national security, but rather in the possibilities of transnational democracy and education.⁵⁵ A measure that is needed to respond to radicalism is the measure that “does not only rely on policing and military action but operates instead on a political and cultural level, inviting a better understanding of the causes of risk and global conflict, of the facts of global interdependence, and of the possibilities of peace.”⁵⁶

Such a measure can be found in the development of new perspectives on cultural and democratic change. In order to develop such a measure, there must be “new institutional building across cultural traditions, the acknowledgement of justice issues posed by polarisation of wealth, income and power and the pursuit of interests common to humanity as a whole.”⁵⁷ “In this process, education has to play a major role, both within Islamic countries and in the West.”⁵⁸ Both sides need “democratic education system” where all assertions are regarded as provisional, subject to discussion and debate

⁵⁴ Fazal Rizvi. *Ibid.*,

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25-26.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*,

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*,

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*,

and students learn to develop a global intelligence that prepares them to participate in the processes of complex cultural negotiations as dialogue partners in a global civilization.⁵⁹ This can be done by developing “a pluralistic educational environment” and introducing new ideas in the curriculum of traditional Islamic education institutions in the Muslim world.⁶⁰

When “democratic” or “pluralistic” education is established and prevail, some fundamental issues related to Islamic radicalism can also be revisited. Christian-Muslim conflicts in Maluku and other parts of Indonesia and all around the world, for example, may have been caused by the development of what Modood describes “a self-fulfilling prophecy,” that Islam and Christianity represent two different and separate ways of looking at the world.⁶¹ This kind of understanding “is fundamentally flawed and serves only to reinforce the forms of fundamentalism.”⁶² Any effort to counter this type of understanding needs “a more complex understanding of cultural traditions.”⁶³ Islam and Christianity have sufficient historical and cultural experiences that can be learnt by both sides in order to

⁵⁹ Benhabib 2002, quoted in Fazal Rizvi 2003, p. 253.

⁶⁰ Ibrahim Abu Rabi 2002. “A post-September 11 critical assessment of modern Islamic history,” in Ian Markham and Ibrahim Abu Rabi’, *September 11 Religious Perspectives on the Causes and Consequences*. Oxford: Oneworld. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁶¹ Fazal Rizvi 2003. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁶² *Ibid.*,

⁶³ *Ibid.*,

develop faithful, thoughtful, and peaceful living.⁶⁴ Today, the historical links between Islamic and Christian traditions are masked by the idea of the clash of civilizations⁶⁵ and politically corrupted by both the militant Islam and those who hold Islam responsible for their despair to serve their own distinctive sets of ideological purposes. “The militants [Islam] have exploited the feelings that many Muslims are being increasingly threatened and marginalized by the forces of globalisation.”⁶⁶

Another fundamental issue that has contributed to the spread of Islamic radicalism all around the world is a simplistic understanding of the concept of *jihad*. “The term *jihad* has come to connote an aggressive attitude that is rooted in a reactionary discourse of authenticity and purity which traditional Islam never possessed.⁶⁷ With this particular understanding, the concept of *jihad* “came to mean struggle for self-preservation and self-defence, always regulated by a range of ethical principles and sanctions,” such as acts of terror and indiscriminate violence against

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*,

⁶⁵ This idea is discussed by Samuel Huntington 1996. *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Simon Press. In Indonesia, Huntington’s argument has been widely criticized. Nurcholiz Madjid, for example, said that the argument is “absurd.” He said: “Huntington does not understand Islam. The important thing is to try and bridge the differences as much as possible.” He further said: “Mr. Huntington had it all wrong because the major religions of the world have more in common than not. ‘It’s a family quarrel. We all coe from the same fountain of wisdom, God.” See discussion in Jane Perlez 2002. *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Fazal Rizvi 2003. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

civilians.⁶⁸ “The term [*jihad*] was originally used to refer to one’s personal struggle against one’s human weaknesses, which included battling over various temptations such as greed and pride.”⁶⁹ Following Barbara Metcalf, Rizvi suggests that *jihad* can be understood in term of personal purification and in term of warfare. The militant self-appointed “defenders of the faith,” said Rizvi, highjacked the later meaning of *jihad* and applied it without any reference to the ethical principles that guide the conduct of war.⁷⁰

Putting Modernization on Track

The major cause of problems in contemporary Islamic education institutions in the Muslim world is the failure of modernization. Despite intensive modernization of educational institutions, religious education institutions in the Muslim world “has not been modernized sufficiently to reflect the enormous changes wrought in society after independence.”⁷¹ In Pakistan and Afghanistan, “traditional Islamic education survived through independence without any major change in the medieval curriculum.”⁷² In conservative Arab states, the absence of critical vision in most of the educational systems is closely linked to the

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*,

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*,

⁷¹ See Ibrahim Abu Rabi 2002. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

⁷² *Ibid.*,

failure of modernization launched by political elites.⁷³ In these countries, “a traditional educational system was resurrected in the 1960s and 1970s.”⁷⁴ “The result has been the creation of two different, and sometimes antagonistic, kinds of intelligentsia that have nothing to do with each other.”⁷⁵ This implies that the modernization of Islamic education institutions needs to be revisited and put on the right track, to allow “democratic” or “pluralistic” education prevail.

To day, in Indonesia, many Islamic educational thoughts come from anti-modernist and anti-West scholars. They control many Islamic education institutions, such as *Pesantren* and *Madrasah*. These scholars tend to believe that Muslim youths will be ready to face all sort of challenges in modern life if they memorize a number of Qur’anic verses and *Hadith* as well as being familiar with the basic teachings of *Fiqh* (jurisprudence), *Shari’ah* (Islamic law), and *Tawhid* (Islamic theology). These scholars tend to see various modern scientific disciplines as the treasure of the West that has nothing to do with Muslims. I share Khan’s opinion that such as narrow understanding of knowledge has caused lack of creativity, dynamism, vitality and power in the Muslim world.⁷⁶

⁷³ *Ibid.*,

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*,

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*,

⁷⁶ Muqtedar Khan 2003. [Globalist Paper Global Education] Islam's Future and the Importance of Social Sciences. Available on <http://www>.

In order to counter the spread of Islamic radicalism in the country, the philosophy, organization, curriculum, and teaching methodology in public schools need to be revisited and adapted to the contemporary challenges of modern life in pluralistic and global world. Appropriate regulatory control need to be applied, intensive teacher training must be provided, and critical analysis and democratic habits need to be emphasized. With such a substantial modernization, Islamic education institutions in Indonesia will be able to produce a generation of leaders who are able to participate in the processes of complex cultural negotiations as dialogue partners in a global civilization. They will be the locomotive for banishing radicalism and strengthening moderation. Above all, they will be leading figures in developing faithful, thoughtful, and peaceful Indonesia and the world.

Developing a New Vision of Islamic Teachings

Modernization of Islamic education in Indonesia requires a more sophisticated approach of Islamic teachings. This approach can not, of course, be developed in a close minded intellectual environment or with backward looking attitude. Muslim teachers need to develop a new vision of Islamic teaching that can bring Muslims to the level of understanding, commitment, and social responsibility to serve Islam and humanity effectively. Islamic teachings need

theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3255. Downloaded on September 19, 2003.

to be rational, practical, and relevant to Muslims' daily experiences and problems. The teachings introduce and explain Islam as both *normative* and *empirical* ideal. They link fundamental Islamic teachings, such as *tafsir*, *hadith*, *fiqh*, and *tawhid* to the natural concerns of Muslims and their relation with the whole world.⁷⁷ They equip Muslim youths with a proper understanding of contemporary world order and put them away from prejudices.

The new Islamic teachings need to introduce Islam as one of many religions that exist on earth, not as the only one. They make Muslims realize that despite they are the adherents of the same religion, Muslims are diverse. Muslims from different geographical, historical, educational, and cultural backgrounds are developing and practicing their own Islamic tradition. More importantly, Islamic teachings need to combine religious and secular knowledge, so that young generation of Muslims are well equipped with religious and social knowledge as well as scientific, technical, and leadership skills that they need to strengthen both their faith, their social life, and their professional career.⁷⁸ In the words of Dawud Tawhidi, Muslim educators need to move from teaching *facts about Islam* to teaching

⁷⁷ Dawud Tawhidi. *A Vision of Effective Islamic Education*, edited by Anas Coburn. Available on http://islamic-world.net/parenting/parenting_page/a_vision_of_effective_islamic_ed.htm. Downloaded on September 19, 2003.

⁷⁸ *Ronald A. Lukens-Bull* 2003. *Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies Teaching Morality: Javanese Islamic Education In A Globalizing Era*. Available on <http://www.uib.no/jais/v003ht/lukens1.htm>. downloaded on september 19, 2003.

about being Muslims.⁷⁹ “The goal of Islamic education,” said Tawhidi, “is not to fill our children’s minds with information about Islam, but rather to teach them about *being* Muslim”.⁸⁰

Islamic education institutions need to be designed and redesigned for academic purposes, not for supporting particular schools of thought and movements. They need to develop intellectual excellence, not becoming political tools for the elites or arenas of power struggles among different religious, political, and social groups. Islamic education institutions must be training centers for scholars (*ulama*), not for recruiting holy warriors (*mujahidin*). Muslim teachers need to redefine what they mean by knowledge, what contents need to be prioritized in their teachings, what approach is appropriate, and what standard is used to measure effective teachings in modern era.

Who is Responsible?

At this stage, we have discussed some educational measures that need to be taken to counter the resurgence of Islamic radicalism and develop better understanding of fundamental teachings of Islam, such as *jihad* and interfaith relations. But who is going to take the measures? Who is responsible for developing “democratic” or “pluralistic” Islamic education system, banishing “self-fulfilling

⁷⁹ Dawud Tawhidi 2003, *ibid*.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*,

prophecy” in Christian-Muslim relations, and countering the simplistic understanding of *Jihad in the Muslim world*? For Rizvi, the answer is simple: the moderates. In his words: “they [moderate Muslim intellectuals] also need to demonstrate to Muslims everywhere that there is nothing inconsistent between Islam and the ideas of democracy, freedom, the rule of law and partnership with the West, and capitalism.”⁸¹ “Some of the impetus for democratic change,” Rizvi stresses, “clearly has to come from the moderate Muslim leadership with the Islamic countries.”⁸²

Moderate Muslim intellectuals “have to show how *jihad* has always had a historically specific meaning and that in the present context it must mean struggle for economic development, modernization and the creation of democratic civil society.”⁸³ They need to show that *jihad* is destructive if it does not produce economic and social prosperity, and if it is aimed simply at striking nihilistically at a target that in the long run has the power to inflict more harm on Muslims than they can on it.”⁸⁴ At the same time, they “have sought to reclaim the concept of ‘*jihad*’, and provide Muslims everywhere a more complex but accessible analysis of their feelings of marginalisation, of the contemporary processes of globalisation, and of more realistic resources of hope

⁸¹ An-Na’im 1990, quoted in Rizvi 2003, p. 37.

⁸² *Ibid.*,

⁸³ *Ibid.*,

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*,

than those provided by the neo-conservatives.”⁸⁵

Moderate Muslim scholars in Indonesia need to address the modern challenges of living for Muslims clearly and continuously. Indonesian Muslims can't effort to go back to their ancient tradition model of the sixth century Prophet Muhammad and his companions without adjustment and creativity. In many ways, social and political contexts of life among early Muslims are different from the social and political contexts of the life of contemporary Muslims. Muslims need to revive the tradition within the contexts of modern challenges by developing a proper sacred vision of Islamic life based on a workable synthesis between their traditional values and the modern ones. They need to base Islamic teachings on a *dynamic*, rather than static and legalistic view of Islam. The teachings need to be rooted in a belief that the mission of Islam is to positively affect and transform the world and aims to prepare young Muslims to be able to carry out this mission emotionally, morally, and intellectually.

East-West Cooperation

How to take all of the educational measures? Since Islamic radicalism develops and acts internationally, countering Islamic radicalism is not only the task of educational authorities, but also the task of all parents, community leaders, educators, and other social groups in

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*,

Indonesia. This task requires an international West-East joint cooperation, specific and sharp vision and mission, strong commitment, and substantial modernization. There must be joint academic and financial cooperation between Muslim countries and the West in order to revisit the credibility, quality, and accountability of Islamic religious education institutions in term of their curriculums, human and financial resources, and academic orientations.⁸⁶ Such cooperation will involve the implementation of some kind of regulatory control, proper training for teachers, the inclusion of critical skills of interpretation and analysis and of democratic habits of thought and action in the curriculum.⁸⁷

In the Muslim world, the curriculums need to reduce indoctrination of students to follow a particular path to political action and pay more attention on the enhancement of their life prospects and community welfare. Instead of telling the students that the world is against them and they must fight to defend Islam, Islamic religious education institutions need to tell their students about the crucial need of the world for democracy and the availability of various paths to spiritual salvation, and culture to achieve it. Islamic religious schools need to help their students to develop a better understanding of local, national and global processes and practices, both in terms of the sources of inequalities and their marginalization and also of the opportunities provided by other more benign forms processes and

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*,

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*,

practices. Islamic education institutions need to use new information and communication technologies and recruit teachers with international qualification to expose their students to the world outside their villages and towns.

In the West, the contents and contexts of internationalization in school curriculums need to go beyond commercial modes of practice.⁸⁸ The curriculums need to focus more on the values of intellectual complexity and openness in order to equip students with the ability to think and speak with subtlety and depth, listen to others, and become more attentive to global issues and cultures. They must learn certain kinds of serious and intelligent civic responsibility that extend beyond the boundaries of their own community and nation across the world.”⁸⁹

Muslim intellectuals in Muslim countries must not be left alone to take care of Islamic radicalism. Rizvi suggests that both Muslims living in the West and the West itself need to supports moderate Muslim intellectuals in Muslim countries to counter the resurgence of Islamic radicalism in their countries.⁹⁰ However, Rizvi further suggests, the supports need to be given in a democratic manner, with sincerity and cultural sensitivity, and through negotiation,

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*,

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*,

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*,

not by imposing ideological agenda, peddling a set of stereotypes and prejudices, and security measures.⁹¹

For Rizvi, “a democratic manner” will work under a “global intelligence.” This intelligence, he explains, “requires the development of a moral imagination to view the world through the other’s eye, and a commitment to build cultural bridges across regimes of fear and suspicion of others.”⁹² “In the end,” he further explains, “it [global intelligence] involves a range of values central to democracy: reason, compassion and respect for all human life.”⁹³ “Global intelligence,” I think, can only be developed through “democratic” or “pluralistic” education system. “Global intelligence” will eradicate narrow minded and self-justified intelligence, and produce broad minded and accountable intelligence. With “global intelligence,” Muslim youths and leaders will be able to think and speak with subtlety and depth, listen to others, and become more attentive to global issues and cultures. They will share certain kinds of serious and intelligent civic responsibility within and beyond their own community. They will be able to promote faithful, thoughtful, and peaceful living in a pluralistic and democratic environment.

Certainly, the radicals were not educated in a “democratic” or “pluralistic” education system and do not seem to have “global intelligence”. They were educated in

⁹¹ *Ibid.*,

⁹² *Ibid.*,

⁹³ *Ibid.*,

“politically inclined” and “religious and highly gendered” tradition of education based on *Salafi-Wahhabi* understanding of Islam and aims to serve *Salafi-Wahhabi* distinctive sets of ideological purposes. There is no space for “global intelligence” in such a tradition of education. The graduates may be able, for example, to think and speak about the issues of *jihad* and *Shari’ah*, but may not be able to think and speak about the issues with subtlety and depth, listen to others’ views about the issues, and put them on global perspectives. They may share certain kinds of serious and intelligent civic responsibility within their own groups, but may not be able to share it with other groups. They may have been able to promote faithful living, but may have not been able to promote thoughtful and peaceful living as required in a pluralistic society like Indonesia.

If moderation, modernization, democracy, and globalization remains a choice for developing better Indonesia in the future, the most challenging task of moderate Muslim leaders in the country is to develop and disseminate moderate Islamic teachings at all levels of education. They need to work hard to balance a claim of Islamic authenticity as emphasized by the radicals with a very real openness to change and constructive attitude. They need to elicit a moral commitment not only to be critical toward modernity, democracy, and globalization but also being able to reconstruct it based on Islamic values. Moderate Muslim leaders need to develop an Islamic path to modernity, democracy, and globalization: design social, economic, cultural, political, and religious modes of

modernity, democracy, and globalization that suit Islamic values and principles. They need to utilize Islam as spiritual salvation and inspiration to allow Muslims to achieve modernity, develop democracy, and respond to globalization with their own way and style, without losing their cultural, national, and religious identity.

The moderates need to work hard to invite and persuade the radicals to reconsider their understanding of the relationship between Islamic civilization and modernity, democracy, and globalization as well as the role that Muslims need to play in the dynamic of the relationship. At educational level, they need to develop new materials and approaches to produce an open-minded and skillful generation of Muslims who are capable of synthesizing Islamic, modern, democratic, and global concepts of successful living. The moderates also need to develop more realistic, rational, and contextual Islamic teachings, train more visionary Islamic teachers, and produce more faithful, creative, open-minded, thoughtful, and skillful generation of Muslims. Such a generation of Muslims will replace West-phobia, modernity-phobia, and anti-democracy with a creative attitude and constructive mode of thinking.

Certainly, this type of Muslims can only be produced through a sophisticated education system. Radical Islamic teachings need to be carefully and critically treated, agendas as well as strategies for Islamic education reform need to be revisited, and “democratic” or “pluralist” Islamic education system urgently need to be developed to produce

a generation of Muslim youths and leaders who have “global intelligence,” a generation who is able to think and work with reason, compassion, and respect for all human life, prevent the institutionalization of radical ideology in public life, strengthen the importance of culture and education in personal advancement, accelerate modernization, democratization, and globalization, and affirm the philosophical or religious ideas of non-violence as the foundation of Muslim purpose, the presupposition of Muslim belief, and the manner of Muslim action.

Concluding Remarks: The Roles of Islamic Universities

All efforts to introduce and disseminate moderate Islamic perspective and promote modern, democratic, and global values require strong leadership and institutional bases. It is in this regard that all major Islamic organizations or institutions, particularly the educational ones, such as Islamic universities, can share the responsibility and take their roles. They can be the locomotives that bring together all cultural, structural, and intellectual potentials, strengths and resources for developing modern, democratic, and moderate Islam in Indonesia. They can facilitate the moderates to express and develop their arguments, and invite or persuade the radicals to review their perspectives.

Islamic universities can be the advocates of moderate Islam. They can guide and assist moderate Muslims to express their perspective, defend their position, and deal with threats, conflicts, and dilemmas caused by radicalism.

Islamic universities can also be the collaborators that integrate various efforts to counter Islamic radicalism at local, national, and international levels. They can develop scientific corroborations with their counterparts all around the world, policy makers, mass media, and religious activists in an effort to critically review Islamic radicalism and carefully adopt, produce, implement, support, and promote moderate Islam at intellectual, policy, and practical levels. Such corroborations will allow Islamic universities to strengthen all efforts to counter radicalism and increase their effectiveness. Such corroborations allow them to represent and introduce modern, democratic, and moderate Islamic perspective to the society at large, beyond their academic circles.

Islamic universities can also be the brokers that can connect all parties to openly, honestly, and sincerely look at the strengths of being moderates and the weaknesses of being radicals in this plural and global world. The key proponents of the universities can be the middlemen who bridge the cultural, structural, and intellectual gaps among the moderates and between the moderates and the radicals, to avoid conflicts and allow fair, open, academic, continuous, and constructive communications, discussions, and dialogues. For this purposes, they need to take the middle path and develop diplomatic strategies. They can be very critical to the radicals and at the same time, being their good partners for dialogues.

Discussion in this article suggests that efforts to

counter Islamic radicalism in Indonesia tend to be limited to individual, local, and organizational levels and trapped within a hostility cycle. The moderates tend to be hostile and reactive to the radicals and vice versa. As a result, nothing has been changed and no meeting point has been reached. The moderates and the radicals continue to take their own ways, perform their own styles, express their own perspectives, and defend their own positions with self fulfilling truth and self justifying arguments. They spread religious prejudices, split the community, provoke religious disharmony, and of course, disturb modernization, threaten democratization, and mess up globalization. To be more effective, such efforts need to be developed in more collective and discursive ways under an international cooperation. Such efforts require quality individuals and institutions that can be the credible, capable, and accountable leaders in moderate Islamic movement.

In contemporary development of moderate Islamic movement in Indonesia, it is hard to find such individuals and institutions. Our hope very much relies on Islamic universities in this country. Key figures in these universities need to play active and constructive role, not casual and reactive ones, to balance a claim of Islamic authenticity as emphasized by the radicals with a very real openness to change and constructive attitude; develop an Islamic path to modernity, democracy, and globalization; invite and persuade the radicals to reconsider their perspectives; develop more realistic, rational, and contextual Islamic teachings; train more visionary Islamic teachers; develop

“democratic” and “pluralist” Islamic education system; and produce a generation of Muslim youths and leaders with “global intelligence.” They must be the key figures in developing democratic education system, putting modernization of Islamic education on track, and introducing a new vision of Islamic teachings.®

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5

THE EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS OF WAR ON TERRORISM:

The role of *Pesantren* in the Resurgence of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia

Introduction

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 tragedy has heightened sense of insecurity, security measures and, more patchily, commitment to addressing the underlying causes of that insecurity among many nations in the world, particularly the American people. The threat has made many American people feel unsecured and uncomfortable in their daily life. "What are the threats that keep me awake at night?," George J. Tenet questioned his audience in his Oscar Iden

Lecture, Georgetown University on October 18, 1999. His answer: "International terrorism, both on its own and in conjunction with narcotics traffickers, international criminals and those seeking weapons of mass destruction. You need go no further than Usama Bin Ladin...."⁹⁴ For President Bush, September 11 tragedy proves that "America is no longer protected by vast oceans." In his view, international terrorism is a murderous evil that is as dangerous as other ideologies of 20th century, such as Nazism, Facism, and totalitarianism.⁹⁵ Bush believes that September 11 attacks in Washington, D.C., New York, and Pennsylvania did not simply aim to destroy American assets or scare American people, but also aimed to destroy American values and civilization.⁹⁶ As the most responsible person for the safety of the United State of America (USA) he is committed to fight international terrorism to death. As he expresses his commitment: "No group or nation should mistake America's intentions: We will not rest until terrorist groups of global reach have been found, have been stopped, and have been defeated."⁹⁷

⁹⁴ As said in his Oscar Iden Lecture, Georgetown University--October 18, 1999
Available on <http://www.cia.gov/terrorism/>

⁹⁵ President George W. Bush address to a joint session of congress and the American people September 20, 2001

⁹⁶ See National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003. Available on <http://www.cia.gov/terrorism/>

⁹⁷ Said by President George W. Bush on November 6, 2002. Quoted in National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p. 1. Available on <http://www.cia.gov/terrorism/>

Further more, September 11 tragedy has changed the way Bush government thinks and handles many world problems. For the first time he openly declared that his government decided to use “preemptive” strategy for protecting American people from terrorist threat. “Sometimes,” Bush justified the strategy, “the most difficult tasks are accomplished by the most direct means.” “In the world we have entered,” he further justified, “the only path to safety is the path of action.”⁹⁸ “We [the Americans],” he explained, “must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they [the terrorists] emerge.” “The [preemptive] strategy,” he further explained, “focuses on identifying and defusing terrorism threats before they reach American borders.” He added that the preemptive strategy will use diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military resources owned by the USA.⁹⁹ He stressed in his explanation that war on terrorism will be a long term efforts and among top priorities of his government.

President Bush made it clear from the beginning that preemptive strike on international terrorism aims to destroy terrorist organizations, win the “war of ideas,” and strengthen America’s security at home and abroad. In his rhetoric, War on Terrorism aims “to shape a free and more prosperous World” based on American democratic values

⁹⁸ President Geroge W. Bush, June 1, 2002.

⁹⁹ National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003. Available on <http://www.cia.gov/terrorism/>

and way of life. He explained that War on Terrorism aims “to stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and our friends and allies around the world and ultimately, to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them.” Bush particularly emphasized that War on Terrorism aims to win “the War of Ideas” or “to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation, to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit in areas most at risk, and to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism.” “The War of Ideas,” he explains, aims “to delegitimize terrorism and make clear that all acts of terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide.” The war, he further explained, aims “to establish a new international norm regarding terrorism requiring non-support, non-tolerance, and active opposition to terrorists.”

Bush also made it clear that War on Terrorism will involve global alliances and partnerships with local and national governments. He promised to use American strengths in economy and technology to “help failing states and assist weak countries in ridding themselves of terrorism.” “The United States and its partners,” said Bush, “will defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances.” However, he also made it clear that the USA does not

hesitate to act alone and take preemptive action if American interests are under threat.

Since many suspects of international terrorist networks are Muslims, the focus of War on Terrorism led by President Bush has been on the Muslim world. For the success of “The War of Ideas,” Bush stressed, “The United States will seek to support moderate and modern governments, especially in the Muslim world.” “The United States,” he further stressed, “will work with such moderate and modern governments to reverse the spread of extremist ideology and those who seek to impose totalitarian ideologies on our Muslim allies and friends.” Indeed, the United States has come to the aid of many Muslims in the past, such as in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Bosnia, and Kosovo. He assures Muslims that “American values are not at odds with Islam.”

Cooperation with Indonesia in The War on Terrorism has developed only few days after September 11 tragedy. On September 17, 2001, President of the Republic of Indonesia, Megawati Sukarno Putri, visited President Bush at the White House. The stakes were high for the two Presidents. For President Bush, the support of the President of the most populous Muslim country for what he describes “war against terrorism” is essential for the future of diplomacy with the Muslim world. For President Megawati, visiting the White House was ignoring calls at home by anti-America

groups to postpone her visit.¹⁰⁰ Despite the difficulty, the two Presidents managed to focus their talk on relevant issues. Megawati began her talk by condemning the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre

¹⁰⁰ Inside Indonesia, a potential split is already opening up between Megawati and Vice President Hamzah Haz, who is head of the Islamic-based United Development Party. Haz condemned the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington but then, in a remark interpreted as justifying the attacks, added that the tragedy might “cleanse the sins” of the US. Both he and Amien Rais, speaker of Indonesia’s parliamentary upper house and the leader of an alliance of Islamic parties, warned the US administration not to immediately blame Muslims as had been the case in the Oklahoma City bombing. On Tuesday, the influential Council of Ulemas [Muslim scholars] called for a holy war or *jihad* if the US launched an attack on Afghanistan and warned Megawati not to give any support to the US war plans. In its statement, the council said: “We call on the government of the Republic of Indonesia not to fall to US persuasions to support plans for the said aggression in all forms, political or moral, including by not allowing Indonesian territory to be passed by the US armada or fighter planes.” Already a variety of groups have organised protests against US military preparations. Over the weekend, groups of 20-25 men from several Islamic organisations entered a number of international hotels in Solo, Central Java, and warned Americans to leave if the US started military action against Afghanistan. Last week the Islamic Defenders Front threatened to attack the US embassy and round up Americans for expulsion if Washington carried out its military plans. According to reports in the Jakarta Post, not all demonstrations have been organised by Islamic extremists. Last Friday around 200 women from the Muslim Women’s Sisterhood organisation held a rally outside the UN office in Jakarta to register their opposition to terrorism and also to any US plan to attack Afghanistan. Dozens of students held a protest outside the US consulate in Medan in northern Sumatra. Its spokesman declared: “We condemn the brutal attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, but the tragic incident must not be used as an excuse for attacking Afghanistan.” On Saturday, several hundred students took part in anti-US rallies in Surabaya, East Java and Pulu, Central Sulawesi. In Surabaya, several hundred students from the Indonesian Muslim Students Association unfurled banners which read “America is the Great Terrorist” and “Bush, Big Boss of Terrorists”. In an official statement, the protest deplored all terrorism and demanded that America protect the rights of Muslims. Further protests were reported yesterday in Jakarta, Bandung, Banjarmasin and Yogyakarta against any US attack on Afghanistan

and the Pentagon. However, she did not express a commitment to offer concrete support for the Bush's military preparations to attack Afghanistan. Expecting a concrete military supports, Bush responded to Megawati with a mixture of the carrot and the stick. The meeting ended up with two joint statements outlining a package of US financial assistance to Indonesia and pledging co-operation between the two countries to combat terrorism. Some US trade finance agencies promised to provide Indonesia with \$US400 million to promote trade and investment, particularly in oil and gas sector. In addition, Bush promised to secure Congressional support for another \$130 million to help Indonesian government to finance education and legal reform. What was ore, President Bush expressed his commitment to reestablish military connections with Indonesia that was troubled by poor human right records of Indonesian military in the separation of East Timor from Indonesia in 1999. Bush administration promised to provide \$400,000 for expanding international military education and training, end to the embargo on sale of non-lethal defence items to Indonesia, and establish a bilateral security dialogue.

The reciprocal nature of the attitude of the two Presidents was very clear. After Bush expressed his commitment to help Indonesia, Megawati restated that Indonesia is ready to cooperate with the United States and other countries in the fight against terrorism. When she addressed the American Indonesian Chamber of Commerce the day after meeting Bush, Megawati described terrorist

attacks on the World Trade Centre as “the worst atrocity in the history of civilization.”¹⁰¹ In accordance with Megawati’s statement, her foreign minister Hassan Wirayuda signed the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and indicated that Indonesia would increase its intelligence coordination with the US and its neighbouring countries in South East Asia. Megawati’s Defence Minister Matori Abdul Jalil promised to crack down on anyone threatening foreigners or foreign property, particularly belonging to the US. He stated that Police action will not be limited to Islamic extremist groups but will be extended to other opposition groups, particularly if the protests against US actions continue to mount.¹⁰² Matori’s statement particularly responded to Bush’s expectation that Megawati has to crack down all organizations linked to.¹⁰³

Bush’s invitation to Indonesian cooperation on The War on Terrorism was strengthened when he visited Bali on July, ..., 2003. Bush’ visit to Bali become a big news, not only because it was his first visit to Indonesia since he took

¹⁰¹ John Roberts and Peter Symonds, 27 September 2001. Megawati’s support for US war drive exacerbates tensions in Indonesia. World Socialist Web Site. Available on <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/sep2001/indo-s27.shtml>

¹⁰² John Roberts and Peter Symonds, 27 September 2001. Megawati’s support for US war drive exacerbates tensions in Indonesia. World Socialist Web Site. Available on <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/sep2001/indo-s27.shtml>

¹⁰³ John Roberts and Peter Symonds, 27 September 2001. Megawati’s support for US war drive exacerbates tensions in Indonesia. World Socialist Web Site. Available on <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/sep2001/indo-s27.shtml>

over power from Bill Clinton in, but also because his visit was followed by a promise to provide financial aid for traditional Islamic education institutions in Indonesia, particularly Pesantren and Madrasah, as part of a package to help Indonesia to fight terrorism. The plan implies a growing concern among American foreign policy makers with the role of traditional Islamic religious education in Indonesia in the resurgence of Islamic radicalism in the country and in the development of international terrorism. Predictably, the financial plan invited various responses from Indonesian leaders.

This article discusses the educational site of War on Terrorism led by President Bush with particular reference on the growing concern with the role of traditional Islamic education in the resurgence of Islamic radicalism and international terrorism in Indonesia. Discussion covers the reasoning of the concern and its manifestations in the future agendas and strategies of War on Terrorism. Indonesian response to the agendas and their implication on future development of traditional Islamic education in the country will also be discussed.

This paper argues that growing concern with the role of traditional Islamic education in Indonesia in the resurgence of Islamic radicalism and international terrorism is baseless. It is due to a failure to understand the considerable diversity of traditional Islamic religious education institutions in the country, the characteristics of their relations with teachers and alumni, and the social and

political contexts of their development. This article also argues that the resurgence of Islamic radicalism, including militancy, extremism, and anti-American attitudes among Indonesian Muslims are caused by many factors other than traditional Islamic religious education in the country, such as lack of leadership, loosening security system, transitional democracy, informal Islamic study groups, and Afghanistan connection. This article further argues that traditional Islamic religious education in Indonesia have played important role in promoting religious harmony and tolerant in the country.

A Brief Overview of *Pesantren*

Education has always been an important instrument in processes of dissemination of religious authority among Indonesian Muslims. It serves as a means for the propagation of "proper" rites, tenets and values aimed at motivating and disciplining (prospective) young generation of Muslims and for the sustenance and reproduction of religious knowledge and authority. Education is a means of instructing and motivating (prospective) Islamic belief as an integral part of *dakwah* and for the preservation of religious 'knowledge' and the reproduction of religious authority. This is to say that education has always been instrumental in the dissemination of religious ideas, rituals, values, and knowledge among Indonesian Muslims. This instrumental role of education is based on traditional Islamic conception that religious knowledge is a sacred value to adult Muslims,

an act of seeking knowledge is equivalent to an act of worship or embarking on a holy war, and teaching it is a means to get closer to Allah.¹⁰⁴ The cultural well spring of Islam in Indonesia has served as the major resource of the development of Islamic education programs and institutions in the country. Islamic culture has played major role at the philosophical and practical levels of the formation of Islamic education in the country.¹⁰⁵

From the beginning of their arrival in Indonesia until the present day, Muslims in the country continuously develop various types and levels of religious education institutions.¹⁰⁶ The earliest type of traditional Islamic religious education in the country is a boarding school called Pesantren.¹⁰⁷ Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) notes

¹⁰⁴ See Ahmad Shalaby 1954. *History of Muslim Education*. Beirut: Dar al-Kashshaf, pp. 161-162; A.S. Tritton 1957. *Materials on Muslim Education in the Middle Ages*. London: Luzac, pp. 27-29; and A.L. Tibawi 1972. *Islamic Education*. London: Luzac, pp. 35-46.

¹⁰⁵ For further discussion on the role of religion in the formation of Muslim society, see Clifford Geertz, observes in his study of Muslim society in Indonesia and Morocco that religion.Clifford Geertz 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books, especially pp. 89-92 and 123-125.

¹⁰⁶ Along with Pesantrens, Indonesian Muslims also develop informal and small scale education programs, such as Pengajian, Majelis Taklim, Usroh, and Khalaqah. In the early 20th modernization began to influence Islamic education institutions in Indonesia. It was marked by the introduction of Madrasah system¹⁰⁶ by leading ulamas who were inspired by their experiences with educational reforms in the Middle East, such as the founder of Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Hasyim Asy'ari, and the founder of Muhammadiyah, Ahmad Dahlan.

¹⁰⁷ Pesantren, which resemble the *madrasa* (A: religious school) elsewhere in the Islamic world, seem to have been of some interest to Western scholars (Anderson 1990, 64–65, 127–28, Denny 1995, Geertz 1960a, 180–87, 1960b, Jones 1991), certain works having been published in Indonesian (Steenbrink 1974, Van Bruinessen 1995). Indonesian scholars, on the other hand, have

that by the year 2002-2003 they are more than 14,000 *Pesantrens* throughout Indonesia.¹⁰⁸ *Pesantrens* have grown throughout Indonesia, mainly in Java as an indigenous traditional education model for Indonesian Muslims.

Originally, *Pesantrens* are dedicated mainly to the study of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and are intended to guarantee the perpetuation of judicial study and meet the needs of an expanding state system. Their graduates are prepared to be a new group of social and religious leaders with sufficient training in traditional religious knowledge and practices. Many of them become social and religious leaders with high level acquisition of religious knowledge. They are prepared to pursue career in religious

produced an enormous literature on them, including countless books and scholarly theses. Most of this literature is firmly based on the work of Zamakhsyari Dhofier (1980, 1982, 1999) and Taufik Abdullah (1987), which remain good introductions to the study of these schools. A large number of these works assert that *pesantren* and modernity are not incompatible but can work together for the betterment of the nation (see especially, Galba 1991, Prasodjo et al. 1974, Yacub 1985). Others argue, perhaps more accurately, that the exact role of *pesantren* is still being debated (Abdullah 1987).

¹⁰⁸ See Departemen Agama RI 2003. *Statistik Pondok Pesantren Seluruh Indonesia*, brochure issued by the Educational Data and Information Division of the Directorate of Muslim Educational Institutions. *Pesantren* has attracted Western scholars, such as Anderson (1990), Denny (1995), Geertz (1960), Jones (1991), Steenbrink (1974), Van Bruinessen (1995). Indonesian scholars, on the other hand, have produced an enormous literature on them, including countless books and scholarly theses. *Pesantren* has also attracted Indonesian scholars, such as Zamakhsyari Dhofier (1980, 1982, 1999) and Taufik Abdullah (1987). Their works are good introductions to the study of *Pesantren*. They mainly argue that *Pesantren* and modernity can work together for the betterment of the nation. See also Galalza (1991), Prasodjo et al. (1974), and Yacub (1985).

institutions,¹⁰⁹ to be highly qualified religious functionaries, judges, notaries, and ministers. Pesantren promotes traditional values of education with curriculum mainly provides traditional Islamic disciplines such as Qur'an, Hadith, Aqidah, Akhlak, Tarikh, and Fiqh.

With its strong emphasis on traditional Islamic knowledge, Pesantrens remain an important vehicle for social mobility and the pillars of the sociopolitical order among Muslims in rural and urban Indonesia. In some cases, they serve as a lever by which their wealthy patrons could gain political influence. With its strong emphasis on the teaching of Islamic law and jurisprudence, Pesantrens play role as a stabilizing mechanism in Muslim society. Their kyais and santris often become mediators between rulers and their people.¹¹⁰ Pesantrens value a devout lifestyle. They prepare their santris for active and broad participation in society and offered intensive religious training. They train their santris to be religious specialist and custodian of sacred knowledge. In most Pesantrens santris are not allowed to live with their families or rent a house in neighboring areas. They are required to live in dormitory within Pesantren along with kyais and staffs. This arrangement allows kyais and his teachings staffs watch

¹⁰⁹ The International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), Leiden/Amsterdam. RESEARCH PROGRAMMES: 'Islam in Indonesia: The Dissemination of Religious Authority in the 20th Century'. Available on <http://www.iias.nl/iias/research/dissemination/annex4.html>

¹¹⁰ (n2.) On the madrasa, see George Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981); Gary Leiser, "Notes on the Madrasa in Medieval Islamic Society," *Muslim World* 75 (1986): 16-23.

santris' daily activities and lifestyle closely. In this regard, relationships between kyais and santris are direct, close, and everlasting.

The spread of modernization in Indonesian education system has eroded the foundations of traditional Islamic religious education and paved the way for the development of new educational approaches and strategies. Islamic religious education programs in the country expanded rapidly in various approaches and strategies. Major modern oriented Muslim organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, and Islamic foundations developed more types and levels of education programs. Many Pesantrens reformed their methods and curriculums in order to catch up with the modern trend. Soe of them were transformes into Madrasah model. In post-independent era, after the government develops state school system, Pesantren and Madrasah begin to face great challenges from state-run schools. Being better financed and equipped, state schools quickly overrun its competitors. They are more attractive to parents and more promising for students than Pesantren and Madrasah, because they provide better access for university education and job opportunities.

Together, modernization and nationalization strengthen the role of modern education institutions and reduce the role of traditional education institutions in Indonesian society. In part, this changing trend has drawn dividing lines between traditional and modern education system and has caused competition and conflicts between

the two systems. In another part, the changing trend has allowed compromise between modern and traditional values of education. The compromise has blurred the dividing lines between modern and traditional education. What is more, the compromise has inspired the development of modern Islamic schools with strong religious characteristics. The schools provide students with both traditional religious disciplines and modern disciplines. This can be seen in the case of al-Azhar schools in Jakarta, Mutahhari schools in Bandung, Madani schools in Parung, and Insan Cendekia schools in Serpong. These schools are preparing their students to become modern and moderate religious leadership.¹¹¹ They prepare them to pursue higher education in top universities and professional career in top companies. They are serious competitor for Pesantren and Madrasah.

Pressures from modern religious schools and state-run schools have forced many Pesantrens and Madrasahs to modernize some aspects of their programs, such as inserting English and modern disciplines in their curriculums, adopting classical system, applying modern code of dressing, such as wearing pant and next tie, as well as adopting modern teaching methodology. Being under pressure makes it difficult for Pesantrens and Madrasahs to resist every reform imposed by government education

¹¹¹ More information on this project can be found at the [website of the International Institute for Asian Studies \(IIAS\)](http://www.knaw.nl/indonesia/religious/religious04.html) [http:// www. knaw.nl/ indonesia/religious/religious04.html](http://www.knaw.nl/indonesia/religious/religious04.html)

authority under the office of Departemen Pendidikan Nasional (Depdiknas) or Department of National Education. In 1994, Depdiknas introduce new curriculum applies to all schools, including Madrasah. Since then, Madrasah at Ibtidaiyah, Tsanawiyah, and Aliyah levels have adopted the same curriculum as in modern and secular schools. With the same curriculum, Madrasah has been described as Sekolah Dasar dan Menengah berciri khas keagamaan (Elementary and Secondary Schools with religious characteristics). The characteristics are maintained by a limited opportunity to provide five Islamic subjects, including Qur'an, Hadith, Traikh, Aqidah, and Akhlak in supplementary and unaccredited afternoon classes.

Unlike Madrasah, Pesantren seems to have strong resistance to modernization and secularization. Responses to modernization are diverse depending on the attitude of kyai and the degree of dependency on government's assistance. Some Pesantrens adopt modern education values and described as modern Pesantrens. Some Pesantrens tend to stay with their traditional education values and described as traditional Pesantrens. Unlike in the case of Madrasah when nationalization was able to initiate curriculum reform and organizational changes, in the case of Pesantren, nationalization has failed to do so due to strong resistance from kyais. In 200..., a joint decision between Minister of National Education and Minister of Religious Affairs was released to include Pesantrens into National Education System. The decision simply states that Pesantren is integrated part of National Education System, without a

statement on curriculum reform or organizational changes.¹¹²

Some Pesantrens stay firm with their own curriculum, pedagogy and organizational structures and totally ignore any regulation made of Depdiknas. Although include some modern subjects in their curriculum, the core element of these conservative Pesantrens are traditional Islamic disciplines, such as Qur'an, Hadith, Aqidah, Akhlak, Tarikh, and Fiqh. They are dedicated mainly to the study of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and are intended to guarantee the perpetuation of judicial study and meet the needs of an expanding state system. Unlike Madrasahs, modern Pesantrens and Islamic schools which prepare their students for active and broad participation in society and offered religious training as a supplementary curriculum, conservative Pesantrens train their santri to be religious specialist and custodian of sacred knowledge. Their curriculums, pedagogy, and organizations are designed and decided by their kyais. Since kyais adopt particular Islamic school of thought, the curriculums, pedagogy, and organizations are diverse, according to the preference of the kyais.

Growing Concern

Since modernization has dominated many aspects of development in Indonesia, traditional Islamic religious

¹¹² Chapter ... of the Decision states that

education institutions in the country, including Pesantrens, have gained less attention compared with modern education institutions.¹¹³ Many consider Pesantrens a backward education system. Their Kyais are often criticized for providing Muslim youths with irrelevant Islamic teachings, their curriculums are said to be outdated, and their alumni are considered to be unprepared to face the challenges of modern civilization. Nevertheless, after September 11, 2001 and Bali bombings on, 2003, along with the resurgence of Islamic radicalism and the rise of international terrorism, traditional Islamic religious education institutions, particularly Pesantrens have attracted serious attention from all around the world. They have been described as “the breeding ground” of terrorists and allegedly linked to the growth of militancy, extremism and anti-Western attitudes among Indonesian Muslims. Many kyais and santris as well as their relatives have become terrorist suspects and have been detained and questioned with and without legal procedure. They have been accused of being responsible for various terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia region.

In its 2003 report, International Crisis Group (ICG) provides a special section on the *Pesantren* connection of Indonesian terrorist suspects. “Schools [*Pesantrens*] and marriages”, the report suggests, “became two instruments for strengthening ties among *mujahidin* and at the same

¹¹³ Abdullah Saeed. *Traditional Islamic Religious Education Institutions: Source of Conflict or Peaceful Co-existence*. Available on <http://www.conferences.unimelb.edu.au/flagship/Abstracts/Saeed.pdf>

time ensuring that the jihadist ideology was passed down to a new generation”.¹¹⁴ The report also suggests that four *Pesantrens* have “close ties” to a shadowy Islamic group, *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI) of Southeast Asia and other radical Islamic groups in the region, including three *Pondok Pesantren* in Central Java: *Pondok Pesantren Al Mukmin* in Ngruki, Solo; *Pondok Pesantren Al-Muttaqien* in Jepara; and *Pondok Pesantren Dar us-Syhadah* in Boyolali; and one *Pondok Pesantren* in East Java, namely *Pondok Pesantren al-Islam*. The report further suggests that there are 127 *Pesantren Hidayatullah* all around Indonesia that have played role as the main network of the *Pesantren* connection of the radicals.¹¹⁵ The report adds that *Pondok Pesantren Istiqomah* in Sempaga, Samarinda; *Pondok Pesantren al-Ikhlash* (for girls) in Sedayu Lawas, Brondong sub district of Lamongan district, East Java; and *Pondok Pesantren Ibnul Qoyim* in Yogyakarta, Central Java are also parts of JI’s networks.¹¹⁶

Before September 11, 2001, Bali bombings, and the resurgence of Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia, these conservative *Pesantrens* were limitedly known and hardly mentioned in the discussion of *Pesantren* education in Indonesia. They were immersed within huge number of

¹¹⁴ ICG (International Crisis Group) 2003. *Jamaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous*. ICG Asia Report No. 63 Jakarta/Brussels, 26 August, p. 26.

¹¹⁵ ICG (International Crisis Group) 2003. *Jamaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous*. ICG Asia Report No. 63 Jakarta/Brussels, 26 August, p. 26.

¹¹⁶ ICG 2003, p. 27.

Pesantren in the country that are developed and run by more open-minded and moderate kyais.¹¹⁷ It must be said that the most cited of all conservative *Pesantrens* after September 11, 2001 and Bali bombings is Pondok Ngruki. A report by International Crisis Group (ICG) suggests that Pondok Ngruki is “the most famous” of the *Pesantrens* network of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia.¹¹⁸ The founders and graduates of Pondok Ngruki are closely linked and or part of the terrorist suspects. Along with Abdullah Sungkar, co-founder, adviser, and teacher of Pondok Ngruki, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, has been described as a key figure in the development of the network of radical Islamic groups in Southeast Asia. The establishment of *Pesantren al Islam* in Lamongan, East Java, was made possible by the strong support of Pondok Ngruki. Another key institution in the network, *al-Ikhlash* foundation based in Gading, Solo, Central Java, that runs an Islamic higher education institution named *Ma’had Ali al-Ikhlash* (Islamic Higher Education) is also closely associated with Pondok Ngruki. Some kyais in this *Pesantren* previously taught at Pondok Ngruki.¹¹⁹ Besides, a number of terrorist suspects in Indonesia

¹¹⁷ Latest document released by Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) shows that by the year 2002-2003 they are more than 14,000 *Pesantrens* throughout Indonesia. See Departemen Agama RI 2003. Statistik Pondok Pesantren Seluruh Indonesia, brochure issued by the Educational Data and Information Division of the Directorate of Muslim Educational Institutions.

¹¹⁸ ICG (International Crisis Group) 2003. *Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous*. ICG Asia Report No. 63 Jakarta/Brussels, 26 August, p. 26.

¹¹⁹ ICG 2003, p. 26.

bombings linked to Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI) are alumni of Pondok Ngruki.¹²⁰

After Bali bombings, Pondok Ngruki has become a focus of national and international attention with regard to terrorism. More than thirty people were detained in connection with the bombings. The key individuals are Imam Samudra, a Sundanese (from West Java), who is the alleged field commander of the operation, Muchlas (Ali Ghufron) who is alleged to have replaced Hambali as the mastermind of the Indonesian operation, Amrozi, who allegedly bought the explosives and the minivan used in one of the blasts, and Ali Imron, who allegedly assembled the bomb. The last three are brothers from the town of Tenggulun in East Java.¹²¹ These key individuals are alleged to be associated with a loose organization called Jamaah Islamiyah. It has been widely mentioned that the spiritual leader of JI is Abu

¹²⁰ They are Fathur Rahman Al-Ghozi alias Saad, Utomo Pamungkas alias Mubarok, and Ali Imron (bombing at the residence of the Philippines Ambassador, Jakarta; Jabir alias Enjang (Christmas Eve 2000 bombings); Datuk Rajo Ameh alias Zoefrie, Sardono Siliwangi, and Muhammad Rais (Christmas Eve bombing in Pakan Baru); Toni Togar alias Indrawarman and Idris alias Jhoni Hendrawan (Christmas Eve bombing in Medan); Utomo Pamungkas alias Mubarok alias Amin and Abdul Ghoni alias Umar alias Wayan (Christmas Eve Bombing in Mojokerto); Enjang Bastaman alias Jabir (Christmas Eve Bombing in Bandung); Andul Rauf alias Syam and Yudi alias Andri Oktavia (22 August 2002, Gold Store Robbery, Serang); Ali Ghufan alias Mukhlas and Zulkarnaen (12 October 2002, Sari Club and Paddy's café Bali Bombing); and Asmar Latin Sani (5 August 2003, JW Marriot Hotel Bombing, Jakarta). See complete list in ICG 2003, *ibid.*, pp. 33-35.

¹²¹ Greg Fealy, March 14, 2003. USINDO Open Forum Islamic Extremism in Indonesia. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/2003/Islamic%20Extremism%20in%20Indonesia.htm>

Bakar Ba'asyir, co-founder, adviser, and teacher of Pondok Ngruki, a conservative Islamic boarding school considered as a puritanical Qur'anic studies that applies strict Islamic norms and regulations and promotes Jihad as its core teaching. It has been widely mentioned in national and international media as “the nest of terrorist” and a training camp for JI terrorists. This accusation refers to an Arabic and English sign painted on the wall of one of its buildings which says, "Jihad is our way. Death in the way of Allah is our highest aspiration." This particular teaching of Pondok Ngruki has been considered as being responsible for the growing number of radical Muslims in Indonesia and Southeast Asia region.¹²² Although there is no sufficient evidence so ever that Pondok Ngruki aims to produce terrorists, it has been found that some of its kyais and santris are among the terrorist suspects. Among a list of 59 top names¹²³ of 1985-1995 “Afghan alumni” who directly

¹²² For a discussion of the possible role of Pondok Ngruki in international terrorist network, see ES. Soepriyadi 2003. *Ngruki & Jaringan Terorisme: Melacak Jejak Abu Bakar Ba'asyir dan Jaringan nya dari Ngruki sampai Bom Bali*. Jakarta: Al-Mawardi Prima; *Kompas Cyber Media*, November 3, 2003. Nasional: “Pesantren Al Mukmin, Ngruki: ‘Sarang Teroris’ atau Berprinsip pada Kebenaran Islam?”. Available on: <http://www.kompas.com> and *Asia Times Online*, February 6, 2002. “Southeast Asia, The Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda of Southeast Asia”. Available on <http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/DB06Ae01.html>

¹²³ The list includes: (1) Achmad Roihan alias Saad, (2) Aris Sumarsono alias Zulkarnaen, (3) Mohammed Faiq Hafidz, (4) Syawal Yasin alias Laode Ida, (5) Raja Husain alias Idris, (6) Muhamad Qital, (7) Mustopa (Mustafa), (8) Mustaqim, (10) Thoriqudin alias Hamzah alias Abu Rusdan, (11) Suyono alias Abu Farauk, (12) Muchlas alias Ali Gufron, (13) Hambali, (14) Muchliansyah alias Solihin, (15) Fihirudin alias Moh Iqbal alias Abu Jibril, (16) Jabir alias Enjang Bastaman, (17) Mukhlis Yunos, (18) Usman alias Abbas alias Edy Setiono, (19) Asep Danu, (20) Nasir Abbas, (21) Firdaus alias Ahmad Azzam, (22) Zahroni alias Nuim, (23) Farihin, (24) Arkam/Arqom alias Haris alias Azmi, (25) Iswandi, (26)

involved in the Southeast Asian Network of Islamic radical groups are closely associated with Pondok Ngruki whether as kyais or santris. They include Fathur Rahman Al-Ghozi alias Saad, Utomo Pamungkas alias Mubarok, and Ali Imron (bombing at the residence of the Philippines Ambassador, Jakarta; Jabir alias Enjang (Christmas Eve 2000 bombings); Datuk Rajo Ameh alias Zoefrie, Sardono Siliwangi, and Muhammad Rais (Christmas Eve bombing in Pakan Baru); Toni Togar alias Indrawarman and Idris alias Jhoni Hendrawan (Christmas Eve bombing in Medan); Utomo Pamungkas alias Mubarok alias Amin and Abdul Ghoni alias Umar alias Wayan (Christmas Eve Bombing in Mojokerto); Enjang Bastaman alias Jabir (Christmas Eve Bombing in Bandung); Andul Rauf alias Syam and Yudi alias Andri Oktavia (22 August 2002, Gold Store Robbery, Serang); Ali Ghufuran alias Mukhlas and Zulkarnaen (12 October 2002, Sari Club and Paddy's café Bali Bombing); and Asmar Latin Sani (5 August 2003, JW Marriot Hotel Bombing, Jakarta).¹²⁴

Ali, (27) Dedi Mulyadi, (28) Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, (29) Ali Imron, (30) Utomo Pamungkas alias Mubarok, (31) Dul Matin alias Joko Pitono, (32) Holis, (33) Akim Akimuddin alias Suheb, (34) Usaid alias Zainal Arifin alias Suwarso alias Saklo, (35) Muchtar Daeng Lao alias Abu Urwah, (36) Kahar Mustafa, (37) Syarifuddin alias Abu Jamiah, (38) Basyir alias Abu Mukhlisun, (39) Umar Besar alias Abdul Ghoni, (40) Abdul Aziz alias Imam Samudra alias Kudama, (41) Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, (42) Suheimi, (43) Jamsari, (44) Jafar bin Mistooki, (45) Agus, (46) Abdul Razak alias Farouk, (47) Moh. Jauhari bin Abdullah, (48) Fathi Abu Bakar Bafana, (49) Abu Yusuf alias Dadang Suratman, (50) Abbas, (51) Hasyim bin Abbas, (52) Halim bin Hussein, (53) Sarjiyo alias Sawwad, (54) Aris Munandar, (55) Asep alias Darwin, (56) Muhajir, (57) Mas Slamet Kastari, and (58) Taufik bin Abdul Halim alias Dani. The last two names are among few non-Indonesian members of the groups. See ICG 2003 (pp. 8-10).

¹²⁴ See complete list in ICG 2003, *ibid.*, pp. 33-35.

Irrespective of the availability of evidence, growing concern and accusation on the role of Pondok Ngruki and other conservative Pesantrens in the resurgence of Islamic radicalism and international terrorism have brought Pesantren model of education in national and international spotlight. It makes many people aware of the existence as well as the strengths and weaknesses of such a model in the development of religious life in Indonesia. It raises the importance of such a model in the discourse of Islamic education in the country. It shows that despite under funded and lack of resources, Pesantren model of education has survived the challenges of modern education and continued to grow and play particular roles in the development of Islam in Indonesia. At the same time, however, the growing concern and accusation on the role of Pesantren in the resurgence of Islamic radicalism has caused some difficulties for all Pesantrens. They have been blamed for promoting hostile Islamic teachings and become one of the targets of War on terrorism led by President Bush. Indonesian government and Pesantren leaders (kyais) have been pressured by Bush administration to review their curriculums and textbooks, retrain their teachers, watch their santris, and control the activities of their graduates.

Targeting Southeast Asia: Aid Program

September 11, 2001 tragedy made U.S. anti-terrorism efforts prioritize South and Southeast Asia. Foreign assistances to some countries in these regions, such as

Pakistan, Philippines, Nepal, and Indonesia have increased significantly. The assistance include military, security, economic, and education aid to promote U.S. security interests and distributed through Economic Support Fund (ESF) and USAID.¹²⁵ The tragedy also makes the United States recognize that the intensity of security problem in Southeast Asian countries are different from one country to another and thus requires different nuance and finesse in the fight against terrorism.¹²⁶ Indeed, the reactions of countries with minority Muslim population such as the Philippines, Laos, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam to September 11 and War on Terrorism project are different from reactions of countries where Muslim population is majority, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam. The potential of terrorist threats in these countries are also different from one another. In Indonesia and Malaysia where Muslim population is majority, Islamic radicalism is resurging and clearly threatening. Although its majority population is Muslim, Brunei has not shown the resurgence of Islamic radicalism. Despite their minority Muslim population, Philippines and Thailand, however, show a clear potential of Islamic radicalism. Although not being friendly to Islamic radicalism, Singapore can be a hideout for the radicals due to its geographic location and minority

¹²⁵ UK Financial Times, 23 October 2003: US proposes \$157m aid plan to strengthen education in Indonesia. Available on <http://www.bond.org.uk/advocacy/gsdnov.htm>

¹²⁶ Jusuf Wanandi IHT, September 6, 2002. The anti-terror drive needs discernment. In International Herald Tribune Southeast Asia. Available on <http://www.aseansec.org/12772.htm>

Muslim population.¹²⁷ The diversity of the potential of Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia region needs careful assessment and appropriate strategies, tactics, and programs in War on Terrorism. The success of the program will depends on the degree of cooperation and support given by Muslim leaders in the region. “In the end, “ said Yusuf Wanandi, “his is an all-encompassing struggle whose ideas and visions must find acceptance, especially among Muslims.”¹²⁸

After Bali bombings on October 12, 2002, Bush administration began to pay serious attention on terrorist networks in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia. A series of discussions were organized to gain more information regarding the potential of terrorist threat in the region. Just ten day after the bombings, on October 2002, USINDO invited Brendan Sargeant, counselor for defense policy at the Australian embassy and Karl Jackson, director of Southeast Asia Studies at the Johns Hopkins' School for Advanced International Studies, to discuss the aftermath of Bali bombings. Both of them recommended closer ties with Indonesia.

¹²⁷ Jusuf Wanandi IHT, September 6, 2002. The anti-terror drive needs discernment. In International Herald Tribune Southeast Asia. Available on <http://www.aseansec.org/12772.htm>

¹²⁸ Jusuf Wanandi IHT, September 6, 2002. The anti-terror drive needs discernment. In International Herald Tribune Southeast Asia. Available on <http://www.aseansec.org/12772.htm>

For Brendan Sargeant, there would be "no return to isolation."¹²⁹ In his view, Indonesian and Australian governments are challenged to ensure that the bombings do not become a victory for the terrorists and do not disturb Australian-Indonesian relationships.¹³⁰ The bombings, he suggested, must "reinforce our [Australia-Indonesia] mutual strategic interests and increase the imperative to work together."¹³¹ "Both countries," he stressed, "have an overriding interest in eliminating terrorism from Southeast Asia."¹³² Sargeant tended to see the rise of terrorism in Indonesia as a result of the inability of post-Suharto

¹²⁹ Karl Jackson and Brendan Sargeant, October 22, 2002. The Bali Bombings and their Aftermath. American and Australian Speakers Urge Closer Ties with Indonesia. A forum presented in cooperation with The Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service, at Georgetown University in Washington DC. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Bali%20Bombings%20&%20Their%20Aftermath.htm>

¹³⁰ Karl Jackson and Brendan Sargeant, October 22, 2002. The Bali Bombings and their Aftermath. American and Australian Speakers Urge Closer Ties with Indonesia. A forum presented in cooperation with The Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service, at Georgetown University in Washington DC. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Bali%20Bombings%20&%20Their%20Aftermath.htm>

¹³¹ Karl Jackson and Brendan Sargeant, October 22, 2002. The Bali Bombings and their Aftermath. American and Australian Speakers Urge Closer Ties with Indonesia. A forum presented in cooperation with The Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service, at Georgetown University in Washington DC. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Bali%20Bombings%20&%20Their%20Aftermath.htm>

¹³² Karl Jackson and Brendan Sargeant, October 22, 2002. The Bali Bombings and their Aftermath. American and Australian Speakers Urge Closer Ties with Indonesia. A forum presented in cooperation with The Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service, at Georgetown University in Washington DC. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Bali%20Bombings%20&%20Their%20Aftermath.htm>

government to handle some emerging crucial issues related to globalization, international security, and the transition of power in the country. "A key policy objective," said Sargeant, "must be to support the development of institutions capable of handling these challenges."¹³³ "For Australia," he emphasized, "it's back to fundamentals." "Australia," he further emphasized, "will continue to support Indonesia's territorial integrity and the development of institutions that support democracy, stability and economic development."¹³⁴ Sargeant explained that "Australia and Indonesia share many common interests. Both countries know this, and both countries have worked together closely on many issues for decades." "The tragedy in Bali," he concluded, "was a tragedy for Indonesia, as much as it was for Australia. He ended his suggestion by stating: "Collaboration is the only path to the future" for Indonesia and Australia.¹³⁵

¹³³ Karl Jackson and Brendan Sargeant, October 22, 2002. The Bali Bombings and their Aftermath. American and Australian Speakers Urge Closer Ties with Indonesia. A forum presented in cooperation with The Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service, at Georgetown University in Washington DC. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Bali%20Bombings%20&%20Their%20Aftermath.htm>

¹³⁴ Karl Jackson and Brendan Sargeant, October 22, 2002. The Bali Bombings and their Aftermath. American and Australian Speakers Urge Closer Ties with Indonesia. A forum presented in cooperation with The Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service, at Georgetown University in Washington DC. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Bali%20Bombings%20&%20Their%20Aftermath.htm>

¹³⁵ Karl Jackson and Brendan Sargeant, October 22, 2002. The Bali Bombings and their Aftermath. American and Australian Speakers Urge Closer Ties with Indonesia. A forum presented in cooperation with The Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service, at Georgetown

For Jackson, Islam has suffered an "education deficit" since the 13-14th centuries as Western scientific advances outstripped Islamic societies. "The crucible of modernization," he further suggests, "is now a crisis for Muslims."

For Karl Jackson, the rise of terrorism is a result of a "civil war within Islam." Jackson compares the present terrorist groups and Darul Islam:

In Indonesia there have always been about the same few numbers of individuals willing to use violence to achieve an Islamic state. In the 1948-62 period of Darul Islam the government military apparatus eventually quashed the movement. Now the intelligence and policing capacity of the government is greatly reduced. Also, at present, the Jema'ah Islamiah has access to international resources, draws strength from communication of and by Islamic organizations throughout the world, and benefits from the decline of government authorities to maintain law and order. Furthermore, outside financial resources are available to current proponents of the Islamic State. Outside resources were not available to the Darul Islam in the 1950s and 1960s."¹³⁶

University in Washington DC. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Bali%20Bombings%20&%20Their%20Aftermath.htm>

¹³⁶ Karl Jackson and Brendan Sargeant, October 22, 2002. The Bali Bombings and their Aftermath. American and Australian Speakers Urge Closer Ties with Indonesia. A forum presented in cooperation with The Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service, at Georgetown

In the next five years, said Jackson, the Indonesian government is not likely to improve and lack of resources and leadership to overcome terrorist threat. Therefore, he suggests, the U.S. government needs to increase its policy priorities and aid program for Indonesia.¹³⁷ He came out with a concrete idea suggesting the U.S. government to provide “a massive aid program for education and institutional support in Indonesia to support moderate Muslim organizations and democratic institutions.”¹³⁸ In the long-term, said Jackson, the U.S. should provide education aid Muslims and moderate Muslims organizations in Indonesia to "fight for the soul of Islam" and to counter money from Saudi Arabia going to hardline groups as well as to "drain the swamp of terrorists." "We [the u.S. government]," Jackson stresses, “should be in this [education aid] game.”

University in Washington DC. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Bali%20Bombings%20&%20Their%20Aftermath.htm>

¹³⁷ Karl Jackson and Brendan Sargeant, October 22, 2002. The Bali Bombings and their Aftermath. American and Australian Speakers Urge Closer Ties with Indonesia. A forum presented in cooperation with The Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service, at Georgetown University in Washington DC. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Bali%20Bombings%20&%20Their%20Aftermath.htm>

¹³⁸ Karl Jackson and Brendan Sargeant, October 22, 2002. The Bali Bombings and their Aftermath. American and Australian Speakers Urge Closer Ties with Indonesia. A forum presented in cooperation with The Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service, at Georgetown University in Washington DC. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Bali%20Bombings%20&%20Their%20Aftermath.htm>

In his calculation, education aid for Indonesian Muslims must be as much as \$200 million per year for the next 5-10 years and include four main programs:

1. Support for moderate Muslim nongovernmental organizations.
2. Encouragement of religious schooling in Indonesia, with the caveat that these schools should also teach math, science and other modernist subjects such as English.
3. Support for the government's religious affairs ministry, which in the 1980s and 1990s was active in supporting both Islam and Christianity at the village level. There were relationships between religious leaders and bureaucrats, he said, which were beneficial, and which have been weakened since the economic crisis.
4. Bring Indonesian intellectuals out of Indonesia for education abroad. Rather than the dozen or so Fulbright scholars, send at least 800 Indonesians to the U.S., Japan and Australia in a given year. He estimated the cost for this at \$60 million per year, which would leave \$140-150 million for other programs.

Jackson emphasizes that “\$100 million per year is not a huge price tag for the American taxpayer, especially if it is matched by our [American] allies. Since the aim of the program is to improve the capability of Indonesian security to deal with threats, and to understand that terrorism is an issue that concerns everyone, Sergeant believes that education is an important measures. In his reply to a

question on the accountability of such a new policy, Sergeant and Jackson answered: “With regard to the Increased aid is in the vital interest of the United States. We are at war against terrorism and ignoring or isolating our potential allies will not improve their human rights records. We are accountable to the people of the U.S. We simply must do the best we can, and not assume there will be no mistakes.”

Responding on the U.S. government’s concern with Indonesia's "weak" reaction to Bali bombings, Sergeant and Jackson suggest some strategies. For Sargeant, the U.S. government needs to develop closer ties with the military and with other elements of the security system. For Jackson, the U.S. government needs to “work the process of government. Identify the five or six key people in the administration who must be convinced, including the president, and then go to the Congress.”¹³⁹ They suggest that pressure per se will not work and emphasize the importance of proper style to be effective in encountering terrorist threats in Indonesia. In this regard, Jackson stresses that “the road to handle extremism is education and law.” “The rule of law,” he adds, “must be imposed quickly.”¹⁴⁰ In this regard, he support Indonesia’s new

¹³⁹ Karl Jackson and Brendan Sargeant, October 22, 2002. The Bali Bombings and their Aftermath. American and Australian Speakers Urge Closer Ties with Indonesia. A forum presented in cooperation with The Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service, at Georgetown University in Washington DC. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Bali%20Bombings%20&%20Their%20Aftermath.htm>

¹⁴⁰ Firdaus Kadir, March 14, 2003. USINDO Open Forum Islamic Extremism in Indonesia. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/2003/Islamic%20Extremism%20in%20Indonesia.htm>

terrorism law and agree with Muhammadiyah Chairman, Sjafi'i Ma'arif, that "the U.S. should abandon the military approach to Islamic radicalism and concentrate instead on combating poverty, corruption, poor education and lawlessness."¹⁴¹

Sneider shares Jackson's view when she writes: "The key is a woefully underfunded educational system. Unlike Pakistan's madrassah system, the religious schools are integrated into the state system, and many offer a secular curriculum along with religious teaching. But in the pesantran that I visited, one in a city center and the other in the countryside, I found classrooms that offered little more than whitewashed walls and wooden desks. Computers are few in number and science labs primitive, if even existing. State schools are better equipped but still backward." Sneider further writes: "Why not wire every school to the Internet, build science labs and, most importantly, train teachers? A recent report on U.S.-Indonesia relations by the U.S.-Indonesia Society and Stanford University's Asia-Pacific Research Center urged a significant effort to fund education."

The Aid Schem

The present aid contemplated is approximately \$120 million per year (including \$12 million for the police and \$400,000 for IMET, educational training in the U.S. for

¹⁴¹ Firdaus Kadir, March 14, 2003. USINDO Open Forum Islamic Extremism in Indonesia. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/2003/Islamic%20Extremism%20in%20Indonesia.htm>

military officers). Given the size of Indonesia's population these programs are obviously insufficient.¹⁴²

The United States President, George Bush, sought to defuse growing anti-US sentiment in Indonesia yesterday, stressing his support for the tolerant Islam that prevails in most of the country.

In a 3-hour visit to Bali en route to Australia yesterday, Mr Bush met the leaders of the country's two main Islamic organisations and used his public remarks and a joint statement between Indonesia and the US to push his message.

"We know Islam is fully compatible with liberty and progress and tolerance because we see the proof in your country and in our own," he said in statement delivered by the beach, as warships offshore provided a reminder of the security fears Mr Bush had in visiting Indonesia.¹⁴³

He praised Indonesia for its efforts in capturing terrorists and sought to align himself with the heavy majority of moderates in the world's biggest Islamic country.

¹⁴² Karl Jackson and Brendan Sargeant, October 22, 2002. The Bali Bombings and their Aftermath. American and Australian Speakers Urge Closer Ties with Indonesia. A forum presented in cooperation with The Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service, at Georgetown University in Washington DC. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Bali%20Bombings%20&%20Their%20Aftermath.htm>

¹⁴³ Matthew Moore, October 23, 2003. Bush tries to soothe Muslim hatred of US, in Herald. Available on <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/10/22/1066631506470.html?from=storyrhs>

"Terrorists who proclaim Islam is their inspiration defile one of the world's great faiths," he said. "Murder has no place in any religious tradition. It must find no home in Indonesia."¹⁴⁴

Polls in Indonesia have shown a collapse in what was once strong public support for the US. Now the US and its leadership are routinely accused of double standards for the invasion of Iraq and for caring only about its own victims of terrorism.

Mr Bush seemed to acknowledge some of that criticism when he offered sympathy for a recent attack in which all but one victim was Indonesian.

"Nearly three months ago, Americans shared Indonesia's grief when a suicide bomber killed 14 people outside a Jakarta hotel," he said.¹⁴⁵

Mr Bush promised a new \$US157 million (\$224 million) program to provide school funding for six years. "We will also support Indonesia's efforts to build an education system that teaches values and discourages extremism."¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Matthew Moore, October 23, 2003. Bush tries to soothe Muslim hatred of US, in Herald. Available on <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/10/22/1066631506470.html?from=storyrhs>

¹⁴⁵ Matthew Moore, October 23, 2003. Bush tries to soothe Muslim hatred of US, in Herald. Available on <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/10/22/1066631506470.html?from=storyrhs>

¹⁴⁶ Matthew Moore, October 23, 2003. Bush tries to soothe Muslim hatred of US, in Herald. Available on <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/10/22/1066631506470.html?from=storyrhs>

Although it is not yet clear whether the money will come from other aid programs in Indonesia, or how it will be spent, the joint statement from the two presidents made it clear it would be available to Islamic schools, a fraction of which have produced most of the country's terrorists.

The sensitivity of trying to influence Islamic schools quickly became clear when Hasyim Muzardi, the chairman the nation's biggest Islamic group, Nahdlatul Ulama, warned that the money should not be used to try to modify the curriculums in Islamic schools.

"If they want to help our education, we welcome it, but I remind him not to touch on the religious aspects," he said after meeting Mr Bush.

In his remarks after the meeting, Mr Bush did not raise the issue of restoring military relations with Indonesia, which he floated in an interview last week.

The joint statement said the presidents agreed "that normal military relations are in the interest of both countries" but there appears little prospect of restoring the relationship suspended in the wake of Indonesia human rights abuses in East Timor.¹⁴⁷

After attending the meeting with the two presidents, however, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirayuda, said restoring full relations remained unlikely while the US

¹⁴⁷ Matthew Moore, October 23, 2003. Bush tries to soothe Muslim hatred of US, in Herald. Available on <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/10/22/1066631506470.html?from=storyrhs>

Congress continued to insist that ties should not be fully restored until the murders of two Americans in Papua last August were solved.

On that sensitive topic, the two presidents "expressed their sorrow" over the killings and noted a joint investigation by Indonesia and the FBI was continuing.¹⁴⁸

While the United States government spends billions fighting Islamic terrorism worldwide, it has offered Indonesia \$157 million dollars for use by state-owned and Muslim schools.

Indonesian minister Jusuf Kalla announced the U.S. assistance yesterday following a meeting with the U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, Ralph Boyce.

"The assistance will be used to improve the quality of human resources and infrastructure of government-owned schools and religious schools [Islamic boarding schools]," the Jakarta Post quotes the minister as saying.¹⁴⁹

Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world, with more than 180 million.

According to the paper, allocation of the U.S. funds will be decided by Kalla, the coordinating minister for

¹⁴⁸ Matthew Moore, October 23, 2003. Bush tries to soothe Muslim hatred of US, in Herald. Available on <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/10/22/1066631506470.html?from=storyrhs>

¹⁴⁹ WorldNetDaily, November 14, 2003. WAR ON TERROR: U.S. to finance Muslim schools \$157 million to 'improve' education in Indonesia. Available on http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=35603

People's Welfare, in cooperation with the religious affairs minister and the education minister.

Boyce said the U.S. assistance is purely aimed at improving education, to make the quality and capability of government-owned schools and Islamic boarding schools equal, reports the Jakarta Post.

He stressed the money would not interfere in the curriculum of Indonesian schools.

The U.S. aid was initially pledged Oct. 22 by President George W. Bush in a joint press conference with Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri at the Bali International Airport.

"The success of Indonesia as a pluralistic and democratic state is essential to the peace and prosperity of this region," said Bush.¹⁵⁰ "Terrorists who claim Islam as their inspiration defile one of the world's great faiths. Murder has no place in any religious tradition, must find no home in Indonesia."¹⁵¹

"The United States strongly supports a healthy democracy in Indonesia, for the sake of your own people and for the sake of peace," Bush continued. "We'll also

¹⁵⁰ WorldNetDaily, November 14, 2003. WAR ON TERROR: U.S. to finance Muslim schools \$157 million to 'improve' education in Indonesia. Available on http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=35603

¹⁵¹ WorldNetDaily, November 14, 2003. WAR ON TERROR: U.S. to finance Muslim schools \$157 million to 'improve' education in Indonesia. Available on http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=35603

support Indonesia's efforts to build an education system that teaches values and discourages extremism."¹⁵²

Muslim schools in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, other Muslim countries, and even France are often cited as hotbeds of Islamic extremism.

According to the International Crisis Group, a British think tank, a network of Muslim boarding schools in Indonesia called Pesantren teaches the message of jihad and has become an easy recruiting ground for the al-Qaida-linked terror group Jemaah Islamiah. The group was formed in the 1980s by two Indonesian clerics with the goal of creating a pan-Islamic state.

Students at these Muslim schools are taught they have an obligation to try to make the dream of an Islamic state come true, according to Salahudin Wahid, a vice-chairman of Indonesia's largest moderate Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama.

"Some of them then come to think the ends justify the means, even violence. But they forget that Islam is a peaceful religion. It is very clearly stated in the Quran that we cannot kill people, not even ourselves," Wahid told the BBC.¹⁵³

¹⁵² WorldNetDaily, November 14, 2003. WAR ON TERROR: U.S. to finance Muslim schools \$157 million to 'improve' education in Indonesia. Available on http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=35603

¹⁵³ WorldNetDaily, November 14, 2003. WAR ON TERROR: U.S. to finance Muslim schools \$157 million to 'improve' education in Indonesia. Available on http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=35603

Indonesia isn't immune to the fallout of the jihadism taught at these boarding schools, but has itself suffered terrorist attacks. A double bombing at a busy nightclub frequented by American tourists on the island of Bali killed 202 people in October 2002. In August, a suicide bomber drove an explosives-packed van into the front entrance of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, killing 14 people and injuring nearly 150 others. And last month, a dozen or more Christians in Poso, Indonesia, were murdered and hundreds forced to flee their homes following attacks by Muslim extremists.

The Bali and Marriott Hotel attacks have been blamed on Jemaah Islamiah. Three brothers who taught at and attended an Islamic school in Tenggulun, a small village near the coast of East Java, were convicted as the key players involved in the Bali bombings. Investigators believe one of the brothers, called Mukhlas, is a senior member of Jemaah Islamiah.

"We know that Islam is fully compatible with liberty and tolerance and progress because we see the proof in your country and in our own," Bush told a news conference on an island where Muslim militants killed scores in nightclub bomb attacks last year.¹⁵⁴

"Terrorists who claim Islam as their inspiration defile one of the world's greatest faiths. Murder has no place in

¹⁵⁴Taipei Times, 1/27/2004. Available on <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/world/archives/2003/10/23/2003073004>

any religious tradition. It must find no home in Indonesia," he said.¹⁵⁵

Bush, on a six-nation Asian tour, said he would propose to Congress a six-year program worth US\$157 million to support basic education in Indonesia to aid efforts to build a system that discourages extremism.¹⁵⁶

In October 2003 President Bush proposed a \$157 million six-year education programme for Indonesia - apparently aimed at reducing the flow of students to Islamic boarding schools, some of which are alleged to have links to militant Islamic groups. The aid will be used to strengthen the country's public education system. Concerns have been expressed at US involvement in education, including fears that the US will seek to influence curricula.¹⁵⁷

While Indonesia's secular government has been allied to the US in its efforts to fight terror, critics have accused it of failing to explain the dangers of radical Islam to its people and to tackle militancy at its roots, especially in a small number of conservative Muslim boarding schools.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ Taipei Times, 1/27/2004. Available on <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/world/archives/2003/10/23/2003073004>

¹⁵⁶ Taipei Times, 1/27/2004. Available on <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/world/archives/2003/10/23/2003073004>

¹⁵⁷ UK Financial Times, 23 October 2003: US proposes \$157m aid plan to strengthen education in Indonesia. Available on <http://www.bond.org.uk/advocacy/gsdnov.htm>

¹⁵⁸ Taipei Times, 1/27/2004. Available on <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/world/archives/2003/10/23/2003073004>

US attention turned towards specific religious educational institutions after allegations began to surface about links between some pesantrens and the perpetrators of the Bali Bomb blast of 2002 and the Jakarta Marriot bomb blast of 2003.¹⁵⁹

Bush's move followed similar US attempts at introducing changes in the educational systems of a number of Muslim countries, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, since the 9/11 attacks.

A possible connection between some terrorist suspects with some traditional Pesantrens has also been detected, but no special attention was paid. Since Bali and Marriot bombings, however, Pesantrens and their kyais and santris have gained special attention from Bush government. Before the bombings, War on terrorism focused almost entirely on aiding the pursuit of Jemaah Islamiyah, a Southeast Asian terrorist group linked to al-Qaida. Bush government tended to deny that there is a

¹⁵⁹ A recent report released by the Global Campaign for Education, an international coalition of development agencies, teachers' unions and community groups, looked at 22 rich countries and how much aid they provide to boost education in developing countries. The US scored 12 out of 100 points and was considered the least generous aid giver when its donations are measured as a proportional share of its national income. Development groups and the United Nations estimate that \$5.6 billion in additional aid is still needed to ensure that children in poor countries get a basic education. "The extra \$5.6 billion needed for education is one-fifth the amount Americans spend on pizza each year and half of what Europeans spend on ice cream," said Oliver Buston, a senior policy advisor for the development group Oxfam. Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

home-grown problem with regard to terrorism. After the shock of the Bali and Marriott bombings, however, Bush government began to realize that the terrorists have their home-grown. Many Pesantrens in Indonesia are believed to be the “hotbeds” of the terrorists, their “breeding grounds”, or “the nest of terrorism”.

Since then, some experts on Islam and politics in Southeast Asia have been invited to Washington to give advices on how to deal with Indonesian Pesantrens. Many of them suggested that the best way to deal with Pesantrens is to make them less attractive for Muslim parents and children and support moderate Islamic education institutions.

President Bush picked up the idea and decided to announce a U.S. educational aid program for Indonesia during his October stopover in the country. The announcement was followed by an alarming remark that Indonesia must support the war on terror. The program provides \$157 million over 6 years.

To Replace Curriculum

As a result, calls are being made to revise and modify the curricula of traditional Pesantrens and other traditional Islamic religious education institutions in Indonesia and

other Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and even in Western countries.¹⁶⁰

He appeared to be acting on the advice of his more hawkish advisers, who aim to replace a curriculum perceived as radical and anti-American with a more compliant alternative. But not everyone in the US government seems to think so. Both US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz have separately raised the issue of combating anti-American influence in "radical" Islamic schools.¹⁶¹

"Should we create a private foundation to entice radical madrassas [or pesantrens] to a more moderate course?" Rumsfeld wrote in a private 16 October memo quoted by the Washington Post newspaper.¹⁶²

On a different occasion, Paul Wolfowitz, himself a former US ambassador to Indonesia, said, "What they are taught there [madrassas/pesantrens] is not real learning. It's

¹⁶⁰ Abdullah Saeed. Traditional Islamic Religious Education Institutions: Spurce of Conflict or Peaceful Co-existence? Available at: <http://www.conferences.unimelb.edu.au/flagship/Abstracts/Saeed.pdf>.

¹⁶¹ Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

¹⁶² Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

not the tools for coping with the modern world. It's the tools that turn them into terrorists."¹⁶³

Australian Support

BRISBANE, Australia, Oct 4 (AFP) - Australia said it was reviewing its aid contribution to Indonesian schools Saturday but refused to confirm a report the move was linked to a larger American plan to curb the influence of radical Muslims in Indonesia's education system.¹⁶⁴

The Weekend Australian said Washington planned to spend 250 million dollars (170 million US) to boost funding to Indonesian schools to counter the influence of radical Islamic boarding schools.¹⁶⁵

The fundamentalist schools have been blamed for indoctrinating students with anti-Western beliefs and

¹⁶³ Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

¹⁶⁴ Agence France-Presse, October 03, 2003. Australia reviews Indonesia aid as report cites US move on Muslim schools. Available on http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/ay/Qaustralia-indonesia-us.Rx5P_DO4.html

¹⁶⁵ Agence France-Presse, October 03, 2003. Australia reviews Indonesia aid as report cites US move on Muslim schools. Available on http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/ay/Qaustralia-indonesia-us.Rx5P_DO4.html

condoning terrorist attacks such as last year's Bali bombing.¹⁶⁶

Quoting diplomatic sources, the Weekend Australian said the US plan aimed to make state-run and moderate Islamic schools more attractive to Indonesian parents than the radical ones, which are often cheaper than other schools.

It said the plan had not yet been approved by President George W. Bush.

Prime Minister John Howard confirmed his government was reviewing the 12 million dollars a year it contributed to Indonesian schools but refused to say if the budget would be increased.

"We are examining whether the direction of the funding is appropriate, that's all I'm prepared to say at this stage," Howard told reporters at the opening of an Islamic school in Brisbane.¹⁶⁷

He stressed that Australia did not want any say in what was taught in the schools.

¹⁶⁶ Agence France-Presse, October 03, 2003. Australia reviews Indonesia aid as report cites US move on Muslim schools. Available on http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/ay/Qaustralia-indonesia-us.Rx5P_DO4.html

¹⁶⁷ Agence France-Presse, October 03, 2003. Australia reviews Indonesia aid as report cites US move on Muslim schools. Available on http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/ay/Qaustralia-indonesia-us.Rx5P_DO4.html

"We are doing a lot for Indonesia but in the end what is taught in Indonesian schools is the responsibility of the Indonesian government," he said.¹⁶⁸

Indonesian Response

"Give Us the Money and Shut up."¹⁶⁹ Despite the concerns of Indonesia's two largest Muslim organisations, several school leaders have welcomed the US aid.

"I agree that we have to be careful in accepting any aid from anyone. But I think the US really can't do much to change the curriculum of our schools. So, I don't see why we should not accept the aid," said H Romadhon, the principal of Pesantren Asy-Syifaa, Jakarta.¹⁷⁰

Meanwhile, the Indonesian government is also welcoming the US aid and has been reassuring its citizens

¹⁶⁸ Agence France-Presse, October 03, 2003. Australia reviews Indonesia aid as report cites US move on Muslim schools. Available on http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/ay/Qaustralia-indonesia-us.Rx5P_DO4.html

¹⁶⁹ A comment by Charles. Available on http://www.Littlegreen-footballs.com/weblog/?entry=8878_Give_Us_the_Money_and_Shut_Up

¹⁷⁰ Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

that it will make sure that there would be no intervention in the country's educational system.¹⁷¹

"The concern that the US will intervene in the pesantrens' curriculum is a bit overboard," said Dr H Amin, from the ministry of religious affairs. "Even we from the department of religious affairs can't intervene in the curriculum. How could an outsider possibly do it?"¹⁷²

According to education ministry spokesman H Rusmadi, the aid will be allocated to infrastructure improvements, retraining of teachers and the building of new facilities. "We have no plans in using the fund to change any curriculum," he said.¹⁷³

Rusmadi also reminded Indonesians that the country's educational system still has a long way to go in fulfilling its obligation to adequate education for the masses and in turn will need a lot more funding to improve. "The US is not the first or only country we receive funds from," he said.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

¹⁷² Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

¹⁷³ Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

¹⁷⁴ Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

In May 2002, Vice President Hamzah Haz visited *Pesantren* Ngruki and warned Indonesian police to be careful in dealing with terrorist issues, not to take any action without sufficient evidence.¹⁷⁵ Hamza's involvement indicates the importance of Pondok Ngruki in the discussion of Islamic radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia and Southeast Asia.

Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia, Hamzah Haz, is aware of this developing opinion when he said: "these days there are many people who consider *Pesantrens* as Islamist places and see them as dangerous places".¹⁷⁶

Many Indonesians reacted to his October offer with suspicion rather than gratitude. Hasyim Muzadi, Chairman of *Nahdatul Ulama* (NU), is aware of this concern when he said: "Since the capture of Amrozi [Bali bombing suspect], *Pesantren* has been considered as the ground for the hardliners or terrorists".¹⁷⁷ He admits that "some people" may have used *Pesantrens* as a network for implementing their hard-line approach. He, however, guarantees that 8600 *Pesantrens* run by his organization all around Indonesia have no connection with the terrorists.¹⁷⁸ Muzadi believes that Police uneven inspection has caused uneasiness in many *Pesantrens*. Psychologically, he said, such an

¹⁷⁵ *Tempo Interaktif*, September 22, 2002. "Hamzah Janji Lindungi Ba'asyir". Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ *Tempo Interaktif*, September 22, 2002. "Hamzah Haz Janji Lindungi Ba'asyir". Available on <http://www.tempo.co.id/harian/fokus/123/2,1,29,id.html>

¹⁷⁷ *Republika Online*, November 18, 2002. "Hasyim: Pesantren harus Tenang dan Waspada". Available on <http://www.republika.co.id>

¹⁷⁸ *Republika Online*, November 18, 2002. "Hasyim: Pesantren harus Tenang dan Waspada". Available on <http://www.republika.co.id>

inspection disturbs the *santri* (students).¹⁷⁹ He advises Indonesian police to take proper actions toward *Pesantren* and advises *Pesantrens* to be calm and cautious.¹⁸⁰ “Although a lot of suspicion on *Pesantrens*”, said Muzadi, “*Pesantren* people do not need to be panic”.¹⁸¹

“Education, both in conventional schools and *pesantrens* [religious schools], could prevent people from resorting to radical action. But the US must be careful not to intervene in the school curriculum,” said Hasyim Musadi, leader of the largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama.¹⁸²

“If the US enters into the curriculum, it can be accused of intervening in the *pesantrens*’ educational system,” he continued, referring to Indonesia’s Islamic boarding schools.¹⁸³ Musadi agreed: “If there are people saying that the system is dangerous, I will deny it. This is the best

¹⁷⁹ *Republika Online*, November 18, 2002. “Hasyim: *Pesantren* harus Tenang dan Waspada”. Available on <http://www.republika.co.id>

¹⁸⁰ *Republika Online*, November 18, 2002. “Hasyim: *Pesantren* harus Tenang dan Waspada”. Available on <http://www.republika.co.id>

¹⁸¹ *Republika Online*, November 18, 2002. “Hasyim: *Pesantren* harus Tenang dan Waspada”. Available on <http://www.republika.co.id>

¹⁸² Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

¹⁸³ Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

system that can address the problem that Muslims face," he said.¹⁸⁴

"Education can eliminate radicalism but the U.S. must be careful not to intervene in the school curriculum. If the U.S. enters into the curriculum, it can be accused of intervening in the pesantren educational system," Hasyim said after a meeting with U.S. Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce at Al Hikam Pesantren, Malang, East Java, on Monday.¹⁸⁵

The closed-door meeting was a follow-up to a meeting between U.S. President George W. Bush and Indonesian religious leaders in Bali last month, during which the former pledged assistance for the country's education. ...¹⁸⁶ "Education, both in (conventional) schools and pesantren, could prevent people from resorting to radical action. But the U.S. should be careful not to enter the system," said Hasyim, chairman of NU, the country's largest Muslim organization with around 40 million members.¹⁸⁷ According to Hasyim, Boyce acknowledged that the educational

¹⁸⁴ Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

¹⁸⁵ The Jakarta Post, January 28, 2004. Available on <http://www.thejakartapost.com/misc/PrinterFriendly.asp>

¹⁸⁶ The Jakarta Post, January 28, 2004. Available on <http://www.thejakartapost.com/misc/PrinterFriendly.asp>

¹⁸⁷ The Jakarta Post, January 28, 2004. Available on <http://www.thejakartapost.com/misc/PrinterFriendly.asp>

system in Indonesian pesantren was unique and of high quality, apart from the elements of radicalism.¹⁸⁸

"If there are people saying that the system is dangerous, I will deny it. This is the best system that can address the problems that Muslims face," he said.¹⁸⁹ "America will not interfere. America will study the system," Hasyim quoted Boyce as saying. Although the religious leaders conceded that some terrorists were graduates of Al-Mukmin boarding school in Ngruki, Central Java, they told Bush that such a school belonged to a minority group compared with thousands of other, moderate pesantren in the country.

Some Bali bombers, including Ali Ghufron and Ali Imron, and JW Marriott key suspects such as Asmar Latin Sani and Tohir, graduated from Ngruki, which was cofounded by cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, jailed recently for plotting to topple the government.

"It is not fair to generalise about all pesantrens," said Din Syamsuddin, deputy chairman of Muhammadiyah, the second largest Muslim organisation in the country, referring

¹⁸⁸ The Jakarta Post, January 28, 2004. Available on <http://www.thejakartapost.com/misc/PrinterFriendly.asp>

¹⁸⁹ The Jakarta Post, January 28, 2004. Available on <http://www.thejakartapost.com/misc/PrinterFriendly.asp>

to the accusations that pesantrens are "terrorist incubators".¹⁹⁰

Syamsuddin also stressed the importance of remembering that thousands of other pesantrens in the country are moderate in outlook and are far from being a threat.¹⁹¹

No Strings Attached

The Ambassador's Reaction

The U.S. ambassador had to make the rounds assuring Indonesians that the U.S. was not out to dictate curriculum in its religious schools.

In response to the local outcry, the US ambassador to Indonesia, Ralph Boyce, quickly issued a statement reassuring Indonesians that Washington did not intend to interfere in the curriculum of Islamic schools.

According to the ambassador, who in recent weeks had visited Indonesian schools donating books and promoting the education pledge, the aid "is designed to

¹⁹⁰ Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

¹⁹¹ Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

support the educational goals and priorities identified by Indonesian themselves".¹⁹²

"I don't know where the idea [of the US planning to intervene in the curriculum] comes from. The education system in pesantren is one of the greatest education systems in the country," Boyce told reporters.

"America will not interfere. America will study the system," said Boyce, as quoted by Musadi.¹⁹³

But the US would extend its aid only in response to requests from the Indonesian government. "We don't want to be seen as trying to dictate educational development in Indonesia," he said during a visit to the Al Hikam boarding school for university students.¹⁹⁴

Concluding Remarks: Some Agendas for Reform

Assisting the Moderates

Daniel Sneider writes: "Even here in Indonesia, where there is a strong tradition of tolerance, there is a war going

¹⁹² Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

¹⁹³ Dianthus Saputra Estey in Jakarta Tuesday 25 November 2003. *Struggle over Indonesian schools*. Available on <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/27A3B106-A969-4B14-8521-737844F33522.htm>

¹⁹⁴ Antara Interactive, 10/11/2003. Available on http://www.antara.co.id/e_berita.asp?id=118257&th=2003

on between radicals and moderates for Muslim hearts and minds”¹⁹⁵

Sneider adds: “This is a war we cannot afford to see lost. Indonesia is not only the largest Muslim nation in the world, but it could also become a base for radical Islam to spread throughout Southeast Asia.”

Promoting Democracy

Sneider writes: “Alternately, Indonesia's struggling democracy could set an example for others in the Muslim world.”¹⁹⁶

Sneider quotes Sydney Jones: “You have all the ingredients that could make this place the first Muslim majority democracy that works,” says Sidney Jones, a leading expert on Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia. “And you have all the dark forces eager to push Indonesia in the opposite direction. The question is where does it come out.”¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ Daniel Scheider December 4, 2003. “Radical vs. moderate Islam – in Indonesia, a war rages.” Institute for International Studies, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University. Available on <http://iis-dh.stanford.edu/viewnews1htm1>

¹⁹⁶ Daniel Scheider December 4, 2003. “Radical vs. moderate Islam – in Indonesia, a war rages.” Institute for International Studies, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University. Available on <http://iis-dh.stanford.edu/viewnews1htm1>

¹⁹⁷ Daniel Scheider December 4, 2003. “Radical vs. moderate Islam – in Indonesia, a war rages.” Institute for International Studies, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University. Available on <http://iis-dh.stanford.edu/viewnews1htm1>

Says former Ambassador Paul Cleveland, who heads the U.S.-Indonesia Society: "You would get more democracy out of \$1 billion spent in Indonesia than \$20 billion spent in Iraq."

Modernization

Sneider writes: "Ultimately, however, Indonesia needs to build a modern society. While the rest of Asia, from India to Vietnam, vibrates with the energy brought by the information technology revolution, Indonesia feels like a stagnant backwater. Its economy limps along, plagued by poverty and corruption."¹⁹⁸

Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN)

Before the establishment of Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) in 1960s, Islamic religious education in Indonesia available only at primary and secondary levels. Bright students who wanted to pursue higher education must go to Cairo, Mecca, or Medina. Chance for pursuing higher Islamic religious education at home after a nationwide program to develop IAIN. Although inspired by Al Azhar University of Egypt, IAIN was designed according to the development of social and religious life in Indonesian and located in 14 provinces. Since then, IAIN has become

¹⁹⁸ Daniel Scheider December 4, 2003. "Radical vs. moderate Islam – in Indonesia, a war rages." Institute for International Studies, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University. Available on <http://iis-dh.stanford.edu/viewnews1.htm>

leading institutions in the development of higher Islamic religious education institutions throughout Indonesia. To be recognized and accredited, all other state or private higher Islamic religious education programs in the country are required to adopt IAIN curriculum. By 2004, three out of 14 IAINs, IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, IAIN Syarif Qasim Pakan Baru, and IAIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta have been transformed into Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN). Together with IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, another higher Islamic religious education institution, Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (STAIN) Malang has also been transformed into an Islamic university.¹⁹⁹

Despite rapid development of IAINs, trend to pursue higher studies in the Middle East among Muslim youths continues. Hundreds of them are going to Cairo, Mecca or Madinah for continuing their studies at secondary or higher levels by scholarship or by private finance. Connection with the West has also been developed at IAINs. In mid 90s, Munawir Sjadzali, Minister for Religious Affairs, initiated a program called Pembibitan Dosen IAIN (Breeding Program for IAIN Lecturers). The program run nine month intensive methodology and language training (Arabic and English) for new IAIN lecturers for doing Master and PhD programs in the Western world. The program started in 1989 and began to wane when Sajdzali ended his office in 1992. As the result

¹⁹⁹ The International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), Leiden/Amsterdam. Research Programmes: 'Islam in Indonesia: The Dissemination of Religious Authority in the 20th Century'. Available on <http://www.iias.nl/iias/research/dissemination/annex4.html>

of the program, IAIN has been able to send their lecturers to do Master and PhD programs in The USA, Canada, and Europe.

A degree of dependency on foreign centers of learning has remained. Hundreds of Indonesians are still studying in Egypt and, very recently, new groups have been dispatched to Medina under a special agreement with the Saudi government. However, many graduates from IAINs and other institutions are sent to Western universities. In response to globalization on the one hand and fear of religious-political dissidence on the other, the Indonesian state supports the development of a polycentric religious culture. In the official discourse, Indonesian Islam is often represented as being particularistic, in the sense that Indonesian Muslims seek harmony and are devoid of militant Islamist tendencies. The repositioning of Indonesian Islamic institutions vis-à-vis the centers of learning in the Middle East is complex and sensitive for a number of reasons. Firstly, a popular notion in Southeast Asia holds that Middle Eastern or Arabic Islam, for instance as embodied by the Azhar, is genuine and worth imitating. Also translated writings of Islamist authors from the Middle East, including Sayyid Qutb, are widely read, in particular among students. Secondly, good relations with Arab states are appreciated, in particular with Saudi Arabia, in view of the increasingly popular hajj and omrah. Thirdly, reservations on the part of many traditional Muslims towards the Islamic modernism under the patronage by a number of high state officials compels the national leadership to stress the great

value of tradisi. See The International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), Leiden/Amsterdam. RESEARCH PROGRAMMES: 'Islam in Indonesia: The Dissemination of Religious Authority in the 20th Century'. Available on <http://www.iias.nl/iias/research/dissemination/annex4.html>

Recomd: he said, comparable in importance to the Islamic community as the Cold War was in East-West post WWII relations.²⁰⁰

Recomd: Counterterrorist operations need to be conducted in accord with the rule of law and appropriate transparency to protect human rights. In the end, only democracy will serve as an antidote to fighting radicalism and extremism. Of course, there are instances in which military efforts may be required, especially in emergencies and cases like Afghanistan under the Taliban.²⁰¹

In Indonesia, the main struggle is to establish democracy. The most important contribution Indonesia can make to regional security is to maintain its moderate, open and balanced Islam, based on a functioning democracy and viable economic development. If it does this, it could

²⁰⁰ Karl Jackson and Brendan Sargeant, October 22, 2002. The Bali Bombings and their Aftermath. American and Australian Speakers Urge Closer Ties with Indonesia. A forum presented in cooperation with The Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service, at Georgetown University in Washington DC. Available on <http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Bali%20Bombings%20&%20Their%20Aftermath.htm>

²⁰¹ Jusuf Wanandi IHT, September 6, 2002. The anti-terror drive needs discernment. In International Herald Tribune Southeast Asia. Available on <http://www.aseansec.org/12772.htm>

become a model for other Muslim countries including those in the Middle East.²⁰²

The better the United States understands the diversity of ASEAN, the better it can combat global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. In the end, this is an all-encompassing struggle whose ideas and visions must find acceptance, especially among Muslims.²⁰³

Radical views, coupled with despair stemming from a sense of injustice, poverty and alienation, could produce an explosive situation. This is why education by moderate Islamic schools is so important and must be supported.

Muhammadiyah is the second largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, with more than 30 million members, 60 universities and 14,000 schools. The latter are on a par with public schools but need assistance to improve the education they offer.²⁰⁴

Broad-based economic development in Southeast Asia is the key to reinforcing regional security and stability. The

²⁰² Jusuf Wanandi IHT, September 6, 2002. The anti-terror drive needs discernment. In International Herald Tribune Southeast Asia. Available on <http://www.aseansec.org/12772.htm>

²⁰³ Jusuf Wanandi IHT, September 6, 2002. The anti-terror drive needs discernment. In International Herald Tribune Southeast Asia. Available on <http://www.aseansec.org/12772.htm>

²⁰⁴ Jusuf Wanandi IHT, September 6, 2002. The anti-terror drive needs discernment. In International Herald Tribune Southeast Asia. Available on <http://www.aseansec.org/12772.htm>

Bush administration can help revive the regional economy through U.S. aid, trade and investment.

Despair and poverty are not the only reasons for terrorism, but they are a basic ingredient. This reality has not been given enough attention.²⁰⁵.®

²⁰⁵ Jusuf Wanandi IHT, September 6, 2002. The anti-terror drive needs discernment. In International Herald Tribune Southeast Asia. Available on <http://www.aseansec.org/12772.htm>

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6

PERSPECTIVES ON RADICAL ISLAMIC EDUCATION IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA:

Major Themes and Characteristics of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Teachings²⁰⁶

Background Notes

THE TERM RADICAL comes from the Latin *radix*, meaning “root,” used in the sense of “from the roots up” or

²⁰⁶ This article was written while I was doing my program as a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Ohio University, from August 2003 to February 2004. It is a revised version of a paper presented in a Guest Lecture at The Center for International Studies, Ohio University on January 9, 2004. I thank Professor Elizabeth Collins at the Department of Religion and Classical Studies, Ohio University for reading the first draft of this article. Her comments on the draft were helpful for finalizing it. I also thank Ihsan Ali Fauzi, PhD student at History Department, Ohio University, for helping me finding some helpful resources for this article.

“through” (Philip Herbst 2003. p. 144). In politics, *radical* has been used to describe those “who advocate fundamental or extreme measures to challenge an established order” (Philip Herbst, 2003, p. 144-145.). The meaning of *radical* has been shifting, imprecise, and inflammatory (Ibid).ⁱ In the late eighteenth century, after French Revolution, the term *radical reformer* was used to describe respectable leaders and right wing agendas (Philip Herbst, 2003, p.144). Since the end of Cold War and the resurgence of international terrorism, “radicals” has been used to describe the terrorists. Since many terrorist suspects are Muslims, the term *radical* tends to be associated with Islam, such as “radical Muslims,” “Islamic extremism” “Islamic fundamentalism,” or radical mosques“ (Philip Herbst, 2003, p. 145). After September 11, 2001, Robyn Blummer observes, “the ‘radical Islamist’ has become the ‘bogeyman of academe”” (See *This Week*, February 8, 2002, p. 4). Radical is often synonymous with fanatic, a term that refers to “the irrationality of religious or political feeling” (See *This Week*, February 8, 2002, p. 4). “For most Americans,” said Herbst, “Muslim radicalism bristles with images of cruel violence” (Philip Herbst 2003, p. 145).

Irrespective of its shifting, imprecise, and inflammatory use, radicalism has been an important part of Islamic history. Radical Islamism has grown rapidly as the ideology of Islamic intellectual, social, and political movements at local, national, and international levels. Contemporary radical Islamism can be traced back to the

works of Abul A'la Mawdudi (d. 1979)²⁰⁷, Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966)²⁰⁸, and Imam Khomeini (d. 1989)²⁰⁹. These radical Islamists claim that “Islam is for all aspects of social as well as personal life ... that Islam is flexible and that un-Islamic ‘superstitions’ must be eliminated” (See William E. Shepard 1987, p. 314). They accept “the need for absolute *ijtihad*,²¹⁰ but they are likely to grant it less scope and they emphasize that it must be done in an authentically Islamic way and not as a covert means of copying the West” (See William E. Shepard 1987, p. 314). Radical Islamists “tend to accept more of the past *ijtihad* of the scholars and to emphasize somewhat less the failings of the community in pre-modern

²⁰⁷ Sayyid Abu al-Ala Mawdudi is Indo-Pakistani Muslim revivalist thinker, prolific writer, politician, and founder of Jamaat Islami in 1941. He is the author of more than 150 books. Mawdudi believed that “the salvation of Muslim culture lay in the restitution and purification of Islamic institutions and practices”. See John L. Esposito 2003. *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 196-197.

²⁰⁸ Sayyid Qutb is an Egyptian literary critic, novelist, and poet who became an important Islamic thinker and activist. For Qutb, Islam is “a call to social commitment and activism”. He believes that “Islam is timeless body of ideas and practices forming a comprehensive way of life, rendering nonadherence to Islamic law in excusable”. See *Ibid.*, p. 257.

²⁰⁹ Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeini is Iranian Shii cleric, leader of the Islamic revolution, and ideologue of the Islamic Republic of Iran. See *Ibid.*, p. 173 and William E. Shepard 1987. “Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology”, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 314.

²¹⁰ Along with the *Qur'an*, *Sunnah*, and *Ijma'* (consensus), *Ijtihad* (independent reasoning) is a sources of law in Sunni tradition. It is used when the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* do not provide sufficient legal explanation. Sunni scholars suggest that *ijtihad* is fallible since more than one interpretation of a legal issue is possible. To do *ijtihad* or to be a *Mujtahid*, one must have thorough knowledge of theology, revealed texts, legal theory (*usul fiqh*), a sophisticated capacity for legal reasoning, and thorough knowledge of Arabic. See John L. Esposito 2003, p. 134.

times and somewhat more the distortions caused by Western colonialism” (See William E. Shepard 1987, p. 314). They strongly emphasize “the distinctiveness of Islam” and distinguish Islam from “democracy,” “communism,” or “dictatorship”. They tend to reject modified terms, such as “Islamic socialism”.ⁱⁱ For them, “Islam as a whole is a distinct and integrated system [way of life], so that even if individual elements do not seem distinctive, their place in the Islamic system makes them different” (See William E. Shepard 1987, p. 314).

In order to assure the authenticity and distinctiveness of Islam, radical Islamists avoid being apologetics and emphasize the importance of adopting and implementing the *Shari’ah* at individual, community, and state level (See William E. Shepard 1987, p. 314-315). For them, *Shari’ah* “is not only an ideal to be known and revered, but a law to be put into effect and obeyed”.ⁱⁱⁱ For these purposes, some of them adopt a “gradualist approach” by emphasizing negotiation, cooperation, and persuasion towards Islamic law. Some others however prefer to adopt a “revolutionary” approach to Islamic law. They legitimize violence, terrorism, and repression for the sake of implementing *Shari’ah* (John L. Esposito 2003, p. 259).

Although anti-West and anti-Modernity in character, radical Islamists accept and apply some Western and modern ideas. As in the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Khomeini rejects the word “democratic” because of its close connection with modernity, but accepts the word

“republic” which is equally close to modernity. Mawdudi describes *jihad* as a “revolutionary struggle,” and Sayyid Qutb describes Islam as “a universal proclamation of the liberation of man” (William E. Shepard 1987, p. 315). Although emphasizing the importance of following Islamic way of life adopted by Prophet Muhammad and his companions in the seventh century of Arabia, radical Islamists accept the idea of “progress” and insist that Islam is the way to get “progress” (Qouted in William E. Shepard 1987, p. 315). Khomeini describes Islam as a “progressive” religion and Mawdudi believes that adopting the moral values of Islam will allow Muslims to accelerate the onward march to progress (Qouted in William E. Shepard 1987, p. 315). Although strongly emphasizing the importance of preparing for life in the hereafter (*akhirah*), radical Islamists do not ignore the worldly orientation (*dunya*) of Muslim life. Their thoughts and activities are characterized by what Weber described as “inner worldly asceticism” (Qouted in William E. Shepard 1987, p. 316). “They [radical Islamists] are not unconcerned for otherworldly things, and to some extent their emphasis on this worldly things is a function of the fact that it is mainly in this-worldly sphere that secularism has called Islam into question” (William E. Shepard 1987, p. 315).

Indonesia has always been a fertile ground for the development of radical Islamism despite the secularization policies adopted by the government and a majority moderate Muslim population. Radical Islamists have played role in the dynamics of social, religious, and political changes

in the country. The rise of reform and democratization movement after the fall of Soeharto government in 1998 paved the way for the resurgence of radical Islamism. The reform movement allows radical Islamists to organize their activities, develop their networks, and consolidate their power. One leading figure in the resurgence of radical Islamism in contemporary Indonesia is Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, better known as Ustadz Abu.²¹¹

Ba'asyir has been described in national and international media as a radical Muslim leader and a terrorist suspect linked to al Qaeda. His involvement in the radical Islamic movement began in early 1980s when he opposed the Soeharto government's policy requiring all mass organization to adopt *Pancasila*,²¹² the national ideology, as the sole base (*asas tunggal*). After the fall of Suharto, Ba'asyir was one of the founders and first Chairman of an Islamist non-government organization called Indonesia Mujahidin Council (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI*) established in 2000.²¹³

²¹¹ Other radical leaders in Indonesia are Habib Rizieq Shihab of Islamic Defenders Front or *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI), Agus Dwi Karna of or The Warrior of God's Militia or *Laskar Jundullah*, and Ja'far Umar Thalib of Jihad Fighters of *Laskar Jihad*. See Martin van Bruinessen 2002. "The violence fringes of Indonesia's radical Islam", in *ISIM Newsletter*, 11 December.

²¹² *Pancasila* is a Sanskrit word meaning "Five Principles". It is the national ideology of the Republic of Indonesia consisting of belief in God, Indonesian nationalism, humanitarianism, democracy, and social justice

²¹³ Ba'asyir's organizational activities began from his *santri* time in Gontor. In 1961, he was Chairman of *Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia* (GPII) or Muslim Youth Movement of Indonesia for Gontor branch. In Solo, he was Secretary of *Pemuda Al-Irsyad* (Al-Irsyad Youth) and was Head of *Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam*

In second national MMI conference on August, 5-7, 2002 in Yogyakarta,²¹⁴ he was reelected as Chairman.²¹⁵ Since September 11, 2001 tragedy and Bali bombings on October 2002, Ba'asyir has been accused of being involved in international terrorist networks, particularly in Southeast Asia region. The accusation is based on a CIA document which refers to a statement made by Omar al-Faruq, a

(LDMI), a division of *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (HMI) for Solo branch. See Idy Subandi Ibrahim and Asep Syamsul M. Romli 2003. *Kontroversi Ba'asyir: Jihad Melawan Opini "Fitnah" Global*. Bandung: Penerbit Nuansa, p. 34. With its strong emphasis on the importance of adopting and implementing *Shari'ah*, many observers began to see MMI as an umbrella group for people wanting to push for the adoption of strict Islamic *Shari'ah* law in Indonesia and turn the country into an Islamic state. According to Ba'asyir, MMI mission is simply to say right is right and wrong is wrong according to *Shari'ah*. Although it deliberately advocates the implementation of *Shari'ah*, MMI never formally states its intention to establish Islamic state, because it has not been able to formulate the approach to be employed to do so. See *Asia Times Online*, February 6, 2002. "Southeast Asia, The Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda of Southeast Asia". Available on <http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/DB06Ae01.html> See also Ibrahim and Romli 2003, p. 39

²¹⁴ The conference was attended by "hard line" Muslim leaders who were very critical at Soeharto's secularization policies. They were Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Deliar Noor, and some ex political prisoners from various provinces during Soeharto, such as Sahirul Alim and Irfan Suryahadi Awwas (Yogya), Nur Hidayat (Lampung), and Mursalim Dahlan (Bandung). See Ibrahim and Romli 2003, p. 40

²¹⁵ Being MMI national Chairman often put Ba'asyir in the spot light of Islamic politics in Indonesia. The new position also changed the way people looked at him. His public image began to change from a modest preacher to a powerful radical leader. Ba'asyir repeatedly explains that nothing special about MMI. It simply promote *dakwah* and *jihad* as exemplified by *Rasulullah* (the Messenger of Allah). He emphasizes that MMI never involve in anarchy. Islam, said Ba'asyir, prefers peace among Muslims and between Muslims and other believers. He also said: *Mencaci maki* (abusing) other groups is forbidden and forcing others to follow Islam is forbidden. See Ibrahim and Romli 2003, p. 39 & 47.

mysterious suspected member of *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI)²¹⁶ according to *Time Magazine* (September 23, 2002). The report said that Ba'asyir is Al-Qaidah's highest representative in Southeast Asia and that he was involved in serial bombings in Jakarta. It also said that Ba'asyir planned to blow up U.S. military base in Southeast Asia region and kill President Megawati. Al-Faruq claimed that he is familiar with Ba'asyir and indicated that Ba'asyir received money from bin Laden for buying ammunition. In December 2001, the governments of Singapore,²¹⁷ Malaysia, Philippines, and the United States put Ba'asyir on the list of leading figures involved in international terrorist networks. They accused him of being the “spiritual leader” of *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI) and described him as the “Osama bin Laden of Southeast

²¹⁶ JI is a mysterious organization suspected as the umbrella organization of many radical Islamic organizations in Southeast Asia region and being responsible for a series of bombing in South East Asia, including the Bali bombing in October 2002 which killed more than 200 people. JI has been described as an al-Qaeda type terrorist organization that aims to redraw national boundaries in Southeast Asia in order to set up a pan-Islamic state or “Islamic super state”²¹⁶ or *Daulah Islamiyah*, covering Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the southern Philippines island of Mindanao. ABC NEWS, September 2, 2003. Profile: Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Available on <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2339693.stm>. See also *Asia Times Online*, February 6, 2002. “Southeast Asia, The Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda of Southeast Asia”. Available on <http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/DB06Ae01.html>

²¹⁷ See Sydney Jones 2003. “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the *Jemaah Islamiyah* terrorist network operates,” International Crisis Group. Jakarta and Brussels, 11 December, p. 5. See also discussion in Tim Behrend 2003. *Reading Past the Myth: Public Teachings of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir*. Available on <http://www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/asia/tbehrend/radical-islam.htm>.

Asia”²¹⁸ and “number 2 enemy of America (Osama bin Laden is number 1)” (Idi Subandy Ibrahim and Asep Syamsul M. Romli 2003, p. 31). Malaysian security officials described him as the “godfather” of JI.²¹⁹ On October 2002, under pressures from the U.S. government, Indonesian police formally declared Ba’asyir a terrorist suspect and arrested him on the next day. Referring to a source at the American Embassy in Jakarta, *Tempo Interaktif*, September edition, 2003 confirmed that Ba’asyir remains on the top of current list of CIA terrorist suspects.²²⁰

One thing that tends to be less noted in discussions and publications about Ba’asyir is the fact that he is an experienced and influential Islamic teacher. He is an *ustadz* (teacher) and a *musrif* (adviser) at *Pondon Pesantren*²²¹ Al-Mukmin, Ngruki, more popularly known as Pondok Ngruki, a

²¹⁸ Tim Behrend 2003. *Reading Past the Myth: Public Teachings of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir*. Available on <http://www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/asia/tbehrend/radical-islam.htm>.

²¹⁹ Quoted in *Asia Times Online*, February 6, 2002. “Southeast Asia, The Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda of Southeast Asia”. Available on <http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/DB06Ae01.html>

²²⁰ *Tempo Interaktif*, September 21, 2003. Wawancara: “Abu Bakar Ba’asyir: ‘Saya Tak Kenal Umar Al-Faruq’”. Available on <http://www.tempo.co.id/harian/wawancara/waw-Baasyir01.html>

²²¹ Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) notes that by the year 2002-2003 they are more than 14,000 *Pesantrens* throughout Indonesia. See Departemen Agama RI 2003. *Statistik Pondok Pesantren Seluruh Indonesia*, brochure issued by the Educational Data and Information Division of the Directorate of Muslim Educational Institutions. For a discussion of the possible role of Pondok Ngruki in international terrorist network, see ES. Soepriyadi 2003. *Ngruki & Jaringan Terorisme: Melacak Jejak Abu Bakar Ba’asyir dan Jaringan nya dari Ngruki sampai Bom Bali*. Jakarta: Al-Mawardi Prima.

traditional Islamic boarding school that he co-founded in March 1972.²²² He was a key figure in the establishment of *Madrasah Diniyah* which later become Sekolah Menengah Atas Islam (Islamic Senior High School) in Pasar Klewer (Klewer Market), Solo, few years before the establishment of Pondok Ngruki. While managing *Madrasah Diniyah*, he was also teachings daily at *Kuliah Zhuhur* (Noon prayer study group) in Surakarta Agung Mosque. While in exile in Malaysia from 1985 to 1998,²²³ Ba'asyir, under the name of Abdus Samad, was a *pendakwah lepas* (freelance preacher) in many *pengajian* (religious study groups) that Ba'asyir describes as “Qur'an recitation groups” aimed at “purifying Islamic teaching following the *Ahlus Sunah wal Jamaah* school of thought”(Ibrahim and Romli 2003, p. 36).

This article explores radical Islamic education in contemporary Indonesia with particular reference to Ba'asyir's teachings. It focuses on the major themes and characteristics of the teaching, the way Ba'asyir configures religiosity and identity in Muslim society, and the

²²² Among the founders of Pondok Ngruki are Ba'asyir, Abdullah Sungkar, Yoyo Rosywadi, Abdul Qohar Haji Daeng Matase, Hasan Basri and Abdullah Baraja. For further information on Ba'asyir's *dakwah* activities, see *Asia Times Online*, February 6, 2002. “Southeast Asia, The Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda of Southeast Asia”. Available on <http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/DB06Ae01.html>; Ibrahim and Romli 2003, p. 35; and *Tempo Interaktif*, September 21, 2003

²²³ In 1985, after being arrested by Soeharto's security agents, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar decided to leave for Malaysia. They took the chance to leave while they were given home detention and waiting for higher court decision. They crossed to Malaysia through Medan, the Northern part of Sumatera, in order to escape another prison term. They stayed in Malaysia for 13 years and back to Indonesia after the 1998 downfall of Suharto. See *Tempo Interaktif*, September 21, 2003

educational implications of his teachings. It is supplementing previous studies, such as *Meeting Ustadz Abu, Preaching Fundamentalism: The public teachings of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir*, and *Reading Past the Myth: Public Teachings of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir* by Tim Behrend; *Kontroversi Ba'asyir: Jihad Melawan Opini "Fitnah" Global* by Idi Subandy Ibrahim and Asep Syamsul M. Romli; *Dakwah & Jihad Abu Bakar Ba'asyir* edited by Irfan Suryahadi Awwas; *Ngruki & Jaringan Terrorisme: Melacak Jejak Abu Bakar & Jaringan dari Ngruki sampai Bom Bali* by E.S. Soepriyadi; and *Abu Bakar Ba'asyir Melawan Amerika* edited by Arie Ruhyanto.

Identifying the themes and characteristics of Ba'asyir's teachings, the way he configures religiosity and the educational implications of his teachings allows us to assess the type of Muslim community that the radicals expect to develop and the possible impact of radicalism on the future development of Islam in Indonesia. In particular, it allows us to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the radical Islamic movement in contemporary Indonesia and to assess the extent to which Islamic education needs to be redirected for designing strategies and setting up agendas for the reform of Islamic education in the country.

This article is divided into four main parts. The first part provides Background Notes outlining some theoretical considerations with regard to the development of radical Islamism and Ba'asyir's short biography. Major themes of Ba'asyir's teachings, including their contents and methods are described in the second part of this article. The

characteristics of the teachings are discussed in the third part. In the last part, this article discusses the educational implications of Ba'asyir's teachings.

Ba'asyir's Teaching

There are eight major related themes in Ba'asyir's public teachings: *tawhid* (Islamic monotheism), *Shari'ah* (Islamic law), *Ibadah* (worship), *Daulah Islamiyah* (Islamic State), *Jihad*, *Dakwah* (Islamic missionary), *Wahn* (worldly life) and *Mutraf* (luxury) and the authenticity of Islam.

1. Tawhid, the Core Element of Dienul Islam

Tawhid is the Islamic monotheistic doctrine of the oneness and unity of God.²²⁴ The Qur'an suggests that *tawhid* is the original creed of mankind that has been introduced by all prophets of Islam. *Tawhid* forbids any form of partnership to God and suggests that God is the only Creator, Lord, and Mantainer of every thing in heaven and on earth. Adopting *tawhid* requires one to believe in God (Allah) and behave according to the demands of His doctrines (Mustansir Mir, 1987, p. 137-138). *Tawhid* is "a powerful symbol of divine, spiritual, and sociopolitical unity" (John L. Esposito (editor in chief) 2003, p. 318). Islamic

²²⁴ This understanding of *tawhid* refers to Chapter 112 (*Al Ikhlas*) of the *Qur'an* which says: "Say: He is Allah, the one; Allah, the eternal, the absolute; he begetteth not, nor is He begotten; and there is none like unto Him". See Ludwig W. Adamec 2001. *Historical Dictionary of Islam*. Lanham, Maryland, and London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., p. 255

reformers and activists, such as Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), Ismail al-Faruqi (d. 1986), Ali Shariati (d. 1977) and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989) ((John L. Esposito (editor in chief) 2003, p. 317-318), used the concept of *tawhid* as the basic principle for developing their ideas regarding the development of Muslim society.

Ba'asyir shares the position of these reformers and activists. The first and most important theme of his teachings is *tawhid*. He believes that every single human being is born with the spirit of *tawhid* and *tawhid* is the core of *Dienul Islam* (the religion of Islam). He also believes that *tawhid* is a factor that determines whether a human's *amal* (deeds) are accepted or rejected by Allah *Subhanahu wa Ta'ala* (SWT). "Failure to accept *tawhid* or committing *syirik* (polytheism)," he stresses, "is an unforgivable sin".

There are three elements of *Tawhid* introduced by scholars of Islam. First, *Tawhid Rububiyah*, believing that Allah *Subhanahu wa Ta'ala* is the conqueror and controller of the universe, who determines human life, death, and fate. Second, *Tawhid Asma' wa Sifat*, believing that Allah is omniscient and has exclusive characteristics as indicated in *al-Asmaul Husna*. Third, *Tawhid Uluhiyah*, obeying what is permitted and forbidden by Allah as regulated by *Shari'ah* or *hukmullah* (the law of Allah) (Irfan Suryahadi Awwas 2003. *Dakwah & Jihad Abu Bakar Ba'asyir*. Yogyakarta: Widah Press, pp. 41-42). In order to free him/herself from any worldly power, Ba'asyir says, a person needs to adopt the above

three *tawhid* altogether. He stresses that *Tawhid Uluhiyah* is essential. "Without *Tawhid Uluhiyah*, some one's *tawhid* is defective". Those who simply adopt *Tawhid Rububiyah* and *Tawhid Asma' wa Sifat* and reject *Tawhid Uluhiyah* because of arrogance and logical reasoning are among *Iblis la'natullah* (devils condemned by Allah). In this regard, Ba'asyir refers to verse 34 of Chapter 2 (*Al Baqarah*) of the Qur'an which explains that Iblis rejected Allah's command to bow to Adam because he thought he was superior to Adam. *Iman* (Islamic belief), said Ba'asyir, is "believing and implementing the truth". The essence of *tawhid*, he further states, is "believing in Allah's existence, in *Rububiyah* (that Allah creates, enlivens, terminates life, arranges universe etc.), in Allah's perfection.

2. Realizing *Tawhid* through *Shari'ah*

Shari'ah comes from *shar*; "the path leading to the water hole". It is a "God-given prescription for the right life in this world and for salvation in the world to come" (Ludwig W. Adamec, 2001, p. 141). It is "God's eternal and immutable will for humanity, as expressed in the Qur'an and Muhammad's example (*Sunnah*), considered binding for all believers" (John L. Esposito (editor in chief) 2003, pp. 287-288). In brief, it is an ideal Islamic law.

Ba'asyir is committed to the implementation of *Shari'ah* at an individual and collective level. He teaches that *Shari'ah* is "a system of life designed by Allah for His worshippers and brought by His messenger (*Rasulullah*

Shallallahu 'alaihi wa Sallam). It includes *hukum far'i* (laws on empirical deeds) or *hukum fiqih* (fiqh law) and the principle law on the aspects of belief as discussed in *ilmu kalam* (Islamic theology). Ba'asyir believes that implementing *Shari'ah* is a condition for true *tawhid*. "Obeying and implementing *Shari'ah* comprehensively," he said, "is the realization of *tawhid*". Referring to the *Qur'an*, Chapter 16 (*An-Nahl*) verse 36, Chapter 7 (*Al A'raf*) verse 85 and 65, Chapter 23 (*Al-Mukminun*) verse 23, and Chapter 51 (*Adz-Dzaariat*) verse 56, he concludes that Islamic *tawhid* will be defective if a Muslim commits *syirik* (idolatry) and disobey the *Shari'ah* or replaces it with man-made laws. True *tawhid*, he suggests, is implementing *Shari'ah* comprehensively. Ba'asyir particularly stresses that *Tawhid Uluhiyah* is required for the implementation of *Shari'ah* and those who reject the implementation of *Shari'ah* because of arrogance and logical reasoning are among *Iblis laknatullah* (condemned by Allah) (Irfan Suryahadi Awwas 2003, p. 42, 49 & 50).

Referring to the *Qur'an*, verse 85 of Chapter 2 (*Al-Baqarah*), he stresses that implementing *Shari'ah* comprehensively will bring happiness in this world and in the hereafter as well as many positive results in the life of Muslims, such as preserving the purity of *dienul Islam* and strengthening its existence, making public security real, purifying the implementation of *tawhid*,²²⁵ purifying

²²⁵ The first three points are referring to the *Qur'an* Chapter 24 (*An-Nur*) verse 55 and Chapter 5 (*Al-Maidah*) verse 33

wealth,²²⁶ securing wealth,²²⁷ maintaining a healthy mind,²²⁸ preserving offspring,²²⁹ avoiding forceful means in religion,²³⁰ protecting the rights of the *kufur* (disbelievers),²³¹ avoiding *pemurtadan* (apostate) from *dienul Islam*,²³² securing life,²³³ and inviting *barakah* (blessings) from heaven and earth.²³⁴

²²⁶ Referring to the *Qur'an* Chapter 9 (*At-Taubah*) verse 103, Chapter 3 (*Ali Imran*) verse 130, Chapter 2 (*Al-Baqarah*) verse 188, 275-279

²²⁷ Referring to the *Qur'an* Chapter 5 (*Al-Maidah*) verse 38

²²⁸ Referring to the *Qur'an* Chapter 2 (*Al-Baqarah*) verse 219 and Chapter 5 (*Al-Maidah*) verse 90-91

²²⁹ Referring to the *Qur'an* Chapter 24 (*An-Nur*) verse 2 and a *Hadith* narrated by Al Bukhari and Muslim

²³⁰ Referring to the *Qur'an* Chapter 2 (*Al-Baqarah*) verse 256.

²³¹ Referring to the *Qur'an* Chapter 60 (*Al Mumtahanah*) verse 8. In the *Qur'an*, *Kufr* is to disbelieve in or reject God, a prophet, a scripture, the hereafter, the truth, etc. The root meaning of *kufur* is "to hide, conceal". To disbelieve means to hide the truth or deny recognition to it. See Mustansir Mir 1987, p. 52. The word *kufur* or one of its derivatives appears 482 times in the *Qur'an*. It also means "ingratitude", the willful refusal to appreciate the benefits that God has bestowed. For modern reformists and revivalists, "current Muslims beliefs and practices have been so corrupted from true Islam that they constitute *shirk* (idolatry) or *jahiliyyah* (ignorance)". For premodern reformers, *kufur* occurs in popular Islam, including *sufi* practices. See John L. Esposito (editor in chief) 2003, pp. 176-177

²³² Referring to a *Hadith* narrated by At Tirmidzi. *Murtadd* (apostate) is "one who has renounced her or his religion". According to classical Islamic law, a *murtadd* is subject to the death penalty or banishment. See John L. Esposito (editor in chief) 2003, p. 216.

²³³ Referring to the *Qur'an* Chapter 2 (*Al-Baqarah*) verse 178-179.

²³⁴ Referring to the *Qur'an* Chapter 7 (*Al A'raf*) verse 96. For complete version of the verses, see Irfan 2003, pp. 55-60

“In this life,” Ba’asyir teaches, “there is nothing more valuable than struggling to implement Allah’s *Shari’ah*”.²³⁵ *Shari’ah* must be implemented consistently and comprehensively. “No bargaining in this process [of implementing *Shari’ah*]. Accept every thing or reject every thing”.²³⁶ Ba’asyir believes that failure to implement the *Shari’ah* will cause difficulties in worldly life and lead to punishment in the hereafter (Irfan Suryahadi Awwas 2003, p. 51). In this world, he explains, failure to implement *Shari’ah* will cause various types of *musibah* (disaster) in the life of all Muslims, such as moral decadence, sickness, chaos, and depression, particularly psychological depression, so that Muslims will be frustrated and commit suicide. Ba’asyir further explains that failure to implement *Shari’ah* will cause continuous conflicts and arguments among Muslim leaders.²³⁷ He believes that without *Shari’ah* Muslims will always be the losers. To be the winners, he teaches, Muslims do not need sophisticated science and technology. What they need is the blessings of Allah that can only be gained through the implementation of *Shari’ah*. In his words: “Muslims can be the winners only if they are committed to

²³⁵ See “Taushiah Ustadz Abu untuk Muslim Indonesia”, in *Majalah Islam Sabili*, No. 12 TH. X 2 Januari 2003/29 Syawal 1423, p. 35

²³⁶ See “Taushiah Ustadz Abu untuk Muslim Indonesia”, in *Majalah Islam Sabili*, No. 12 TH. X 2 Januari 2003/29 Syawal 1423, p. 35

²³⁷ Ba’asyir explains this view by referring to the *Qur’an* Chapter 8 (*Al-Anfaal*) verse 25, Chapter 20 (*Thaha*) verse 124, and a *Hadith* narrated by Ibnu Majah. See Irfan Suryahadi Awwas 2003, p. 54

Shari'ah, Allah's *Shari'ah*. If we [Muslims] cannot implement *Shari'ah*, we better give up [from this worldly life]".²³⁸

3. *Worshipping (Ibadah) According to Shari'ah*

Ibadah (worship) literally means “servanthood, slavehood” (Mustansir Mir 1987, pp. 217). The technical meaning of *ibadah* is “an act of worship performed in obedience to God [Allah], in accordance with His command, and in order to seek His pleasure”. In term of ritual, *ibadah* includes *salat* (prayer), *zakat* (religious tax), *shaum* (fasting), and *hajj* (pilgrimage). In general, *ibadah* also includes “any act done in recognition of one’s proper relationship with God, the relationship, that is, of a servant or slave to his master”. *Ibadah* covers the whole of human life ((Mustansir Mir 1987, pp. 217-218). *Ibadah* is “acts of devotation” or “the religious duties of worship incumbent on all Muslims when they come of age and are of sound body and mind” (John L. Esposito (editor in chief) 2003, p. 123).

Ba’asyir stresses that the main objective of human being along with the *jinn* is to worship Allah. The right way to worship Allah is to speak and act according to His will, that is to follow *Shari'ah* or Allah’s law sincerely, *lillahi ta’ala* (only for the sake of Allah), in search of His *ridha* (blessings)²³⁹. Ba’asyir teaches that “*ibadah* (worshipping Allah) means

²³⁸ See “Taushiah Ustadz Abu untuk Muslim Indonesia”, p. 35

²³⁹ Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, “Renungan dari Penjara”. Foreword for Irfan Suryahadi Ahwaz 2003, pp. xi-xiv.

implementing Allah's *Shari'ah* in a comprehensive way (*kaffah*) for the sake of gaining His *ridha* (blessings)". He further suggests, the main duty of human beings in this world is "to implement all Allah's *Shari'ah* (law) only for the sake of gaining His *ridha* (blessings). According to Ba'asyir, "other worldly activities, such as earning for life and seeking knowledge are only supplementary ways of perfecting *ibadah*. He warns that in the process of *ibadah*, human beings will face challenges and difficulties from the *syaitan* (devil) because Allah has decreed. He teaches that Muslims can continuously improve the quality of their *ibadah* (worship) by two ways: (1) Pray to Allah so that we gain the strength to perform the *ibadah* well and (2) Fight bravely, strongly, patiently, and with perseverance in against all challenges from the *Syaithan*. The fight must be meant to support *Dinullah* (Allah's religion) through implementing *Shari'ah* consistently, without tolerating any form of *kebathilan* (wrong deed).

4. *Daulah Islamiyah* for Implementing *Shari'ah*

Establishing *Daulah Islamiyah* (Islamic State) has become a goal of Islamic movements since pre-modern times. This goal is based on the belief that religion and government are closely related and cannot be separated. It is also based on the fact that Prophet Muhammad was both a religious and state leader. In the seventh century, the

Khawarij (seceders)²⁴⁰ was the first movement to claim/proclaim the doctrine of divine governance (*hakimiyyah*) and rule (*hukm*) and the ultimate authority of the *Qur'an* as the only reference for Muslims. They rejected the legitimacy of human arbitration unless it was supported by the text. Ibn Taymiyyah and his followers, especially the Wahhabists, called for the purification of Islam by returning to the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah* (way) of the Prophet. Similar arguments were adopted by other Islamic movements, such as *al-Sanusiyah* in Libya, *al-Mahdiyyah* in Sudan, *ikhwan al-Muslimun* in Egypt, *Jamaat Islami* in Pakistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran.²⁴¹

Like the Wahhabists and other proponents of Islamic purification, Ba'asyir rejects the secular state and strives for a *Shari'ah* oriented one. For example, he rejected *Pancasila*²⁴² and promoted the adoption of *Shari'ah* in

²⁴⁰ *Khawarij* is "early sectarian group in Islam, neither *Sunni* nor *Shii*, although they originally supported Ali's leadership on the basis of his wisdom and piety. They turned against Ali when he agreed to submit his quarrel with Muawiyah to arbitration; a group of his followers accused him of rejecting the *Qur'an*. Ali was forced to fight them in 658; in revenge, Ali was murdered at the Mosque in Kufa in 661. The group survives to day, known as the *ibadis*, with fewer than one million adherents". See John L. Esposito 2003, p. 171

²⁴¹ See further discussion in Ahmad S. Moussalli 1999. *Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World, Iran, and Turkey*. Lanham, Maruland, and London: The Scraecrow Press, Inc. Pp. 131-132

²⁴² Ba'asyir began to become a "problematic" religious leader in late 80s when he began to publicly express his strong and uncompromised opposition to Soeharto's secularization policies. He rejected the forceful implementation of *Pancasila* as *asas tunggal* (sole base) for all mass organizations. He also refused to fly and pay respect to national flag in state ceremonies as well as display presidential icons at Pondok Ngruki. He criticized such policies from an Islamic theological perspective and argued that such policies are the practice of *syirik*

Indonesian. He believes that the major cause of backwardness and moral bankruptcy in many Muslim countries, including Indonesia, is the failure of their leaders to implement *Shari'ah* and the one and only way for solving these problems and enlighten Muslim life is by strictly implementing *Shari'ah* principles. Without Islamic State, he believes, Muslims will not be able to implement the *Shari'ah* and sooner or latter the *Shari'ah* will simply be a name. For him, establishing an Islamic State is a leadership strategy that needs to be considered in an effort to implement *Shari'ah* effectively. He believes that *Shari'ah* can be implemented purely and comprehensively (*secara kaffah*) if Muslims are united under one leadership of *Daulah Islamiyah*. He also believes that current environment in Indonesia is far too permissive and fatally flawed. The reason, he suggests, because the country is established not based on *Shari'ah*, but on the principles of the *kufr* (disbeliever), including popular democracy, a usurious banking system, social equality of the sexes, and licensing of immoral (and culturally unacceptable) behavior for economic gains.

(idolatry). For him, "*Asas tunggal Pancasila* is indeed a trick of the Christians/Catholics to destroy all Islamic institutions in this country [Indonesia]". See Tim Behrend, 2003. *Inside Indonesia*, April-June. Preaching fundamentalism: The public teachings of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Available on <http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit74/behrend.html>. See also "Perjalanan menuju Allah", in *Majalah Islam Sabili*, No. 12 Th. X 2 Januari 2003/29 Syawal 1423, p. 25.

5. Performing Jihad

Jihad is an Arabic word meaning “to strive,” “to exert,” “to fight” or “to struggle” with something distressful or hostile or against some wrong. Muslim scholars and jurists generally agree that *jihad* is “the use of the powers, talents, and other resources of believers to live in this world in accordance with God’s plan as known through the Islamic Scriptures” (Mustansir Mir 1987, p. 112). *Jihad* includes “any endeavor that is made to further the cause of God, whether in promoting good or eradicating evil”. It can be in the form of social action or private effort, financial assistance, physical struggle, or against the enemy. There are two categories of *jihad*. First, *Jihad Akbar* (the greater *jihad*) which means “the inner struggle for one’s own soul against the flesh and for righteousness against the forbidden,” including striving for justice and compassion, for example, parents concern for children (Philip Herbst 2003, p. 99). Second, *Jihad Asghar* (the lesser *jihad*), which means “literal warfare against the infidels—holy war by way of the sword”.

Some Western critics of Islam, such as Daniel Pipes, interpret *jihad* as a “holy war,” “to extend sovereign Muslim power” (Daniel Pipes 2002. What is Jihad, in *New York Post*, December 31). In Western media *jihad* is used to refer to “terrorist attacks organized by so-called militant fundamentalist Muslims” (Philip Herbst 2003, p. 100). However, for Muslims *jihad* is waged in defense of Muslims. Thus, for Hamas, *jihad* is a struggle to liberate Palestine, to

end the Israeli occupation of the land of Muslims.²⁴³ Raphael Israeli refers to the following definition of *jihad* provided by Hamas: “When our enemies usurp our Islamic lands, *Jihad* becomes a duty binding on all Muslims. In order to face the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, we have no escape from raising the banner of *Jihad*. This would require the propagation of Islamic consciousness among the masses on all local, Arab and Islamic levels. We must spread the spirit of *Jihad* among the Islamic *ummah*, clash with the enemies and join the ranks of *Jihad* fighters”.²⁴⁴ Jihadist groups, such as *The International Islamic Front for the Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders* led by Osama bin Laden, *Laskar Jihad* led by Ja’far Umar Thalib in Indonesia, *Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami* in Kashmir, *Palestinian Islamic Jihad*, *Egyptian Islamic Jihad*, and *Yemeni Islamic Jihad* wage war in defense of Muslims.

However, for most Muslims *jihad* “simply refers to a spiritual striving to attain nearness to Allah”.²⁴⁵ Thus, the Qur’anic scholar Mohammed Abdul Malek writes, “*Jihad* is a duty of Muslims to commit themselves to struggle on all fronts — moral, spiritual and political — to create a just and

²⁴³ See discussion in Beverly Milton-Edwards 1992. The Concept of *Jihad* and the Palestinian Islamic Movement: A Comparison of Ideas and Techniques. In *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 48-52.

²⁴⁴ Raphael Israeli 2001. The Islamic Doctrine of *Jihad* Advocates Violence. In Jenifer A. Hurley (ed.), *Islam Opposing Viewpoints*. San Diego, California: Greenhaven Press, pp. 118-119

²⁴⁵ Mohammed Abdul Malek 2001. The Islamic Doctrine of *Jihad* Does not Advocate Violence. In Jenifer A. Hurley (ed.), *Islam Opposing Viewpoints*. San Diego, California: Greenhaven Press, p. 121. For Maled, the exact meaning of *jihad* can only be found from the *Qur’an*, and one must pay attention to the context in which *jihad* appears (p. 121-124).

decent society. It is not a ‘holy war’ against the non-believers as is commonly understood.” He maintains that “the doctrine of *jihad* never encourages war or violence.” Malek argues that “the phrase ‘holy war’ was coined by the West in its struggle against the Muslims during the time of the Crusades (a war instigated by the Church for religious gain)”.²⁴⁶

Similarly, for Ibrahim Abu-Rabi from Hartford Seminary, *jihad* is an “effort against evil in the self and every manifestation of evil in society” (Daniel Pipes, 2002). Farid Eisek also emphasizes that *jihad* is a struggle for justice: “resisting apartheid or working for women’s rights”. Western scholars of Islam also support this interpretation of *jihad*. Bruce Lawrence writes, *jihad* is “being a better

²⁴⁶ Mohammed Abdul Malek 2001. The Islamic Doctrine of Jihad Does not Advocate Violence. In Jenifer A. Hurley (ed.), *Islam Opposing Viewpoints*. San Diego, California: Greenhaven Press, p. 121. For Malek, the exact meaning of *jihad* can only be found from the *Qur’an*, and one must pay attention to the context in which *jihad* appears (p. 121-124).

²⁴⁶ Malek quotes Haji Ibrahim Golegity, who writes, “*Jihad* means to strive or make an effort, usually in an Islamic context, so that anything which requires an effort to be made is *Jihad* and the person doing it is a *mujahid* ... Making time in a busy schedule to study the *Qur’an*; going to a *halal* butcher rather than the closest or most convenient one; discussing Islam with both Muslims and non-Muslims and helping them to understand it better; studying *ayat* (signs), both of *Qur’an* and in nature and science, in order to increase *ilm*, or knowledge; setting other Muslims a good example and showing non-Muslims the true way of Muslims; are all examples of *Jihad* in daily life. *Jihad* is the effort made, not just against internal and external evils, but also to live at peace with oneself and one’s community (Muslim and non-Muslims). Mohammed Abdul Malek 2001. The Islamic Doctrine of Jihad Does not Advocate Violence. In Jenifer A. Hurley (ed.), *Islam Opposing Viewpoints*. San Diego, California: Greenhaven Press, p. 121

student, a better colleague, a better business partner. Above all, to control one's anger.” Historian, Karen Amstrong describes *jihad* as “the effort or struggle to achieve [a just] world where you learn to lay aside your own selfishness and recognize the needs of the poor, elderly and sick ... Islam condemns violence except in self-defense” (Karen Amstrong 2001. “The Roots of Islamic Fundamentalism”. In *These Times*, 24 December, p. 12).

Ba'asyir teaches that *jihad* is a fundamental article of Islamic faith that must be performed by all Muslims. In performing *jihad* a Muslim must be: (1) sincere (*ikhlas*) and expect no worldly rewards, (2) patient (*sabar*), never discouraged by calamity (*musibah*), never lazy in the path of Allah, and never giving up to the enemy, and (3) modest (*zuhud*). Ba'asyir teaches that *jihad* requires “proportionate self-defense.” This understanding of *jihad* led him to support the involvement of *Laskar Jihad* (Muslim Fighters)²⁴⁷ in the conflicts between Christians and Muslim in Maluku and Poso as well as the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center by Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaidah on September 11, 2001. Ba'asyir argues that these were appropriate self-defensive actions in response to the violence of the United States

²⁴⁷ *Laskar Jihad* was a radical Islamic organization founded by Ja'far Umar Thalib in January 2000 and disbanded in October 2002. According to Ja'far, there are three major reasons for the disbandment of *Laskar Jihad*. First, due to advices (*fatwa*) from some *ulamas* in Mecca and Madinah, such as Syekh Rabi bin Hadi Al Madkhali. Second, because *Laskar Jihad* has been followed by political interests, that some political elites have approached the organization for their own political interests. Third, because some members of *Laskar Jihad* have violated *akhlak* and the principles of *ahlussunnah wal jamaah*. See *Suara Merdeka*, October 20, 2001, p. 1

against the entire Islamic world (Tim Bahren, 2002). Behrend describes this understanding of *jihad* in “inter-confessional and political terms” as “active defence of Islam wherever and whenever it is threatened.” “When a threat to Islam, or a Muslim community, takes the form of propaganda, *jihad* requires a proportionate response in kind - education and dissemination through comparable media of the Truth undermined by anti-Islamic lies. When the threat is violent and results in the destruction of life and property, a proportionate and equitable *jihadi* response can justifiably take the same form”.

6. Performing Dakwah

Dakwah means “to call,” “to invite,” or “to ask” from the root of *da’aa – yad’uu – du’aa-an* or *da’watan*.²⁴⁸ *Dakwah* can be described as a call or invitation to an individual, family, and others to take Islam as a way of life, to live in accordance with Allah’s will, with wisdom and consciousness, nourished by His blessings. Islamic scholars teach that *dakwah* is “God’s way of bringing believers to faith and the means by which prophets call individuals and communities back to God.” (John L. Esposito 2003, p. 64). For militant Islamic movements, *dakwah* means “calling Muslims back to the purer form of religion practiced by

²⁴⁸ See “Da’wah dan Berbagai Persoalannya”, in *Al Muslimun*, no. 394 Tahun XXXIII (46) Syawal/Dzulqa’idah 1423 H – Januari 2003, pp.19-23. The word *dakwah* can be found in many verses of the *Qur’an*, such as verse 33 of Chapter 41 (*Fushshilat*), verse 125 of Chapter 16 (*an Nahl*), and verse 24 of Chapter 8 (*al Anfal*), and verse 108, Chapter 12 (*Yusuf*).

Muhammad and the early Muslim community”. Radical Islamists, such as Abu al-Hasan al-Nadawi, Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and ‘Abd al-Jawad Yasin taught that *dakwah* at the individual, family, and society levels will provide Muslims with the power they need to take over leadership of the world from the West (Ahmad S. Moussalli 1999, p. 45).

In Malaysia, *dakwah* is the name for a political Islamist movement that emerged in the 1970s through the activities of youth organizations. It seeks greater application of Islamic laws and values in national life and articulates a holistic Islamic perspective of social, economic, and spiritual development (John L. Esposito 2003, p. 64). Muhammad Natsir, the leader of a political *dakwah* movement in Indonesia,²⁴⁹ teaches that *dakwah* aims to refine the

²⁴⁹ Muhammad Natsir (1908-1993) is one of the few Indonesian Muslim leaders who has national and international experience. From the 18th of August 1945 until the 3rd of January 1946, he was a member of BP KNIP (*Badan Pekerja Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*), a nationalist committee for the formation of the new republic of Indonesia. From 1946-1948, Natsir was the Minister of Information and a member of the DPRS (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Sementara*) or the Temporary People’s House of Representatives. From 1950-1951, he was the Chairman of the modernist Muslim party of Masyumi and most importantly, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia. His political career began to face difficulties in the early 1960s when he strongly and openly opposed President Sukarno’s concept of *Demokrasi Terpimpin* (Guided Democracy). He also rejected the involvement of PKI or the Communist Party in parliament, and was involved in a local separatist movement known as PRRI (*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*) in West Sumatera. In 1960 Sukarho had Natsir and other Masyumi leaders detained. Natsir was held in jail for seven years until the New Order government released him in 1967. At the international level, Natsir is known as one of the most consistent supporters of independence movements in Muslim countries in Asia and Africa. He worked to strengthen cooperation among the newly independent Muslim countries. Natsir was a consultant for many international Islamic movements, including the PLO, the Mujahidin of Afghanistan, Moro in the Philippines, and movements in Bosnia, Japan, and

relationship between human beings and their Creator (*hamblun minallah* or *hamblun ma'a al Khaliq*); the relationship among human beings (*hablun minannas* or *mu'amalah ma'a al-khalqi*); and to develop balance (*tawazun*) and harmony between the two relationships. For Natsir, *dakwah* and politics are two sides of a coin: *dakwah* can be performed through politics and politics can be performed through *dakwah*.²⁵⁰

For Ba'asyir, “mendakwahkan (propagating) and menegakkan (lifting up) *dienul Islam* (Islamic religion) is compulsory to all Muslims.” He teaches that *dakwah* will make Islam spread so that it becomes a way of life. He describes those who strive to lift up Islamic values as winning the “two righteousneses (*al-hasanain*): winning or dying as a martyr.” Those who promote other values, he warns, “will receive punishment directly from Allah or through the hands of Muslims”²⁵¹ According to Ba'asyir, *dakwah* is “giving information regarding *Shari'ah* to Muslims and non-Muslims” (Ibrahim and Romli 2003, p. 39). Ba'asyir follows Natsir in his commitment to various forms of

Thailand. From 1967 until his death in 1993, he was the Vice President of the World Islamic Congress based in Karachi, Pakistan and one of the founding members of *Rabithah al-'Alam al Islami* based in Saudi Arabia. See Muhammad Sirozi 1998. Politics of Educational Policy Production in Indonesia: A Case Study of the Roles of Muslim Leaders in the Establishment of the Number 2 Act of 1989. Thesis submitted to Education Faculty, Monash University, Australia, pp. 124-125

²⁵⁰ Quoted in *Khutbah Jum'at*, “Laporan Utama”, No. 253 Rajab 1422H/Juli 2002, p. 84-85; 87.

²⁵¹ See Irfan Suryahadi Awwas 2003, p. 61. Ba'asyir supports this view with the Qur'an, Chapter 74 (*Al Mudatsir*) verse 1-2: “O thou wrapped up (in the mantle)! Arise and deliver thy warning!” (translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali).

dakwah.²⁵² He teaches that *dakwah* can be performed through education, mass media, and social activities (Irfan Suryahadi Awwas, 2003, p. 61). In 1969, he helped to establish Surakarta Radio for Islamic *Dakwah* (*Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Surakarta* or RADIS) to broadcast the call to Islam. Ba'asyir and his colleagues also used the radio to oppose Suharto's secularization policies and to invite Muslims to perform *jihād* to stop the Soeharto regime.

7. Avoiding *Wahn* and *Mutraf*

For Ba'asyir, *wahn*, an Arabic word meaning “love of worldly life” and “fear of death” is a disease that must be avoided by a Muslim. “If some one is infected by *wahn*,” he teaches, “he will gradually begin to commit bad deeds ... to fulfil the worldly needs that he thinks will satisfy him.” Those who are infected by *wahn* will be trapped in a luxurious life style (*mutraf*), which is the life style of *kufr* (disbelievers). Ba'asyir contrasts this life style with the life of Prophet Muhammad and his companions, who lived modestly (*zuhud*). He teaches that luxury will only make the

²⁵² Further information on Ba'asyir's *dakwah* activities. See *Asia Times Online*, February 6, 2002. “Southeast Asia, The Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda of Southeast Asia”. Available on <http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/DB06Ae01.html>; Ibrahim and Romli 2003, p. 35; *Tempo Interaktif*, September 21, 2003. Ibid; and *Asia Times Online*, February 6, 2002. “Southeast Asia, The Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda of Southeast Asia”. Available on <http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/DB06Ae01.html>.

heart fragile and doubtful in matters related to *Shari'ah*”²⁵³ Ba'asyir teaches that Muslims must adopt Islamic principles in their lives. The principles include *tasdiq*, accepting and obeying every thing that comes from Allah and His messenger without questioning (*sami'na wa atho'na*) and *taslim*, accepting *taqdir* (Allah's will).

8. Islam is the Only True Religion

The central theme in Ba'asyir's public teaching is that Islam is the only true and authentic religion: “*Dienul Islam* (Islamic religion) is the only *dienul haq* (true religion)” (Tim Behrend, 2003, p. 8). Islam is the true order and law of Allah for all His creatures given to them through His last Messenger, Muhammad. Ba'asyir teaches that “Islamic order and law is superior to all other social forms, wherever and whenever” (Irfan Suryahadi Awwas, 2003, p. 65). He reminds his listeners that the enemies of Islam, internal and external, have tried many times to destroy it, but Islam survives and attracts millions of peoples in all parts of the world. Ba'asyir describes Islam as a light from Allah that no one can dim. Because of their inner potential for faith (*fithrah*) “human beings will always search for the authentic

²⁵³ See “Taushiah Ustadz Abu untuk Muslim Indonesia”, in *Majalah Islam Sabili*, No. 12 Th. X 2 Januari 2003/29 Syawal 1423, p. 36. Ba'asyir suggests that it is alright for Muslims to adopt *mutraf* life style in the here after, citing verse 77, Chapter 28 (*al Qasash*) of the *Qur'an*: “*But seek, with the (wealth) which Allah has bestowed on thee, the Home of the Hereafter, nor forget thy portion in this world: but do thou good, as Allah has been good to thee, and seek not (occasions for) mischief in the land: for Allah loves not those who do mischief*” (translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali).

truth of Islam.” “The truth that comes from Allah,” he further describes, “is not fabricated by human beings, nor is it simply history or philosophical analysis.” “Those who reject the truth,” said Ba’asyir, “are controlled by their passions, apply too much logic, or lack of knowledge.”

Assessing the Teachings of Ba’asyir

In Ba’asyir’s teachings, Islam is not a spiritual path as understood in Western culture and in the mystical tradition of the Sufis. It is a complete “way of life” based on Islamic faith and law (*aqidah wa Shari’ah*). Islam is not simply a moral guide, it is more like an ideology, a complete package of rules and guidance for all aspects of life. The teachings invite Muslims to view Islam as a total, comprehensive, and all-encompassing way of life. They reflect a desire to unite Muslims in a worldwide Islamic community (*ummah*) through the formation of national and international Islamic organizations, which can pressure policy makers to implement Islamic law as derived from the teaching of Prophet Muhammad and his companions.

In the following section of the paper I discuss seven major characteristics of Ba’asyir’s public teachings: 1) Islam as a normative-ideal; 2) Islam as an absolutist-exclusionary Ideology; 3) the denial of different traditions within Islam; 4) the literal interpretation of scripture; 5) the lens of conspiracy, 6) inconsistencies, and 7) anti-modernism and anti-intellectualism.

1). *Islam as a Normative Ideal*

Ba'asyir's public teachings are about Islamic ideals rather than the realities of Islam and Muslims. They idealize sixth and seventh century Islam as exemplified by Prophet Muhammad and his companions as the best society for Muslims for all times. The teaching is based on interpretations of the texts of the *Qur'an* and *Hadiths* that refer to concepts developed centuries ago under different circumstances. The Islamic ideals of the *Qur'an* and *Hadiths* are not translated into concrete terms, practical guidelines, or logistical strategies (Tim Behrend, 2003). Ba'asyir teaches about *Islam*, not about *being Muslim*. His teachings do not address Muslims' real needs and daily life concerns, such as how to solve individual problems and participate in community development. The teachings focus on the obligatory aspects of Islamic values without showing the practical benefits of the values. Ba'asyir seems to believe that Muslims will follow Islamic moral teachings if they are simply reminded that these are required of them. In fact, as Tawhidi argues, Muslims will follow Islamic teachings if their hearts and minds can see how Islamic values will lead to a better life. Instead of giving Muslims the prospect of a better life, Ba'asyir frightens Muslims with punishments and teaches them that they and their religion are under attack from the West.

2). *Islam as an absolutist-exclusionary ideology*

Behrend describes Ba'asyir as an "absolutist" and "exclusionist" teacher (2003, p. 7). Ba'asyir stresses that

dienul Islam is a complete religion and the only true religion on earth that is accepted by Allah.²⁵⁴ “In consequence,” he argues, “whoever follows [a religion] other than Islam or regards all religions as the same, his/her deeds will be rejected [by Allah].” “All deeds guided by other than Islam,” Ba’asyir teaches, “bring imbalance, chaos, and destruction to the individual, family, society, and state” (Irfan Suryahadi Awwas 2003, p. 66). In contrast, “all deeds guided by *dienul Islam* will certainly bring goodness for individual, family, society, and the state”.²⁵⁵

Ba’asyir emphasizes that Islam is the one and only true faith and only those who follow Islam will gain Allah’s blessings: “*Dienul Islam* is sent by Allah to human beings . . . If you want to be safe, take the Islamic way. . . if you choose other ways, sooner or later you will face a disaster. . . do not mix Islam with other ways of life.”²⁵⁶ For Ba’asyir,

²⁵⁴ Ba’asyir cites verse 3, Chapter 5 (*Al-Maidah*) of the *Qur’an*, “*Forbidden to you (for food) are: dead meat, blood, the flesh of swine, and that on which hath been invoked the name of other than Allah; that which hath been killed by strangling, or by a violent blow, or by a headlong fall, or by being gored to death; that which hath been (partly) eaten by a wild animal; unless ye are able to slaughter it (in due form); that which is sacrificed on stone (altars); (forbidden) also is the division (of meat) by raffling with arrows: that is impiety. This day have those who reject faith given up all hope of your religion: yet fear them not but fear Me. This day have I perfected your religion for you, completed My favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion. But if any is forced by hunger, with no inclination to transgression, Allah is indeed Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful*” (translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali). Irfan Suryahadi Awwas 2003, p. 66.

²⁵⁵ Ba’asyir cites verse 19 and 89, Chapter 3 (*Ali Imran*) of the *Qur’an*

²⁵⁶ This explanation of Ba’asyir refers to verse 29, Chapter 18 (*Al-Kahfi*) and verse 256, Chapter 2 (*Al-Baqarah*) of the *Qur’an*.

Muslims must either struggle to implement *Shari'ah* or reject *dienul Islam*.²⁵⁷ He calls leaders in Muslim countries who fail to implement *Shari'ah* apostates (*murtad*), unbelievers (*kufr*), despots (*dhalim*) and godless (*fasik*).²⁵⁸ Islam is a comprehensive (*syumul*) way of life (*manhajul hayah*). Implementing the *Shari'ah* is an obligation for every Muslim, no matter who they are, what they are, and where they are.²⁵⁹ “In their efforts to implement *Shari'ah*, Muslims have two extreme choices: “living with dignity or dying as a martyr” (*hidup mulia atau mati syahid*). “Dying as a martyr is being killed by the enemy of Islam while striving in the path of Allah (*jihad fi sabilillah*) or being killed by a despot (*dhalim*) because of expressing the truth”.²⁶⁰ Ba'asyir teaches that worshipping Allah is not limited to ritual practices, such as prayer (*shalat*), fasting (*shaum*), pilgrimage (*hajj*), and remembrance of Allah (*dzikir*). The implementation of *Shari'ah* comprehensively (*secara kaffah*) with sole intention: to please Allah and obey His commands forbids gambling, corruption, and prostitution.²⁶¹ Rejection

²⁵⁷ See full description in Irfan Suryahadi Awwas 2003, p. 68

²⁵⁸ Ba'asyir cites the *Qur'an*, Chapter 5 (*Al-Maidah*) verses 44, 45, and 47. See in Irfan Suryahadi Awwas 2003, p. 53-54

²⁵⁹ In this regard, Ba'asyir refers to the following verses of the *Qur'an*: Chapter 4 (*An-Nisaa* verse 65 and 105; Chapter 33 (*Al-Ahzab* verse 36; and Chapter 24 (*An-Nur*) verse 51

²⁶⁰ Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, “Renungan dari Penjara”, in Irfan Suryahadi Awwas 2003, pp. xi-xiv

²⁶¹ Ba'asyir cites Chapter 2 (*Al-Baqarah*) verse 208 of the *Qur'an* (Irfan Suryahadi Awwas 2003, p. 35, 51

of one part of *Shari'ah* places a Muslim among those who commit idolatry (*musyrikin*).²⁶²

3). Denial of Different Traditions within Islam

The *Qur'an* serves as both record and guide for the Muslim community, transcending time and space. It is true that some verses of the *Qur'an* and texts of *Hadith* are precise in meaning (*qat'iyah*), but many of them have to be interpreted (*dzanni*). They can be interpreted in the light of their linguistic, juristic, and theological contexts. Traditionalist, modernist, revivalist, and liberal Islamic scholars may apply different methods of interpretation and produce different legal principles from the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*. Since different methods and contexts of interpretation may produce different understandings and applications, it is necessary to define which method and context of interpretation is to be adopted. However, Ba'asyir teaches that *shari'ah* is the law of Allah (*hukmullah*) based on the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* and is in opposition to man-made laws. He does not acknowledge that the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* need to be interpreted to produce legal principles.

Because there are no clear guidelines on *Shariah*, many Muslim groups in Indonesia, particularly *Nahdatul Ulama* (NU) and *Muhammadiyah*, are reluctant to adopt *Shari'ah* as

²⁶² Ba'asyir refers to the following verses of the *Qur'an* when he explains this view: Chapter 4 (*An-Nisa*) verse 65; Chapter 24 (*An-Nur*) verse 51; Chapter 33 (*Al-Ahzab*) verse 36; and Chapter 6 (*Al-An'am*) verse 121. See Irfan Suryahadi Awwas 2003, pp. 51-52

state law although they do not deny the importance of Muslims implementing *Shari'ah* in daily life. They reject the formalization of *Shari'ah* as state law because the negative impacts (*mudharat*) exceed the benefits (*manfaat*).²⁶³ Instead, they promote informal practice of *Shari'ah* values in state affairs and daily life. The Chairman of Masyumi Islamic political party, Muhammad Natsir, once raised the following question: "Which one is better, pig oil in a camel can or camel oil in a pig can?" The Chairman of National Mandate Party and House Speaker, Amien Rais, distinguishes between "salt politics" (*politik garam*) and "flag and lipstick politics" (*politik bendera dan gincu*). "If flag and lipstick politics is adopted," said Rais, it will wave and shine. But it will invite reactions from other [religious] groups". "On the contrary, if salt politics is adopted, it will not wave or shine, but the society will taste it". Rais believes that "salt politics will produce an inclusive social attitude. . . . If we see with a clear perspective, many Islamic values are not much different from those of Christianity". However, Ba'asyir seems to prefer lipstick politics, demanding the adoption of *Shari'ah*, but he does not explain what type of *Shariah* is to be applied and how to apply it. Nor does he say whether he advocates adopting a "persuasive" approach or a "revolutionary" one.

²⁶³ *Tempo Interaktif*, November 11, 2001. "Siapa Mau Syariat Islam". Available on [http://www.tempoco id/harian/opini/opi-07112001.htm1](http://www.tempoco.id/harian/opini/opi-07112001.htm1)

4). *The Literal Interpretation of Scripture*

Intellectual, contextual, and systematic interpretation of the verses of the Qur'an is essential for producing their relevant meanings. The Islamic scholar Fazlur Rahman writes:

*If the Muslims' loud and persistent talk about the viability of Islam as a system of doctrine and practice in the world of today is genuine ..., then it seems clear that they must once again start at the intellectual level. They must candidly and without inhibitions discuss what Islam wants them to do today. The entire body of the Shari'ah must be subjected to fresh examination in the light of the Qur'anic evidence. A systematic bold interpretation of the Qur'an must be undertaken.*²⁶⁴

Rahman suggests that there are three steps in interpreting the Qur'an. The first is to adopt a historical approach. The Qur'an should be studied in a chronological order in order to understand the relation between the struggle of Prophet Muhammad and the Qur'an, so that one can avoid exaggerated and artificial interpretations and bring out the overall meaning of the Qur'anic message in a systematic and coherent manner. The second is to distinguish between Qur'anic law and the objectives these laws were expected to serve in order and to identify the

²⁶⁴ Fazlur Rahman 1970. *Islamic Modernism: Its Scope, Method and Alternatives*. In *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 4, October, p. 329

reasons provided by the *Qur'an* for its specific legal pronouncements. The third is to identify the sociological setting of the *Qur'an*, the environment in which the Prophet lived and worked. Rahman believes that such steps will limit the interpreter's bias and lead to a clearer understanding of the *Qur'an* and is "the only real hope for a successful interpretation of it [*Qur'an*] today".

With the three steps, he argues, Muslims can move from literal interpretation of the *Qur'an* to metaphorical or intellectual and systematic ones. This method of interpretation of the *Qur'an*, he suggests, is "honest," "true," and practical," thus "the most satisfactory and perhaps the only possible one". The traditionalists, Rahman notes, often criticize this approach as being too total and abrupt, as sacrificing too much of tradition, and suspect it of being Western oriented. He admits that such an interpretation of the *Qur'an* requires living intellectualism and cannot grow if stifled by conservatism (Fazlur Rahman 1970).

Ba'asyir's public teachings are based on a literal interpretation of selected verses of the *Qur'an* and *Hadiths*, without considering their linguistic, historical, and cultural contexts. Ba'asyir does not pay attention to chronological order and fails to distinguish between *Qur'anic* legal dicta and the reasoning behind the dicta, ignoring the sociological setting of the law. He does not provide the basis for his interpretation of the *Qur'an*. Instead of providing the true meaning of the *Qur'an*, Ba'asyir's teachings may be only his own obsessions reflected through the *Qur'an*.

5). *The Lens of Conspiracy*

For the most part, Ba'asyir's public teachings are reactionary in character. They are reactions to liberal Muslim scholars who promote moderate Islamic teachings and whom he perceives as agents of an international conspiracy of Zionists, Christian missionaries, and the government of the USA. Ba'asyir accuses liberal Muslim scholars of introducing an "evil version of *tawhid*" (*tawhid versi iblis*) based on pride in human rationality. Citing verse 34, Chapter 2 (*Al Baqarah*) of the Qur'an regarding Allah's command to Iblis to bow down to Adam,

Ba'asyir argues that bowing to Adam was following Allah's command and was not meant to worship him (Irfan Suryahadi Awwas, 2003, p. 43). He attacks Nurcholis Madjid, a leading liberal Muslim scholar in Indonesia, who quoted Ibnu Arabi by saying that Iblis will enter *syurga* (heaven) because he rejects to do so and simply bow to Allah. Ba'asyir believes that to day, secularism and liberalism dominate the thinking of Muslim scholars, thus an "Iblis version of *Tawhid* is gaining momentum." He accuses liberal Islamic scholars of promoting a misleading understanding of Islamic teachings and leading Muslims from the straight path to the wrong one by suggesting that all religions are the same and the followers of a religion cannot claim that their religion is the only true one. For Ba'asyir, liberal Islamic scholars are allies of an international Zionist and Christian conspiracy to separate Muslims from Islam. They also separate Muslims from one another by creating divisions, such as radical Islam

(*Islam Radikal*) or fundamentalist Islam as distinguished from moderate Islam (*Islam Moderat*).

Ba'asyir accuses secular and liberal scholars of rejection the Qur'an and making Muslims *a priory* to the Qur'an. He points out that verse 221, Chapter 2 (*Al-Baqarah*) of the Qur'an forbids inter-religious marriage, and the liberals argue that this verse is unacceptable because it is discriminates on the basis of religion. Here Ba'asyir indirectly criticizes Nurcholis Madjid, who allowed his daughter to marry a Jewish man and thereby promoted universal marriage (*perkawinan universal*). Ba'asyir also criticizes secular and liberal scholars for rejecting the pattern of inheritance distribution let forth in the Qur'an (Munawir Sjadzali, 1994; Munawir Sjadzali, 1997) by arguing that such a pattern of distribution reflects gender bias. He further accuses liberal scholars of rejecting the Qur'anic verses that require Muslims to perform *Jihad* and of accepting the Western view that such verses are terrorist in character.

Ba'asyir believes that liberal Islamic scholars persuade Muslims to follow a new belief that has no textual basis (*nash*). He accuses the scholars of arrogance because they accept some of the laws set forth by Allah and reject others based on their own ideas. They dare to correct Allah's regulations and reject the words of His Prophet, but accept the words of infidels (*kafir*). He accuses them of being no different Paroah (Fir'aun). And Ba'asyir accuses all those who criticize him of attacking Islam. Accusations of Ba'asyir are "part of efforts of the infidel to dim the light of Islam by

using terrorism as a camouflage. . . What they [U.S. and its allies] mean by terror is everybody who defends *Shari'ah*, including myself." Ba'asyir describes those who accuse him as "Allah's enemies" (*musuh-musuh Allah*) and claims that accusations connecting him to *Jamaah Islamiyah* and *Al-Qaeda* are part of a scenario to corner Muslims (Ibrahim and Romli, 2003, p. 45-47).

Ba'asyir believes there is an international Zionist and Christian conspiracy with the U.S. government to destroy Muslim countries and eliminate Islam from earth. Behrend notes, "His public statements with respect to political issues inevitably refer to supposed manipulation and conspiracy by the US, and to its never-ending 'war against Islam'" (Tim Behrend, 2002, p. 5-6). He urges his followers to ban all American products and to pressure Indonesian government to break off diplomatic relations with the U.S. government. Ba'asyir expresses his admiration for Osama bin Laden whom he considers a "true Islamic warrior"²⁶⁵ or "a true Muslim fighter."²⁶⁶ He says that bin Laden "has dared to represent the Islamic world in combat against the arrogance of the United States and its allies". "The real terrorist," said Ba'asyir, is not bin Laden, but the U.S., which is "waging war on Islam, not terrorism".

Ba'asyir's anti-Americanism does not differentiate

²⁶⁵ BBC News World Edition, October 15, 2002. "Spotlight turns on radical cleric"

²⁶⁶ *Asia Times Online*, February 6, 2002. "Southeast Asia, The Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda of Southeast Asia". Available on <http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/DB06Ae01.html>

between American values and the American political system and President Bush's foreign policy toward the Muslim world. His views are reactive to what he interprets as attacks on Islam, and he believes that attacks on him are simply attacks on Islam.

6). *Inconsistencies*

Fazlur Rahman (1970, p. 324) has described as “janus-faced” the view of some Islamists. This criticism can be applied to Ba'asyir's teachings on an Islamic State (*Daulah Islamiyah*) and *jihād*. Ba'asyir teaches that Muslims need an Islamic state that will enforce *Shari'ah* comprehensively and consistently. He calls Muslim leaders who fail to implement *Shari'ah* apostates (*murtat*), infidels (*kafir*), despots (*dhalim*) and godless (*fasiq*). He teaches that Muslim nations must be united under a single and righteous leadership of one caliphate. However, he denies that he wants to develop an Islamic state in Southeast Asia, including parts of the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Indonesia in Nusantara Islamic State (*Negara Islam Nusantara* or *Daulah Islam Nusantara*).²⁶⁷ Yet Ba'asyir has denied this and called such a plan “really irrational,” asking: “How could it be possible to unite countries that have different ideologies

²⁶⁷ According to CNN's Maria Ressa, Ba'asyir wants to develop an Islamic super state, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, parts of the Philippines, Thailand, and Myanmar. If Philippines national Security Adviser Roilo Golez's claim is correct, Ba'asyir also intends to include northern Australia as part of his theocratic state, *Daulah Islam Nusantara*. See discussion in Tim Behrend 2003. *Reading Past the Myth: Public Teachings of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir*, p. 5.

and ethnic groups into one *Daulah Islamiyah*?” (Irfan Suryahadi Awwas, 2003, p. 34).

He argues that the idea of a Southeast Asian Islamic state is only an effort [made by Arroyo and George Bush] to create horizontal conflict in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. Behrend has tried to explain this inconsistency by saying that what Ba’asyir means by a caliphate is a concept of moral leadership and shared vision without necessarily establishing an over-arching super state (Tim Behrend 2003. *Reading Past the Myth*, p. 8). Ba’asyir’s lawyer, Adnan Buyung Nasution, defends him by arguing that “[Ba’asyir] is simply fighting for the implementation of *Shari’ah* as Indonesian law, not to bring down the Republic of Indonesia.” However, given Ba’asyir’s teaching it remains difficult to understand how *Shari’ah* could be implemented if *Daulah Islamiyah* is simply means “moral unity” and “vision”?

Ba’asyir claims: “I never teach violence” (Ibrahim and Romli 2003, p. 39). His follower at Pondo Ngruki, Farid Ma’ruf, describes him as a person with a soft (*lembut*) personality who does not justify violence and who “never criticizes other groups of Muslims, except those who have committed wrong deeds (*lalim*)”²⁶⁸ When on trial in Jakarta in September 2003, Ba’asyir told his students (*santri*) and supporters not to use violence in their protests. He said that

²⁶⁸ Another student (*santri*) at Pondok Ngruki, said: “As far as I am concerned, Pak Abu (Ba’asyir) is far from violence. He is even too soft, that I used to think that he is a coward.” (*Kompas Cyber Media*, November 3, 2002. Nasional, “Ustad Menanam Dakwah, Ustad Menuai Teror. Available on <http://www.kompas.com>).

those who used violence were provocateurs (*provokator*). Wahyudin, Deputy Director for Pondok Ngruki, said that Ba'asyirs followers would "not take anarchistic actions in protesting [Ba'asyir's four year prison sentence]. We will do every thing according to the rule of law, namely by bringing the case to higher court".²⁶⁹ However, a political manifesto entitled "The Latest Indonesian Crisis: Causes & Solutions" composed in late May 1998, as Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar were preparing to return to Indonesia after the fall of Suharto, presented Indonesian Muslims with a simple and stark alternative: "We have two choices before us: 1. Life in a nation based upon the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah*; or 2. Death while striving to implement, in their entirety, laws based upon the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah*."²⁷⁰ Indeed, Ba'asyir does not object being described by the media as the "Osama bin Laden of Southeast Asia" (ABC NEWS, September 2, 2003). Ba'asyir asks Allah to help bin Laden and destroy his enemies:

O Allah, please help every one who help your religion [Islam], save Osama bin Laden, and also save the *mujahidin* all around the world. Oh Allah, destroy every one who wants to destroy your religion, as you have destroyed those who disobeyed you. Destroy George Bush, Sharon, Howard, Lee

²⁶⁹ See *Republika Online*, September 3, 2003. Berita Utama, "Melawan Dengan Ketenangan". Available on <http://www.republika.co.id>

²⁷⁰ This Manifesto was later published in a bulletin called *Nida'ul Islam*, July-August 1998. See Irfan Suryahadi Awwas 2003, p. 51. It has been one of the important documents used by government authorities in Malaysia, Singapore and Philippine to interrogate terrorist suspects. *Asia Times Online*, February 6, 2002,

Kuan Yew, demolish Tony Blair, Goh Tjok Tong. And demolish all your enemies. Please answer [my prayer] oh Allah.²⁷¹

7). *Anti-Modernism, Anti-intellectualism*

Modernity, a product of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the discovery of the New World, promotes rationality and individualism (Daniel Miller, 1994. p. 61). According to Habermas, “modernity can not and will no longer borrow the criteria by which it takes its orientation from the models supplied by another epoch; it has to create its normativity out of itself” (Jurgen Habermas, 1987, p. 7). Modernity challenges and revises tradition by adopting scientific mode of thinking and introducing other social and cultural values.

Bernard Lewis argues that the Muslim world has responded to modernity in three different ways. The first he calls “supermarket style.” Muslims learn, select, and finally adopt certain modern values and practices that they consider beneficial without necessarily becoming Western in term of religion and culture. They remain hostile to the West, and they see Western civilization as immoral and dangerously corrupting. This is the response of Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers. In the second way Muslims combine what they consider as the best elements of Islamic

²⁷¹ See “Hari Fitri Bersama Ust. Abu”, in *Majalah Islam Sabili*, No. 12 Th. X 2 Januari 2003/29 Syawal 1423, p. 21

and modern civilizations, but often result in “a promiscuous cohabitation of the worst.” The third response to modernization is that of Kemal Ataturk and the Young Turk movement, which accepted modernization as the peak of the development of human civilization and believed that Muslims must follow it in order to be part of the civilized world (Bernard Lewis, 1997, in *Foreign Affairs* 76 (1), p. 127).

The dismissive analysis of the Muslim response to modernity of Bernard Lewis contrasts with the analysis of the modernist Islamic scholar Fazlur Rahman. He suggests that although very careful and selective, Muslims tend to respond to modernity positively, intellectually, and spiritually. For example, the most important characteristics of the classical Muslim modernists of the nineteenth century was an “intellectual *élan* and the specifically intellectual and spiritual issues with which it dealt” (Fazlur Rahman 1970, p. 318).

Ba’asyir’s public teachings reject modernity for its emphasis on rational and liberal thinking. Modern values that are in line with Islamic teachings, such as progress, justice, and egalitarianism are ignored. Ba’asyir criticizes, ridicules, and rejects modern values and adopts an uncompromised, uncritical, and unreflective approach to the *Qur’an* and the *Sunnah*. Ba’asyir’s teachings maintain that Muslims will be able to revive the quality of their life only by going back to models provided by Prophet Muhammad and his companions in sixth and seventh centuries. The teachings focus only on the negative effects of

modernization, such as egotism, materialism, social inequities, and moral degradation, but fail to appreciate the achievements of modern civilization. In particular, Ba'asyir teaches that embracing modernity and Westernization has caused moral degradation in Muslim society. He denies the significance of systematic, creative, and intellectual effort for solving Muslims' problems.

Concluding Remarks: Some educational implications

Radical Islamic teachings as introduced by Ba'asyir are on the line with the teachings of *Wahhabiyyah*, eighteenth-century reformist/revivalist movement for socio-moral reconstruction of society led by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The teachings are “intolerant,” “fanatic,” and “extreme,” emphasizing the fundamental role of *Tawhid* (uniqueness and unity of God). They promote *Tawhid* as a primary doctrine and propose a return to an ideal Islamic monotheism based on *Qur'an* and *Hadith*. They invite Muslims to do internal reforms and unite against the West, especially the USA and its allies, and totally oppose any form of modernization and secularization, promote anti-West and promise to dismantle Western civilization as well as replacing it with an Islamic one. The teachings place Islam and modernity in a binary opposition, as if the two of them are totally hostile to one another – exaggerating their differences and ignoring their sharing points. Ba'asyir's teachings may be able to raise a feeling of “religiosity” or “muslimness” and a feeling of “Islamicity” (Hussin Mutalib

1990. In *Asian Survey*, Vol. 30, No. 9, September, p. 883) among Muslim youths, but may not be able to provide them with the quality and type of knowledge, skills, and mode of thinking that they need to solve their daily life problems and come to term with the future challenges of modern civilization.

Ba'asyir's teachings confront Muslim real life situation in contemporary Indonesia where modernization has dominated many aspects of public life and discourses. Such teachings may not be popular among Indonesian Muslims who are getting along with modern life style. However, their emphasis and claim on the authenticity of Islam, their ability to call for commitment, their attention on the inner characteristics of Islam for bringing dignity and respect to Muslims, and Ba'asyir's sincerity and dedication in promoting them can make his teachings attractive, particularly to the beginner modernists who are still doubtful about modern values and those who are disappointed with modernity, such as many young people and recent urban immigrants who are threatened by the alienation of life in cities. For oppressed groups, Ba'asyir's teachings may be attractive as a vehicle for protesting against unjust authorities. Opportunistic and pragmatic Muslim politicians who look for a shortcut to gain support may use Ba'asyir's teachings as part of the rhetoric of their political campaigns. With regard to their anti-West characteristics, Ba'asyir's teachings can create an opinion in the West as well as in the Muslim world that Islam is not compatible with the West. In the light of their rejection to

modernity and democracy, Ba'asyir's teachings can hinder democratization and modernization in Indonesia.

If Muslim leaders in Indonesia still believe in the importance of partnership with the Western world and the need to pursue modernization and democratization for a better future of Indonesia, they need to counter the spread of Islamic radicalism by all means. They need to develop and disseminate moderate Islamic teachings at all levels of education by designing Islamic teachings that do not only raise a feeling of “religiosity”, “muslimness”, and “Islamicity,” but also raise a very real openness to change and constructive attitude toward modernity. They need to elicit a moral commitment not only to be critical toward modernity, but also being able to reconstruct it based on Islamic values. Indonesian Muslim leaders need to utilize Islam as spiritual salvation and inspiration for modernity in order to develop an Islamic path to modernity. This approach to modernity will allow them to design social, economic, cultural, political, and religious modes of modernity that suit Islamic values and principles. In turn, this approach will allow Muslim youths in the country to achieve modernity that is relatively different from secular Western modernity. It will enable them to be modern, competitive, and play important role in the global world without losing their cultural, national, and religious identity.

To day, many Islamic educational thoughts in Indonesia come from anti-modernist and anti-West scholars. They control many Islamic education institutions, such as

Pesantren and *Madrasah* as well as many Islamic study groups all around the country. These scholars tend to believe that Muslim youths will be ready to face all sort of future challenges if they memorize a number of Qur'anic verses and *Hadith* as well as being familiar with the basic teachings of *Fiqh* (jurisprudence), *Shari'ah* (Islamic law), *Tawhid* (Islamic theology), *Dakwah*, and *Jihad*. These scholars also tend to believe that all problems in Muslim society can be solved by going back to the sixth century model of Muslim life adopted by Prophet Muhammad and his companions. They tend to suggest that being losers in this worldly life is not a problem for Muslims as long as they will be champion in the hereafter. They also tend to suggest that various modern scientific disciplines are the treasure of the West that has nothing to do with Muslims. I share Khan's opinion that such as narrow understanding of knowledge has caused lack of creativity, dynamism, vitality and power in the Muslim world.²⁷²

Muslim scholars in Indonesia need to address the future challenges of Muslims in the country realistically and rationally. They need to develop a proper sacred vision of Islamic life based on a workable synthesis between Muslim traditional values and the modern ones. They need to base Islamic teachings on a *dynamic*, rather than static and legalistic view of Islam and on a belief that the mission of

²⁷² Muqtedar Khan 2003. [Globalist Paper Global Education] Islam's Future and the Importance of Social Sciences. Available on <http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3255>. Downloaded on September 19, 2003.

Islam is to positively affect and transform the world. Muslim teachers, including Ba'asyir, need to redefine what they mean by knowledge, what contents need to be prioritized in their teachings, what approach is appropriate, what standard is used to measure effective teachings, and what quality is required for Muslims to be able to compete in modern and global world. They need to develop an open minded intellectual environment and forward looking attitude in order to develop a new vision of Islamic teaching that can bring Muslims to the level of understanding, commitment, and social responsibility to serve Islam and humanity effectively. They need to introduce and explain Islam as both *normative* and *empirical* ideal and link fundamental Islamic teachings, such as *Tafsir*, *Hadith*, *Fiqh*, *Tawhid*, *Dakwah*, and *Jihad* to the natural concerns of Muslims and their relation with the whole world.²⁷³ Islamic teachings need to equip Muslim youths with traditional and modern disciplines as well as a proper understanding of contemporary world in term of social, political, and religious diversity.

Ba'asyir and other radical Islamists in Indonesia need to reconsider their understanding of the relationship between modern and Islamic civilization and the role that Muslims need to play in the dynamic of the relationship. At educational level, they need to develop new materials and

²⁷³ Dawud Tawhidi. A Vision of Effective Islamic Education, edited by Anas Coburn. Available on http://islamic-world.net/parenting/parenting_page/a_vision_of_effective_islamic_ed.htm. Downloaded on September 19, 2003

approaches to produce an open-minded and skillful generation of Muslims who are capable of synthesizing Islamic and modern concepts of successful living. Such a generation of Muslims will replace West-phobia, modernity-phobia, and America-phobia with a creative attitude and constructive mode of thinking. They will be knowledgeable about Islam and capable of being good Muslims, playing their role as the vicegerent of God on earth (*khalifatullah fil Ardhi*). In the words of Dawud Tawhidi, Muslim teachers need to move from teaching *facts about Islam* to teaching *about being Muslims*. “The goal of Islamic education,” he explains, “is not to fill our children’s minds with information about Islam, but rather to teach them about *being Muslim*”. Indeed, Islamic mission is *rahmatan lil alamin*, being part of the world and share the responsibility to make it a better place to live.

If Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, is to be able to compete in globalization era and play role in the future development of world civilization, more realistic, rational, and contextual Islamic teachings need to be developed. More visionary Islamic teachers need to be trained, and more faithful, creative, open-minded, thoughtful, and skillful generation of Muslims need to be produced. Above all, more affordable and accessible modern Islamic education institutions need to be developed. It is in this regard that radical Islamic teachings as presented by Ba’asyir need to be carefully and critically treated. It is also in this regard that agendas and strategies for Islamic education reform in the country need to be developed.®

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UNDERSTANDING MUSLIM INTERNAL CONFLICT:

Some Inspirations from Badiuzzaman Said Nursi²⁷⁴

Introduction: *Ideals and Reality about Muslims*

THIS ARTICLE DISCUSSES why internal conflicts occur among Muslim believers, what are the impacts of the conflicts on Muslim society, and how to cure them with particular

²⁷⁴ This article is pravisd version of paper presented at International Symposium on "Religion, Peace, and Globalization: Some Inspirations from Risaleinur," jointly organized by The Istanbul Foundation for Science and Culture and Graduate Program, Palembang State Institute of Islamic Studies, Palembang, July 25, 2004.

reference to Nursi's ideas as described in *The Flashes Collection*, especially The Twentieth Flash on Sincerity and *The Damascus Sermon*.

There is no dispute among scholars of religious studies that man's most fundamental need is the need for religion, the need to recognize and worship Almighty God, and to obey His laws. Religion can be ideological and cultural, affecting social relations. It can be both integrating and disintegrating forces. It can be a cultural self expression that produces alienating elements, legitimates the existing power relations, and be the glue or the common bond that keeps a community together²⁷⁵. As an integrating force, religion can provide its followers or a community of believers with guidance for developing a peaceful and harmonious life, make them become a peace and harmony makers, and enable them to manage differences and conflicts. All religions suggest that harmony is an essential element for developing good social life and that tension and conflict are harmful to society. All religions consider every person or group who triggers and causes conflict as a trouble maker. If the believers fail to utilize the integrating force of their religions, they will gradually create what Johan Galtung (1996) describes as *destruction* and *deculturation*, and what Durkheim describes as "anomie."

Social relations among the believers, especially in a pluralistic society, at local, regional, national, and

²⁷⁵ Gregoey Baum 1975. Quoted in Nasikun 2002, "Peran Agama dalam Proses Reformasi menuju Transisi Demokrasi," in *Harmoni*, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 39

international level is always up and down. Harmony and disharmony always come and go, depending on the capability of the believers to control the integrating and disintegrating forces of their religions. This may be the reason why, despite the noble teachings of every religion, such as harmony, peace, mutual respect, and togetherness, the social, cultural, economic, and political reality among the believers has not met these teachings. In many places and cases, religion becomes a disintegrating force, a prime source of tensions, conflicts, and violence, with religious leaders, scholars, and activists as the main actors involved, not as an integrating force.

One of the fundamental teachings of Islam is to spread love on earth (*rahmatan lil alamin*). Islam admits religious pluralism²⁷⁶ promotes religious freedom, encourages religious harmony, allows fair competition in promoting goods, being cooperative with other religions, advises its followers to be just to other believers and protects all religious centers. These characteristics of Islam are reflected in the principles of Madinah Charter.²⁷⁷ With these principle

²⁷⁶ “Verily! Those who believe and those who are Jews and Christians, and Sabians, whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day and does righteous good deeds shall have their reward with their Lord, on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve” (Qur’an, 2: 62)

²⁷⁷ After migrating to Madinah, Prophet Muhammad SAW made an agreement with other religious groups. This agreement is known as Madinah Charter. One of the principles of the charter says that Prophet Muhammad promised to protect other religious groups and gave them the freedom to implement their religious teachings. The policy was continued by his successors, Abu Bakar and Umar both of whom prohibited Muslims to disturb non-Muslims.

teachings, Muslims all around the world are guaranteed to be united in the spirit of brotherhood and cooperation. They can live in harmony and become the best community of believers (*khoiru ummah*) that live with the spirit of love. Islam wants its followers to live in love and avoid enmity. Good Muslims promote and defend love, unity, peace, and harmony and avoid hatred, conflict, and disunity.

In reality, however, Muslims all around the world frequently involve in tension, hatred, disharmony, and conflicts internally and externally. There are continuous tension and conflict between imams, *kyais*, *Sufi* leaders, *Mullahs*, Islamic organizations, Islamic political parties, and *madzhabs*. There are also continuous conflicts between the traditionalists and the modernists, between the extremists and the moderates, and between the orthodox and the progressive groups at local, national, and international level. Internal conflicts have been one of the most disturbing problems in Muslim society. Although many explanations have been given regarding the causes of the conflicts and many measures have been taken as the cures, the conflicts continue to occur and reoccur, spreading at individual, organizational, local, national, and international levels, causing disunity, isolation, frustration, hopelessness, and despair in Muslims' religious, social, economic, and political life.

This reality shows that for many Muslims, Islam has not been an integrating force, but rather a disintegrating force. Indeed, it opposes the very mission of Islam as a

peace and love maker on earth (*rahmatan lil alamin*) and makes Muslims disunited, powerless, and hopeless. Internal conflicts have triggered social, cultural, and political conflicts among Muslims. They have been one of the sad sites of the history of Muslim society all around the world. Internal conflicts have spread and damaged their life and reputation. They make social relationships among Muslims fragile, weaken their political life, and destroy their religious life. Furthermore, internal conflicts have created a negative image about Islam and Muslims. Many people, including some Muslims, begin to see Islam as a major cause of social and political problems and Muslims are trouble makers, not love and peace makers. Certainly, Muslims do not have the respect to spread love and promote peace.

If no better understanding of the causes of the conflicts are developed and no better measures are taken to cure them, we can be sure that Muslim internal conflicts will continue to spread wider and wider and bigger and bigger, gradually weakening Muslim communities. It is in this regard that, Muslims all around the world badly need inspiring sources of ideas to develop better understanding and insight about the causes and cures of their internal conflicts. It is also in this regard that, they need to find some inspirations in the works of Badiuzzaman Said Nursi , a

“seminal,” “committed,” and “pioneering” thinker of the twentieth century.²⁷⁸

Nursi pays a lot of attention on the problems faced by Muslims. When he delivered sermon in the historic Umayyad Mosque in early 1911, he told the *jama'ah* (his audiences) what he described as “six dire sicknesses” of Muslims;

1. The rising to life of despair and hopelessness in social life.
2. The death of truthfulness in social and political life.
3. Love of enmity.
4. Not knowing the luminous bonds that bind the believers to one another.
5. Despotism, which spreads, becoming widespread as though it was various contagious diseases.
6. Restricting endeavour to what is personally beneficial.²⁷⁹

In order to cure these six diseases, Nursi introduced his “six ‘Words’,²⁸⁰” including hope (the nurture a strong

²⁷⁸ These attributes of Nursi are given by Michel, S.J., Thomas 1999. Muslim-Christian Dialogue and Cooperation in the Thought of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, in *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXXIX, No. 3-4, p. 325

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*,

²⁸⁰ According to Nursi, the six words are the luminous bonds for Muslims the awareness of which would unite them and allow mutual consultation among them. They “the positive truths of Islam” that can cure the grievous sicknesses besetting the Muslim community. The words, Nursi believes, are the qualities that form the very foundation of Muslim society and cannot be dispensed in the

hope of God's mercy), eliminating despair (do not despair of God's mercy), truthfulness and honesty, love and loving, Islamic brotherhood, and mutual consultation enjoined by the Shari'ah. These cures, according to Nursi, are lessons that he learnt "from the pharmacy of the Qur'an." For him, Qur'an is "like a faculty of medicine". In particular, Nursi pays a lot of attention on Muslim internal conflicts. He often expresses his deep concern with widespread and continuous conflicts among Muslims and discusses the causes and cures of this particular problem with his students. He considers such conflicts as one of the most destructive problems in the life of Muslims.

Nursi's ideas regarding various problems of humanity, including Muslim internal conflicts can be found in his work, *Rasalei Nur*. Although most of his discussions on the causes and cures of Muslim internal conflicts refer to Turkish twentieth century experiences, his ideas and arguments are helpful to all humanity. *Risalei Nur* can be a source of inspirations for Muslims and non-Muslims all around the world to understand and cure their fundamental problems. It is a book that is "uniquely fitted to address not only all Muslims but indeed all mankind for several reasons". It is written in accordance with modern man's mentality, a mentality that, whether Muslims or not, has been deeply imbued by materialist philosophy. *Risalei Nur* is answers to all the 'why's' that mark the questioning mind of modern

face of the difficulties or threats. See Badiuzzaman Said Nursi 1996. *The Damascus Sermon*. Istanbul: Sozler Ofset A.S., p. 9

man. It explains the most profound matters of belief, which formerly only advanced scholars studied in detail, in such a way that every one, even those to whom the subject is new, may understand and gain something without it causing any difficulties or harm.

Why Religious Conflicts? Seven Causes

Social conflicts have attracted scholars from many disciplines. Sociological and psychological studies suggest four major elements that simultaneously involved in social conflicts: *facilitating context*, *core (roots) of conflict*, *fuse factor*, and *triggering factors*.²⁸¹ The impacts of conflicts in society vary, depending on the form of the conflicts. If the conflicts occur at instrumental level, their impacts can be very limited and they can be stopped immediately. If the conflicts occur at ideological level, their impacts can be widespread and they will be very difficult to manage. The impacts of religious conflicts can be very destructive and harsh, because those involved in the conflicts do not act for themselves, but for abstract goals that they consider higher and more honorable.²⁸²

In his psychological study of conflicts, Pruitt (1999) suggests that conflicts can come from three sources: psychological motivation, cognition, and culture. Conflicts,

²⁸¹ See discussion in Mudzhar, M. Atho 2002. "Anatomi Konflik Sosial Bernuansa Agama: Perspektif Sosiologis dan Psikologi Sosial." I *Harmoni*, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 15-16

²⁸² *Ibid.*,

he adds, can escalate and prolong when parties involved begin to use “harsh tactics” and “prejudice”²⁸³ Sociologists are divided in explaining why conflicts occur within a society. One group introduces a *consensus theory*, suggesting that a society exists because its members are able to reach an agreement regarding many aspects of their daily life. Another group introduces *coercion theory*, suggesting that social unity does not due to consensus, but due to coercive attitude among dominant group.

Like many sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists, Nursi also pays a lot of attention on many types of religiously related social conflicts, including Muslim internal conflicts. For him, conflict among Muslim believers is an “important” and “awesome” question and an “appalling disease” (Antony S.R. Manstead and Miles Hewstone (eds) 1999. P. 202) that brings a “painful, disgraceful and awesome situation, and causes the zealous to weep” (Nursi, 2000, p. 201). For him, conflicts among Muslims, especially among scholars and sufi are strange. As he questions the facts: “Why is it that while the worldly and the neglectful, and even the misguided and hypocrites, cooperate without rivalry, the people of religion, the religious scholars, and those who follow the Sufi path, oppose each other in rivalry, although they are the people of truth and

²⁸³ Rupert Brown and Lorella Lepore 1999 define prejudice: “the holding of derogatory attitudes or beliefs, the expression of negative effect or the display of hostile or discriminatory behavior toward members of a group on account of their membership in that group.” See Antony S.R. Manstead and Miles Hewstone (eds) 1999. *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social Psychology*. Black Well Publishers

concord?” In his view, only the hypocrites who involve in such conflicts; “agreement belongs in reality to the people of concord and dispute to the hypocrites; how is it that these two have changed places?”

Nursi pays a lot of attention on the causes and cures of Muslim internal conflicts. He argues that Muslim internal conflicts due to lack of *ikhlas* (sincerity). This argument is based on verse 2 of Chapter 29 (*al ‘ankabut*) of the Qur’an: “verily We sent the Book down to you in truth, so worship God in sincerity, for God’s is sincerely practiced religion.” Nursi also bases his argument on a *hadith*: “all men will perish, except the scholars, and all scholars will perish except those who act in accordance with their knowledge, and all of them will perish except the sincere, and even the sincere are in great danger” (Quoted by Nursi from *al-Ajluni, Kashf al-Khafa*, ii, 280). According to him, this Qur’anic verse and *hadith* “demonstrate together how important a principle of Islam is sincerity” (Nursi, 2000, p. 200). In relation to this understanding of sincerity, he identifies seven major causes of Muslim internal religious conflicts.

First, competition for moral and material rewards. According to Nursi, Muslim scholars need to dedicate themselves to all men, without expecting moral and material reward. In his words: “But as for the people of religion, the scholars, and those who follow the path, the duty of each is concerned with all men; their material reward is not set and specified; and their share in social esteem and acceptance and public attention is not

predetermined” (Nursi, 2000). Expecting moral and material rewards, according to Nursi, will lead to rivalry, discord, and dispute. As he explains: “Many may be candidates for the same position; many hands may stretch out for each moral and material reward that is offered. Hence it is that conflict and rivalry arise; concern is changed into discord, and agreement into dispute” ((Nursi, 2000, p. 201).

Second, self-fulfilling truth. “On account of difference in outlook,” said Nursi, “they [the people of guidance and religion] feel no real need for the aid of the one whose outlook apparently opposes their own, and see no need for agreement and unity” (Nursi, 2000). “Indeed,” he further said, “if obstinacy and egoism are present, one will imagine himself to be right and the other to be wrong; discord and rivalry take the place of concord and love. Thus sincerity is chased away and its function disrupted” (Nursi, 2000, p. 203). Nursi observes that self-fulfilling truth makes many Muslims unable to be critical to one another in a fair manner. “Our worst calamity and sickness,” he said, “is that criticism which is based on pride and deception” (Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 120-121). “If fairness utilizes criticism, it pares the truth” (Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 120-121). “Whereas if it is pride that employs it [criticism],” he further adds, “it mutilates and destroys it” (Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 120-121). “The very worst sort [of unfair criticism],” according to Nursi, “is that which is leveled at the tenets of beliefs and questions of religion”(Second Addendum, *The*

Damascus Sermon, p, 120-121). “For belief comprises both affirmation, and exercise of the mind, and commitment, and surrender, and compliance,” he explains, “criticism of this sort [unfair] destroys the compliance, commitment, and mental exercise” (Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 120-121).

The *third* cause of rivalry among the believers, according to Nursi, is being ambitious and greedy for reward in the hereafter. “Disagreement among the people of truth,” he said, “does not arise from lack of zeal and aspiration, nor does union among the people of misguidance arise from loftiness of aspiration” (Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, pp. 120-121). “That which impels the people of guidance to the misuse of their high aspiration and hence to disagreement and rivalry,” he further said, “is the desire for heavenly reward that is counted as a praiseworthy quality in respect of the hereafter, and extreme eagerness with respect to duties pertaining to the hereafter (Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 204). This ambitious and greedy attitude, according to Nursi, is an “error,” “wound,” and “awesome sickness of the spirit.” “Greed and precipitancy,” he believes, “are the cause of loss” (Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 119-120). “The greedy and hasty person,” he further believes, “will not act in accordance with the successive causes in creation, like the steps of a staircase, and therefore will not be successful” (Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 119-120). “Even if he is,” Nursi adds, “since he skips some of the steps of the

natural progression, he falls into despair, and then, when overcome by heedlessness, the door is opened to him” (Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 119-120)

The *fourth* cause of conflicts and rivalry among the believers, according to Nursi, is losing sense of direction and sincerity. In his words: “... the people of guidance, through the influence of truth and reality, do not succumb to the blind emotion of the soul, and follow instead the farsighted inclinations of the heart and the intellect” (Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 119-120). “Since, however, they fail to preserve their sense of direction and their sincerity,” Nursi adds, “they are unable to maintain their high station and fall into dispute” ((Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 205). He stresses that, losing sense of direction and sincerity is a “serious disease” among the believers.

The *fifth* cause of conflicts and rivalry among the believers, according to Nursi, is lack of community and collective personality. “The lack of union of the people of guidance,” he said, “comes from the power that results from the support provided by perfect belief, and the union of the people of neglect” ((Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 206). “The people of truth,” he adds, “submit to and place their reliance in the firm source of support that is belief in God; hence they do not present their needs to others or request aid and assistance from them” ((Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 207). “The people of truth,” Nursi further adds, “do not recognize and

seek the true strength that is to be found in union; hence they fall into dispute, as an evil and harmful consequence of this failure” ((Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 207). This lack of community and collective personal, he concludes, is “[a] disease of discord” that is “harmful” to Islam ((Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 207).

The sixth cause of conflicts and rivalry among the believers, according to Nursi, is lack of brotherhood, love, and cooperation. “The people of truth,” he explains, “are generally concerned with benefits to be had in the hereafter and hence direct their zeal, aspiration and manliness to those important and numerous matters.” “Since they do not devote time –the true capital of man—to a single concern,” he further explains, “their union with their fellows can never become firm.” “Their concerns,” he adds, “are numerous and of a wide scope” ((Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 208). For him, “the people of truth are obliged to flatter and cringe before a handful of vile and lowly men of the world” ((Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 208). “The person who does not understand the true meaning of co-operation,” he said, “is more lifeless than a stone” ((Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 122). “For some stones arch themselves to co-operate with their brother,” he adds, “such a stone, despite being a stone, leans towards his brother in the dome when he leaves the builder’s hand and bows his head so it touches his brother’s head, and so they keep from falling.” (Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 122).

The seventh cause of conflicts and rivalry among the people of truth, according to Nursi, is jealousy. “The people of truth,” he said, “are unable to preserve fully the magnanimity and high aspiration that proceed from the truth, or the laudable form of competition that exists on God’s path” (Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 122). “Infiltrated by the unworthy,” he further said, “they [the people of truth] partially misuse that laudable form of competition and fall into rivalry and disputes, causing harm both to themselves and to the Islamic community (Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 209). “O people of truth given to dispute and afflicted with disaster!,” Nursi advises, “it is through your loss of sincerity and your failure to make God’s pleasure your sole aim in this age of disaster that you have caused the people of truth to undergo this humiliation and defeat” ((Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 209). “In matters relating to religion and hereafter,” he advises his fellow Muslims, “there should be no rivalry, envy or jealousy” (Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 209). “Indeed,” he emphasizes, “there can be none of these [rivalry, envy, and jealousy] in truth” ((Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p, 209).

What are the Cures?

Many studies have been done to develop better understanding of religiously related conflicts and better ways to stop them. In his review of sociological studies on

conflict resolution, Mudzhar identifies five sociological ways to resolve conflicts. The first way is through winning-losing struggle. In this way, conflict is resolved by using political and physical pressures that end with a winning party and a losing one. This way is also known as a *zero-sum game*. The second way is *bargaining*, that all parties involved are trying to reach an oral or written agreement by accepting each other's demands. The third way is *mediation*. A third party is invited to involve, not to make a decision, but to assist bargaining process. The fourth way is *arbitration*. All parties involved authorize a third party to make a binding decision. The fifth way is adjudication, that all parties let a court to make a decision. Among these five ways, said Mudzhar, sociologists believe that bargaining and mediation are the most peaceful solution (Mudzhar, M. Atho, 2002, p. 19).

Another sociological perspective on conflict resolution is given by Imam Tholkhah when he introduces what he describes as a *community based conflict resolution*. In order to implement this approach, he suggests, there are four principles that need to be adopted: (1) developing the tradition of dialogue, (2) nurturing genuine social brotherhood, (3) nurturing social creativity and innovation, and (4) developing social trust to government (Tholkhah, Imam 2002. In *Harmoni*, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 10). Governmental and non-governmental organizations, he further suggests, must play roles as motivator and facilitator ((Tholkhah, Imam 2002. In *Harmoni*, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 12). These organizations, he argues, can provide community leaders with multicultural education; assisting the leaders to identify

and analyze their social situation as well as developing their social awareness; and assisting community leaders to develop the tradition of dialogue (p. 12). In his study, *Pola Kerukunan di Tanah Deli*, another sociologist, Karim identifies three major causes of religious conflicts: (1) the willingness of a group to impose their unique characteristics, (2) the expansive attitude of a certain group of religious followers, and (3) the use of religion to justify and defend vested interests (Karim, Muchit A. 2002, In *Harmoni* Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 78).

With regard to the first cause of Muslim internal conflicts, competition for moral and material reward, Nursi suggests that the cure is “sincerity.” He advises Muslims to work hard to attain sincerity by worshipping God. In his words: “sincerity may be attained by preferring the worship of God to the worship of one’s own soul, by causing God’s pleasure to vanquish the pleasure of the soul and the ego” (Nursi, 2000, p. 202). This effort, said Nursi, is the manifestation of the meaning of the following verse of the Qur’an: “Verily my reward is from God alone.” Nursi also suggests that sincerity can be developed by renouncing the material and moral reward to be had from men. This way, he explains, is manifesting the meaning of the following verse: Naught is incumbent on the Messenger but conveying the message (Nursi, 2000, p. 202). The third way to attain sincerity, Nursi further suggests, is “by knowing that such matters as goodly acceptance, and making a favourable impression, and gaining the attention of men are God’s concern and a favour from Him, and that they play no part in

conveying the message, which is one's own duty, nor are they necessary for it, nor is one charged with gaining them." In this way, he believes, a person will be successful in gaining sincerity, otherwise it will vanish ((Nursi, 2000, p. 202).

In relation to the second cause of Muslim internal conflicts, self-fulfilling truth, Nursi suggests "nine commands" as the remedy:

1. To act positively, that is, out of love for one's own outlook, avoiding enmity for other outlooks, not criticizing them, interfering in their beliefs and sciences, or in any way concerning oneself with them.
2. To unite within the fold of Islam, irrespective of particular outlook, remembering those numerous ties of unity that evokes love, brotherhood and concord.
3. To adopt the just rule of conduct that the followers of any right outlook has the right to say, "My outlook is true, or the best," but not that "My outlook alone is true," or that "My outlook alone is good," thus implying the falsity or repugnance of all other outlooks.
4. To consider that union with the people of truth is a cause of Divine succour and the high dignity of religion.

5. To realize that the individual resistance of the most powerful person against the attacks through its genius of the mighty collective force of the people of misguidance and falsehood, which arises from their solidarity, will inevitably be defeated, and through the union of the people of truth, to create a joint and collective force also, in order to preserve justice and right in the face of that fearsome collective force of misguidance.
6. In order to preserve truth from the assaults of falsehood.
7. To abandon the self and its egoism.
8. And give up the mistaken concept of self-pride,
9. And cease from all insignificant feelings aroused by rivalry ((Nursi, 2000, p. 202).

Nursi believes that adopting these nine commands will enable Muslims to maintain and develop sincerity. “If this nine fold rule is adhered to,” he suggests, “sincerity will be preserved and its function perfectly performed” ((Nursi, 2000, p. 203). “At this time of doubts and hesitation,” he further suggests, “it is necessary to look favourably on the positive ideas and encouraging statements that emerge from luminous, warm hearts, and to foster and strengthen the exercise of the mind and commitment” (Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, p. 121).

With regard to the *third* cause of conflicts among Muslims, being ambitious and greedy for reward in the

hereafter, Nursi suggests Muslim believers to realize that the success of their worldly deeds is not determined by worldly benefits, but by the extent to which the deeds are sincerely done and accepted by God. In this regard, he wants all Muslims to remember one principle: “God’s pleasure is won by sincerity alone, and not by a large following or great success” (Nursi, 2000).

With regard to the *fourth* cause, losing sense of direction and sincerity, the cure and remedy, according to Nursi, “is to be proud of the company of all those traveling the path of truth, in accordance with the principle of love for God’s sake; to follow them and defer leadership to them; and to consider whoever is walking on God’s path to be probably better than oneself, thereby breaking the ego and regaining sincerity” (Nursi, 2000, p. 206).

To cure the *fifth* cause, lack of community and collective personal among the believers which he described as “a disease of discord” and “harmful” fact to Islam, Nursi suggests the people of truth to make one’s rule of conduct, do not fall into dispute, do not lose heart, be strong²⁸⁴, be wise in social life, and work together for the sake of virtue and piety. He stresses that dispute is harmful to Islam and “helps the people of misguidance to triumph over the people of truth” (Nursi, 2000, p. 207). Instead, he suggests, the people of truth must wholeheartedly and self-

²⁸⁴ Nursi refers to Qur’an, 8:46 that says “And obey Allah and His Messenger, and do not dispute (with one another) lest you lose courage and your strength departs, and be patient. Surely, Allah is with those who are *As-Sabirun* (the patient).”

sacrificingly join “the caravan of the people of truth, with a sense of his own utter weakness and importance” (Nursi, 2000, p. 207). Nursi further suggests that, “one must forget his own person, abandon hypocrisy and pretension, and lay hold of sincerity” (Nursi, 2000, p. 207).

Abandoning hypocrisy is also a major theme in the Damascus Sermon that Nursi delivered in the Ummayyad Mosque in 1911. According to him, “truthfulness is the basis and foundation of Islam, and the bond between people of good character, and the basis of elevated emotions” (Nursi 1996. *The Damascus Sermon*, p. 45). He added that truthfulness and honesty is the cure of moral and spiritual sicknesses among Muslims (Nursi 1996. *The Damascus Sermon*, p. 45). “Yes,” he said, “truthfulness and honesty are the vital principles in the life of Islamic society” (Nursi 1996. *The Damascus Sermon*, p. 45). “Hypocrisy,” he further said, “is a sort of actualized lying” (Nursi 1996. *The Damascus Sermon*, p. 45). “Flattery and artifice,” he explained, “are cowardly lying” (Nursi 1996. *The Damascus Sermon*, p. 45). “Duplicity and double-dealing,” he further explained, “are harmful lying. And as for lying, it is to slander the All-Glorious Maker’s power.” For Nursi, truthfulness and honesty is the substance of belief; “Unbelief in all its varieties is falsehood and lying. Belief is truthfulness and honesty. As a consequence of this, there is a limitless distance between truth and falsehood; they should be as distant from one another as the East from the West” (Nursi 1996. *The Damascus Sermon*, p. 45).

With regard to the *sixth* cause of Muslim internal conflicts, lack of brotherhood, love, and cooperation, Nursi suggests Muslims to be tolerant and appreciative to one another; “O people of truth! O people of the law, people of reality and people of the path, all worshipping God! Confronted by this awesome disease of discord, overlook each other’s faults; close your eyes to each other’s shortcomings! Behave according to the rule of courtesy established by the criterion that is the Qur’an”²⁸⁵. Nursi stresses that Muslims need to regard such efforts as their primary duty and use brotherhood, love, and cooperation as the essentials ingredients. As he suggests: “Practice the brotherhood, love and cooperation insistently enjoined by hundreds of Qur’anic verses and traditions of the Prophet! Establish with all your powers a union with your fellows and brothers in religion that is stronger than the union of the worldly! Do not fall into dispute!. For Nursi, efforts to develop brotherhood, love, and cooperation are the practice of “moral jihad” and Muslim brotherhood must be Islamic brotherhood.

Nursi believes that Islamic brotherhood will lead to Islamic nationhood. “The foundation and spirit of our true nationhood,” he argues, is “Islam” (Nursi 1996. *The Damascus Sermon*, p. 54). “All the people of Islam,” he further argues, “become like a single tribe.” “Like the members of a tribe,” he explains, “the peoples and groups

²⁸⁵ Nursi refers to the following verse of the Qur’an: “When they pass by error, they pass by it with honourable avoidance” (Qur’an, 25:72).

of Islam are bound and connected to one another through Islamic brotherhood. They assist one another morally, and if necessary, materially. It is as if all the groups of Islam are bound to each other with a luminous chain” (Nursi 1996. *The Damascus Sermon*, p. 54). Nursi stresses that, being united is part of the implementation of Islamic belief. In his words: “The reason for our unity is Divine Unity; our oath and pledge is belief; we are united because we affirm Divine Unity” (Nursi 1996. Reality, First Addendum – Third Part, *The Damascus Sermon*, p. 78-79). According to Nursi, “unity may be achieved through Divine Guidance, not through personal whims and desires” (Nursi 1996. Reality, First Addendum – Third Part, *The Damascus Sermon*, p. 78-79). He stresses that Islamic nationhood, brotherhood, and unity does not mean Islamic politics. As he warns his listeners in the Ummayyad Mosque: “Beware, my brothers! Do not imagine that I am urging you with these words to busy yourselves with politics. God forbid! The truth of Islam is above all politics. All politics may serve it, but no politics can make Islam a tool for itself” (Nursi 1996. Reality, First Addendum – Third Part, *The Damascus Sermon*, p. 78-79).

In particular, Nursi is concerned with the danger of backbiting attitude to Muslim brotherhood. Referring to the Qur’anic verse, “would any among you like to eat the flesh of your dead brother?”, he warn the backbiters with six levels of questions;

Think! Could such a thing be permitted? If your mind is not sound, look at your heart; could it love such a thing? And

if your heart is not sound, examine your conscience; would it consent to destroying the life of society, as though tearing off your own flesh with your own teeth? And if you have no social conscience, examine your humanity; could it have such an appetite and such monstrous rapacity? If you have no humanity, think of fellow-feeling; could it incline towards an action that would break its own back? And if you have no humanity, is your inborn nature so completely corrupted that you tear a corpse with your bare teeth? (Nursi 1996. Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, pp. 121-122).

Nursi concludes that “backbiting is repugnant to man’s mind, heart, conscience, humanity, fellow-feeling, and inborn nature, as well as to the Shari’a, and is therefore to be utterly rejected” (Nursi 1996. Second Addendum, *The Damascus Sermon*, pp. 121-122).

Brotherhood, unity, love, and belief are integrated and central in Nursi’s discussion of the causes and cures of Muslim internal conflicts. As he said: “we are devotees of love, we do not have time for enmity.” According to him, love is also needed at state level: “Republicanism consists of justice, mutual consultation, and the restriction of power to the law” (Nursi 1996. Reality, First Addendum – Third Part, *The Damascus Sermon*, p. 78-79). Nursi also emphasized the importance of love when he responded to questions on *Ittihad-I Muhammedi* (Muhammadan Union). In his words: “The way of this Union is love; its enmity is only for ignorance, poverty, and strife” (The voice of Truth, p. 81).

For him: “Belief demands love, and Islam demands brotherhood” (Second Addendum, p. 125). As he explains this view:

Belief and the affirmation of Divine Unity, the causes of love, are like Mount Uhud, while the causes of enmity are like pebbles. However unreasonable it is to think of pebbles being heavier than Mount Uhud, for a believer to be hostile towards another believer is lacking in heart to the same degree. Hostility between believers may only take the form of pity” (Second Addendum, p. 125).

Nursi suggests that every *jamaah* (Muslim group) must not impose their understandings and practices to other *jamaah* (Muslim groups). They need to maintain mutual respects, enforce brotherhood,²⁸⁶ and develop multi-dimensional understanding of Islam.

²⁸⁶ Muslims’ commitment to unity and brotherhood, according to Nursi, must not be limited to Muslim believers alone, but also to other believers; “Believers should now unite, not only with their Muslim fellow-believers, but with truly religious and pious Christians, disregarding questions of dispute and nor arguing over them, for absolute disbelief is on the attack” (see Michel 1999, *ibid.*, p. 326). For him, all believers, Muslims and non-Muslims must unite to challenge their common enemy, “aggressive atheism.” He advises Muslims to recognize this common enemy and work hand in hand with other community of believers to counter it. Nursi particularly stresses that “Muslims should unite, not only with their own fellow-believers, but also with the truly pious Christians” (See Lem’alar, 146, 1991. *Sincerity and Brotherhood*. Istanbul, 13. Quoted in Michel, *ibid*). For the unity to develop, he suggests, the believers must refrain from disputes and share the common task “of offering the modern world a vision of human life and society in which God is central and God’s will is the norm of moral values” (see Michel 1999. *ibid.*, p. 327). Nursi foresaw two great threats to religion: hostility toward the Shari’ah of Muhammad and the promotion of naturalist and materialist philosophy that can lead to the denial of God (*Mektubat*, p. 424). Other common enemies of the believers, according to Nursi, are ignorance, poverty, and disunity; “Our enemy, that which is

It is this spirit of love that Said Nursi tried to explain in The Damascus Sermon. He stressed that “the thing most worthy of love is love, and that most deserving of enmity is enmity”. In his words: “That is, love and loving, which render man’s social life secure and lead to happiness are most worthy of love and being loved. Enmity and hostility are ugly and damaging, have overturned man’s social life, and more than anything deserve loathing and enmity and to be shunned” (*The Damascus Sermon*, p. 49). Nursi further stressed in his sermon that the main enemy of the believers is arrogance and self-worship. “Sometimes,” he said, “man’s arrogance and self-worship cause him to be unjustly hostile towards believers without his being aware of it; he supposes himself to be right” (*The Damascus Sermon*, p. 49). “But this hostility and enmity,” he further said, “is to slight powerful causes of love towards the believers, like belief, Islam, and fellow humanity; it is to reduce their value. It is a lunacy like

destroying us, is Ignorance, his son Poverty Effendi, and grandson, Enmity Bey. If the Armenians have opposed us in hatred, Nursi reflected Turkish experience, they have done so under the leadership of these three corrupters” (Cited in Michel, *ibid.*, p. 329). Nursi’s emphasis on the importance of all believers to unite against their common enemy gained special attention from non-Muslim scholars. For example, Thomas Michel from Center for Interfaith Dialogue, Vatican, wholeheartedly shares his perspective: “at the deepest levels of spiritual striving to do God’s will and build harmonious and peaceful societies, our true enemies are not other persons, but rather the powers of ignorance, poverty, and aggression that cloud our powers of perception and prevent us from acting as we should. These dark powers lie not outside us, but within our own hearts (*Ibid.*, p. 330). Although it was delivered long time ago, Michel believes that Nursi’s message is valid for own day. “The root of tension and conflict between Muslims and Christians today,” said Michel, “lays not so much in the evil nature of the other as in our own egoistic desire to dominate, control, and retaliate.”

preferring the insignificant causes of enmity to the causes of love, which are as great as a mountain (*The Damascus Sermon*, p. 49).

“Since love and enmity are contrary to one another, like light and darkness,” Nursi explained, “they cannot truly combine. The opposite of whichever is predominant in the heart cannot at the same time be truly present” (*The Damascus Sermon*, p. 49). “Indeed,” he further explained, “the causes of love, like belief, Islam, humanity and fellow-feeling, are strong and luminous chains and immaterial fortresses.” “One sort of the causes of enmity towards the believers,” he added “are personal matters, which are like small stones.” “In which case,” he concluded, “to nourish true enmity towards a Muslim is a great error; it is like scorning the causes of love, which are as immense as a mountain” (*The Damascus Sermon*, p. 49). He further concluded that, “love, brotherhood, and affection are basic to Islam, and are its bond” (*The Damascus Sermon*, p. 49). “The people of enmity,” he illustrates, “resemble a spoilt child who wants to cry. He looks for an excuse, and something as insignificant as a fly’s wing becomes the pretext” (*The Damascus Sermon*, p. 49). He further illustrates: “they [the people of enmity] resemble too an unfair, pessimistic person who so long as it is possible to distrust, never thinks favourably. He ignores ten good deeds due to one bad deed. Fairness and favourable thinking, which mark the Islamic character, reject this” (*The Damascus Sermon*, p. 49).

With regard to the *seventh* cause of conflicts and rivalry among the believers, *jealousy*, Nursi advises Muslims to take one remedy: “to accuse your own soul before others raise these charges, and always to take the side of your fellow, not your own soul” (*The Damascus Sermon*, p. 211). “If then the people of religion, the people of truth, the people of the path, and the people of learning take this principle as their guide, they will attain sincerity, and be successful in those duties that prepares them for the hereafter” (*The Damascus Sermon*, p. 211). “Through God’s mercy,” he further explains, “they [the believers] will be delivered from this appalling wretchedness and misfortune from which they presently suffer” (*The Damascus Sermon*, p. 211).

These seven cures of Muslim internal conflicts imply that three related core elements: belief, *akhlak* (morality), and optimism. With regard to belief, Nursi refers to the problems of Muslims in early twentieth century, “the urgent and over-riding need [for Muslims] was to strengthen, and even to save, belief” (*The Damascus Sermon*, p. 211). “What was needed,” he adds, “was to expend all efforts to reconstruct the edifice of Islam from its foundations, belief, and to answer at that level those attacks with a ‘non-physical jihad’ or ‘*jihad* of the word” (*The Damascus Sermon*, p. 211). By him, this *jihad* was implemented in the writing of the *Risalei Nur* in which he explains and expounds the basic tenets of belief, the truths of the Qur’an, to modern man” (*The Damascus Sermon*, p. 211).

With regard to *akhlak*, Nursi quotes one Hadith of Prophet Muhammad: “I came to perfect morality” (Quoted this Hadith from Ajluni, *Kashf al-Khafa’*, p. 211). As he describes this Hadith: “an important reason for my being sent to mankind by Almighty God was to perfect good conduct and morality, and deliver mankind from immortality and vice” (Quoted this Hadith from Ajluni, *Kashf al-Khafa’*, p. 211).

With regard to optimism, Nursi stressed in the Damascus Sermon that “the future shall be Islam’s and Islam’s alone. And its ruler shall be the truths of the Qur’an and belief” (Quoted this Hadith from Ajluni, *Kashf al-Khafa’*, p. 211). “Therefore,” he further stressed, “we must submit to Divine Determining and our fate of the present, for ours is a brilliant future, while the Europeans’ is a dubious past” (Quoted this Hadith from Ajluni, *Kashf al-Khafa’*, p. 211). “Islam and its truths,” he added, “posses the perfect capacity to progress, both materially and in moral²⁸⁷ and non-material matters”²⁸⁸. Nursi also stressed in his sermon that despair is a most grievous sickness, cancer, that has

²⁸⁷ With regard to moral and non-material matters, Nursi, identified eight serious obstacles prevented the truths of Islam completely overwhelming the past: 1. The Europeans’ ignorance. 2. The Europeans’ barbarity. 3. The Europeans’ bigotry in their religion. 4. The domination and arbitrary power of the clergy and religious leaders. 5. The fact that the Europeans obeyed and followed them blindly. 6. Despotism. 7. Degeneracy that arose from opposing the Shari’a. 8. Opposition from modern science

²⁸⁸ With regard to material matters, Nursi stressed that “Islam will also be materially dominant in the future.” According to him, there are five strengths that can make Muslims achieve material progress: perfection, intense need, competition, freedom, and dignity (See further explanation on these strengths

entered the heart of the world of Islam and is an obstacle to achievement. Nursi believes that despair among Muslims has been one of the reasons for their inability to defend themselves from colonial power. He says: “It is despair that has as though killed us so that a small state of one or two million in the West has as though made twenty million Muslims in the East its servants and their country, its colony.” Nursi also believes that it is despair that causes moral decadence among Muslims. In his words: “And it is despair that has killed our high morals, and causing us to abandon the public good, has restricted our sight to personal benefits.”

In relation to optimism among Muslims in setting up their future, Nursi stresses the importance of mutual consultation enjoined by the Shari’ah. Referring to a Qur’anic verse: “Whose rule is consultation among themselves”. Nursi suggests that, “the key to Muslims’ happiness in the life of Islamic society is the mutual consultation enjoined by the Shari’ah”. For him, “orders consultation as a fundamental principle.” Mutual consultation was also major theme in the pray that he expressed in Damascus Sermon: “long live truthfulness! Death to despair! Let love endure! Let mutual consultation find strength! Let those who follow their own whims and desires be the object of blame, reproach and detestation! And on those who follow right-guidance be peace and well-being! Amen”. One of the questions asked to him was: “Why do you attach this much importance to mutual consultation? And how may the life and progress of mankind, in particular

Asia, and particularly Islam, be achieved through mutual consultation?”. Nursi replied to this question by explaining that mutual consultation will make Muslims appear bigger and stronger. In his words:

since just consultation results in sincerity and solidarity, three ‘alifs’ [the first letter of the Arabic alphabet] become one hundred and eleven. Thus, three men between whom there is true solidarity may benefit the nation as much as a hundred men. Many historical events inform us that as a result of true sincerity, solidarity, and consultation, ten men may perform the work of a thousand.

Nursi adds that mutual consultation enables Muslims to support one another, maintain their social life, and defeat their enemies. As he further replied to the question: “Man’s needs are endless and his enemies innumerable, his strength and capital insignificant, and the number of destructive, harmful humans who have become like monsters through lack of religion is increasing”. “In the face of those endless enemies and innumerable needs,” Nursi adds, “man can continue his personal life only through the support and assistance proceeding from belief, and can maintain his social life only through the mutual consultation enjoined by the Shari’ah, that again proceeds from the truths of belief. It is only thus that he can halt his enemies and open up a way to secure his needs”.

Conclusion

Continuous and widespread internal conflicts make the life of many Muslims away from Islamic teachings. They oppose Islamic teachings on religious pluralism, freedom, harmony, and cooperation. Instead of preserving, protecting, and enriching social and spiritual life, differences have been the sources of tensions, conflicts, disunity, and disharmony among many Muslims. For them, Islam has played an enslaving and alienating role, not a reconciling, liberating, and enlightening role. Islam has been a disintegrating force, not an integrating force for them. Instead of becoming the best social group (*khoiru ummah*), many Muslims become a weak and hopeless social group.

Muslim internal conflicts are caused by a mixture of psychological motivation, defected cognition, and disoriented culture. They occur within the context of the rising to life of despair and hopelessness and are deeply rooted in the weakening *iman* (belief) and the loosing sense of direction and sincerity (*ikhlas*). They are fused by lack of community and collective personality, competition for moral and material rewards, and self fulfilling truth and are triggered by ambition and greedy for reward in the hereafter, jealousy, and lack of brotherhood, love, and cooperation.

The best way to resolve Muslim internal conflicts is by bargaining and mediation, not by zero-sum game, arbitration, and adjudication. Peace and harmony will prevail in a Muslim community if Muslim scholars and leaders

develop the tradition of dialogue, genuine and sincere social brotherhood, social trust, social cohesion, participation, justice, tolerance, and a rule of conduct. They need to act and think positively, unite within the fold of Islam, be socially creative and innovative, abandon the self and its egoism, give up the mistaken concept of self-pride, avoid disputes, and work together with the spirit of love, optimism, morality (*akhlak*), and mutual consultation based on strong *iman* (belief).®

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8

NURSI'S IDEAS ON SCIENCE DEVELOPMENT IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES

Introduction

SCIENCE HAS BEEN and has always been an integrated part of human affairs. It directly or indirectly affect human affairs in many ways. Science allows people all around the world to develop technological tools that can change and transform the way they live. Science and technology have made many impossible things become possible, many unworkable things become workable, and many unpredictable things

become predictable. More importantly, science and technology have transformed the way people learn, communicate, think, behave, and work. They allow people to disclose the laws of the natural world or rules regarding the relationship between facts or events in the natural world. Above all, science and technology allow people to understand the mastermind behind the wonderful design of the universe.

This paper aims to discuss the ideas of a great Turkish Scholar, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, regarding the importance, the success, the failure, the characteristics, and the future of science development in human affairs with particular reference to Muslim countries. Discussion mainly refers to his masterpiece, *Risale-i Nur* (The Treatise of Light) and focuses on his ideas on the approach and methods of science development in Muslim countries.

It is believed in this article that exploring Nursi's ideas on science will allow contemporary Muslims to understand the connection between science and civilization, the state of contemporary science and technology in the Muslim world, and what approaches, methods, and steps are required for making science development successful in Muslim countries. Nursi's ideas on sciences will explain why we, Muslims, all around the world, need to pay serious attention on the development of sciences in our society.

Who is Nursi ?

Nursi was born in 1877 in Eastern Turkey and died in 1960 in Urfa (Turkey) at the age of eighty-three. He was a remarkable child endowed with a prodigious memory. His basic education was a combination of traditional religious education and science education. He completed his basic education in a traditional madrasah education at the early age of fourteen and then studied physical sciences, mathematics and philosophy. Being exposed to two traditions of education inspired Nursi with ideas to reform and reconstruct Islamic education system. In his very early age, Nursi began to criticize the Madrasah education in Turkey as being inadequate and propose a new model of curriculum for the Islamic educational system. Nursi came up with a blue print for the establishment of a university, *Medrestu'z Zehra* (the Resplendent Madrasah) in the Eastern Provinces.

In 1917, Nursi arrived in Istanbul and met Sultan Abdul Hamid to ask some supports for establishing the university. Subsequently, Nursi received some funding for the construction of the university and in 1913 he was able to lay the foundations of the university. Unfortunately, the university project was stopped due to the complexity of social and political events in the beginning of World War I.

What is *Risale-i Nur*?

A combination of religious and science education also made Nursi become a scholar with two faces of knowledge competency: traditional religious sciences and modern

sciences. This two faces of knowledge competency allows Nursi to produce a unique and monumental masterpiece, the *Risale-i Nur* (The Treatise of Light). It is said that *Risale-i Nur* has been Nursi's greatest work that he wrote in exile after his Divine Illumination. In the words of John Bowker (1997), *Risale-i Nur* is "an attempt to demonstrate the spiritual dimension of the Qur'an an age under the sway of scepticism and materialism". For Muzaffar Iqbal (2002, p. 2), *Risale-i Nur* is "a *manevi tefsir*, or commentary which expounds the truths of the Qur'an." "In the course of his expressive prose which pulsates with energy", Iqbal adds, "Nursi substantiates Islamic faith on the basis of the certainties of modern physical sciences and reads the cosmic verses of the Qur'an in the light of modern science" (Muzaffar Iqbal 2002, p. 2). Over all, *Risale-i Nur* is a work that explain and expound the basic tenets of belief, the truths of the Qur'an, to modern man. It provides clear and simple scientific explanation of stories, comparisons, explanations, and reasoned proofs that strengthen religious truths and belief (Nursi 1998, pp. 9-10).

Although being based and focused on Muslim's experiences in Turkey, ideas that Nursi explains in *Risale-i Nur* have been influential and widely discussed throughout the Muslim world. The book has been translated into many languages and hundreds thousand of its copies are displayed and read in thousands of houses, mosques, and libraries all around the world. Undoubtedly, *Risale-i Nur* has made Nursi become an influential religious scholar who strongly advocate Qur'anic teachings against the forces of

secularism. With his strong and influential ideas, said John Baker (1997), Nursi has played a prominent role in the Islamic revival in and outside Turkey. For Colin Turner in Manchester University, England, *Risale-i Nur* provides a comprehensive, objective, and inspirational explanation of Islamic perspective on the universe. In his words:

Finally, I would say this: After many years of searching and comparing, I can say that the *Risale-i Nur* is the only self-contained, comprehensive Islamic work that sees the cosmos as it actually is, presents the reality of belief as it truly is, interprets the Qur'an as our Prophet intended, diagnoses the real and very dangerous diseases that afflict modern man, and offers a cure (quoted in Syukran Vahide 1989).

Turner adds that *Risale-i Nur* will characterise the future of Islam. As Vahide quotes him:

A work such as the *Risale-i Nur*, which reflects the light of the Qur'an and illuminates the cosmos, cannot be ignored. For only Islam stands between modern man and catastrophe, and I believe that the future of Islam depends on the *Risale-i Nur* and on those who follow and are inspired by its teachings (Syukran Vahide 1989).

Muzaffar Iqbal (2002, p. 2) shares Turner's view and observes the uniqueness of *Risale-i Nur*. As he writes: "*Risale-i Nur* is not a *tafsir* (commentary) on the Qur'an in the usual sense of the term; rather, it attempts to establish links between the Qur'anic verses and the natural world"

What makes *Risale-i Nur* is unique is Nursi's ability to reconcile and integrate traditional and modern science within a theistic perspective. He makes it clear that the Qur'an and modern physical sciences had no dissonance; rather, relating the truth of the Qur'an to modern men and women was even easier (Muzaffar Iqbal 2002, p. 2). With his theistic perspective, Nursi inserts Islamic worldview on the matters related to the creation of the earth and other planets, the pre-eternity of matter, the question of ether, the creation, nature, and purpose of biological beings and in particular man, and the motion of particles and matter.

Brief Historical Assessment

The historical development of human civilization clearly shows a close connection between science development and the quality of life in a country. Science has been a major instrument for a country to develop better quality of life and higher level of civilization. In his monumental five-volume *History of Science*, George Starton (1971, p. 141-146) divides history of science development into ages, each of which lasting half a century.

Starton notes that the foundations of science was laid by scholars and scientists of the Mesopotamian civilization (present-day Iraq). He further notes that the second development in science came through the Greeks, that started in 450-400 B.C., known as the age of Plato. This was followed by the age of Aristotle, of Euclid, of Archimedes, and so on (500-450 B.C.) . The third age of science

development was the age of the Chinese century of Hsiin Tsang and I Ching (600 A.D. to 700 A.D). From 700 A.D. to 1100 A.D. (350 years) was the unbroken succession of the ages of Jabir, Khawarizmi, Razi, Masudi, Wafa, Biruni, and Avicenna, Ibn Al Haitham and Omar Khayam (Arabs, Turks, Afghans, and Persians) men belonging to the culture of Islam. After 1100, the first Western names appeared: Geard of Cremona, Roger Bacon, sharing honours with Ibn Rushd, Musa bin Maimoun, Tusi, and Ibn Nafis, the man who anticipated Harvey's theory of circulation of blood.

After 1350 A.D. developing countries, including the Muslim ones, lose out except for the occasional flash of scientific work, like that at the court of Ulugh Beg, the grandson of Timurlane, in Samarkand in 1437 A.D. or of Maharaja Jai Sigh of Jaipur in 1720, who at the court of Muhammad Shah in Delhi corrected the serious errors of the Western tables of eclipses of the sun and the moon as much as six minutes of arc and published Zijj Muhammd Shahi. After 1720, Michael the Scot turned full circle of science to the West and then for more than three centuries, Western culture, lifestyle and modes of thinking has gradually come to dominate the world. Today, the West directly or indirectly influences and characterises the world and the contribution of other cultures to the mainstream of world life is relatively negligible. As a result, the modern approach to science is largely represented by Western approach.

It is, however, important to note in this historical assessment of science development, that Muslims used to

dominate and gave fundamental contributions to science development. Two centuries after the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, Caliph Harun al-Rashid made the Islamic world culturally very active in science development. During this era, Islamic universities conducted many scientific studies and made many scientific discoveries. Under Caliph Harun al-Rashid, George Starton (1971, pp.146–66) notes, science development was to be credited to the meteoric rise of Islam for nearly four hundred years (700 A.D. to 1100 A.D.). He further notes that it was the period when Muslim scholars from Spain to India led science development by exchanging the great body of past knowledge, carrying forward new discoveries, and introducing new ideas. Starton (1971, p. 166) concludes that the Islamic universities of the Middle Ages were the very first institutions that brought science into international level.

Islamic Vs Western Science

When the Islamic world controlled science development and producing the best minds of the age (from 700 A.D. to 1100 A.D.), Muslim believers and scientists were steeped in the religious spirit. They proved that scientific knowledge was the twin of religious knowledge and it should never have ceased to be so.

In a university in Cordova, scientific enterprise was international in character and Muslim scientists actively spread knowledge throughout Europe. For the scientists, the goal of scientific affairs was not to exploit mankind, but to reveal the

truth of their religion, Islam. For them, science is a common heritage of mankind that must not be dominated only by certain groups or nations. As a result, Muslim society was inclusive and tolerant. Al-Kindi wrote: “It is fitting then for us not to be ashamed to acknowledge truth and to assimilate it from whatever source it comes to us.” For him “who scales the truth there is nothing of higher value than truth itself; it never cheapens or abases him who seeks.”

During this period of Muslim domination, scholars in Christendom were mainly occupied in translating from Arabic into Latin. Starton (1971, p. 166) is certain that Islam paved the way for the European Renaissance, which in turn led to science’s fourth great development in the modern world.

With their science domination, the Western world are described as developed countries that are controlling the resources and riches of the earth. These countries began to introduce a materialistic worldview of science. They use the geniuses such as Newton and Maxwell as the private intellectual property or the cultural heritage of the West. They see the developing countries as the objects of their economic and political exploitation. They avoid any form of fair sharing, transferring technology, and know-how to developing countries. The mentality of the western nations, said Sayar (1992), “what is yours is ours and what is ours is ours.”

It has been widely admitted by many influential Western scientists that Western approach to science contains some weaknesses and can lead the world to a

catastrophe. Many of them have been aware of the shortcomings of their scientific approach and their implications on the future of world civilization. This awareness is stated by Einstein during the Cold War:

We, scientists, believe that what we and our fellow-men do or fail to do within the next few years will determine the fate of our civilisation. And we consider it our task untiringly to explain this truth, to help people realize all that is at stake, and to work, not for appeasement, but for understanding and ultimate agreement between peoples and nations of different views.

Like their Muslim counterparts, some western scientists began to think the important of religious values in science development, so that science does not become an evil instrument for economic and political interests. Carl Sagan (1990) said at the Moscow meeting of a global forum of spiritual and political leaders: “Mindful of our common responsibility, we scientists, many of us long engaged in combating the environmental crisis, urgently appeal to the world religious community to [co-operate] in words and deeds, and as boldly as required, to preserve the environment of the earth.”

Science in Contemporary Muslim World

Although used to dominate and contributed to science development for more than 350 years, contemporary Muslim countries are struggling to regain their sciences.

They are left behind in science development and application. In the application of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), for example, non of the best ten countries is a Muslim one. *Foreign Policy* journal (2006, p. 52) describes that among the best ten countries in ICT application are (1) Singapore, (2) Ireland, (3) Switzerland, (4) United States, (5) Netherlands, (6) Canada, (7) Denmark, (8) Sweden, (9) Austria, and (10) Finland (*Foreign Policy* 2006, p. 52). Based on country data (1997), Muslim countries are among the technological adopters and technologically excluded. Non of them are among technological innovators like Japan, USA, and many European countries.

Why did we [Muslims] lose control on science development? Many scientists have tried to answer this question and came up with several answers. Francis Ghiles, for example, writes:

What is wrong with Muslim science? . . . At its peak about one thousand years ago the Muslim world made a remarkable contribution to science, notably mathematics and medicine. Baghdad in its heyday and southern Spain built universities to which thousand flocked: rulers surrounded themselves with scientists and artists (*Nature*, March 24, 1983).

It can be understood from Ghiles' words that one of the strengths of Muslim scientific tradition was the integration of three groups: rulers, scientists, and artists in science development. This is to say that one of the reason for the collapse of science in Muslim countries was

disintegration among the three groups. Ghiles also explains that “a spirit of freedom allowed Jews, Christians and Muslims to work side by side” (*Nature*, March 24, 1983). To interpret him, lack of freedom has caused the failure of science development in Muslim countries.

Quoting Ibnu Khaldun, Abdussalam (1994, pp. 8-9) suggests internal and external factors that cause Muslims lose in sciences. Among internal factors are lack of curiosity, no wishfulness, just apathy, and bordering on hostility. Among external factors is colonialism, such as the invasion of Mongols. For Abdussalam (1994, p. 9), the first thing that Muslims need to have to regain their reputation in science and technology is a spiritual strength. As he writes: “We are all convinced today of the need for acquiring science and technology and for recovering our lost heritage. But before this happen, we must arouse the spiritual energies, particularly of the younger generation, for science and technology.”

Nursi’s Response

Bediuzzaman Said Nursi plays a unique and important role in inspiring science development in Muslim countries. Being well grounded in traditional Islamic sciences, Nursi was “aware of the apparent discrepancy between traditional cosmology articulated by Muslim philosophers and Sufis, and the Newtonian worldview, but instead of rejecting the mechanistic view of the universe presented by Newtonian science, he tried to appropriate it by appealing

to the classical arguments from design” (Iqbal 2002, p. 4). Nursi put a very strong emphasis on the importance of science and technology in the life of human being. “For sure,” he said, “at the end of time, mankind will pour into science and technology. It will obtain all its power from science. Power and dominion will pass to the hand of science” (Nursi 1977, p. 275).

For Nursi (1960, p. 57), scientific approach is the most effective way to persuade the civilized world. In the future, he explains, truth will take the place of force, and proof the place of sophistry. In his words: “Through the endeavours of science, what will prevail entirely in the present and totally in the future, is truth instead of force, proof instead of sophistry, and reason instead of nature” (Nursi 1977, p. 32). Nursi adds that in the future, truth and justice will take the place of the gun and the sword. In his words:

Yes, just as in former times Islam’s progress was obtained through weapons and the sword, by smashing the enemy’s bigotry, destroying their obstinacy, and repulsing their aggression, in the future the immaterial swords of true civilization and material progress and truth and justice will defeat and rout the enemy in place of weapons and the sword (Nursi 1960, p. 79).

Nursi warns his fellow Muslims not to undervalue or neglect science if they are to regain their superiority among world nations. “The limitation of science”, he stresses, “can render these powers dangerous and destructive” (in Choudary 2004, p. 54). Nursi also stresses that “science is a

great tool, but its limitations render it highly unsuitable for its use out of the region of its scope” (in Choudary 2004, p. 54). Nursi believes that “the success of science places tremendous powers in our hands” (quoted in Choudary 2004, p. 54). For the success of science development in Muslim society, Nursi suggests some ideas to be discussed below.

Refer to the Qur’an

For Nursi, there are two major sources of Islamic sciences: the nature and the Qur’an. In his view, developing sciences is part of a means to prove the authenticity of the Qur’an. As he writes: "In the future, when the intellect, science and technology prevail, of a certainty, that will be the time the Qur'an will gain ascendancy, which relies on rational proofs and invites the intellect to confirm its pronounce" (Sukran Vahide 1978). Nursi’s understanding and interpretation of the Qur’an are scientific and or connected to scientific endeavors. One of his readers, Vahide (2003, p. 1), writes:

His greatest achievement was to develop a way of expounding the teachings of the Qur’an on ‘the truths of belief’ that incorporates the traditional Islamic sciences and modern scientific knowledge, and that while instilling those truths, effectively refutes the bases of materialist philosophy.

For Nursi, Qur'an must be taken as a spurce of science development. Vahide (2003) further writes: "From his youth, Nursi's overriding aim in life was to vindicate the Qur'an as a source of true knowledge and progress, and he prepared himself accordingly by acquiring wide learning in numerous branches of knowledge" (p. 1). Nursi was so concerned with the importance of scientific approach in his understanding and interpretation of the Qur'an. For him, contemporary Muslims' advances in science, technology, and civilization will depend on their ability to exalt God's Words.

Nursi was very optimistic about the ability of his fellow Muslims to acquire sciences. As he suggests: "For the Muslims it is a great adventure that the West has acquired science and knowledge, and Islam can therefore appeal to them more easily than at any time before" (Nursi, 1960, p.78). Indeed, Nursi himself was an authentic example of a truly devout Muslim whose love for science is in line with his love for Islamic faith. For him, Muslims must stand on their own feet before they can manage their science development. Nursi adds that "the Qur'anic themes of the regularity and harmony of the natural order, when combined with the predictability of Newtonian physics, disproved the triumph of the secularists and positivists of the nineteenth century and provided a solid rock on which to construct a new understanding of the message of the Qur'an" (Iqbal 2002, p. 4).

According to Nursi, Qur'an is the book of sciences. It points clearly to the true goal of the sciences and branches

of knowledge, which are truth and reality, as well as the perfections, attainments, and happiness of this world and the next. It indicates the importance of sciences in two ways: (1) In the form of the miracles of the Prophets and (2) in the form of certain historical events. For Nursi, Qur'an urges man towards them. As he writes in *The Words*: "Most of the Qur'an's verses are keys to a treasury of perfections and guides to a store of knowledge" (Nursi 1998, p. 272). He further writes: The verses of the Qur'an "indicate in allusive fashion the important of man's arts and sciences, and urge him towards them" (Nursi 1998, p. 273).

For scientists, Nursi suggests, nature must be seen as a fabric of scientific symbols that must be read, realized, and understood. The Qur'an, he further stresses, must be positioned as the counterpart of nature. In this way, Nursi believes, all sciences will speak about the Power of the Almighty and Divine Unity, because they provide a good understanding of His creation. Indeed, the Qur'an encourages all Muslims to read and understand nature. Reading the Qur'an will allow scientists to find hints and some basic concepts of sciences. In this regard, Nursi's view is shared by the well-known writer, Maurice Bucaille, when he stated in his book, *The Bible, The Qur'an and Science* : "The relationship between the Qur'an and science is a priori a surprise, especially as it turns out to be one of harmony and not of discord" (Bucaille, 1975, p.110).

Remain Hopefull

Nursi was aware of the progress of science in the Western world and its possible impacts on Muslims' attitude toward science development. As he evaluate the situation: "Why should the world be the world of progress for everyone, and the world of decline only for us [Muslims]?" (Nursi 1960, p. 71). For Nursi, the first thing that Muslims need to do to regain their reputation in science is never being carried away by despair and oppose despair and hopelessness. In his words: "And you are making a grievous error if you suppose in despair and hopelessness that the world is the world of progress for everyone and the Europeans, but the world of decline only for the unhappy people of Islam" (Nursi 1960, p. 80). Nursi invites his fellow Muslims to be realistic about the situation. To quote his words:

Consider this: time does not run in a straight line so that its beginning and end draw apart from one another. Rather, it moves in a circle, like the motion of the earth. Sometimes it displays the seasons of spring and summer as progress. And sometimes the seasons of storms and winter as decline. Just as every winter is followed by spring and every night by morning, mankind, also, shall have a morning and a spring, God willing. You may expect from Divine Mercy to see true civilization within universal peace brought about through the sun of the truth of Islam (Nursi 1960, p. 80).

Clearly, Nursi wants Muslims to be realistic and objective about their past and pay more attention on their future. Muslims must accept that being up and down in many aspects of worldly live, including in science development, is a normal experience of the circle of live. What seems to be more important in Nursi's view is for Muslim nations to look at the future. Nursi (1960, p. 80) believes that Islam is the true civilization of the future which will bring peace and happiness to mankind.

Be Original, Be Islamic

Nursi was well aware of the dominant of scholastic thoughts in modern scientific approach. In order to achieve scientific recovery, he urges Muslims not to be preoccupied or being "fallen into the swamp of scholastic thought" (Nursi 1960, p. 523). At the same time, Nursi further urges, Muslims need to develop their own approach and characteristics. As he reflects his personal experience: "They suppose me to be a medrese professor sunk in the bog of scholastic thought, but I was occupied with all the modern sciences and the philosophy and learning of the present age" (Nursi 1960, p. 523).

Nursi was also well aware of the exploitation of science and technology and its progress for ideological purposes in materialist philosophy. In his observation, the materialist have made the progress of science and technology as the tool of its own ideology of materialism and irreligion or the denial of creator and belief in the pre-

eternity of matter. In the face of the pragmatic and materialist currents of thought, Nursi suggests a method in conformity with the understanding of the present century. For him, science must be used as a means to look to God Almighty. Nursi suggests: “Continue make your sciences and your progress steps by which to ascend to those heavens” (Nursi 1998, p. 270). He further suggests: “Then you may rise to my dominical Names, which are the realities and sources of your sciences and attainments, and you may look to your Sustainer with your hearts through the telescope of the Names” (*The Words*, p. 270).

In the light of his awareness, Nursi suggests that sciences in Muslim countries must be based on an Islamic worldview of the relationship between science and Islamic teachings. For him, Islam is the father of all the sciences. It is “the lord and guide of knowledge, and the chief and father of all the true sciences” (Nursi 1977, p. 18). Thus, there is no boundaries between Islam and science. “History”, Nursi notes, “testifies that whenever the people of Islam have adhered to their religion, they have progressed relatively to former times. And whenever they have become slack in their adherence, they have declined (Nursi 1977, p. 451).

Nursi’s idea on the Islamic characteristics of scientific affairs is obvious when he explains that the aim of Islamic science as a whole is “to show the unity and interrelatedness of all that exists, so that, in contemplating the unity of the cosmos man may be led to the Divine principle, of which that unity is the image” (Quoted in

Ozervarh 2003, p. 329). He further explains that the ultimate goal of science development is not “to set up a theoretical system, but to reinforce the faith and beliefs of his people” (Quoted in Ozervarh 2003, p. 329). The ultimate goal of Islamic science, Nursi stresses, is to relate the corporeal world to its basic spiritual principles through knowledge, in order to achieve spiritual perfection (Quoted in Ozervarh 2003, p. 329).

Rely on Reason and Proof

For Nursi, Islam relies on reason and proof, no matter of Islam is contrary to reason. Therefore, it is possible to prove and explain all its matters rationally. For him, the dismissal of the reason, rejection of proof, and blind imitation of the clergy will lead Muslims into misguidance. In his view, sciences must be developed by taking the highway of the blending of the reason and the Qur’an. In this way, Nursi believes, sciences will ease and plenty in the world and happiness in the next (Argunduz 1993, p. 88). He stresses that sciences cannot be developed by leaving the reason in the second place, in accordance with the principles of Qur’an that are corrupted, such as bigotry, misguidance, lawful oppression, and injustice. For him, attaching no importance to reason and proof, and blind imitation of the clergy is a great error (see Nursi 1977, 34).

Nursi further stresses that the only way for Muslims to be the champion of science is to rely on reason and proof. In his words:

What continually makes Islam manifest and makes it develop in relation to the advancement of thought is its being founded on reality, relying on proof, being in agreement with reason, established on reality, and being in conformity with the principles of wisdom, which are bound to one another from pre-eternity to post-eternity (Nursi 1977, p. 35).

Nursi adds that reason and proofs allow Muslims to seek renewal, be inclined towards renewal, and be able to achieve sciences in conformity with the Qur'an. As he explains in the following paragraph of his writing

We Muslims, who are students of the Qur'an, follow proof. We approach the truths of belief through reason, thought, and our hearts. We do not abandon proof for blind imitation of the clergy like some followers of other religions. Thus, in the future when reason, science, and technology prevail, the Qur'an will surely then rule, which relies on reasoned proofs and makes the reason confirm its pronouncements (Nursi 1960, p. 77).

Place Science on Divine Names

According to Nursi, all sciences must be placed on divine name. For him,

all attainments and perfections, all learning, all progress, and all sciences, have an elevated reality which is concealed under numerous veils and has various manifestations and different spheres, the sciences and

arts attainments find their perfection and become reality. They are not some incomplete and deficient shadow (The Words, p. 270).

“Being based on God’s name,” Nursi suggests, “sciences may contain true wisdom” (Nursi 1998, p. 271). “Otherwise,” he argues, “they are either transformed into superstition, or become nonsense, or open up the way to misguidance like Naturalist philosophy” (Nursi 1998, p. 271). Nursi further argues that science development in Muslim society must be based on Divine Unity. All scientific achievements need to reveal the unity of nature and provide patterns that allow people to contemplate the Divine Unity.

Nursi urges his fellow Muslims to ask scientific guidance and inspirations from God. “If man relies on Almighty God, and asks it of him with the tongue of his innate capacity, ... and ... conforms to His laws of wisdom in the universe”, Nursi explains, “the world may become like a town for him” (Nursi 1998, p. 265). He quotes the Qur’an: “it is He Who has made the earth manageable for you, so traverse its tracts and enjoy of the sustenance which He t unto Him is the Resurrection” (Qur’an, 67: 15). For Nursi, “this world is the abode of wisdom, and Almighty God carries out His works under the veil of causes” (Nursi 1998, p. 269). Nursi also urges Muslims to integrate scientific endeavor with the worshiping of God. “On condition you do not neglect your duties of worship,” said Nursi, “strive to transform the face of the earth into a garden every part of

which you may see, and the sounds of every corner of which you may hear” (Nursi 1998, p. 265).

Explore Prophets’ Miracles

Nursi believes that the miracles of the Prophets are the sources of scientific guidance and inspirations. In his observation, “most craftsmen have a prophet as the patron of their craft” (Nursi 1998, p. 262). For him, Prophets’ miracles are “the final limit of man’s science and industry” (Nursi 1998, p. 162). The miracles indicate four scientific guidances: (1) a wonder of human art or craft, (2) spiritual base as well as index of sciences and branches of knowledge, (3) encouragement to achieve similar things and to imitate them, (4) spiritual and moral as well as material attainments, (5) the urgency of scientific attainments. For Nursi, Prophets’ miracles encourage, motivate, guide, and direct scientific endeavors.

There are nine Prophets’ miracles that that Nursi notes to be the object of scientific exploration for Muslim scientists. The miracles include:

1. The miracle of Adam (PUH) inspires science for names (Qur’an, 2: 31), (2).
2. The miracle of Noah (PUH) inspires science for the creation of ship (sailors).
3. The miracle of Joseph (PUH) inspires science for the clock (watch makers).

4. The miracle of Idris (PUH) inspires science for tailors.
5. The miracle of Solomon (PUH) inspires science for air transportation (Qur'an, 34: 12) and subjugating evipirits (Qur'an, 21: 82)..
6. The miracle of Moses (PUH) inspires science for clean water exploration (Qur'an, 2: 60).
7. The miracle of Jesus (PUH) inspires science for (medicine) healing spiritual ills and physical sicknesses (Qur'an, 3: 49).
8. The miracle of David (PUH) inspires science for iron technology (Qur'an, 34: 10) and science for decision making (Qur'an, 38: 20).
9. The miracle of Muhammad (PUH) inspires science for rhetoric and linguistic.

According to Nursi, it is Muslims' failure to explore scientific ideas in the miracles of the Prophets that have caused the backwardness of their sciences. He was certain that if Muslims are to understand and explore the Prophet's miracles well, they can overtake the Europeans in science development. In his words:

O patriotic brothers of this land!...God willing, through a miracle of the Prophet, from the hundred-year distance we have remained backward in progress we shall mount with our actions the train of the Constitution, which is accordance with the Shari'a, and shall mount with our minds the Buraq (the Prophet's mount) of Islamic Consultation, and perfecting our means and crossing in a

brief time this fearsome vast desert, shall compete neck and neck with the civilized nations. For they mounted ox-carts and set off; we shall straight away mount vehicles like trains and balloons, and shall overtake them (Nursi 1978, p. 59).

Science as a Subset of Religion

In the long search to answer the relationship between science and religion, a great scientist like Einstein has expressed his understanding in a simple sentence: “Science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind.” In Nursi’s view, science and human knowledge in general is legitimate, noble, and acceptable to Islamic teachings if it is subordinated to Divine Wisdom. For him, Muslims must look at science as a subset of religion. Religion is a majestic river, and the science is a tributary to the river (Nursi 1998, p. 262). In science, Nursi explains, no exact results exist, only the probabilities for the results are attainable. Science, he further explains, does not provide all the answers, only certain answers can be provided for practically an infinite number of enquiries (Nursi 1998, p. 262). This view is shared by Maurice Bucaille (1975, p. vii) when he claims that “in Islam, science and religion have always been “twin sisters.” Iqbal (2002, p. 2) also shares Nursi’s view when he notes that *Risale-i Nur* shows that “there is no contradiction between religion and science.”

To interpret Nursi, science will not become a blessing for mankind before it is guided by religion. So, a fundamental challenge for Muslim scientists is to

reconciliate a conflict between religious faith and scientific investigations. Before such a conflict is reconciled, scientists will cause fearful and threatening barbarization in the name of science or religion for human well-being. Nursi seems to suggest that religion should be given a very esteemed position in science development so that human thoughts and actions are morally acceptable.

Be Specialized

For the last two decades, academic programs in higher education institutions have become more and more specialized. The programs become so diverse. A faculty can provide dozens of departments, each department provides dozens of programs, and each study program may provide dozens of concentrations. When it comes to paper or thesis writings students or experts of a particular concentration of a study program may introduce many different focuses that reflect their special or individual interests. The development of this academic specialization is in line with Nursi's idea for science development in Muslim countries, that specializing in science is a necessity for a scientist. As he suggests, "One individual cannot be proficient and a specialist in many sciences...to attempt all is to abandon all" (Nursi 1977, p. 24). Indeed, experts of modern management suggest the importance of being focused and specialized in all areas of work when they say: "If you want to get all, you will lose all."

Be Culturally Bond

For Nursi, being exposed to modern sciences is a must for every Muslim. However, being exposed to modern science does not mean that a Muslim is pulled away from his culture. In his view, science development in Muslim countries will be successful and beneficial if it is culturally bond. In this regard, Nursi explicitly admires Japanese people and urges his fellow Muslims to follow them. As he writes: “In acquiring civilization we have to follow the Japanese, for together with taking from Europe the virtues of civilization, they preserved their national customs, which are the means by which every people is perpetuated” (Nursi 1978, p. 62). In Nursi’s observation, Japanese people have been able to develop superiority in science within their own cultural framework. They are not only adopting sciences from other countries, but also adapting them to their cultural values. As he further writes: “The Japanese are taking science and technology without leaving national customs and practices” (Nursi 1978, p. 262). Clearly, in the light of science development, Nursi wants his fellow Muslims to take the Japanese as examples in progress.

Develop Good Civilization

Nursi emphasizes that science development requires good cultural bases. As he writes:

You should understand that what I mean are the good things that are civilization’s virtues and its benefits for

mankind. Not its iniquities and evils that idiots have imagined to be its virtues and imitating them have devastated our possessions. And even giving religion as a bribe they have not gained the world (Nursi 1960, 1979).

For Nursi, good civilization will allow science to develop and vice and evils civilization will be harmful to science.

What Nursi means by good civilization is when in a society the truth takes the place of force and proof the place of sophistry. As he explains: “Through the endeavors of science, what will prevail entirely in the present and totally in the future, is truth instead of force, proof instead of sophistry, and reason instead of nature” (Nursi 1977, p. 32). In Nursi’s view, good civilization is a civilization that is free from bigotry, obstinacy, and aggression. As he further explains: “Yes, “just in former times Islam’s progress was obtained through weapons and the sword, by smashing the enemy’s bigotry, destroying their obstinacy, and repulsing their aggression” (Nursi 1960, p. 79). “In the future,” Nursi believes, “ the immaterial swords of true civilization and material progress and truth and justice will defeat and rout the enemy in place of weapons and the sword” (Nursi 1960, p. 79).

Concluding Remarks

Nursi introduces Islamic particular world view of modern science by introducing new approach and method

appropriate to the level of understanding of the present century and to the need of Muslim countries. His approach is unique, combining theistic and rationalistic styles. Due to its uniqueness, Nursi's approach needs to be understood within the context of its social, political, and historical setting. Like many other Muslim reformers of the nineteenth century, Nursi's ideas seem to be inspired by a need to reform Muslims' perspective on science development in the light of the threat of bigotry, secularization, and westernization at local, national, and international level. His discussion of science development seems to have been characterized by his educational, religious, political, and social experiences in Turkey before, during, and after the first World War.

Throughout his ideas on science development in Muslim countries, Nursi reminds Muslim scientists to be very clear about the approach of their scientific affairs. For him, the approach must be at variance in many respects with those of their counterparts in Western countries. Nursi suggests that Islamic approach of science development will enrich and strengthen scientists' faith, not to weaken it. For him, the secret of progress in science development in Muslim countries is not to lie only in political will and financial strength, but also in the level of self-sacrifice among Muslims, that is their sincerity to hold the society's interests above personal interests.

In other words, the progress of science development in Muslim countries depends on the commitment of Muslim

scientists to expend all their efforts and energy for their countries. This unselfish manner is considered by Nursi as the fine characteristics that made Muslims reached the superiority of science development for nearly four centuries in the middle age. In his view, it is this fine characteristics of Muslims that have been taken over by the Europeans, so that they can undergo scientific revolution and rule world science. In the same way, it is the dismissal of this fine characteristics and the spread of immorality that made Muslims lose their control over science and being excluded in the development of modern science.

Above all, Nursi's ideas suggest Muslim scholars and reformers to preach the full message of the Qur'an, that Muslims must not neglect science. They must reoccupy the intellectual mainstream and regain their ideological, social and political superiority by being well acquired with sciences. For this purposes, Muslim rulers, scientists, and artists need to integrate their vision. Besides, Muslims need to raise their spirit of freedom.

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**IN SEARCH OF A DISTINCTIVE
PARADIGM FOR INDONESIAN
ISLAMIC STUDIES:**

Some Notes From 13 Th AICIS 2013

Introduction

THESE NOTES REPRESENT my personal reflection and observation on various aspects of the organization of 13th Annual International Conference on Islamic Studies (AICIS) held in November, 18-21, 2013 in Senggigi Beach, Mataram-Lombok, known as *Pulau Seribu Masjid* (an Island with a Thousand Mosques). These notes also reflect

my opinion on the ideas as well as arguments proposed, discussed, and exposed during the conference by national and international active participants and speakers.

First of all, I would like to acknowledge that the conference that was jointly organized by Directorate General of Islamic Education of Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) and Mataram State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN Mataram) was a very successful one. The success was made possible by a good cooperation and full commitment of the two institutions. I observed during the conference that the organizers were hand in hand, supporting one another and working tirelessly to prepare and manage the conference.

The conference was officially opened by Minister of Religious Affairs, Suryadharma Ali and attended by distinguished guests, including Zainul Majdi, Governor of West Nusa Tenggara, Head of West Nusa Tenggara Parliament, Director General of Islamic Education, Rector of Institute Agama Islam Negeri (IAINs) or State Institutes of Islamic Studies and Universitas Islam negeri (UINs) or State Islamic Universities, and Head of Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (STAINs) or Islamic Colleges. The opening ceremony was very impressive. It was quiescence but very entertaining. The audiences was cheered by unique and dynamics local dances and musics.

In its 13th birthday, AICIS seems to have really become an international event of Indonesian Islamic studies. It has attracted speakers and participants from many parts of the

world, including Whitney A. Bauman (Florida International University, USA), Maryam Ait Ahmed (IbnThufayl University, Morocco), Angelika Neuwirth (Freie Universitat Berlin, Germany), Kevin W. Fogg, Ph.D, (University of Oxford, England), Loretta Pyles, Ph.D (Professor Social Welfare, University at Albany, New York), Elmir Colen, Ph.D. (Director of Islamic Finance, Melbourne University, Australia), Maria Toufiq (Morocco). Some visitors from Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand were also actively participating in the conference. This annual event also seems to have become a favorite and competitive event for scholars of Indonesian Islamic Studies. Muhammad Zen, coordinator of the organizing committee, disclosed to the press that 900 papers were sent to the organizer and only 128 of them were selected for presentation.

The Objectives

According to Director of Islamic Higher Education, H. Dede Rosyada, AICIS aims “to produce Islamic researchers and thinkers who have the competency and self-esteem to perform on world stage, in order to introduce the distinctive features of Indonesian Islamic studies and the development of Indonesian Muslims.” (See<http://diktis.kemenag.go.id>). The researchers and scholars, Pak Dede explains, are expected “to share their latest researches” and “play bigger role in responding the problems faced by modern societies, and introduce the concepts of Islamic knowledge for solving

them.” See <http://diktis.kemenag.go.id>. In my observation, the 13th AICIS provided dynamic forums for scholars of Indonesian Islamic studies and their international counterparts to present, share, discuss, review, and develop their academic works. They reflect and review the progress of academic works on Indonesian Islam.

My observation of 13th AICIS and the previous ones makes me believe that this annual event can be a *bridging line* for the academic works of different generations of scholars of Indonesian Islamic studies in term of the focus, methodology, authenticity, uniqueness, and contribution of their works. It allows the participants to identify some key or fundamental aspects and dimensions of *changes* and *continuity* in the development of Indonesian Islamic studies from generation to generation of scholars.

Certainly, for young scholars of Indonesian Islamic studies, AICIS can be a stepping stone to start an academic career. It can provide them with an opportunity to introduce their works, examine their authenticity, and define their future areas of academic interests, as well as clarify their academic *road map*, sharpen the focuses of their researches, establish the platform for their academic career, and develop their academic networking. For scholars of Indonesian Islamic studies who are in the peak of their academic career, AICIS can provide them with an opportunity to examine the originality, authenticity, acceptability, and contribution of their works to the development of Indonesian Islamic studies. This annual

event can also provide them with an opportunity to refine their approaches, improve their methodology, sharpen their focuses, and expand their academic networking. For senior or experienced scholars of Indonesian Islamic studies, AICIS can provide an opportunity to share their academic experiences and perspectives with younger scholars, to inspire them with original and relevant ideas for future researches. More importantly, AICIS can provide them with an opportunity to nurture strong academic tradition among younger generation of scholars of Indonesian Islamic studies. With good management and strong commitment among the organizers and the participants, I am sure that AICIS will continuously strengthen the tradition of Indonesian Islamic studies, inspire scholars with new ideas, and provide the authorities and managers of Islamic higher education institutions in Indonesia, especially the Heads of STAINs and Rectors of IAINs as well as UINs, with an overview of the past, the present, and the future development of Islamic studies, so that they can develop strategic plans for improving the quality and quantity of programs on Islamic studies.

For international scholars, AICIS can provide them with an overview of the contemporary development of Indonesian Islamic studies, gives them an opportunity to share international perspectives to Indonesian audiences, and initiate or strengthen academic partnership with Indonesian scholars and Islamic higher education institutions.

The Main Theme

The main theme of 13th AICIS in Mataram is “*Distinctive Paradigm of Indonesian Islamic Studies; Towards the Renaissance of Islamic Civilization.*” This theme seems to reflect a collective view among speakers and participants of the conference, that Indonesian Islam is unique in many ways and thus, requires a unique approach to understand, explain, and review it. The main theme also reflects a belief that Indonesian Islam has the potentials and strengths to be a good model for the revival of Islamic civilization.

Indeed, some papers discussed in many sessions of the conference suggest that historically and sociologically Indonesian Islam has experienced dynamic relations and interactions with Islam from many different cultural backgrounds. It has been exposed to many types of Islamic traditions from various parts of the world, particularly the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, East Asia, and Africa. The traditions have contributed to the formation of the tradition of Indonesian Islam. They have made Indonesian Islam so diverse and unique. Therefore, some speakers suggested in the conference, better understanding, description, and explanation of the tradition of Indonesian Islam cannot be developed by a common paradigm borrowed from Middle Eastern or Western tradition of Islamic studies. It requires a distinctive and unique Indonesian paradigm.

It is clear from the main theme that the main mission of 13th AICIS was to explore, identify, and define a suitable, workable, and reliable paradigm for discussing, understanding, and explaining Indonesian Islam. Such a paradigm is believed to be urgently needed to avoid misperception, misunderstanding, miscalculation, and misleading explanation of Indonesian Islam. Therefore, some speakers of 13th AICIS urged scholars of Indonesian Islam to pay serious attention on the paradigmatic aspects of their researches. In this way, they believe the scholars can sharpen their focuses, refine their approaches, and produce better discussion or analysis of Indonesian Islam. In a long term, the objective 13th AICIS is to trigger “paradigm shift” in Indonesian Islamic studies.

According to Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) in his idea of “scientific paradigm” discussed in his book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), “successive transition from one paradigm to another via revolution is the usual developmental pattern of mature science.” (p. 12) With regard to its main theme and mission, 13th AICIS may indicate that Indonesian Islamic studies is dynamic and begins to reach its maturity stage. According to Kuhn (1962), a need for *paradigm shift* occurs when scientists encounter unsolvable anomalies and a current paradigm is being challenged, so that a scientific discipline is thrown into a state of *crisis*. It can be implied from this perspective that in the light of its main theme and missions, 13th AICIS reflects a sense of anomalies and crisis in contemporary Indonesian Islamic studies. There seems to be a common perspective

among speakers and participants that current paradigm of Indonesian Islamic studies needs to be thoroughly evaluated or criticized in order to pave the way for paradigm shift. Indeed, there seems to be widespread unhappiness with the dominance of the use of normative approach or *bayani* tradition adopted from Middle Eastern Islamic studies. The use of such an approach is blamed to be most responsible for the emergence of “narrow minded” and “self-fulfilling truth” in the attitude of the scholars of Indonesian Islamic studies. Such an approach is also blamed to be most responsible for the spread of misleading explanation and misunderstanding of Indonesian Islam.

Keynote Speakers

The organizer of 13th AICIS invited two keynote speakers, to inspire the participants in discussing and developing ideas related to the main theme. The two keynote speakers are very familiar faces among scholars Indonesian Islamic studies: Professor Dr. Azyumardi Azra, MA and Professor Dr. Abdul Malik Fadjar, M.Pd.

Professor Abdul Malik Fadjar is a leading Muslim scholar with many academic and professional experiences. He was born in Yogyakarta on February 22, 1939 and being exposed to both religious and general higher education systems. In 1972, he finished his undergraduate study at Sunan Ampel State Institute of Islamic Studies in Malang. From 1979-1981 Malik Fadjar was at Florida State University,

USA, doing Master of Science with major in *International/Intercultural Development Education*.

Malik Fadjar is highly achieving in both academic and political career. From 1983 to 2000 he was Rector of Muhammadiyah University in Malang; from 1998 to 1999 he was Minister of Religious Affairs; and from 2001 to 2004 Malik Fadjar was Minister of National Education. Now, he is a Professor of educational studies at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta with main research interests and publications on Islamic educational issues.

Professor Azyumardi Azra was born in Lubuk Alung, West Sumatera on March 4, 1955. He graduated from Department of Arabic Teaching, Syarif Hidayatullah State Institute of Islamic Studies for undergraduate program and from Department of History, Columbia University in 1992 for Magister program. Azyumardi is one of key scholars and resource persons of Indonesian Islamic studies with extensive international academic and professional reputation. He is prominent as one of Indonesian public intellectuals, Muslim thinker, and a prolific book writer. His publications and research interests cover Islamic historical, sociological, educational, and political experiences.

This former Rector of State Islamic University of Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta (1998-2006) is a member of the Advisory Board of a number of international organizations, such as United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). In 1998, Azyumardi was

elected as a member of National Committee of Indonesian History. In the same year, he was selected as a member of the International Association of Historian of Asia (IAHA). From 2004 to 2009, Azyumardi was a Professional Fellow, University of Melbourne, and in 2007, he was elected as the Director of Graduate School, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta, Indonesia. From 2007 to 2009, he was Deputy Secretary of Vice President for Social Affairs.

Azyumardi is also well known for his international reputation in promoting inter- religious harmony for which he becomes the first Indonesian who receives “the commander of the order of the British empire (cbe award) from Queen Elizabeth of England.

In Indonesia, Azyumardi is one of the most acknowledged scholars for his thoughts in Islamic studies. He is one of the only three scholars from Islamic Higher Education Institutions, together with Professor Amin Abdullah of UIN Yogyakarta and Professor Mazda Muzdalifa of UIN Jakarta, who are accepted as the members of Akademi Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (AIPI), Indonesian Academy for Sciences, the most prestigious academy in the country.

The Contexts

Discussions of the importance of paradigm shift in the study of Indonesian Islam has been a regular agenda among Muslim scholars in the country for the last two decades. The

discussions have inspired some ideas for renewal, such as “Islam kultural ((cultural Islam)” by Abdurrahman Wahid; “Islam alternatif (alternative Islam)” by Jalaluddin Rahmat; “reaktualisasi ajaran Islam (reactualization of Islamic teaching)” by Munawir Syadzali; “membumikan al-Quran (bringing al-Quran down to earth)”, by Quresy Shihab; “Islam Ditinjau dari Berbagai Aspek (Viewing Islam from various aspects)”, by Harun Nasution; “Islam moderate (Wasattiyah Islam)” by Azyumardi Azra; “Keislaman dan Keindonesiaan” by Nurcholis Madjid; and “Islam inklusif” by Alwi Shihab. Below, some of the ideas will be briefly highlighted.

This idea, *Islam Ditinjau dari Berbagai Aspek*, was introduced by Harun Nasution or Pak Harun (1919-1998), one of the most influential scholars in Indonesian Islamic studies in the 80s. Pak Harun is a former Rector of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta and widely known as one of the proponents of rationalist approach in Islamic studies. For him, Indonesian Muslims need to be rational, open minded, moderate, and flexible. With this perspective, Pak Harun is known as the key person in the formation of inter-religious forum in Indonesia. In his view, the use of a critical, analytical, comparative, objective, and comprehensive approach in Islamic studies can be very crucial for the development of Indonesian Islamic studies. He often warns his students and his colleagues in various occasions that being narrow minded in understanding and explaining Islam can lead to misunderstanding of Islamic teachings.

Another idea, *Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam* (Reactualization of Islamic Teachings) was introduced by Munawir Syadzali or Pak Munawir, Minister of Religious Affairs from 1983 to 1993. Focusing on Islamic legal thoughts, Pak Munawir stresses the shortcomings of literal and textual interpretation of Islamic norms as stated in the Quran, Sunnahs, and books of fiqh, and the urgency of empirical and contextual interpretation of the norms. For him, *ijtihad* and historical as well as sociological analysis is fundamental in the development of Islamic legal thoughts.

The third renewal idea is introduced by another strong proponent of Indonesian Islamic studies, Nurcholis Madjid or Cak Nur (1939-2005). In his academic works, Cak Nur continuously and consistently promotes the uniqueness of Indonesian Islam. For him, Islam and Indonesia are two faces of a coin. Islam has characterized Indonesia and vice versa. Therefore, he suggests, Indonesian Islam cannot be understood without sufficient understanding of Indonesian values and culture and vice versa. Key issues in the works of Cak Nur are the idea of “secularization,” “pluralism,” and “religious freedom.” These ideas, he explains, reflect the national concept of unity and diversity (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*). For Cak Nur, Islam is a comprehensive system of life that must not be reduced into political ideology. This view is represented in his controversial idea, “*Islam yes, Partai Islam no.*”

The fourth renewal idea is *Islam Kultural* (Cultural Islam) introduced by Abdurrahman Wahid whose nick name

is Gus Dur (1994-2009). For Gus Dur, Indonesian culture and Indonesian Islam develop together and characterize one another. For him, Indonesia Islam cannot be understood without sufficient knowledge of Indonesian culture and vice versa. Gus Dur rejects the endorsement of Islam in politics and suggests that Islam must not be considered as an alternative ideology, but must be considered only as one of ideological elements that complement the idea of Indonesia.

As can be implied from these ideas, Indonesian Islamic studies are dynamic and continuously producing new ideas and searching new paradigm. Although being different in their focuses and arguments, the scholars are continuously pushing paradigm shift for Indonesian Islamic studies. Contemporary discussions of the paradigm of Indonesian Islamic studies tends to focus on the idea of knowledge integration and interconnection. This idea is continuously circulated and disseminated among scholars in Islamic higher education institutions, particularly at State Islamic University in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Malang.

In Jakarta State Islamic University, Professor Azyumardi Azra and his colleagues have constantly criticized the use of normative approach as in Middle Eastern Islamic studies. For them, such an approach is responsible for the development and spread of narrow minded and self-fulfilling truth among Muslims. In their view, the development of Indonesian Islam has been shaped, not only by normative values, but also by sociological,

anthropological, economic, historical, and political values as well as experiences. Therefore, they argue, empirical and multidisciplinary approaches are very important for Indonesian Islamic studies. They believe that combining such approaches with the normative ones will produce better understandings of Indonesian Islam.

In Yogyakarta, Professor Amin Abdullah and his colleagues have continuously and consistently been introducing the concept of knowledge *integration* and *interconnection* for Indonesian Islamic studies. The concept is visualized in the form of a rather complicated *Jarring Lava-lava* (The Spider Nets). In line with Azyumardi, Amin Abdullah emphasizes the importance of multidisciplinary approach. In particular, he stresses the relevance of anthropological as well as economic approaches to Indonesian Islamic studies. For Pak Amin, approaches to Islamic studies need to be shifted from “dichotomistics-atomistics” to “integrative-interdisciplinary.”

Amin Abdullah also introduces the use of hermeneutics approach for Indonesian Islamic studies. For him, general and religious knowledge need to be epistemologically integrated, to produce better understanding of religious issues. In his view, “fixed religion” needs to be reconciled with “a dynamics world.” In this regard, he suggests, *ulum al-din*, *al-fikr al-Islamiy*, and *dirasat Islamiyyah* must be connected, not separated or juxtaposed. With this perspective, he discusses the

connection between “Islamic hermeneutics” and “pop culture” and the use of “hermeneutics approach in the study of religious fatwa.”

In many discussions and presentations Pak Amin urges Muslim scholars to balance the authority of texts and *salaf* with the authority of natural sciences (*kauniyyah*), *aql* (*aqliyyah*), and intuition (*wijdaniyyah*). According to him, *bayan* or textual tradition is unable to respond the sociological and cultural reality of religion. Such a tradition, he criticizes, tends to be dogmatic, defensive, apologetic, and polemical. The tradition, he argues, only produces *al-ilm al-taufiqi*, not *al-ilm al-huduri* and *al-ilm al husuli*. The reason, he explains, because in *bayani* tradition *aql* is always negatively perceived and only used to justify the authority of texts, not to assess the relevance and contexts of the texts to real life experiences. *Bayani* tradition, he further criticizes, puts too much emphasis on *qiyas alillah* for *fiqh* and *qiyas al-dalalah* for *kalam*. For Pak Amin, *Bayani* tradition is overwhelmed with textual-*lughawiyah* epistemology (*al-asl wa al-far; al-lafz wa al-makna*) and lack of attention on contextual-*bahtsiyyah* epistemology as well *asirfaniyyah-batiniyya* epistemology. For a better understanding and explanation of Islamic tradition, Pak Amin suggests scholars of Islamic studies to pay more attention on *burhani* and *irfani* epistemology in their works.

In Malang, Professor Imam Suprayogo has adopted a more practical and functional approach to the idea of knowledge integration. In State Islamic University of

Maulana Malik Ibrahim where he bases his academic works, Imam Suprayogo introduces the concept of *Knowledge Tree* (Pohon Ilmu), a structure of a body of knowledge with the branches that are considered to be fundamentally related and supporting one another for developing strong Islamic intellectual tradition. For such a tradition, Pak Imam explains, Muslim scholars need to be equally well exposed to both religious and scientific tradition.

These few examples reflect a growing desire and continuous efforts among scholars to push paradigm shift in Indonesian Islamic studies. I am aware that more names and thoughts can be mentioned in the discussion. But due to limited time, I am sorry to share with you few names only. I believe that further review of other names will inspire us with some ideas to explore, question, criticize, construct, and develop better paradigm for Indonesian Islamic studies.

Key Points

The 13th AICIS reemphasized the idea of paradigm shift for Indonesian Islamic studies and promoted collective awareness and common perspective on the importance of the idea. The conference suggests that the paradigm of Indonesian Islamic studies needs to identify, reflect, and represent the historical, sociological, anthropological, and cultural experiences as well as the main characteristics of Indonesian Islam. It also suggests that Indonesian Islam is pluralistic and moderate (*wasattiyah*) in character, and therefore, its paradigm needs to be contextual and relevant

to these characteristics. It was widely believed in the conference that a distinctive paradigm for Indonesian Islamic studies can be developed through a comprehensive analysis and understanding of the unique characteristics of Indonesian Islam. It can not be developed through adapting or adopting or mimicking or simply following the paradigm of Middle Eastern or Western tradition of Islamic studies.

In this regard, the conference further suggests that Indonesian Islamic studies needs to combine normative and empirical studies with multidisciplinary approaches. Scientific principles as applied in various modern disciplines of social, natural, and humanity sciences need to be carefully and critically combined with Islamic normative values as suggested in the Quran and Sunnah. Such a combination can be represented in a model of “knowledge integration,” namely integration between religious and scientific knowledge or between “qouliyyah” and “kauniyyah” knowledge. “Knowledge integration” model is believed to be helpful for scholars and researches of Indonesian Islamic studies to produce more relevant, objective, and acceptable explanation of Indonesian Islam. Knowledge integration can be “a unique and distinctive model of Indonesian Islamic studies,” said Surya Dharma Ali, Minister of Religious Affairs in his welcome speech to the conference.

It was recommended at the end of the conference that developing “Knowledge Integration” model needs to be taken as a collective agenda for scholars of Indonesian Islamic studies. The scholars and their

institutions, including STAINs (State Islamic Colleges), IAINs (State Islamic Institutes), and UINs (State Islamic Universities) need to pay special attention on the idea of “Knowledge Integration” model, so that developing the idea become their collective, systematic, and continuous agenda. To support this agenda, a collective *road map* and *action plan* needs to be developed to formulate, disseminate, and implement “Knowledge Integration” model among Muslim students, scholars of Islamic studies, and Islamic education institutions. More importantly, authorities of Islamic higher education institutions need to develop strategic plan or policies that suit the needs for the development of “Knowledge Integration” model in all aspects academic programs, including teaching and learnings; researches, and social services.

A paradigm, in Thomas Kuhns view, “is not simply the current theory, but the entire worldview in which it exists, and all of the implications which come with it.” This view implies that developing or changing scientific paradigm is not an overnight job for every researchers, because it will take time for investigation, discussion, and dissemination. It is also not a simple process, because it will involve and require social and political context and construction. The organizers 13th AICIS seems to be fully aware that identifying and developing a distinctive paradigm and pursuing knowledge integration in Indonesian Islamic studies is not an easy task. It requires long term commitment, intensive researches, and extensive discussions, considering many opinions, and involving

scholars of various disciplines. For this reason, a long term planning and action plans will pave the way for the development of a unique paradigm for Indonesian Islamic studies that can produce open minded attitude and broad understanding of Islamic teachings. In a long term, Azyumardi believes, such a paradigm will develop and promote “moderate Islam (*wasatiyyah Islam*)” that can be a model for other Muslim countries. Above all, open mind and moderation will make Indonesia become the future center for Islamic civilization. “Indonesia,” Surya Dharma Ali, suggested in his opening remarks, “is qualified to be a center for the development of new Islamic civilization.”

Since my notes are generally based on participant observation and scan reading of some relevant papers, I am aware that my notes and my judgments may not fully be accurate. Therefore, criticisms and suggestions to these notes are invited and will be wholeheartedly appreciated. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to all national and international speakers as well as participants of 13th AICIS who generously shared their ideas and experiences. May their ideas inspire scholars of Indonesian Islamic studies with new and distinctive paradigm.

Biografi



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In 1998, Sirozi finished his PhD study in Department of Educational Policy, Faculty of Education, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. Now, Sirozi lives in Palembang with his wife, Eni Zahara, and their three children, Imtiyazi Nabila, Izzaty Zephaniah, and Muhammad Fazal Rizvi. In 2002, Sirozi was selected as one of 32 members of New Century Scholars Research Group sponsored by Fulbright to investigate the trend and impacts of globalization on the development of higher education systems. In 2007, he gained a certificate of Assessor from Board of Accreditation for higher education institutions, and in 2008 he was elected as the Chairman of

South Sumatera Education Council Sirozi's research interests are mostly related to the politics of education, globalization and education, and management of education